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
Europe

IN OUR TIME

1914 TO THE PRESENT

BY

Robert Ergang



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Preface

HARDLY ever before in history have so many serious problems presented themselves for solution. The dominant position of our country in world affairs makes it imperative that American citizens should have clear and sound ideas concerning these problems. By providing a historical background the author hopes he will contribute in some little way toward giving the present generation a better understanding of recent events and contemporary problems. Shortly after the First World War H. G. Wells wrote: "The need for a common knowledge of the general facts of human history throughout the world has become very evident during the tragic happenings of the last few years. There can be no peace now, we realize, but a common peace in all the world; no prosperity but a general prosperity. But there can be no common peace and prosperity without common historical ideas. . . . [There must be] a sense of history as a common adventure of mankind." This is even more true today than it was at the time it was written. The international outlook must be based on appreciative understanding of the life and problems of other peoples. Only by understanding the common problems of the world can we arrive at a common peace.

Choosing the facts and events to be included in a historical work is never easy; but when the work surveys recent or contemporary history, it is particularly difficult. The events are too near the writer to be seen in proper perspective. Some of them will soon be left behind by the march of time while others will continue to influence the destiny of man over a long period. Hence the writer makes no claim to have written a definitive history. This cannot be done until the real significance of the events has been established in the light of broader movements.

I wish to make grateful acknowledgment to Dr. Louis L. Snyder, Professor of History in the College of the City of New York, who generously interrupted his own work to read the first twenty chapters of the typescript and to make many excellent suggestions for their improvement. I am also grateful for the assistance and cooperation of the editorial staff of D. C. Heath and Company. I am especially indebted to my wife, Mildred Overbeck Ergang, for typing the manuscript, for her counsel, and, above all, for her faith and encouragement.

ROBERT ERGANG

New York City

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World War I



CHAPTER ONE

The Background of World War I

THE BREWING OF THE STORM AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S declaration of war against Serbia on July 28, 1914, precipitated the most widespread war in human history up to that time. Before the armistice came in 1918, about 90 per cent of the world's population was to become involved in the conflict. To put a finger on the deeper causes of this sanguinary struggle is no easy matter, for they go far back into the past and deep down into the subsoil of European political, economic, ethnic, and geographical conditions. As President Wilson put it in 1917: "You can explain most wars very simply, but the explanation of this war is not simple. Its roots run deep into all the obscure soils of history." The factors making for war were so complex that one historian has well described the period preceding the world conflagration as "international anarchy." Among the more fundamental causes of World War I the following may be listed: (1) the system of secret alliances; (2) the armament race among the European nations; (3) economic imperialism or the struggle for markets, raw materials, and colonies; (4) the disruptive force of nationalism. These and many other springs contributed their waters to the current which swept Europe toward the abyss with ever-quickenning speed.

(1) *The system of secret alliances.* During the decades before 1914 a strong feeling of insecurity gripped the European nations. Separated by language, by national traditions, and by peculiar ways of thought as well as by political lines they found it difficult to understand one another. These differences, coupled with conflicting ambitions, soon gave rise to suspicion and mistrust which in turn engendered exaggerated fears in the various states regarding the

aims and purposes of their neighbors. These fears caused the citizens of every country, great or small, to seek means of protection against the "evil designs" of other nations. Since national alliances appeared to offer security, the nations gradually entered into combinations with other states which considered themselves threatened by the same enemies. Thus came about the alignment of the great powers into two rival groups, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente.

Of the two the Triple Alliance was the older. It was the handiwork of Bismarck. Having achieved his purpose of unifying Germany, a task which had necessitated the fighting of three wars, Bismarck became a man of peace. He needed peace to consolidate the new empire and to develop its resources. Keeping the peace was, however, not an easy task, for he had made a number of enemies in creating German unity. One nation alone he did not fear; what he feared was a coalition against Germany. Consequently it became the primary purpose of his diplomacy to prevent the formation of such a coalition. The nucleus of any combination of powers against Germany, he knew, would be France, for the French could not forget that Prussia had taken Alsace-Lorraine from them in 1871. Since then their one object had been to regain it. Bismarck himself had said during the Franco-Prussian war, "France will consider any peace simply as an armistice." At first he tried to make the French forget the lost provinces by encouraging them to embark on imperialist ventures, but when this failed he decided to isolate France. "So long as France has no alliances," he said, "she is not dangerous to Germany."

Believing that colonial interests would sooner or later lead to a clash between France and Great Britain, Bismarck centered his attention on drawing the other great powers close to Germany. In 1879 he concluded a defensive alliance with Austria-Hungary, known as the Dual Alliance. The main provisions of the treaty were that in case of an attack on either ally by Russia, the other was bound to come to its defense; in case of attack on either by any other power, the other was bound to maintain a benevolent neutrality.

In 1882 Bismarck expanded the Dual Alliance into a Triple Alliance which included Italy. The treaty signed by the three nations provided that if Italy were attacked by France without direct provocation, the other signatories were bound to give full assistance; Italy, in turn, was to come to Germany's aid if the latter were attacked by France; if one or two signatories were attacked by two or more great powers, all were to join against the attackers. To take such a step it was necessary for the Italians to submerge a deep-seated

enmity toward Austria-Hungary, the power that had sought to thwart Italian unification. What caused them to do this was their anger over the French seizure of Tunis, which they had marked out as a suitable field for colonization.

Although the Dual Alliance was directed specifically against Russia, Bismarck did not fail to maintain cordial relations with the tsarist empire. In 1887 he negotiated with Russia a separate pact, known as the Reinsurance Treaty, in which he recognized Russian interests in the eastern part of the Balkans. Previously in 1883 Rumania had attached herself to the group of powers that had formed the Triple Alliance and later Turkey was also drawn into this circle. Thus Bismarck was successful in his plan of isolating France.

Fear of the Triple Alliance gradually resulted in the formation of the Triple Entente as a counterpoise. The way toward the formation of the Triple Entente was opened when Bismarck retired in 1890 and the young Emperor William II permitted the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia to lapse. The kaiser felt that in the contest which had developed between Austria and Russia for the control of the Balkans, Germany must needs support the former. This change of policy gave France the opportunity to build an alliance. No sooner had the treaty between Germany and Russia terminated than France began to make overtures to the latter. In 1888 France had already won the friendship of Russia by floating a loan to provide the tsarist government with funds for the building of the Siberian railway; after 1890 fear of the Triple Alliance drew the two powers together. Finally in 1894 the so-called Entente Cordiale, a military agreement the details of which were not revealed until 1918, was signed by France and Russia. The agreement stipulated that Russia would come to the assistance of France if the latter were attacked by Germany or by Italy supported by Germany, while France for her part promised to aid Russia if the latter were attacked by Germany or by Austria supported by Germany. Thus what Bismarck had feared most—a coalition against Germany—had come to pass only four years after his retirement.

Great Britain still stood apart from both groups. The British were not only imperial rivals of the French but they were also opposed to Russia's attempts to dominate the Balkans and the China trade. Gradually, however, Germany with her policy of industrial development and colonial expansion began to appear as the greater menace. The result was that Great Britain and France decided to compose their differences, and a treaty of mutual understanding between the two countries was signed in 1904. No sooner had this

step been taken than Russia's unmitigated defeat in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905 dissipated the British fear of the tsarist empire. In 1907 these two powers concluded agreements which practically transformed the Entente Cordiale into the Triple Entente.¹ In 1910 Japan, which had already entered into an alliance with Great Britain in 1902, came to an understanding with Russia, thereby virtually ranging herself on the side of the Triple Entente.

(2) *The armament race.* The primary purpose underlying the great alliances was undoubtedly the attainment of security, but no sooner were they founded than the mirage of security began to recede; in fact, the alliances heightened the insecurity they were intended to dissipate. On the one hand, the members of the Triple Entente did not cease to fear the Triple Alliance and, on the other, the Triple Alliance regarded the Triple Entente as a menace to its safety. The Germans, for example, saw in the Triple Entente an attempt to prevent the German Empire from achieving its "place in the sun." Thus the alliances fortified the general atmosphere of distrust, suspicion, and fear. Each group of states began to fear that the other would overreach it. This fear not only caused the groups to keep vigilant watch over each other but also to expect war.

And what was more natural than that the nations should arm for the expected fray? Moreover, the intensity of the military preparation increased as the dread of war grew. Careful, persistent preparation was regarded as essential to success. In many countries periodicals cited with relish such statements as that of Theodore Roosevelt: "Victory in any contest will go to the nation that has earned it through preparation. . . . When the day of battle comes, the difference of race will be found as nothing when compared with differences in thorough and practical training in advance."² Consequently all the great powers of Europe, with the exception of Great Britain remodeled their armies on the Prussian system of universal liability for service. Ever-increasing sums were lavished on things military and ever more formidable weapons were heaped up until all Europe was armed to the teeth. In time the burden of military expenditures became so heavy that it deprived the governments of the means for dealing with domestic ills. Nevertheless the armament race continued. No nation, not even the most peaceful, dared withdraw for fear of annihilation. Paradoxically, none of them wanted war. Most of them were building armaments because they

¹ The Triple Entente was never a formal alliance, but rather a "gentleman's agreement."

² *Quarterly Review*, vol. 207 (1907), p. 27.

believed that the maintenance of large armies and navies was the surest way of preserving peace.

Certain leaders, however, who saw that the race was inevitably leading Europe to a bloody abyss, advanced various plans for curbing the growth of armaments. The most notable was that of Tsar Nicholas II. In August, 1898, he had his foreign minister address to all powers represented at St. Petersburg a circular letter in which he expressed his anxiety over the existing state of things and urged "a reduction of the excessive armaments before they produce the very catastrophe which everyone wishes to prevent." He proposed that representatives of all powers address meet in conference to discuss the question. When a number of the nations received the proposition coldly, he sent out a second letter in January, 1899, which, after pointing out that the political horizon of Europe had become more clouded during the intervening months, again urged a conference for an exchange of ideas. This time the appeal was heeded. In May of the same year representatives of twenty-six powers convened at The Hague for sittings which extended over ten weeks. The assembly, known as the First Hague Conference, succeeded in establishing a permanent court to which the nations could refer their grievances for arbitration and in formulating certain laws for the conduct of warfare. But in regard to the main question, that of limiting armaments, it achieved nothing beyond stating that "the limitation of the military charges which at present oppress the world is greatly to be desired." In other words, the tsar's proposal for the limitation of armaments was given a first-class funeral. In 1907 a second congress met at The Hague. Again no agreement was reached for the reduction of armaments, and the frenzied competition continued.

A special cause of friction between Great Britain and Germany was the resolve of the German government to build a formidable fleet. The kaiser himself enthusiastically sponsored the idea by declaring that he would carry through the work of reorganizing the navy "in the same spirit in which my grandfather strengthened the army." His principal assistant in putting the idea into practice was Admiral von Tirpitz who in 1897 was placed in control of German naval policy. The first program of naval construction, enacted by the Reichstag in 1898, was followed two years later by one that was far more ambitious, and during the succeeding years other increases were voted. In the preamble of the Navy Act of 1900 it was stated that "Germany must have a fleet of such strength that a war against

her would involve such risks even for the mightiest naval power as to jeopardize the supremacy of that power."

Such statements together with the continued increase in the strength of the German navy inevitably came to be regarded by the British as a challenge to their naval supremacy. It was even stated that Germany was trying to "rule the world." The British saw themselves compelled by the competition to spend large sums in maintaining a supremacy that was essential to an island power dependent upon imported food and sea-borne trade. More than this, as the successive naval programs unfolded before their gaze the British were impressed with a growing sense of danger. It was feared that if Britain should lose control of the sea it could be starved into submission in a short time. In 1912 Sir Edward Grey, the foreign minister, said in a speech: "A new situation in this country is created by the German programme, whether it is carried out quickly or slowly. When it is completed, Germany will have a fleet of thirty-three dreadnoughts—the most powerful the world has ever seen. That imposes on us the necessity, of which we are now at the beginning—except so far as we have dreadnoughts already—of rebuilding the whole of our fleet."

While the British thought themselves justified in charging the kaiser with aggressive designs, William II took great pains to deny the imputation. To King Edward VII he stated in 1905 that the German navy was "intended, equally with the German army, for the preservation of peace." Three years later he said to Lord Tweedmouth, then First Lord of the Admiralty: "It is absolutely nonsensical and untrue that the German Navy Bill is to provide a navy meant as a 'challenge to British naval supremacy'; the German fleet is built against nobody at all." It is probably true that William II had no warlike ambitions; nevertheless, the fact that he continually thought and spoke in terms of war gave rise to widespread misgivings regarding his intentions. Such provocative utterances as "our future lies upon the water," "the trident must be in our fist," and "we Germans fear God, and nothing else in the world" were certainly not calculated to allay the fears of the British. They served only to widen the breach between the two powers, to strengthen the accord between Great Britain and France, and, above all, to hasten the construction of British dreadnoughts. As one British writer put it: "Taxation proving inadequate, loans must be raised, the national debt must be increased, social legislation set back, and cultural problems postponed, in order that larger and ever larger sums may be tossed into the water. For that, in the last analysis, is what it all

comes to. Germany will have it so, and whether we will or not, we must needs acquiesce, and keep abreast of the militarist powers, cost what it may.”³

The European armament competition which culminated in a series of Army Acts during the years immediately preceding 1914 is a valuable barometer of the European war atmosphere. Early in 1913 France, for example, obtained a considerable increase in her standing army by extending military service from two years to three. Other nations followed suit. Seriously alarmed at the growing strength of the combined forces of France and Russia and thoroughly convinced that Germany's enemies were trying to encircle her with a “ring of steel,” the German government voted a huge increase in the size of its standing army, raising it to almost 800,000 men. Austria-Hungary had already in the preceding year greatly increased the number of her recruits. At the same time Russia not only increased the number of her annual enlistments to 580,000 but also lengthened the period of service by six months. Thus the great nations of Europe, assembled in two groups, faced each other in full battle array. Even Belgium, Switzerland, and other countries hastily began arming in the expectation that a great European war was impending. All this moved Count Witte, the Russian statesman, to ask: “When and how will it all end? Unless the Great States which have set this hideous example agree to call a halt, so to say, and knit their subjects into a pacific, united Europe, war is the only issue I can perceive. And when I say war I mean a conflict which will surpass in horror the most brutal armed conflicts known to human history and entail distress more widespread and more terrible than living men can realise.”⁴

(3) *Economic imperialism.* The unsatisfactory relations between the European states during the decades preceding 1914 were further aggravated by economic competition. This was particularly true of the relations between Germany and Great Britain. Probably the most striking feature in the history of the German Empire between 1870 and 1914 was its development from an agricultural to a manufacturing and commercial nation. Primarily an agricultural nation in 1870, it had by 1914 come to be second only to the United States of America in manufacturing and to Great Britain in shipping. During this period Germany's export trade had increased almost three-fold. Some idea of her industrial development may be gained from the fact that the number of cotton spindles doubled between 1897

³ *Contemporary Review*, vol. 99 (1911), p. 621.

⁴ *Contemporary Review*, vol. 105 (March, 1911), p. 115.

and 1912, the output of coal more than doubled during the two decades before 1914, and the smelting of pig iron increased from less than four million tons in 1885 to more than fifteen million in 1913. In 1913, for example, Germany produced twice as much steel as Great Britain. But German industries not only produced goods in quantity; they also manufactured them so cheaply that German merchants were able to undersell their competitors in the world markets. While practically all the Continental nations erected tariff barriers against German goods, the British still adhered to a policy of free trade, with the result that the markets in the United Kingdom itself were soon flooded with goods bearing the legend, "Made in Germany." In other words Britain, which for decades had gloried in the title, "the workshop of the world," now saw its industrial and commercial supremacy menaced. Thus German economic rivalry, by arousing British apprehension and antagonism, became "one root of the war between the United Kingdom and Germany."

The development of industry and commerce in Germany was accompanied by a growing disposition to seek colonial adventures. While her industrialists loudly demanded colonies as a source of raw materials and an outlet for surplus products, insisting that the prosperity of the empire would not be secure without colonies, jingoists asserted that Germany was by reason of her greatness predestined to play a major role in colonial affairs.


There was nothing new in this demand for colonies. Soon after the proclamation of the German Empire in 1871 proponents of colonialism had raised the cry; Bismarck, however, discountenanced the idea, saying that "for us Germans, colonies would be exactly like the silks and sables of the Polish nobleman who had no shirt to wear under them." In the end events proved too strong for him and after 1884 he consented to the acquisition of some islands in the Pacific and some unprofitable colonies in Central Africa. A new era opened with the accession of William II (1888). Whereas Bismarck had been content to make Germany the foremost power on the Continent, the young kaiser undertook to transform Germany into a "World Power." So the Germans began to look about for undeveloped territories which might be exploited with profit. Much to their surprise they discovered that they had waited too long. Practically all the desirable colonies had been pre-empted by others. When the German government sought to share the exploitation of some of these territories, trouble ensued. In the words of an English historian, "Coming last into the field of world-policy, she could not

acquire a coaling station without alarming everybody.”⁵ In Asia German interests clashed with those of Japan and Russia; in northern Africa German activities caused difficulties with France, Great Britain, and Spain; and when Germany turned in the direction of the Near East, both Russia and Great Britain saw their plans for the domination of that part of the globe menaced. All in all, Germany's efforts generated much friction but gained few profitable colonies.

(4) *Nationalism*. Another factor which intensified the hostility between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente was the spirit of nationalism, particularly that phase of it known as national self-determination. The idea that people of the same nationality should be united in one state had in the nineteenth century not only contributed to the unification of Italy and Germany but also excited political aspirations in the smaller national groups subject to other nations. Italians in the Austrian Empire and French in Alsace-Lorraine, to mention only two, wished to be united with their fellow nationals in the “mother state.”

In the Balkans particularly this spirit was working like a leaven. By the end of the century it had pretty well disrupted the Ottoman Empire and was threatening the Austro-Hungarian Empire with disintegration. A conglomeration of nationalities and creeds which the Habsburgs had been unable to fuse into one nation, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, also known as the Dual Monarchy, contained many ardent nationalists who were desirous of joining their brethren living in independent states. In the southern provinces of the Dual Monarchy there were, for example, more than five million Serbs who desired to be united with Serbia and whom Serbia in turn hoped to annex. When Pan-Serb propaganda was circulated in its southern provinces, the Austro-Hungarian Empire adopted all possible means to suppress it and to stop the movement which was threatening its very existence. On the other hand, the agitators were being encouraged by Russia, who posed as the “big brother” and “protector” of the Slavic peoples. Having in large part achieved its purpose of weakening the Ottoman Empire, the Russian government planned to undermine the strength of Austria-Hungary in the hope of being able to get control of Constantinople and the Straits, so that it would have a warm-water port in the south and an outlet in the Mediterranean. This was, of course, incompatible with the ambitions of Germany, which had become the most influential of the great powers at Constantinople. Thus the Balkan question was a fertile source of antagonism between the two great alliances.

⁵ J. H. Rose, *Origins of the War* (1914), p. 75.



CENTRAL EUROPE IN 1914



CRISES PRECEDING THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

The last decade before 1914 witnessed the rise of a series of international crises more serious and more alarming than any that had troubled uneasy Europe since 1870. Any one of them might have started an international conflict. Two of them developed over French attempts to establish a protectorate over Morocco. When Great Britain and France settled their long-standing differences in 1904 preliminary to concluding an alliance, the former in return for freedom of action in Egypt and elsewhere granted to France a free hand in Morocco. Thereupon Delcassé, the French foreign minister, proceeded to gain the consent of Italy and Spain to France's control of Morocco. He obtained Italian approval by recognizing Italy's pretensions in Tripoli and satisfied Spain by promising her a share of Morocco. But Germany, which like the others had been a signatory of the Madrid Convention of 1881 relating to Morocco, he completely ignored. As an English writer later stated it: "France had found it necessary to pay the British, Spanish, and Italian bills. To Britain, relief in Egypt; to Spain, almost the entire northern and part of the Atlantic coasts of Morocco, with a goodly slice of hinterland thrown in; to Italy, a free hand in Tripoli; to Germany—nothing!"⁶ Delcassé, in fact, did not even take the trouble of informing the German government of the agreements.

At first German official circles seemed uninterested but as they gradually realized the full import of the agreements, disinterestedness gave way to chagrin. Not only did the fact that Germany had been treated as a "negligible quantity" hurt German pride, but the government also felt that its rights in Morocco had been flouted. To show France that she could not ignore Germany, von Bülow, the German chancellor, induced a reluctant kaiser to make a spectacular diplomatic demonstration. On March 31, 1905, William II suddenly landed at Tangier in Morocco and in a public oration declared the sultan an independent sovereign in whose territories all powers were to enjoy the same footing and exercise the same rights. This pro-

⁶ E. D. Morel, in *Nineteenth Century and After*, vol. 71 (1912), p. 237.

CENTRAL EUROPE IN 1914. *Note especially the overlapping of national groups and political boundaries and the conglomeration of national groups in Russia and Austria-Hungary.*

nouncement was later followed by a German proposal for a conference of the signatory powers of the Madrid treaty to discuss the Morocco question.

Although von Bülow assured the British ambassador that Germany was seeking no special privileges but only wished "to keep the door open for all nations," the Tangier incident and the request for a conference were denounced no less in Britain than in France. Edward VII, for instance, asserted that it was "the most mischievous and uncalled for event which the German emperor has ever been engaged in." Delcassé advocated resistance to the request for a conference but relented when the situation became threatening. The decision of the conference which met at Algeciras in June, 1906, was in one sense favorable to the Germans. It recognized "the sovereignty and independence of his Majesty the Sultan and the integrity of his dominions." Actually, however, the sultan was largely put under the control of France and Spain, who were given permission to police the coast towns and to establish a state bank for the purpose of managing the finances. In the latter France was to have a predominant interest.

If the Morocco crisis strained to the breaking point the relations between Germany on the one hand and Great Britain and France on the other, a new crisis was soon to do the same thing to the relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary on the one hand and Russia on the other. The cause was the annexation by Austria of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. Although these were nominally a part of the Ottoman Empire, they had been administered by the Austrian government since the Congress of Berlin in 1878. What caused the Dual Monarchy to annex them so suddenly was the attempt of the "Young Turks" to revivify the Turkish Empire so that it could reassert its authority over all parts of the Ottoman dominions. The success of this movement might have spelled the end of Austrian administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But the Austrians and the Young Turks were not the only ones who wanted this province. The Serbs had also been casting covetous glances at it. They hoped by annexing it to double the population of their state and at the same time secure an outlet to the sea. Consequently excitement ran high when the annexation was announced in Belgrade, the capital of Serbia. Great crowds that gathered in the streets burned the Austrian flag, smashed the windows of the Austrian embassy, and went about crying, "Down with Austria." Some of the irresponsible spirits even clamored for war.

The Serbs in themselves would not have been so serious a menace

if they had not been supported by Russia. After a time the Russian government announced that the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina constituted a violation of the Treaty of Berlin and therefore could not be permitted. This position had the moral backing of both Great Britain and France. While the British foreign minister sent to the Austrian government a formal protest in which he urged "the necessity of reconsidering the decision to annex the two occupied provinces," the French government stated that "the Treaty of Berlin cannot be modified without an agreement between the signatory powers." In Germany the kaiser was taken aback by the bold stroke. First, it deeply hurt his feelings that the Austrian government had not taken him into its confidence while the annexation was being planned. Second, he feared that the annexation might jeopardize his influence in Turkey. "The situation presents itself," he wrote when the news was brought to him, "that after I have pursued a friendly policy for twenty years, my best ally is the first to give the signal for the partition of European Turkey." However, his ministers soon persuaded him to give his unreserved support to Austria. Would one side back down or would it be war? As the weeks passed, passions began to cool. Russia's allies, Great Britain and France, were unwilling to go to war in support of Serbian interests, and Russia herself had not yet recovered from the disastrous defeat of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). So Russia gave way and the crisis passed.

In 1911 the Morocco question flared up again. During the years following the Algeiras Conference there was no improvement either in Franco-German relations or in the internal conditions of Morocco. The finances of the sultan did not improve, nor was the police force commanded by French and Spanish officers able to restore order. Finally in the summer of 1911 the French government sent an army into the interior to occupy Fez, the capital, on the ground that the sultan was unable adequately to protect the lives of foreigners. Earlier when the German chancellor learned that the French were planning this move he had warned the French ambassador, "If you go to Fez you will stay there, and then the Morocco question will be raised in its entirety, which I wish at all costs to avoid." Upon receiving the news of the march to Fez the German government at once interpreted it as a step to reduce Morocco to the status of a French protectorate, and staged another dramatic protest. On July 1 it announced that the gunboat *Panther* had been sent to the port of Agadir "to help and protect German subjects and clients in those regions." Thus another crisis had developed. This time the French,

backed by the British, were determined not to yield and during the summer of 1911 many people were asking, "Will there be war?" That most of the states of Europe were expecting war can be seen from the following statement written at the time by an English historian:

"Quietly and unostentatiously Germany, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Great Britain have taken all the necessary steps for an immediate mobilisation. The small neutral neighbors of Germany, which possess some of the most valuable strategic positions and harbours in the world, and which might, and very likely would, become theatres of war in a great European conflict, have strengthened in hot haste their much neglected defences. . . . The military authorities of Switzerland and Denmark also took precautions. The British fleet took up a position in the north of Scotland which it would very likely occupy in case of a war with Germany, and the German fleet took up a corresponding position in the north of the Danish peninsula. . . . Even Turkey, Spain, and the Balkan states are reported to be preparing for war. Apparently a Franco-German war might set all Europe aflame."⁷

This time Germany gave way. In November the French and German governments arrived at an agreement whereby Germany in return for a slice of the French Congo acquiesced in the occupation of Morocco by France and Spain.

In 1912 when Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece combined to fall upon senile Turkey in the first of the Balkan Wars, another grave situation developed. The rapid defeat of the Turks, who lost all their European possessions except Constantinople and the adjacent districts, was a severe blow to the Austro-German policy of establishing a permanent hegemony over the Balkan Peninsula. Not only did it weaken Turkey, the ally of Germany, but it also placed a barrier of Slav and Greek states across the road to Constantinople and the Near East, thus blocking the German *Drang nach Osten* (drive to the east). For Austria the victory of Serbia was a particular menace because it raised the hopes of the Serbs within the Austro-Hungarian Empire for their eventual liberation. Gradually the tension between Austria-Hungary and Serbia grew acute. Austria began to mobilize for action, and Russia as the avowed protector of the Balkan states gathered troops behind the girdle of Polish fortresses. Again a general war was imminent. But once more the statesmen of Europe succeeded in averting it. Comparative calm settled upon Europe, but it was only the calm before the great storm.

⁷ J. Ellis Barker in *Fortnightly Review*, vol. 96 (1911), pp. 590-591.



THE STORM BREAKS

The entire European situation was distinctly critical by 1914. "The feeling that the nations are moving toward a conflict urged by an irresistible force grows from day to day," a Frenchman wrote at the close of 1913. Several months earlier an Englishman had written: "Very likely we stand close before a great war." In May, 1914, Colonel House, who had been sent to Europe to promote better relations between the European states and the United States, reported: "The situation is extraordinary. It is militarism run stark mad. The whole of Germany is charged with electricity. Everybody's nerves are tense. It only needs a spark to set the whole thing off."

The fatal spark which caused the explosion was the murder on June 28, 1914, of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir apparent of the Habsburg throne, and his wife in the streets of Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. The actual assassin was a twenty-year-old Serbian youth named Gavrilo Princip, but the crime was instigated by the Narodna Odbrana, a powerful Pan-Serbian society whose main object was to break up the Habsburg Empire so that the Serbs under Austrian rule could be included in a Greater Serbia. The Serbs hated the archduke because he was planning to convert the Dual Monarchy into a Triple Monarchy in which the Serbs within the empire were to have self-government. It was feared that the success of this plan would make the Serbs under Habsburg rule less desirous of becoming a part of Serbia and thus frustrate the dream of a Greater Serbia. Hence, when it was announced that the archduke and his wife would attend military maneuvers at Sarajevo in June of 1914, plans were laid to assassinate him. A group of young men, inflamed by the Pan-Serbian propaganda, armed themselves with bombs and pistols. Although a number of members of the Serb cabinet, including the prime minister, knew of the plot, they made no attempt to warn the Austrian government. The archduke and his wife reached Sarajevo according to schedule and after the failure of an attempt to blow them up with a bomb, young Princip mortally wounded both of them with a pistol.

The news of the assassination shocked most of Europe, but the Austrian ministers shed few if any tears. To them the death of Francis Ferdinand not only meant the removal of a figure whose accession they had feared⁸ but also offered a favorable opportunity to put an end to the anti-Austrian movement which was threatening

⁸ As the Emperor Francis Joseph was in his eighty-fourth year, his days were numbered.

the existence of the empire. The day after the crime Count Berchtold, the foreign minister, is reported to have told the chief of the general staff that the time had come to settle the Serbian question once for all by making war on Serbia. The chief of staff eagerly supported the idea, stating that the Dual Monarchy must "choose between allowing itself to be strangled and making a last effort to prevent its destruction."

What Berchtold wanted was only a local war. Nevertheless he could not embark upon such a war unless Germany was willing to promise full support in the event of Russia's entry into the conflict on Serbia's side. So he sent a special envoy to Germany to obtain the promise of German support. The mission was successful. On July 5 the kaiser gave assurance that Austria "could depend on the complete support of Germany." As Winston Churchill put it: "The Vienna cabinet was given a blank check against the whole resources of the German Empire." At least two motives impelled William II to promise "wholehearted support." First, he was convinced that Russia was not ready for war and would back down as it had in 1908 and 1913. Second, he saw that the Habsburg Empire was Germany's one dependable ally and as such must be kept strong. Italy, it is true, was technically a member of the Triple Alliance but her interests were known to diverge from it. In the case of Austria-Hungary there was considerable chance that she would cease to be a great power unless the nationalist activities of the various groups within her borders were curbed. The latter, the kaiser believed, could be achieved by abating the rising power of Serbia.

Berchtold at once proceeded to cash the check the German government had given him. Upon the return of his envoy he told an Austrian Crown Council that "a purely diplomatic victory even if it ended with a striking humiliation of Serbia would be useless" and then drew up an ultimatum to Serbia containing terms deliberately framed to be unacceptable. Among other things the ultimatum demanded suppression of anti-Austrian publications, anti-Austrian societies, and anti-Austrian propaganda. It also demanded the removal of all Serbian officials guilty of anti-Austrian propaganda. Finally it demanded that Austrian officials be permitted to participate in the suppression of anti-Austrian propaganda in Serbia and in the proceedings against the authors of the Sarajevo crime. Having drawn up his ultimatum, Berchtold did not communicate it to Germany for modification but sent it at once to Serbia giving her forty-eight hours to accept it. When the representatives of the other European governments discovered the terms, they were amazed. The



THE BRITISH AND RUSSIAN ROYAL FAMILIES AT COWES, ENGLAND, IN 1914

*The present
Duke of Windsor*

Tsar Nicholas II

King Edward VII

*The Prince of Wales
(later King George V)*

British foreign minister exclaimed, "C'est la guerre européenne." Just two minutes before the expiration of the time limit the Serbian answer was handed to the Austrian ambassador. Much to the surprise of the Austrian and German officials the Serbs accepted all the demands but the last two and even declared their willingness to enter into further discussion regarding these. The German emperor was highly pleased with the answer. "A great moral victory for Vienna," he said, "and with it every reason for war disappears." But the Austrian government decided that the reply was unsatisfactory and on July 28 declared war on Serbia.

Austria's declaration of war marks the beginning of the final stage of the crisis. During the next week the representatives of Germany and Great Britain made feverish attempts to avert a general war. The kaiser and his ministers made a belated but futile attempt to induce the Austrian government to accept a peaceful solution. The German chancellor, for example, wired Vienna: "We are ready, to be sure, to fulfill our obligations as an ally but must refuse to allow ourselves to be drawn by Vienna into world conflagration frivolously and in disregard of our advice." But the Austrian officials were immovable. At the same time Lord Grey, the British foreign minister, was desperately seeking to restrain Russia from a general mobilization which he knew would inevitably cause Germany to declare war at once. But Sazonov, the Russian foreign minister, was determined not to let Austria secure an easy victory. According to the German ambassador, he was blinded by "a hatred which is absolutely clouding more and more all judgment here." Many still hoped that the tsar would restrain his minister. Nicholas II, a weak monarch, was not equal to the task. Although he at first said to Sazonov, "Think of the responsibility you are asking me to take; think of the thousands and thousands of men who will be sent to their death," he lacked the moral courage to stand firm. After parrying the arguments of his minister for several hours he reluctantly gave his consent to general mobilization on July 29. That same evening, upon receiving a conciliatory telegram from the kaiser, he tried to countermand the order but was informed that it could not be stopped.

Germany's principal military advantage lay in the ability of her armies to move rapidly. This advantage the German general staff was determined not to sacrifice. Consequently when news of the Russian mobilization reached Berlin on the morning of July 30, the government forthwith demanded that it cease within twelve hours under threat of war. The Russian government did not answer and on August 1 Germany declared war. On the previous day Germany

had also sent an ultimatum to France asking whether it would remain neutral in case of war between Russia and Germany. The French government, delaying its answer until the next day, stated that it would consult its own interests. French mobilization began the same day and on August 3 Germany declared war on France.

Although Sir Edward Grey had committed himself without the knowledge of parliament to give France naval aid, Great Britain was still a nonbelligerent. Grey could not make good his promises until parliament declared war on Germany. But he did not have to wait long for the event which convinced the British parliament as well as the British people that war was necessary. On August 2 the German government asked the Belgian government to permit an army to march through Belgium, promising "to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian kingdom to the full," "to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace," and "to pay an indemnity for any damage that may be caused by German troops." The reply was that the king of Prussia had in 1870 guaranteed the independence of Belgium and that no strategic interest would justify the violation of this agreement. It also stated that if Belgian neutrality were violated, the army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader. This bold defiance did not change the plans of the Germans. In their eyes the treaty was just "a scrap of paper." The early hours of August 4 saw their army invade Belgium.

It was the event which inflamed British public opinion. On the same day parliament declared war on Germany. Of the great powers Italy was the only one not in the war. The Italian government proclaimed its neutrality on the ground that its obligations to the Triple Alliance did not include support in a war of aggression. Consequently Germany and Austria, known as the Central Powers, fought alone against the Entente Allies which included Great Britain, France, Russia, Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro.⁹

The First World War had begun, fulfilling the prophecy Bismarck had made shortly before his death to Herr Ballin, noted director-general of the Hamburg-Amerika Line, "I shall not see the world war, but you will, and it will start in the Near East." None of the powers, it seems, really wanted a European war and all made genuine though belated efforts to avert it. Nevertheless war had broken out. Why did it come? The most obvious answer is that statesmen were not ready to make the sacrifices necessary to preserve peace. They did not sufficiently foresee the consequences of their acts. In the words of Lloyd George, "The more one reads

⁹ Japan took her place with the Allies on August 23 and Turkey entered the war on the side of the Central Powers at the beginning of November.

memoirs and books written in the various countries of what happened before August 1, 1914, the more one realizes that no one at the head of the affairs quite meant war. It was something into which they glided, or rather staggered and stumbled." The war was the fatal result of unsolved economic clashes and of the blundering incapacity of statesmen aided and abetted by the malign influence of alarmists and jingoists. For decades men on both sides had indulged in making arrogant claims, rattling the sword in its scabbard, distilling venom, piling up suspicion, fostering gigantic misunderstandings, and doing other things that created an atmosphere making for war. All countries were more or less to blame; no one nation can be saddled with the sole responsibility.

The two most potent weapons for the struggle were the German army and the British navy. Germany had trained most of her younger male citizens so that she had a reservoir of about four million to draw upon. Even more important was the quality of the training and the general organization of the German forces. In this respect Germany enjoyed a distinct advantage. The Austrian armies were inferior both in numbers and in efficiency, although they had no equal in siege artillery. However, since they were composed of so many nationalities, their special weakness was lack of homogeneity. The fighting machine which most nearly approached Germany's in size and efficiency was that of France, but its power of expansion was not so great as that of Germany whose population was larger by twenty-five millions. This difference was, however, more than offset by the French colonial levies. The country which had the largest number of trained men was Russia, with almost six millions.¹⁰ Thus France and Russia had an enormous superiority in numbers. But the Russians were poorly equipped and their effectiveness was further limited by difficulties of transportation. As for the British army, it was well equipped and well trained but small. Since the British had not introduced universal military service, their regular army together with the reserves numbered less than 450,000 men, of which only 160,000 were ready for immediate service at the outbreak of the war. What the British did have was a navy that was second to none. A program of reform during the years before 1914 had raised the efficiency of the navy to a point unprecedented in history. Together with the French and Russian navies it constituted a force beside which the Austro-German naval combination appeared almost insignificant, although Germany had the second largest navy in the world.

¹⁰ General Gourko (*Russia in 1914-17*, p. 75) estimates that fourteen million Russians were called to the colors up to December, 1916.

World War I: The First Phase

THE OPENING CAMPAIGNS

THE German plan of campaign had been carefully worked out long before the outbreak of war. It was based on a scheme originally drawn up by General von Schlieffen, chief of the German general staff from 1891 to 1896. Von Schlieffen had foreseen the possibility of Germany's being involved in a war against France, Russia, and Great Britain—in other words, in a war with one front in the east and another in the west—and had made his plan accordingly. The essence of it was to achieve a quick decision against one enemy and then settle the issue with the other. More specifically, he planned to bring France to her knees by a series of swift, overwhelming blows before Russia could mobilize her vast man power. The bulk of the army would be hurled at France and would reach Paris in two or at most three weeks. The forces would then be turned eastward against the Russians whom the Austrians, aided by a minimum German army, were to hold in check until France was crushed. The speedy execution of the plan was the key to its success. There was no time to be lost if France was to be defeated before Russia could put effective forces into the field.

The eastern boundary of France was, however, protected by a great chain of concrete forts stretching from Montmédy to Switzerland. The Germans saw that the task of piercing this powerful line would not only be difficult but could not be achieved within the required time limit. In short, it would be courting disaster to make a frontal attack. The obvious solution was to strike through Belgium and Luxemburg, where the frontier was unfortified. Only by violating the neutrality of these two countries could the army deal a swift blow at France. The Germans reckoned that the strategic benefits

would more than compensate for the loss of reputation they would incur. If Belgium were held inviolable, the advantage would be with the French. On the other hand, if they could rapidly march through Belgium the advantage lay with the Germans. They could then turn the left flank of the French defense and cut the French armies from the capital.

During the night of August 1-2, before Germany had actually declared war on France, cavalry crossed the French frontier between Luxemburg and Switzerland at a number of points. These movements were, however, only in the nature of a feint to draw as many French troops as possible to the south. The main attack was directed through Luxemburg and Belgium. On the morning of August 2 the advance guard had already entered Luxemburg, which had as its sole defense a volunteer force of 150 men. The Grand Duchess made a patriotic gesture in motoring out and wheeling her car across the road on which the Germans were advancing, but the German soldiers laughingly swept by to occupy the duchy. In Belgium the Germans met a more determined and effective resistance, for the Belgians were resolved to defend their country to the utmost. Marching across the border early on the morning of August 4 the German vanguard advanced as far as Liège the same day.

It was here that the Belgians intended to make a serious stand. The defenses consisted of a ring of twelve forts regarded as the highest achievement of military science. Constructed of steel and concrete, they had turrets with walls that were twelve feet thick. But the German heavy howitzers, whose force had been underestimated, soon reduced these supposedly impregnable fortresses to a mass of wreckage. One was silenced on August 5 and three were destroyed the next day. Those to the west and north held out some days longer, but the last one fell on August 15. On August 20 the advancing Germans occupied Brussels and the same day began bombarding Namur, another ring of forts which the entente hoped would make a delaying resistance. This group was demolished even more quickly with the great guns that had eaten away the defenses of Liège. One after another the forts fell in a bombardment lasting little more than twenty-four hours. The entrance of the Germans into Namur on August 23 marked the end of the attempt to block their advance.

Although the delay amounted to only eighteen days, it was of priceless value to the French and British. During this period the British had transported all available troops, to the number of about 160,000, across the Channel and by the 21st they were in position near Mons. To their right five French armies moved into line to


stay the German onset. The first engagement took place August 22 in the region of Charleroi, and the next day the British also engaged the Germans at Mons. Although both the French and the British fought with spirit and determination, they were defeated with heavy losses along the entire front. This defeat convinced General Joffre, the French commander, that any attempt to check the Germans with the men he had in his advanced position would be futile. Consequently he ordered a general retreat which would permit him to strengthen his forces for an offensive. The retreat continued until the Germans were within twenty-five miles of Paris and the fall of Paris appeared certain. Hastily the government gathered its effects and moved to Bordeaux.

Meanwhile, however, Joffre had actually strengthened his forces with fresh units, while the power of the advancing units was being greatly reduced. Furthermore, whereas the Germans had been moving farther and farther from their bases of supply, the French as they fell back came nearer to theirs. Finally Joffre decided that the time had come to take the offensive. On September 5 he addressed the following stirring appeal to his soldiers: "As we engage in the battle upon which the safety of our country depends, all must remember that the time for looking backward has passed; every effort must be devoted to attacking and driving back the enemy. Troops that can no longer advance must hold the ground won at any cost, and die in their tracks rather than retreat. In the present circumstances no weakness can be tolerated."

Early the next day the general offensive known as the battle of the Marne began. Fighting with fierce courage the French drove the Germans back across the river, retaking Châlons and Rheims, and were not halted until they reached the Aisne, where the Germans had previously prepared positions. Here began the trench warfare that was to continue for the duration. Both sides constructed lines of trenches from the Oise to the Swiss border, with the cheerless waste of no man's land in between the trenches. The defensive line was not to move so much as ten miles in either direction before March, 1917.

The battle of the Marne, in which more than two million men were engaged for a period of seven days (September 6–12), was the decisive event of the first period of the war; in fact, some students of military tactics regard it as the most significant battle of the war.¹ Although the German losses had not been overwhelming, the battle did decisively dispel the Germans' hopes for a quick victory. Their

¹ General Falkenhayn later said that the war was really lost in the battle of the Marne.



International News

TANICABS AND BUSES USED TO CONVEY FRENCH SOLDIERS TO THE FRONT LINES, 1914

military leaders had staked all on a speedy knockout blow and had failed. Among the factors contributing to this failure were the resistance of the Belgians, the delaying actions of the French and British troops, and the fighting qualities of the victors. The force of the German avalanche having spent itself, it was evident that instead of "a short and joyous war" the contest would be "a long and desperate struggle."

While the Germans were trying to drive through to Paris, the situation on the east front had become perilous. There the German plan failed as signally as in the west. Assuming that the Russians would not be ready to make a major move for some time, the Germans had allotted only a minimum force to the defense of East Prussia. But the assumption proved to be wrong. The Russians succeeded in mobilizing their troops much faster than the Germans had believed they could. By the middle of August a number of armies were ready to take the field. As soon as it became clear that the Germans were striking the main blow against France and were merely standing on the defensive in the east, the Russians decided to invade East Prussia. On August 17 two armies entered the province from the east and the south, flinging the inadequate German forces back upon Königsberg. Soon the province as far as the Vistula River was in Russian hands, much to the consternation of the German military leaders. On August 17 the Russians had also launched an offensive in the south which the Germans did not expect. Strong forces had invaded Silesia, had thrown back the Austrians, and were threatening Lemberg, the capital of the province. Such was the favorable situation for Russia. In France and Great Britain hopes ran high that by a continued advance the Russians would counterbalance the territorial losses in the west.

Various reasons urged the immediate deliverance of East Prussia. To abandon this province would have been disastrous from a strategic point of view, for from East Prussia the Russian armies could launch an offensive at the very heart of Germany and flank an attack on Poland. Furthermore, since East Prussia was the cradle of the Prussian monarchy, sentimental reasons demanded its deliverance. Consequently the German general staff decided that East Prussia must be cleared at once. The task was assigned to the one man who was probably best fitted to carry it out. He was Paul von Hindenburg, a retired general who from years of military duty and maneuvers in East Prussia had learned to know the terrain as well as if it had been his own estate. It had been the dream of his life to lead an army against the enemy in this region. With Ludendorff as

his chief of staff and with reinforcements from the western front,² he proceeded at once to set a trap for the Russians, whom the weakness of the opposition had made overconfident. Moreover, dissension between the Russian generals, Rennenkampf and Samsonov, hampered the Russian effort. As the army of the left pushed forward in the district of Tannenberg, Hindenburg's troops enveloped it and destroyed most of it. Of the four and a half corps only the equivalent of one and a half escaped. It was the most complete victory the Germans won in the whole war³ and Hindenburg became at once the great hero of the German people. His next objective was to destroy the other Russian army in East Prussia, but its commander saved it by ordering a retreat to the frontier. Thus the invasion of East Prussia came to an end.

In the meantime the Russian armies in Galicia had administered a crushing defeat to the Austrians at Lemberg in a battle that began at the end of August and lasted a week. The Austrian losses in men and materials were so heavy that they seriously crippled the army. Of the 900,000 operating in Galicia 250,000 were killed or wounded and 100,000 were taken prisoners. It was necessary for the Germans to do something to relieve the situation. The innovation of trench warfare having led to a deadlock which enabled them to maintain a defensive position with fewer men, a considerable portion of the troops were moved eastward. Thus the importance that had belonged to the west front was for a time diverted to the east. Early in October Hindenburg organized an invasion of West Poland, expecting thereby to force a retirement of the Russian armies. But the latter made an effective stand in prepared positions along the line of the Vistula. There the German attempt to take Poland came to a standstill. Gradually the situation settled down to trench warfare much as it had in the west. The end of 1914 saw the Germans and Russians facing each other in a stalemate on a front some nineteen miles in length.



THE PERIOD OF GERMAN PREDOMINANCE

The fact that the plan of the Central Powers for a quick victory had failed gave the Allies time to put more trained men into the


² This diversion of troops from the western front to East Prussia at a critical time was undoubtedly a contributing factor to the defeat of the offensive in France.

³ A notable feature of this battle was the use for reconnaissance which the Germans made of the few airplanes they had. Hindenburg paid tribute to the aid given him by the planes in these words: "Without airplanes no Tannenberg."

field and also strengthened the hope of victory in their hearts. So confident of ultimate success did they become that they divided the spoils on paper. France was to get Alsace-Lorraine and the left bank of the Rhine; Russia was allotted the Straits, Constantinople, and adjacent districts; Great Britain's reward was to be the destruction of Germany's navy, colonial empire, and merchant marine. Furthermore, in April, 1915, a secret treaty was concluded with Italy according to which Italy, in return for intervention, was to receive part of the Austrian Tyrol (the Trentino), the city of Trieste, the eastern littoral of the Adriatic, and the Dodecanese Islands. In other words, Italy was accorded the right to convert the Adriatic into an Italian lake. Having made the best possible bargain, Italy declared war on Austria, May 24, 1915.⁴ Rumania, too, joined the entente upon receiving pledges of compensation.

But the hopes of the Allies were somewhat premature. They were still to experience many defeats and setbacks before victory was achieved. On the western front the whole year 1915 saw the opposing armies confronting each other from the long lines of entrenchments which stretched from the Channel to Switzerland. Occasional battles raged along this front, with enormous casualties on both sides, but the military results were not commensurate with the loss of blood. On the Italian front the results were almost equally disappointing. Fighting to wrest the Trentino from Austria, the Italian army had a superiority in numbers; but lack of proper training and especially the difficulty of the terrain prevented it from achieving military results of importance beyond diverting Austrian troops from the eastern front. In addition, 1915 witnessed the tragic failure of an attempt by the Allies to gain possession of the Straits and Constantinople. The plan for an expedition "to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople as its objective" was projected by Winston Churchill. It was hoped that such an expedition would relieve Turkish pressure on Russia's army in the Caucasus and open the Dardanelles as a channel through which munitions and supplies could be sent to Russia. After an English fleet, assisted by a French squadron, failed to effect a passage of the Straits in March, troops were landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Turkish resistance was, however, so effective that these troops were unable to advance beyond the beaches. By the end of May they had little to show for their efforts except enormous losses in men and materials. Finally heavy rains made it necessary to evacuate the expedition.

⁴ Public opinion in favor of intervention was largely influenced by the fiery speeches of the poet D'Annunzio and the militant newspaper articles of one Benito Mussolini.



THE EASTERN FRONT IN WORLD WAR I

Not only were the British casualties of the campaign about 120,000⁵ but the failure of the undertaking encouraged the Bulgarians to join the Central Powers.

The Allies also suffered setbacks on other fronts. An offensive against the Russians in April moved into Poland with steady momentum despite counterattacks. The heavy artillery of the Germans not only quickly leveled any fort that made a show of resistance but also literally blasted the Russians out of their trenches. Although suffering from an acute shortage of munitions the Russians fought doggedly. But the odds were against them. By August their situation was so bad that they decided to evacuate Warsaw, fearing that any force which might attempt to defend it would be cut off. From Warsaw the retreat continued until almost all of Poland was in the possession of the German armies. In November, 1915, the little Serb army which had twice routed the invading Austrians was threatened on three sides by a superior force of Germans, Austro-Hungarians, and Bulgarians and was able to escape the trap only by retreating into Albania. With Serbia under their control and Bulgaria on their side, the Central Powers were now in direct contact with Turkey.

Thus at the end of 1915 they found themselves in a strong position. They had been able to hold the Allied armies in the west while achieving signal successes in the east. One of their great schemes, that of controlling the Balkan Peninsula and the Near East, appeared to be near realization. For the Allies the outlook was anything but cheerful. Joffre summarized the situation in the following words, "Our armies had everywhere been either checked or beaten." Only on the oceans and seas, with the exception of the Baltic Sea, was Allied control unchallenged.



A YEAR OF HOPES AND DISAPPOINTMENTS

The year 1916 was intended by both the Central Powers and the Allies to be a year of decision. The Germans had already begun preparations in the late fall of 1915 for delivering a blow in the west that would bring the war to a triumphant close. General von

⁵ The Turkish losses were about 218,000.

THE EASTERN FRONT IN WORLD WAR I. *Since the Germans underestimated the strength of the Russians, the latter were able to penetrate deeply into Germany and Austria during August, 1914.*

Falkenhayn, chief of the general staff, outlined the plan in a report which he presented to the kaiser at Christmas. No immediate danger, he argued, threatened from Russia or Italy because a shortage of materials would prevent the former from taking the offensive and the latter was being held in check by Austria. In his estimation Great Britain constituted the worst peril. But the British were not ready to strike. Although a strong force was in the making, it would be some months before it was properly drilled. In addition, the submarine campaign which the Germans planned to launch was counted on to keep England's hands tied. Since the French, who had borne the brunt of the fighting on the western front, were believed to be at the point of exhaustion, the obvious move was to attack and annihilate their army before the British could send substantial assistance. The French, in order to meet the attack, would be forced to throw in every available man and would thus "bleed to death." More than this, by striking down France, Falkenhayn stated, "England's best sword would be knocked from her hand." It was the old strategy of Frederick the Great, that of wearing down the military power of the enemy until exhaustion induced him to surrender. On the Allied side there was equal determination to reach a decision. Joffre, convinced that the Allies could achieve victory in 1916 if their efforts were coordinated, invited representatives of the Allied powers to his headquarters to discuss plans. The representatives decided that they should seek a decision by launching simultaneous offensives on all fronts. However, it was recognized that the general offensive could not be set in motion before June because the training of the new British forces was not complete and Russia was in great need of equipment.

The Germans launched their attack first. Faced with the problem of dwindling man power, von Falkenhayn decided that only an operation on a limited front would be necessary to deal France the *coup de grâce*. An attack concentrated on one point, he argued, could inflict the greatest injury at the least cost. After surveying the possibilities, he chose the fortress of Verdun as best suited to his purposes. Not only was Verdun near the German lines but it also formed a salient in the French front which was surrounded by the Germans on three sides. Furthermore, Verdun was a famous city, the taking of which would be a success of the first order. The plan of attack was worked out meticulously. A terrific artillery barrage was to destroy all means of resistance, and the infantry was then to advance without suffering heavy losses. It was, briefly stated, the principle that "the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." This

required a tremendous concentration of artillery and troops specially trained for the attack. Soon great streams of arms and ammunition were flowing in the direction of the Verdun front. Such unexampled preparation could not, however, be completely concealed from the French. From reconnaissance reports and from information supplied by prisoners and deserters the French knew that a blow was impending. Colonel Driant, for example, wrote to a friend on February 20: "The assault of Verdun is near and the [German] Crown Prince declares, we hear from deserters, that he is going to take the town and finish the war." Nevertheless the belief persisted in the high military circles of France that the attack was merely a feint to attract French reserves while the main blow would be delivered elsewhere. Consequently, though some measures were taken to improve the defenses of Verdun and to reinforce the troops in that sector, the preparations for meeting the attack were not complete or energetic.

Toward the end of February, 1916, all was ready. The Germans were convinced that their formidable and painstaking preparations could not fail. One general even announced to his corps that it would be the last battle of the war. But once more they underestimated the fighting qualities of the French soldier. On February 21 the German artillery unleashed the most terrific bombardment ever known, after which the infantry carried the advanced French positions. On the following days progress continued so that by the 25th a German victory seemed assured. On that day the French troops were ordered to hold their positions at all costs, Joffre telegraphing that "every commander who gives an order for retreat will be tried by court-martial." The French stiffened at once. Standing firm as rocks, they rolled back attack after attack until the impetus of the German advance was broken. During the succeeding months the Germans endeavored time and again without much success to force the French positions; and on numerous occasions the French took the offensive to recapture many positions. The middle of June saw Verdun still out of German reach. On June 20 the Germans resorted to the use of a new kind of diphosgene gas against which the masks of the French artillerymen proved insufficient protection. With the artillery paralyzed the French infantry gave ground, enabling the German forces to advance to the east outwork of Verdun. The jubilation at German headquarters was tremendous. But the success had been achieved too late. The German forces lacked the strength to achieve final victory. To meet a Russian offensive that had started at the beginning of June, the German supreme command had been compelled to send seven di-

visions to Galicia, thereby greatly weakening its forces before Verdun. More than this, on June 24 the British opened an offensive on the Somme, to which sector more German men and materials had to be moved. Thereafter the attack on Verdun gradually came to a standstill. The second German attempt to achieve a decisive victory by a swift stroke had failed as utterly as the first. The cost in blood was frightful. No less than 315,000 Frenchmen and 281,000 Germans were devoured in the attempt.

Meanwhile the Germans had won several successes on the eastern front. The great Russian offensive which had started in June and had compelled Falkenhayn to withdraw troops from the west, at first gave every indication of being a brilliant success. It advanced with such momentum that the Austrian defenses crumbled before it and the Austro-Hungarian troops retreated in utter rout. However, the German general staff, upon seeing the plight of the Austrians, quickly sent troops who by a series of counterattacks checked the Russians all along the line from the Pripet marshes southward to the Rumanian frontier.

Furthermore, before the end of 1916 the Central Powers also dealt a decisive blow to Rumania. Long sympathetic to the entente cause, Rumania had been watching for a favorable moment to enter the fray, its primary object being the annexation of Austrian Transylvania. The early success of the Russian offensive coupled with the belief that Austria-Hungary was on the verge of collapse ended the hesitation of the Rumanian government and on August 27, 1916, it took the fateful step of declaring war on Austria-Hungary. Although the Rumanian army numbered about half a million men, they were poorly trained and poorly armed. There was a shortage not only of aircraft and artillery but also of machine guns and rifles. Some of the divisions had no machine guns whatever. What is more, there was only a six weeks' supply of ammunition for such guns as the army possessed. Nevertheless they might have placed Austria in grave peril if they had acted with dispatch. Crossing the Carpathians into Transylvania after the declaration of war, they moved so slowly that the Austro-German command was enabled to collect a picked force for a counteroffensive. Soon two strong armies were moving against the Rumanians. By a coordinated strategy these armies gradually broke the resistance and on December 6 marched into Bucharest. Before the end of the month all the province of Wallachia with its rich oil deposits and fertile grain lands was in the possession of the Central Powers.

Thus the year 1916 closed with "a gleam of triumph" for the

Central Powers. Besides eliminating Rumania as a military factor in the war, they had impaired the strength of the Russian armies to the extent that they were no longer an offensive power. But the situation of the Central Powers as a whole was not so rosy as these successes might indicate. For example, the efforts of the Austro-Hungarians against the Russians, Rumanians, and Italians had exhausted their resources and man power, the fighting against the Russians alone having cost them half a million in prisoners and dead. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was, in fact, disintegrating under the strain of war. On the western front the fighting which had ended in a stalemate had taken a terrific toll in German men, materials, and energy. Ludendorff himself later wrote: "The strain of the year 1916 had proved too great; the endurance of the army had weakened; we were completely exhausted on the western front." Within Germany the Allied naval blockade was beginning to cause widespread distress. In short, the war was gradually sapping the material, physical, and moral strength of Germany. Dissatisfaction with the achievements of the war was growing. After all the sacrifices the Germans had made and all the hardships they had endured, final victory was still out of reach.

The German government was under no illusions regarding the true state of affairs, for the danger signals were too patent to be overlooked. On the other hand, Germany would have enjoyed a great advantage if it had been able to induce the entente to accept a peace on the basis of its territorial holdings which, in addition to Belgium and northern France, included Poland, Serbia, Montenegro, half of Rumania, and much of Russia. In the hope that the entente would be willing to do this Bethmann-Hollweg, the German chancellor, on December 12 sent a note to the entente governments stating that the Central Powers "feel sure that the propositions which they would bring forward would serve as a basis for the restoration of a lasting peace." Some opposition to this offer was expected, particularly from France, but much to the surprise of the Germans it was also denounced by the British and the Italians. Lloyd George, who had just become prime minister, said emphatically, "To enter, on the invitation of Germany proclaiming herself victorious, without any knowledge of the proposals she has to make, into a conference is to put our heads into a noose." Before the end of December the Allies, believing that the peace offer was made for the purpose of creating dissension among them, sent a group reply which read in part, "The Allied governments refuse to consider a proposal which is empty and insincere. Once again the Allies de-



THE WESTERN FRONT IN WORLD WAR I

After the Germans almost reached Paris in 1914, the front was stabilized for over three years as indicated by the heavy black line on the map; the dotted line indicates the comparatively great advance of the Allies in the late summer and the autumn of 1918.

clare that no peace is possible till they have secured reparation of violated rights and recognition of the principle of nationalities and of the existence of small states."

Meanwhile President Wilson had on December 18 independently issued an invitation to the powers to state the terms on which peace might be made. It was a great opportunity for the Germans. They had in their hands a most admirable card, that is, the restoration of Belgium. A frank and unequivocal statement that Germany was prepared to restore the complete independence of Belgium and to pay the costs of the destruction caused by her armies was the *sine qua non* of any further discussions. But the Germans in their folly did not, it appears, perceive this; hence they did not play their best card. Instead they declined the President's invitation to state their terms, replying that direct discussion between representatives of the belligerent nations seemed the best road to peace. On January 10, 1917, the Allies sent their reply, which restated in more definite terms the ideas of their earlier collective statement: among other things that "the civilized world knows that they imply, necessarily and first of all, the restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro, with the compensations due to them; the evacuation of the invaded territories in France, in Russia, in Rumania, with just reparation; the reorganization of Europe, guaranteed by a stable regime and based at once on respect for nationalities and on the right to full security and liberty of economic development . . . ; the restitution of provinces formerly torn from the Allies by force or against the wish of their inhabitants; the liberation of the Italians, as also of the Slavs, Rumanians, and Czechoslovaks from foreign domination; the setting-free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks."⁶ It was clear that the aims of the belligerent groups were poles apart. So the war went on.



NEW ELEMENTS IN WARFARE

The First World War witnessed many important changes in the scope, methods, and instruments of warfare. One of the most striking of these was the increase in the size of the armies and in the length of the battle lines. Whereas in previous wars the soldiers had been counted by the hundreds of thousands, they were now counted by the millions. For the opening campaign the Germans assembled no less than seven armies, while the Allies collected six—five French

⁶ *Documents and Statements Relating to Peace Proposals and War Aims*, with an introduction by G. Lowes Dickinson (1919), pp. 12-13.

and one British. The average number of men under arms has been estimated at twenty millions and the total number as near sixty millions, of which the Allies mobilized about forty and the Central Powers about twenty millions. These vast numbers did not fight in one small sector. General Joffre, the commander of the French armies, could not, as Napoleon did at Austerlitz, survey the entire battlefield with the aid of field glasses. At the battle of the Marne, for example, the fighting front covered a distance of 125 miles and when the battle lines later became stabilized they extended from the English Channel to the frontier of Switzerland, a distance of some six hundred miles. Only through the use of modern inventions—the telephone and radio—did a commanding general know what was taking place. Even a sector commander had to use these instruments in order to ascertain whether the center was holding or the left wing was advancing according to plan.

To keep these millions of soldiers supplied with the means of warfare was no easy task. Besides food, clothing, and medical supplies, they needed ammunition, machine guns and small arms, artillery, planes, tanks, motor trucks, radio apparatus, photographic appliances, and innumerable other kinds of equipment. As the arsenals could supply only a small part of the total, peacetime industries were converted to war production. Furthermore, it was often necessary to build special railway lines to facilitate transportation to the front, or to construct concrete roads if the transportation was done by motor trucks. Gradually more and more civilian industries, trades, and professions, together with all the resources of scientific knowledge and research, were drawn into the war until the major nations on each side became “nations of warworkers.” Whereas wars once affected merely the fighting men who comprised only a small part of the total population, during the First World War almost the entire populations of the belligerent nations became engaged in wartime industries, the ramifications of which were so embracing that nearly every peacetime invention became a potential instrument of war.

Another novelty was the entrenched lines stretching hundreds of miles, with flanks secured by the sea at the one end and by neutral territory at the other. After the drive on Paris had been stopped, the fire power of the machine gun and quick-firing field gun proved too much for the endurance of the soldiers; so they dug trenches for protection. The war became one in which the spade was as indispensable as the rifle. There was, of course, nothing essentially new in the simple trench. It had been used in some crude form or other almost

since the Stone Age. Caesar used it in his wars against the Gauls, and in more recent times it was used in the Crimean, American Civil, and Russo-Japanese wars. It was the use of trenches on a grand scale that was new in the First World War. Not only were they extended to a distance of six hundred miles, but in 1915 the multiple trench system appeared. When the opposing armies "dug in" after the battle of the Marne, they found that a single trench system did not offer sufficient protection against penetration. Consequently both sides constructed second and third line trenches to which the troops could retreat if they were unable to hold the first line. These various lines were connected by communication trenches through which troops and supplies could be moved without openly exposing them to enemy fire. At intervals underground dugouts were constructed in which troops could rest or find protection when they were subjected to heavy cannonading. In some places veritable underground towns were built, with first-aid stations, kitchens, storage rooms for supplies and ammunition, and sleeping quarters for officers and men. Nevertheless life in the trenches was usually anything but pleasant. Heavy rains filled them with water and mud and they were infested with vermin and swarmed with rats. Major Auld wrote: "In some parts of the line the trench rats are an absolute plague. They swarm in the dugouts and appear in all sorts of odd corners. They disturb the little rest one does get; and I have had them run all over me, even over my face, while lying in my dugout."⁷

Both sides endeavored in every possible way to make their trenches invulnerable to assault. The territory between the opposing trench systems, known as "no man's land" because it was continually swept by rifle, machine gun, and artillery fire, was covered with a maze of barbed-wire entanglements, often electrically charged. An infantry attack upon trenches protected in this way was always costly in men and material; in fact, the trinity of trench, machine gun, and barbed wire was so formidable that infantry alone was seldom able to make much headway against it. Both sides tried to blast their way through the entanglements by means of terrific artillery bombardments. Such heavy gunfire not only consumed tremendous quantities of munitions but also had two further disadvantages. It eliminated the element of surprise and tore up the ground so badly that only a short penetration was possible. Thus the opposing lines were almost impregnable against frontal or flank attacks. The fact that both sides had made their fronts equally strong brought major operations to a standstill. A stalemate termination of the war seemed

⁷ *Gas and Flame* (1918), p. 95.

certain unless one side or the other could devise new offensive weapons.

The German solution for the deadlock was poison gas. Although it had been suggested as a weapon in warfare as far back as 1812, it was not actually used until April 22, 1915, when the Germans launched a gas attack in the northeastern part of the Ypres salient. Its object was to asphyxiate all the entente soldiers in the area. The gas was chlorine, a violent irritant of all mucous membranes and especially of the lungs. Since the Allied troops were without protection against it, those whom the gas cloud enveloped were suffocated. Many who were on the fringe saved themselves by burying their faces in the earth, by stuffing handkerchiefs in their mouths and noses, or by wrapping mufflers around their faces. Had the Germans waited until they had sufficient gas for an attack on a wider front, they might have inflicted irreparable losses. But before they could launch further attacks, defensive measures were devised. At first a cotton pad dipped in a chemical solution was tied over the mouth, and later each soldier was equipped with a respirator or mask which filtered the poisonous gases from the air he breathed. These masks proved effective. Because a favorable wind was necessary to propel the gas toward the opposing lines, the Germans soon had recourse to hurling shells filled with deadly phosgene gas. Later they also used mustard gas. But although they did make some advances through its use, it did not open the way to victory as they had hoped it would.

The offensive weapon devised by the British was an armor-plated, self-propelled vehicle which soon became known as a "tank." The basic idea of the tank, that of combining mobility with offensive power and armor, was not new. Centuries earlier the Chinese had used "war cars" armored against projectiles; and various kinds of "battle wagons" and "landships" had also been designed and constructed in Europe. What made the tank possible was the invention of the internal combustion engine and the caterpillar track, the former providing a compact means of propulsion and the latter enabling the vehicle to cross soft ground and trenches. But it was the necessity for overcoming the immobility of trench warfare that actually inspired the construction of the tank. As early as October, 1914, Colonel E. D. Swinton appears to have suggested the idea of an armored car on a caterpillar system, one which would be "capable of crushing down wire entanglements and crossing trenches." Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, thought the idea such a good one that he urged immediate action. Ultimately in

1916, after months of experiment hampered by official opposition and red tape, the first tank was brought into being. This tank, later called the *Mark I*, was the prototype of all British tanks used in the First World War. It had a maximum speed of four miles an hour and its armor was proof against ordinary .30-caliber bullets, shrapnel, and most shell splinters, but not against armor-piercing bullets.

As soon as the tanks were pronounced ready for combat they were sent to France, where they went into action for the first time on September 15, 1916, during the battle of the Somme. The Germans seem to have had no advance information concerning them; hence they were amazed when they appeared in battle. To some, the new vehicle looked like a threshing machine. One German officer later wrote: "It did look something like a threshing machine, but why should it have arrived there in the middle of a war and on a most unhealthy sector at that? We waited and watched. Then it moved. It actually started to come towards us. But that was not all. Suddenly into view came another. It joined the first one, and side by side they came on, ugly and ungainly, but terribly businesslike. Then without warning, from both of them came streams of bullets. Next they were on top of . . ." ⁸

The first tank operations were not a startling success. Of the forty-nine used, only a few proved effective. Many of them either broke down from mechanical trouble or became bogged in soft ground and shell holes, while others were knocked out by the German field guns. The showing of the tank, as a whole, was so poor that it weakened the confidence of many officials in its possibilities. For a time the whole development was in danger of being snuffed out. The Germans, too, did not regard the armored Behemoth as much more than a terrible plaything and therefore made no organized attempts at defense for some time.⁹ But the successes of a few of the machines did convince a number of British experts that the infant tank was a child that deserved to live. To them it had demonstrated its possibilities for crushing barbed-wire entanglements and clearing out machine gun nests. One tank had, in fact, succeeded in taking three hundred German prisoners. Consequently the development of the tank continued. Making the most of the lessons they had learned, the British produced improved tanks in quantities. It was not until the battle of Cambrai, on November 20, 1917,

⁸ *Evening Standard*, September 17, 1935. Cited in Sueter, *The Evolution of the Tank*, p. 141.


⁹ When later tank actions opened their eyes to the part the new weapon could play, the Germans began the construction of a type known as the "Elfriede." However, only fifteen of these machines were finished in time to see action before the end of the war.

that their value was fully demonstrated. By omitting the artillery preparation the entente forces were able to surprise the Germans, with the result that the nearly four hundred tanks used in the attack effected a penetration of 10,000 yards in twelve hours. Before the war ended the tank was to rob barbed wire of its terror completely and to reinstate mobility.

Another novelty of the First World War was extensive use of aircraft. During the decade immediately preceding the war the German government had spent much on the development of the Zeppelin, an airship with a long hull constructed of aluminum, covered with a strong weather-proof fabric, and filled with hydrogen to give it power of ascent. It was confidently believed in German military circles that the Zeppelin was for military purposes the superior of the airplane. Some even saw in it the instrument with which Germany could overcome Great Britain's insular security. In pursuance of this idea the first of a series of raids on England began in January, 1915. Of a total of forty-eight raids, twenty were directed against London. Though they caused considerable damage to life and property,¹⁰ they did not achieve their military purpose. The aim of the crews seems to have been so poor that it is doubtful if one bomb found the target at which it was directed. Furthermore, the Zeppelins had three serious weaknesses: the bulk of their structure, the inflammability of the hydrogen gas, and lack of speed. Their huge bulk, together with the fact that they could attain a maximum speed of only 54 m.p.h., made them an easy target for airplanes and improved antiaircraft guns. So many of the "gas bags" were shot down that their use was soon discontinued in offensive tactics.

Infinitely more important than the airship was the airplane. Like the airship, the airplane had no military history; it went into the conflict as a new and untried instrument. The first ones had been slow but by the outbreak of the war the average speed of the better planes had been raised to 100 m.p.h., the maximum being 126½ miles. Both sides used this weapon in practically the same way. Its earliest use was for purposes of scouting and of regulating artillery fire. Airplanes of the Entente Powers, for example, were already active in observing and reporting the movements of the enemy at the battle of Mons. As the eyes of the army, the airplane greatly reduced the element of surprise but fell far short of eliminating it. Various factors still made accurate observation difficult. For one thing antiaircraft guns compelled the pilots to fly at an altitude

¹⁰ 435 persons killed and 1069 injured.



British Combine

A HANDLEY-PAIGE BOMBING PLANE FROM THE FIRST WORLD WAR

which blurred even photographic observations. Furthermore, troop movements were often made under cover of darkness or on cloudy and misty days. Finally, the use of the airplane for observation purposes stimulated the development of the art of camouflage, which was employed to conceal everything that was a mark for opposing guns and airplanes. Although reconnaissance and artillery control were at first regarded as the primary functions of the airplane, it was also used, usually in groups of two or three, to attack points of military importance. But since the bombs they carried were low powered and usually fell more or less at random because of faulty aim, the early raids were more spectacular than destructive. When more planes became available, raids were organized in which forty or perhaps fifty were used. Bombs, too, grew not only in size and weight but also in destructive power and, what is equally important, the pilots grew more skilled in dropping them.

The first military planes were not equipped with machine guns. At most the pilots were armed with rifles or revolvers. It even appears that the German pilots had orders to evade combat if possible so as to keep their machines intact for scouting and for directing artillery. Nevertheless there were occasional duels during the first months of the war between pilots using revolvers or rifles. The following description of such a duel was published in the *Morning Post* on August 28, 1914: "An English pilot, emerging from a cloud, found immediately beneath him a German aeroplane. Swooping down to within revolver shot, he emptied all his chambers, with an effect that he could not observe, because the cloud once more enveloped him. Later on, when he emerged from the cloud again, he saw underneath a small crowd gathered round a smashed aeroplane, and he came to the conclusion that his revolver shots had not been without effect." In another encounter a British pilot was wounded by a German pilot armed with a rifle.

Soon, however, machine guns were installed in military airplanes, but even then the pilots were still primarily scouts and range finders rather than fighters. When an aviator flew over enemy positions to direct artillery, observe troop movements, or make maps of the trenches, the enemy sought to drive him away with anti-aircraft fire. This proved ineffective because the pilots could complete their reconnaissances at a height that was out of range of the guns. Consequently the commanders of the troops that were being spied upon began to send up one or more airplanes to challenge the invader and to drive him away. In this way military airplanes became fighters as well as bombers and air scouts. Thereafter when an observa-

tion plane was sent out, so-called fighter planes often accompanied it to protect it against attack. Neither side, however, succeeded in driving its enemy from the air or in establishing a definite air superiority.

NAVAL WARFARE, 1914–1916

Even though the war on land had proved indecisive, the Allies did possess one advantage. They controlled the sea. It was this undisputed control of the sea that finally enabled them to strangle both Germany and Austria-Hungary. The British navy had been the controlling force on the sea right from the beginning. During the summer of 1914 a test mobilization had been held, after which the ships were to disperse. The First British Sea Lord, however, decided to keep the Grand Fleet concentrated because of the threatening European situation. Thus it was ready for action the moment war was declared. Its primary objective was naturally the elimination of the German High Seas Fleet and it was so located that it could strike a swift blow should the enemy seek battle. No sooner, therefore, did the war open than the question was asked, "When will the enemy come out?" But the German government decided not to risk its fleet in an all-out battle. Although the kaiser believed that ship for ship the German vessels were more than a match for the British, he felt that the numerical superiority of the latter precluded any possibility of a German victory. He wished to "keep the fleet in being," so that it could protect the coast against invasion. Hence he refused the request of the commander of the High Seas Fleet to engage the British even when "circumstances are exceptionally favorable." It was not a question for the British to seek out the enemy, for the German fleet normally lay in the Jade under the protection of the heavily fortified island of Helgoland, which was impregnable to attack from the seas.

Thus the entente navies enjoyed practically undisputed domination of the sea during the early period of the war. Only the Baltic and the Dardanelles were held by the Central Powers. Control of the Baltic was important to Germany because it kept open the supply lines from Scandinavia and thence to the outside neutral world. More than this, it enabled the Germans to cut off Russia's communication with the outer world through the Baltic. Control of the Dardanelles also put a serious check on the efforts of the Allies by keeping military supplies from Russia and thus bringing about her eventual collapse.

The fact that the German High Seas Fleet did not try conclusions

with the British navy does not mean that the Germans were not active on the sea. In some way or other they were constantly threatening or impairing Allied control. For one thing, submarines made numerous attacks on English warships. That the submarine warfare was not without results can be seen from the fact that on September 22, 1914, the submarine U-9 sank three armored British cruisers off the coast of Holland. Mines were also used with good results. As early as August 5, 1914, two British cruisers were sunk by mines. Furthermore, German cruisers and armed merchantmen became actively engaged in harrying British commerce. The cruiser *Emden*, for instance, entered the Indian Ocean on August 22, 1914, and for the next eleven weeks continued to prey on commerce. Before it was destroyed by the Australian cruiser *Sidney* on November 9, it succeeded in capturing and destroying twenty-one merchant ships and their cargoes. Such commerce-destroying ships were eventually, and often quickly, captured and sunk, but others were sent out to take their places and the damage they did was considerable. The only formidable German raiding squadron was that under Admiral von Spee which sank two British armored cruisers on November 1, 1914, off the Chilean coast (battle of Coronel) but was in turn disposed of on December 8 (battle of the Falkland Islands) in an engagement which cost Germany four armored cruisers. Finally, German squadrons also made occasional raids against the British coast for the purpose of terrorizing the British into keeping a large force for home protection.

However, control of the sea was of the greatest value to the Allies, despite the menace of submarines and an occasional armed raider. It enabled them to banish German commerce from almost all the waterways of the earth and to deprive Germany of all its colonies and it also permitted British ships to use the seas for the purpose of transporting men and food supplies from remote parts of the world to Great Britain and France. Without control of the Channel, for example, it would have been most difficult to ferry troops to France and to maintain them there. To keep the Channel free of enemy raiders, submarines, and mines was no easy task. It was done through the use of nets, mine fields, and other devices. The task of maintaining these defenses was entrusted to the so-called Dover Patrol, which was ever on the lookout for enemy mines or craft. Occasionally a submarine or a raider of some sort did manage to penetrate the defenses, but on the whole the Dover Patrol maintained uninterrupted communication by water between France and Great Britain.

The primary use the Allies made of their naval superiority was

to blockade the Central Powers. Before the war began, Germany had been dependent to a considerable degree on imports of foodstuffs and raw materials. In 1913 the import of foodstuffs had exceeded the export by more than \$400 million and even the home production of food had been largely dependent upon imported fertilizers and fodders. In addition Germany had imported much of the raw material for its industries. From the United States, for example, it purchased nearly all the raw cotton, three fifths of the copper, and three fourths of the mineral oils used in its industries, while the Argentine supplied wool and hides. Other essential imports were rubber, manganese, and tin. Since German merchant shipping had been swept off the seas, it was but natural that the government should endeavor to import these necessities in neutral ships or through neutral ports from which the goods would subsequently be conveyed to Germany. The Allies believed that if they could cut off Germany's foreign supplies completely, the need of foodstuffs and raw materials would soon compel her to surrender. Accordingly the British proclaimed a blockade. At first only "contraband of war" was excluded, but gradually the list was extended to include practically everything. The final stage was reached when an order in council announced on March 11, 1915, that "His Majesty has decided to adopt further measures to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany." This was, of course, in violation of the rules of international law, according to which neutral countries had the right to trade with Germany. To the neutrals who presented their grievances Great Britain sought to justify its action on the ground of sheer necessity.

The German government had foreseen this blockade but had planned to end the war in triumph before it could cause serious shortages. When this plan failed, it became necessary to devise means for breaking the blockade. The weapon chosen was the submarine, and the method decided upon was unrestricted submarine warfare. At the outbreak of the war neither Germany nor Great Britain appreciated the immense potentialities of the submarine. Certainly the Germans regarded it as crude and unreliable, possessing only a certain value for purposes of observation. Accordingly it was used in the first days of the war largely for scouting in an effort to ascertain British naval dispositions. One submarine, the U-15, did fire a torpedo at the British battleship *Monarch* but without success. It was probably the first torpedo launched by a submarine with intent to kill. Before many weeks passed, the attempt to torpedo a warship did prove successful when the U-20 sank the cruiser *Pathfinder*.



SUBMARINE WARFARE. 1917-1918

When the Germans announced, in January, 1917, the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, they marked out safety lanes for the passage of American ships to England and to the eastern Mediterranean and set forth the conditions under which such vessels might proceed.

Then, on September 22, as already stated, the U-9 sank three cruisers, thereby driving home to the British the menace of the submarine. This triple sinking, by demonstrating the destructive potentialities of the craft, opened a new era in naval warfare. More immediately it showed the Germans that they had in their hands a weapon "wherewith they could strike at their enemy with a freedom denied to their surface ships." Gradually the idea took shape of using the submarine to attack entente shipping.

The announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare was published on February 4, 1915, and read in part: "The waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole of the English Channel, are herewith declared to be in the War Zone. From February 18 onward every merchant ship met with in this War Zone will be destroyed, nor will it always be possible to obviate the danger with which the crews and passengers are hereby threatened." This was of course no less contrary to the rules of international law than the blockade, but that fact did not deter the Germans any more than it had the British. Left and right, ships were torpedoed as the submarines went about their work. During March twenty-seven ships were sunk, and eighteen in April. However, the sinkings soon led to strained relations between Germany and the United States. On May 7, 1915, a U-boat torpedoed and sank the speedy Cunard liner *Lusitania* just off the coast of Ireland with a loss of 1198 lives of which more than a hundred were American citizens. Although the German government stated in defense of the deed that Americans had been officially warned by advertisements in the chief newspapers of the United States not to travel in entente ships and that the *Lusitania* carried munitions and other materials of war, public opinion in the United States was nevertheless outraged. Many began to insist upon an immediate declaration of war. President Wilson sent a strong protest to Germany and after a series of diplomatic notes were exchanged the German government assured the United States that henceforth "liners will not be sunk without warning and without safety of the noncombatants."

In 1916 the only great naval battle of the war was fought. Having postponed the program of unrestricted submarine warfare to avoid a break with the United States, the German admiralty decided to use the fleet more aggressively. The plan was to entice out and to destroy a part of the British Grand Fleet. To this end the German fleet left the Jade on the morning of May 30 and sailed northward. The interception of a wireless message divulged the move, and soon the Grand Fleet began steaming out of its base at

Scapa Flow toward the coast of Jutland. As a result two large fleets, the British of 150 vessels and the German of 99, were rapidly nearing each other on May 31. That afternoon the battle began and when it was over on June 1 the British had lost three battle cruisers, eight light cruisers, and eight destroyers while the Germans suffered the loss of one battleship, one battle cruiser, four light cruisers, and five destroyers. The number of killed and wounded was 6274 British and 2545 Germans. Although the German admiralty claimed a decisive victory, the fleet withdrew and thereafter clung to its base, never again seeking battle on the high seas. Actually the battle had confirmed the British mastery of the seas.



CHAPTER THREE

World War I: The Second Phase

THE UNITED STATES ENTERS THE WAR

AT THE end of two years the war had settled down to an indecisive struggle. Although the advantage on land rested with the Central Powers, victory was in sight for neither side. In 1917, however, two events took place that greatly changed the situation: the entry of the United States on the side of the Allies, and the withdrawal of Russia. While the first renewed the hope of the Allies, the latter encouraged the Central Powers.

At the outbreak of the war sentiment in the United States had been largely but not overwhelmingly pro-Ally. There was, of course, a minority that favored the Central Powers, and there were also large sections that were completely indifferent. Others were anti-British but not pro-German, and still others tried to remain neutral. In a survey "from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and from Mexico to the Canadian border" conducted by the *Literary Digest* it was found that of the cities surveyed 189 favored the Allies, 38 the Germans, and 140 were neutral or divided.¹ In the East the preponderance of sentiment was pro-Ally, a fact which probably led the British ambassador to conclude that "about 90 per cent of the English-speaking people, and half the Irish, are on the side of the Allies." Among the governing classes there was a distinct tradition of friendship with England; in fact, the relations between Great Britain and the United States had for some years amounted to almost an entente. Most of the publicists were favorable to the Allied cause from the beginning and this was probably true also of the leaders of industry, commerce, and finance. The German government was

¹ November 14, 1914. Of the pro-German communities two were in the East, twenty-nine in the Middle West, four in the South, and three in the Far West.

widely regarded as not only exceedingly militaristic but also autocratic, both distasteful to believers in democracy. Furthermore the Germans bore the odium of having started the war by invading Belgium. The blame, however, was put on the kaiser rather than on the German people as a whole. Thus one could read as early as August 4, 1914, in the *New York World*: "The kaiser plunges Europe into the most devastating conflict known to human history."

Nevertheless, even among the most ardent supporters of the Allied cause there were few if any who advocated active participation of the United States in the war. As the *Literary Digest* survey has it, "No belligerency is evident anywhere." Practically all believed that the government should adhere to its traditional policy of not meddling in European affairs. The *New York Sun*, which was soon to become openly pro-Ally, said: "There is nothing reasonable in such a war as that for which Europe has been making ready, and it would be folly for the country to sacrifice itself to the frenzy of dynastic policies and the clash of ancient hatreds which is urging the Old World to destruction."² Even ex-President Theodore Roosevelt, who was later to become the most ardent interventionist, at first breathed a spirit of mild neutrality. "Our country," he wrote, "stands well-nigh alone among the great civilized powers in being unshaken by the present world-wide war. For this we should be humbly and profoundly grateful. All of us on this continent ought to appreciate how fortunate we are that we of the Western world have been free from the working of the causes which have produced the bitter and vindictive hatred among the great military powers of the Old World. . . . We must profit by reading aright the lesson writ in fire and steel before our eyes, and therefore we must safeguard our future against the onfall of any similar disaster."³

President Wilson, whose sympathies were pro-Ally, set his heart upon keeping the United States neutral so that nothing would "stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation." "Every man who really loves America," he said in his appeal for neutrality,⁴ "will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. . . . It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. . . . I venture, therefore, my fellow countrymen, to speak a solemn word of warning to you against that

² Cited in Grattan, *Why We Fought*, pp. 36-37.

³ *Outlook*, vol. 108 (1911), p. 169.

⁴ August 19, 1914.

deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of passionately taking sides. The United States must remain neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. We must remain impartial in thought as well as in action."

Despite Wilson's effort to keep the people neutral "in thought as well as in action," the sympathy of the country became increasingly favorable to the Allies. This was in part due to the effectiveness of entente propaganda. Since both sides stood in need of loans and supplies from this country, the United States became the scene of an active contest for favors in which every known method of propaganda was employed. In this contest the Germans were not only handicapped by the fact that the tide of opinion was running against them, but their propaganda was also less adroit than that of the entente. German agents periodically released floods of pamphlets, they regularly sent translated passages from the German newspapers and magazines to something over five hundred newspapers, they circulated German moving pictures, and they subsidized periodicals. Many of these periodicals, however, reached only those who were already pro-German and much of the propaganda was directed to German newspapers which could be read only by very few. Even the Americans of German descent were largely immune to German propaganda, only the more recent immigrants proving highly susceptible. Most of them were of the second or third generation and had become so thoroughly Americanized that the ancestry of their parents or grandparents exercised little influence upon them. Thus German propaganda had little effect on opinion in the country as a whole. By the end of 1915 its blundering efforts were pretty thoroughly discredited.

Although entente efforts had little to do beyond sustaining and confirming the prevalent attitude, they were much more efficient than those of the Central Powers. The British, who enjoyed the advantage of being able to reach the public through the medium of a common language, were the most active. Before the war was many hours old the British navy cut the one cable connection the Central Powers had with the United States and thereafter all news via the cables was obliged to pass through England, where the censors naturally deleted anything unfavorable to their cause. Thus the newspapers and people of the United States saw the war largely through British eyes. But the British did not stop at censoring news dispatches; they also engaged in positive forms of propaganda. To convince the Americans that they were fighting for a righteous cause,

they sent eminent men to the United States on lecture tours, sought to win the support of men and periodicals of the highest order, and supplied newspapers with releases. However, let Sir Gilbert Parker tell the story himself:

Practically since the day war broke out between England and the Central Powers I became responsible for American publicity. I need hardly say that the scope of my department was very extensive and its activities widely ranged. . . . Among other things we supplied three hundred and sixty newspapers in the smaller States of the United States with an English newspaper, which gives a weekly review and comment of the affairs of the war. We established contact with the man in the street through cinema pictures of the Army and Navy, as well as through interviews, articles, pamphlets, etc. and by letters in reply to individual American critics, which were printed in the chief newspapers of other and neighboring States. We advised and stimulated many people to write articles; we utilized the friendly services and assistance of confidential friends; we had reports from eminent Americans constantly, and established association, by personal correspondence, with influential and eminent people of every profession in the United States, beginning with university and college presidents, professors and scientific men, and running through all the ranges of the population. We asked our friends and correspondents to arrange for speeches, debates, and lectures by American citizens, but we did not encourage Britishers to go to America and preach the doctrine of entrance into the war. Besides an immense private correspondence with individuals, we had our documents and literature sent to a great number of public libraries, Y.M.C.A. societies, universities, colleges, historical societies, clubs, and newspapers.⁵

So far as propaganda goes, the United States probably would have continued nonbelligerent to the end of the war. What caused it to become an active participant was the unrestricted submarine warfare which, in addition to interfering with commerce, destroyed American property and the lives of noncombatants. It also appeared to confirm the reports regarding the inhumanity of the Germans. Thus the sinking of the *Lusitania* with the loss of 124 American lives seemed particularly brutal and senseless. Indignation ran so high that many newspapers called for war, and the Congress probably would have declared war if President Wilson had demanded it. But Wilson hoped to keep the country out of the war so that it could negotiate a peace. After receiving a number of sharp protests from the United States government the Germans decided that they did not have enough submarines to make defiance worth while and therefore abandoned unrestricted submarine warfare for a time. To

⁵ *Harper's*, vol. 136 (1918), p. 522.

many it seemed that the crisis had passed and that the United States would succeed in staying out of the war. In November, 1916, Wilson was re-elected, though not by a wide margin, on the ground that "he kept us out of war" and soon after he made the peace proposals that failed. Then came the message from Germany announcing the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare.

Having frustrated Wilson's attempts at mediation by refusing to state its terms, the German government was confronted with the necessity of ending the war by military measures. The campaigns of 1916 had convinced Hindenburg, who was now chief of staff, and Ludendorff, his principal assistant, that land armies alone could not bring the war to a successful conclusion within a short time. What they pressed for in the most urgent manner was immediate resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, for in it they saw the means to quick victory. There were also internal reasons demanding a speedy victory. By the end of 1916 the blockade of Germany had become really stringent. The Germans, it is true, were still importing considerable food from countries within the cordon, but their supplies of fertilizer and fodder upon which the home production was dependent were now largely cut off. With fats, meats, and milk scarce, the diet was limited in the main to bread and potatoes. The summer of 1916 had also seen the potato crop fail and in the succeeding winter, known as the "turnip winter," coarse fodder-turnips became the principal fare for many. An American correspondent who was in Germany at the time wrote: "No German will ever forget the terrible turnip winter of 1916-1917. . . . The writer has seen his own children come into the house from their play, hungry and asking for a slice of bread, and go back to their games with a piece of turnip because there was no bread to give them. The turnip winter was one of unusual severity, and it was marked by a serious shortage of fuel. Thus the sufferings from cold were added to the pangs of hunger. There was furthermore already an insufficiency of clothing."

The demands of the two generals for unrestricted submarine warfare were supported by many civilian leaders, who saw that if something were not done soon to bolster the morale of both soldiers and civilians it would collapse. So the program was readopted. The "unrestricted" was necessary because it had previously been demonstrated that the U-boats could not be used successfully so long as they did not sink all ships without regard for passengers and crews. As the Germans had been building submarines at top speed since

⁶ S. M. Bouton, *And the Kaiser Abdicates* (1919), p. 67.



International News.

AN AMERICAN SUPPLY DEPOT IN FRANCE; FIRST WORLD WAR

the first campaign, there were many at hand and steps were taken at once to announce that in certain areas, including the waters round the British Isles, every ship, whether Allied or neutral, was liable to be sunk without notice after February 1, 1917.

Neither Hindenburg nor Ludendorff nor any other high German official seems to have been informed as to the temper and potentialities of the United States. Like most Germans they probably believed, as Mr. Gerard, the United States ambassador to Germany, stated it, that President Wilson had been elected with a mandate to keep out of the war at any cost, and that America could be insulted, flouted, and humiliated with impunity. They knew that the United States had no great standing army and they were certain that even if this country did join the Allies the submarine would obtain a victory for Germany before any sizable American force could be developed and transported to Europe. "Give us only two months of this kind of warfare," the German foreign secretary said to Ambassador Gerard, "and we shall end the war and make peace within three months." Ludendorff himself wrote afterwards: "With the help of our submarines we reckoned on a decision in our favor at the latest before America and her new armies could intervene in the war."

When Count Bernstorff, the German ambassador in Washington, received official notice from his government that unrestricted submarine warfare would begin again on February 1, he sought to have the order canceled or at least to have its inauguration postponed. But Germany had other ideas. Accordingly he informed the Department of State of the decision on the evening of January 31. "After all that had happened," he later wrote, "I could but regard this intimation as a declaration of war against the United States, and one which, in addition, put us in the wrong." A few days later, on February 3, President Wilson appeared before the Congress to announce the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany and at the same time sounded the warning that "if American ships and American lives should in fact be sacrificed by their commanders in heedless contravention of the just and reasonable understandings of international law and the obvious dictates of humanity, I shall take the liberty of coming again before the Congress, to ask that authority be given me to use any means that may be necessary for the human right, of which we are only a single champion."

The warning went unheeded. On March 12 the steamer *Algonquin* was torpedoed and sunk without warning off the English coast. Although no lives were lost, the sinking constituted an "overt act"

and was followed by others in rapid succession. Public opinion became more and more hostile and from all sides came the demand for a declaration of war. Finally President Wilson, feeling that he could no longer postpone active participation, appeared before a joint meeting of both Houses to ask that the Congress "formally accept the status of belligerent which has been thrust upon it." The resolution which made the United States a belligerent was passed and was formally signed by the President on April 6.⁷ To the last he had endeavored to keep the United States out of the war so that he, as the representative of a country not at war, could act as mediator in the conflict. It had been a purpose he cherished above all others, but the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare had caused him to lose his strategic hold on the situation.

The entrance of the United States strengthened the confidence of the Allies. They did not know, however, whether this country could do more than furnish supplies and naval support. But the people were determined not to rest content with half measures. All the immense resources of the United States, man power no less than materials, were at once consecrated to the cause for which the Allies were fighting. The German army leaders who professed to have little apprehension of the effect of the United States' entry into the war were astounded at the speedy adoption of compulsory military service and at the pressure exerted to prevent supplies from reaching Germany through the Scandinavian countries and Holland. Before many months had passed they were to realize that they had blundered greatly.



THE COLLAPSE OF RUSSIA

The United States entered the war none too soon, for Russia, shaken by revolution, was about to drop out. Russia had long been ripe for revolution. Dissatisfaction with the political regime and the social order had been characteristic of the country throughout the nineteenth century. Every war in which it became involved during that period had called forth an uprising against the existing regime, the central feature of which was the autocracy of the tsar. In the early centuries when the country was exposed to invasion from all sides the people had readily submitted to the most absolute rule in return for protection. Though the need had passed, the tsars did

⁷ In the wake of the United States other nations including Cuba, Panama, Brazil, China, Liberia, Siam, and Greece joined the Allies. Guatemala, Costa Rica, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Honduras followed in 1918.

not abdicate any of their power. Thus at the beginning of the twentieth century Russia was still ruled by an autocracy. The will of the tsar was the supreme law. He was the head of an administration composed of a group of ministers completely subordinate to him and of a huge bureaucracy that was no less corrupt than inefficient. The chief care was not the welfare of the people but the suppression of every attempt to modernize and reform the government. No means were left untried to inculcate blind submission to the tsar. Perhaps the most effective was the Holy Orthodox Church. Whereas in western Europe the church stood as an independent power, in Russia it was a kind of administrative department of the state. Since Peter the Great had replaced the patriarchate with the Holy Synod, a college of dignitaries chosen by the tsar, the latter could say not only, "I am the state" but also, "I am the church." It became the official concern of the church to invest the tsar with a sacred character by teaching the masses that he was the vicegerent of the Almighty on earth and as such must be obeyed without question. Woe to the individual or group who expressed doubts about his divine mission or who attempted to counteract it.

The government might forbid all expression of opinion upon political subjects and all free political action but it could not repress the Russian mind. No civilized people could remain content for long with a system so arbitrary, so unjust, so corrupt, so inefficient. Underneath the surface the forces of revolution, like the forces of a great volcano, were gathering for an enormous eruption. In every class except the upper clergy and the large landlords, who together formed the main prop of the throne, the leaven of revolt was working. Among the intelligentsia, which was excluded from participation in politics, there were many who had long been hatching lofty utopian schemes of revolution while others were demanding such sober reforms as civil liberties and representative government.

Even the peasants, who constituted the bulk of the people, were in a revolutionary mood. Until 1861, when they were emancipated by Tsar Alexander II, most of them had been serfs bound to the soil and subject to the arbitrary whims of their landlords, with but little opportunity to escape the blight of poverty and ignorance. Upon being freed each had received a small plot of land which he was required to redeem by annual payments extending over a period of forty-nine years.⁸ This did not, however, solve the economic problem of the peasant. Many were, in fact, worse off than they had

⁸ All outstanding redemption payments were canceled in 1905.

been before. Most of the plots were too small for adequate maintenance and for meeting the annual redemption payments; consequently an intense land hunger developed which vented itself in demands for more land and in continued agrarian riots.

Equally discontented was the proletariat, which was increasing with the growth of large-scale machine industry. The grievances of the industrial working class were low wages, long hours, bad working and housing conditions, and the government's refusal to permit the workers to organize trade unions. The feeling that they were being exploited not only kindled in their minds a hatred for the existing regime but also made them highly receptive to the Marxist ideas that were filtering into Russia.

All the discontented parties had hoped that Nicholas II, who became tsar in 1894, would take steps to reform the government, establish some kind of constitution, and promulgate measures to improve the conditions of the peasantry and the proletariat. When he dashed this hope by declaring that he was determined to preserve the *status quo*, various groups began to organize as a means of achieving their demands. The strongest moderate group was the Constitutional Democratic Party or Cadets (from the initial letters of the party's Russian name), composed of merchants, manufacturers, liberal gentry, and the professional class of the *bourgeoisie*. This party aspired to a constitutional monarchy on the English model. The most extreme group, excepting the anarchists, was the Social Revolutionary Party whose basic tenet was seizure of the land of the nobility. This, together with the destruction of the Romanov autocracy, they hoped to achieve through such individual acts of terror as the assassination of high government officials. The members of this party were convinced that no revolution could succeed without peasant participation. But the group that was later to play the major role was the left wing of the Social Democratic Party. Marxist disciples, making the most of the discontent of the proletariat, had worked feverishly for some years to convert the workers and to organize them in local societies. In 1898 these societies combined to form the Social Democratic Labor Party. Before many years passed differences of opinion began to appear within the party. The right wing believed that Russia was ready only for a "bourgeois" revolution and that this revolution in establishing freedom of speech and assembly would open the way for the ultimate realization of a socialist order. Such an attitude was too mild for the left wing led by Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, better known as Lenin. He would establish a socialist order by force at once. Because this group had

a small majority in the party at the time, it became known as the Bolsheviks (majority men), while the members of the right wing were called the Mensheviks (minority men).

Symptoms of revolution were manifest on all sides. In the words of Count Muraviev, minister of justice, "The general dissatisfaction with the existing regime has seized all sections of society. . . . Things cannot continue in this way for long." But the government took no heed of the fact that the social barometer was prophesying foul weather. Instead of trying to redress grievances, it embarked on imperialistic ventures in China and thereby became involved in war with Japan (1904). As one defeat after another both on land and on sea exposed the shameful incompetence and widespread corruption of the government, the various parties became more and more insistent for reform. The Cadets put forward their demands for freedom of speech and assembly and for representative institutions. The workers not only supported these demands but also others for higher wages and better conditions of labor. On January 22, 1905, which became known as "Red Sunday," under the leadership of Father Gapon a vast orderly procession of working people marching to present both the economic and the political demands to the tsar was brutally fired upon by the police and by troops who were loyal to the tsar. The news of the massacre spread over Russia like wild-fire. Strikes broke out in many towns, railway traffic was suspended in many places, and bands of peasants burned the houses and barns and seized the lands of their landlords. Finally in October, 1905, a general strike paralyzed the industry, commerce, and transportation of most of Russia. Chaos became so general that the government was forced to give way. On October 30 the tsar issued the so-called Freedom or October Manifesto which promised that a Duma or parliament would be elected on a democratic suffrage, that "civil liberties" would be established at once, and that the new assembly would have full legislative powers. It seemed as if the people had won a complete victory. But when the more radical groups who were not satisfied with the promised reforms continued their agitation, the moderates became alarmed and hastened to make peace with the government. This move encouraged the reactionaries, who were by no means subjugated, to inaugurate a policy of repression which they tried to justify with the assertion that the weakening of the executive power was ruining the country.

Although the reactionary forces were gaining strength, the law providing for a national Duma was still in existence and it was in the meeting of this body that all the hopes of the progressives were

centered. The meeting of the first Russian parliament in the spring of 1906 might, in fact, have marked the beginning of a great national transformation if the tsar had been more far sighted in his views. Unfortunately this was not the case. There were even doubts in the minds of some that he would permit the Duma to assemble. Nicholas did allow it to meet, thereby "saving his face"; but when he discovered that an overwhelming number of its members were opposition deputies, he at once took steps to circumscribe their powers. As the Duma could not see any way of reforming the government on the lines of the Freedom Manifesto so long as its legislative competency was limited, it made a fight on the question of rights and was promptly dissolved. Every possible means was employed by the government to influence the elections for the second Duma; nevertheless the voters again returned a majority of liberal members. After a session of three months this Duma was also dissolved. To make certain that the next one would be moderate and submissive, the tsar and his ministers devised a new electoral law which disfranchised most of the liberal voters and gave the large landowners a preponderance in the selection of deputies. This resulted in the election of a more submissive Duma, but it was hardly a representative assembly. Had the tsar and his ministers decided to work harmoniously with even this assembly, some progress might have been made toward a more representative government and the need for the revolution of 1917 might have been averted. But the tsar resented any interference or criticism on the part of the Duma.

Instead of becoming more liberal, Nicholas became more and more reactionary after the Revolution of 1905. It had taught him nothing whatsoever. He still failed to comprehend that there were new forces at work, that the Russia of his day could not be ruled on the same lines as the Russia of Peter the Great. In his heart he was sure that his country could be happy only under an autocrat. This conviction became even stronger after the tsarina presented him with a son and heir in 1904. Thereafter the desire to preserve the autocracy intact for his son gradually overshadowed everything else. Nevertheless it might yet have been possible to persuade Nicholas, whose great defect was a lack of will power and self-reliance, that his system was an anachronism in the twentieth century if he had not been under the domination of his consort, the Tsarina Alexandra. A woman of strong will, she was a born despot. Obsessed with the idea that only an autocratic regime could hold Russia together, she opposed all concessions to the liberals. Knowing that the tsar was often weak and vacillating she perpetually preached firmness,

telling him that for the sake of Russia and their son he must be an autocrat in deed as well as in name. "Be more autocratic, my very own sweetheart, show your mind," was one of her typical admonitions. Her baneful influence over the tsar is seen particularly in the fact that she encouraged him to choose his ministers for their political opinions rather than for their qualifications for office. The British ambassador to Russia aptly characterized her in the following words: "She misjudged the situation from the first, encouraging him, when the political waters were already running dangerously high, to steer a course fraught with danger to the ship of state. A good woman bent on serving her husband's interests, she is to prove the chosen instrument of his ruin."⁹

The tsarina, in turn, was surrounded by a group of unscrupulous and self-seeking adventurers who used her as an agent to further their own ends and ambitions. The outstanding member of this group was Grigoryi Efimovich, better known as Rasputin. To him above all others the tsarina looked for guidance before giving advice to the tsar. Born in a Siberian village as the son of an illiterate moujik, he had in early manhood earned for himself the nickname Rasputin, meaning *debauchee*. About the age of thirty this half-illiterate peasant had "gotten religion" and become a roving "man of God." Despite the fact that his life was no less dissolute than before, he gradually acquired the reputation of a holy man and was credited with the gifts of healing and prophecy. In 1903 his wanderings took him to St. Petersburg, where he was soon introduced into the court circle. Later when the heir of the imperial couple was found to be afflicted with the dread disease of haemophilia, Rasputin was able to convince the tsarina that he was indispensable to her son's well-being. Whenever the tsarevich became ill, he would mumble incantations over the child and improvement would set in at once. Before long his ascendancy over the tsarina was so complete that she urged the tsar from one folly to another in order to satisfy the wishes of "the man of God," the name she used when referring to Rasputin. At first the dissolute "holy man" contented himself with securing for his friends and adherents high appointments in the Orthodox Church but later he began to take a hand in politics. Through his influence over the tsarina he was able to obtain vacant ministries for his friends and even secure the dismissal of ministers who opposed him, thereby further discrediting the Romanov rule and hastening its downfall.

When the news of Germany's declaration of war arrived on Au-

⁹ Sir George Buchanan, *My Mission to Russia*, vol. 1, p. 76.

gust 1, 1914, a wave of patriotic enthusiasm swept over Russia, giving the lie to the prediction of the German ambassador that the declaration would precipitate a revolution. War against Germany was as popular as the Russo-Japanese war had been unpopular. In St. Petersburg a mob attacked the German embassy, threw the furniture into the street, and even tumbled from its pedestal the large equestrian statue on the façade. On Sunday, August 2, hundreds of thousands of Russians from all classes stood for hours in the blazing sun to catch a glimpse of the tsar, while other thousands sang "God Save the King" in front of the British embassy. Some days later in Moscow, where he went to pray in the churches of the Kremlin, Nicholas was greeted with a never-ending cheer. Many in their enthusiasm even kissed the ground over which he passed. Everywhere workmen called off strikes, and the members of the various political parties put away their differences. In the Duma, which the tsar convoked for an extraordinary session, all the deputies excepting a few of the extreme left swore an oath of loyalty to the throne and to Holy Russia. A new comradeship seemed to have sprung up between the tsar and his people, one which gave the promise of better things after a period of bitter strife. Only a few saw disaster ahead, and one of these was Rasputin. He perceived that the foundations of the imperial structure had rotted away to such an extent that any serious strain would cause it to collapse in a heap of ruins. When the order for general mobilization was given, he sent the following telegram to Madame Vyrubova, inseparable companion and confidante of the tsarina: "Let Papa (the tsar) not plan war. It will be the end of Russia and all of us. We shall be destroyed to the last man."

The military successes during the first weeks seemed to bear out the optimism with which the Russians entered the war; but when defeat followed, the weaknesses of the regime began to emerge in new proportions. It soon became clear that the government had failed to prepare properly for the war. When the troops wished to resist the German invasion they found themselves face to face with an enemy well equipped with modern machinery, guns, and artillery while they lacked some of the most essential supplies. Not only were food and medicine insufficient but there was also a shortage of armaments and munitions. The military machine was, in fact, inferior in everything but numbers and courage. From the very outset the army had only sixty batteries of artillery against Germany's 381; it had only about 12 per cent of the machine guns it needed; and before many weeks passed there was a serious shortage



British Combine

FRENCH TANKS IN ACTION: FIRST WORLD WAR

of rifles. "The shortage of rifles was so great," Sir George Buchanan wrote, "that a considerable percentage of the men had to wait unarmed till they could pick up the rifles of their fallen comrades." Even more serious was the lack of munitions. During the years before the war the government had prepared a quantity of munitions which it regarded as sufficient for a war of any length. But this stock was used up so rapidly that as early as October, 1914, a circular order called for the greatest possible economy in the use of artillery munitions. During the succeeding weeks the shortage of other kinds of munitions also became critical. Sir George Buchanan tells the story in the following words: "On September 25th General Joffre had inquired whether Russia's supply of ammunition was sufficient to meet the prevailing high rate of consumption, and had received the comforting assurance that there was no cause for anxiety on that score. Then suddenly, on December 18, the French ambassador and I were informed by the chief of staff that, though Russia had in her depots men enough and to spare to make good her colossal losses in the war, she had no rifles wherewith to arm them and that her reserves of artillery ammunition were exhausted. This announcement came as a bolt from the blue."

The problem of obtaining the necessary supplies and munitions was not easy to solve. Industries were still backward and could not fill the needs of the army. Not only did Russia not have sufficient munitions factories, the ratio being about one to every 150 operated by Great Britain, but those she had often lacked the necessary machinery and skilled labor. The military authorities had at the beginning of the war withdrawn most of the skilled laborers from the factories in order to fill the need for technical service at the front. In time refugees, prisoners of war, and women filled their places but the rate of production was very low. Nor was it easy to obtain supplies from the other entente powers because Russia was very largely blockaded. Soon after the start of the war the land frontiers toward Europe and also most of the seaways had been closed. While the German fleet dominated the Baltic, Turkey held the Dardanelles. This left Russia only three seaports—Archangel, Murmansk, and Vladivostok—each one of which had its special inconveniences. Archangel, being in the White Sea, was ice bound during much of the year; Murmansk, though an ice-free port, was without communications until the Murmansk Railway was built in 1916; and Vladivostok, on the Pacific, was separated from European Russia by the vast expanse of Siberia, traversed by only a single-track railway.

Although the Russians were still able to take the offensive on

occasion, the heavy losses in battle and the confusion in internal affairs were gradually undermining the morale of the soldiers and unchaining the smoldering discontent of the civilians. Both saw what they had hoped would be a quick victory turning into a long defeat. As a result mass desertions became common in the army, and the civilian population became restive. Discouragement and discontent expressed themselves in bitter criticism of the government and, in particular, of the tsar and the tsarina. It was bruited about that the sympathies of the tsarina were with the enemy and that Rasputin was in German pay. In June, 1915, an excited mob in Red Square even insulted the portraits of the tsar and tsarina and demanded the removal of Rasputin. At the front the situation became so desperate that the tsar decided to take personal command of the army in September of the same year. After his departure for headquarters the tsarina and her group of reactionaries virtually governed Russia,¹⁰ and Rasputin whom the tsarina consulted on all important matters exercised a greater influence than ever. "The situation," she said, "requires firmness." She would show her husband that firmness could put an end to the disorder and confusion. If a minister opposed her will, she did not rest until he was dismissed. The result was that ministers succeeded each other with startling rapidity and the confusion in the government increased. Several members of the imperial family who saw the danger of revolution tried to open her eyes to the gravity of the situation and the true character of Rasputin. But it was to no avail. Finally in December, 1916, three nobles took it upon themselves to deliver Russia from her evil genius. First they gave him poison; but when that had no effect, they shot him. Then to make sure that he would not come back to life, they put his body under the ice in the Neva River.

The news of Rasputin's assassination thrilled Russia, but his death came too late to prevent the revolution. The estrangement between the autocracy and the people was so complete that a reconciliation was no longer possible. By this time conditions were about as bad as they could be. The army was defeated and dispirited, and in the civilian population the discontent had reached the boiling point. Some were even openly proclaiming revolution to be the only cure for the political gangrene which had set in. The atmosphere was so tense that almost any cause would have been sufficient

¹⁰ Some insight into the mind of the tsarina may be gained from reading the advice she gave her husband. "Remember to comb your hair before all difficult talks and decisions," she wrote; "the little comb [probably blessed by Rasputin] will bring its help."

to start a revolution. As it was, causes were not lacking. Poor transportation and faulty distribution, coupled with a reduced harvest, had resulted in a shortage of foodstuffs in the larger cities. Those who wished to purchase food found it necessary to wait for hours in long queues. In some of the working-class districts "bread was scarcely to be obtained at all."

On March 8, 1917, the discontent vented itself in a strike of about 90,000 workers in Petrograd,¹¹ followed by street demonstrations and the display of banners bearing the inscription, "Down with Autocracy." The demonstrators were soon joined by women demanding bread; and on each of the following days the demonstrations were repeated on a larger scale. When the tsar was informed of the growing seriousness of the situation, he made no attempt to remove the causes but ordered the commander of the garrison to disperse the rioters by force. Even then the revolution might have been averted for a time if the commander had been able to carry out the order. But the troops, sympathizing with the people, refused to fire on the crowds. More than this, the soldiers gradually joined them. So the city passed completely into the hands of the revolutionaries. By March 12 the tsarist rule had disintegrated so completely that the Duma appointed a provisional government to take charge of affairs. The next day the tsar with some of his ministers started for Petrograd in a special train, but the trainmen sidetracked the train. Realizing that the game was played out, Nicholas abdicated his throne (March 15). Thus with but little bloodshed the rule of the Romanovs came to an end.¹²

In the Allied countries the news of the revolution was received with rejoicing. Previously the fact that autocratic Russia was fighting on their side had tended to weaken the effect of the statement that they were fighting for freedom and justice. Now they could say with greater conviction that they were fighting to "make the world safe for democracy." Moreover, they were convinced that the elimination of the autocracy would strengthen Russia's determination and increase her capacity for war.

But the joy of the Allies was short lived. The provisional government was unable to redeem its promise to prosecute the war vigorously. Its members were completely out of harmony with the desires of the people as a whole. They failed to realize that for the

¹¹ At the outbreak of the war the name of St. Petersburg had been changed to Petrograd; in 1924 it was again changed to Leningrad.

¹² Seventeen months later Nicholas and his family together with their attendants were summarily put to death at Ekaterinburg by agents of the Bolsheviks.

peasant the revolution meant seizure of the estates of their landlords and that the workers coveted control of the factories in which they worked. Furthermore, the provisional government failed to realize that Russia was thoroughly war weary. Above everything else the soldiers wanted to go home. Their main idea, according to General Gourko, chief of the Russian staff, "was to stop the war, so that they might the sooner benefit by the fruits of the revolution."¹³ At home the people were equally tired of the war and wanted an end to what they regarded as "senseless slaughter." Drunk with the new wine of liberty, all felt that the revolution meant they could do what they pleased. The result was anarchy, with the workers refusing to work, the peasants to pay rent and taxes, and the soldiers to fight. What the situation needed was a determined leader, but the provisional government did not include such a man. Being typical liberals, its members lacked the ruthlessness necessary to win the respect of the masses.

In an effort to win the support of the disaffected parties the provisional government was reorganized (May, 1917) with Alexander Kerensky as its head. It was hoped that since he was a Social Revolutionary both the workers and the peasants would accept his leadership and that the soldiers would submit to discipline at his behest. The experiment failed. The more radical groups were determined to be satisfied with nothing less than a thorough-going social revolution. When the old police ban was lifted, thousands of political exiles flocked back into Russia eager to play a part in political life. These were the real enemies of the provisional government. Among them was Lenin, acknowledged leader of the Bolsheviks, who together with some of his followers returned from Switzerland in the famous "sealed train" furnished him by the German government. No sooner did he set foot in Petrograd than he called for the overthrow of the provisional government and the establishment of working-class control. With the help of Léon Trotsky he took over the soviets (councils of workers) and soon the streets were ringing with the slogan, "All power to the soviets." Lenin knew exactly what he wanted and was determined to get it at any cost. What he wanted was to establish a soviet republic. In the words of Maxim Litvinov,¹⁴ "Russia must become not a bourgeois democratic but a soviet republic, that is, a commonwealth in which the central power would belong to a central committee of all the soviets in the country, and the local government would be carried on by the local soviets or

¹³ *Memories and Impressions of War and Revolution in Russia*, p. 276.

¹⁴ *The Bolshevik Revolution*, p. 27.

delegates from the working classes and the poorer peasantry, as the sole organs of the state." Capitalizing his knowledge of the exigencies of the situation and his understanding of the masses, Lenin was quickly able to gain support from the soldiers and peasants by promising the former peace and the latter land.

Throughout the summer and early fall of 1917 the Bolshevik cause gradually gained in strength and at the beginning of November Lenin declared that the time had come to overthrow the provisional government. The night of November 6–7 saw picked groups of Bolsheviks quietly seize the railway stations, the fortresses and military staff quarters, the central postal, telegraph, and telephone offices, and the state bank. A cruiser was also stationed on the Neva ready, if necessary, to bombard the Winter Palace, which was the headquarters of the provisional government. This was unnecessary, for the members of the government meekly submitted to arrest the next day. The provisional government was overthrown as easily as the tsarist government had been some months earlier. Russia was proclaimed a "soviet republic" and before the Congress of Soviets which assembled the same day Lenin announced, "We shall now proceed to construct the Socialist Order." A new government was set up under the title of Soviet (Council) of Peoples' Commissars, with Lenin at its head; then the congress proceeded to adopt three decrees submitted by him. First, it offered to conclude an immediate peace on the basis of "no indemnities, no annexations." Second, the lands hitherto in possession of private landlords were declared confiscated and their use transferred to the peasants. Third, control of production was vested in soviets or working-class committees. Thus a small but determined minority took over the rule of Russia.

As head of the government Lenin at once declared a cessation of hostilities, and in December opened peace negotiations with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk. In January the conference broke up for a time because Lenin felt that the German terms were too severe. But the Germans were determined to impose their terms, and orders were given for the army to advance toward Petrograd. Since the Russian troops were in no condition to stop the advance, there was no other course open to Lenin but to accept the German terms. On March 13, 1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed. It required Russia to renounce sovereignty in favor of the Central Powers over Russian Poland, Courland, Livonia, and Estonia. In addition she had to cede Ardahan, Kars, and Batum to Turkey; recognize the independence of Finland, the Ukraine, and Georgia; and agree to reparations payments in the amount of six billion marks. In short,

European Russia was completely dismembered for the benefit of the Central Powers. When Rumania also dropped out of the war early in 1918,¹⁵ Germany's work of winning the war on the eastern front was finished. But victory on the western front was another problem.



THE GREAT GERMAN DRIVE

Meanwhile the Germans had started the unrestricted submarine campaign which, they were certain, would end the war in a few weeks. The gamble was no wild one. At first it was so successful that it really augured defeat for the Allies. During the month of April alone the U-boats sank 881,027 tons of shipping. For a time one out of every four ships leaving British ports was torpedoed. The Allies sent out many patrol boats to hunt down the submarines, and the British navy sowed mines near the submarine bases. But despite such methods of defense the campaign was proving successful. Submarines were being built several times as fast as they could be destroyed, the British mines were being swept up almost as fast as they were planted, and, worst of all, ships were being sunk several times as fast as they could be replaced. Had the Germans maintained the high rate of sinkings, Great Britain would soon have been unable to maintain its part in the war. However, the Allies did devise methods to combat the menace successfully. In May, 1917, the "convoy system" was adopted; in other words, ships went out in large fleets protected by warships. This system, together with the use of depth bombs and ship camouflage, greatly reduced losses. By the midsummer of 1917 the German leaders realized that their attempt to gain a quick victory with the submarine had failed. Thenceforth to the armistice 88,000 Allied ships were convoyed, with the loss of only 436 vessels. Perhaps even more remarkable is the fact that not one eastbound United States troopship was sunk.

By the end of 1917 the nations on both sides, excepting the United States for which the year was one of preparation, were war weary. For the Allies it had been full of disappointments. Not only had the collapse of Russia and Rumania been a severe blow to their hopes but in the fall the Italians had also suffered a serious defeat which caused a great reduction in Italian morale. Furthermore, the French attempt in the spring to smash the German line on the western front "at one blow of a gigantic fist," as General Nivelle put it, had failed. The British had made some gains on the western front, but only in the Near East had they been uniformly successful.

¹⁵ The treaty of Bucharest was signed on May 7, 1918.

The news that General Allenby had entered Jerusalem in December, 1917, caused much rejoicing in Allied circles. Among the Central Powers the war weariness was equally widespread. While Turkey was at the point of exhaustion, Bulgaria, having gained the territory she wanted, was "unwilling to make further effort." In Austria-Hungary conditions were rapidly nearing a crisis. The Austro-Hungarian ship of state was so rotten and leaking so badly at the seams that it appeared unlikely to remain afloat much longer. Even in Germany the situation was critical. Not only had the food problem not been solved but the question of man power was also becoming acute. So many men had been and were being taken into the armed forces that it was increasingly difficult to man the farms and the essential industries.

At the beginning of 1918 the German leaders tried to whip up the flagging energies of the people for one more great effort. They told them that conditions on the Allied side were such that a determined effort would force a victory before the United States could transport large numbers of troops to Europe. The offensive on the western front, Ludendorff told the kaiser, "will be an immense struggle but it will be victorious." Indeed, conditions seemed favorable to German success. Whereas the reserves of the French and British were seriously depleted, the Germans as a result of the collapse of Russia and Rumania were free to move to the western front most of the troops that had previously been fighting the Russians and Rumanians. Furthermore they had an advantage in being able to mass their troops at those points at which they planned to break through the Allied lines, while the Allies had to be prepared to defend their lines at all points. As early as November, 1917, the German general staff had begun the transfer of troops from east to west and by the beginning of spring everything was ready for the supreme effort.

The great attack was launched at dawn on March 21. Although the Allied lines held at some points, they gave way at others. Week after week the Germans made gains until at one point they were again on the Marne. In advancing they had captured 225,000 prisoners and inflicted almost a million casualties. From a distance of nearly seventy-five miles a small group of guns dropped shells on Paris. Although this bombardment accomplished no results of military importance, it did greatly alarm the people of Paris. Victory appeared to be within German reach and many on the Allied side were beginning to believe that their efforts and sacrifices during the four years of war would go for nothing.

But the situation was not so hopeless as some believed. In the great drive the Germans had spent so much man power and used so many supplies that they lacked the necessary energy to achieve the final breakthrough. The weakening of the offensive together with the rapid arrival of troops from the United States sustained the hope of the Allies. At first there had been many in the United States who insisted upon an army of volunteers; ex-President Theodore Roosevelt even offered his services as leader of a division which he would raise. But President Wilson doubted the wisdom of sending a small volunteer force. He saw that the United States must send great numbers of troops to the front if the Allies were to defeat the Germans. He appointed Major General John J. Pershing commander-in-chief of the so-called American Expeditionary Force and on June 14, 1917, Pershing and his staff reached Paris to make preparations for the arrival of the national army from the United States. Up to January 1, 1918, only small contingents arrived in France, but during the early months of 1918 troops began arriving in ever increasing numbers. The six months after March 21 saw no less than one and one half million "Yanks" disembark in France.¹⁶ Although most of them had had only a few months of training, they were eager and confident. The appearance of these troops in itself was a great moral tonic to the weary Allies.



ALLIED VICTORY

Thus the mobilized strength of the Allies was being increased in preparation for a counterattack. The threat of the German drive had finally caused the Allies to establish a unity of command under General Foch, who believed that "to make war is to attack." When the Germans reached the Marne, he decided that the time had come to translate this principle into practice. In making his plans he hesitated to use the newly trained United States troops for purposes of attack because he feared that they would not keep their organization under the strain of battle. "The prevailing opinion among the Allies," General Pershing wrote, "was that American units were suitable only for the defensive." The need for troops was, however, so desperate that Foch finally decided to use the American soldiers. The plan was to cut off the German bulge at Château-Thierry, the United States attacking from one side and the French from the other. So determined was the attack that the German positions in the salient

¹⁶ There were more than two million United States troops in France when the armistice was signed.

soon became untenable. Much to the surprise of the Germans as well as the Allies the "Yanks" had demonstrated their fighting abilities. A German army report of the battle states that "the qualities of the men individually may be described as remarkable. . . . They lack at present only training and experience to make formidable adversaries. The men are in fine spirits and are filled with naive assurance; the words of a prisoner are characteristic: 'We kill or get killed.'" While the success of the first operations fortified the confidence of the Allies, the unexpected strength of the attack shattered the German morale. Soon they began to withdraw all along the Marne salient. The Marne, which had been the high-water mark of German success in the drive of 1914, was also destined to be the high-water mark of their last desperate drive.


General Foch was not the man to let an opportunity slip through his hands. The first attack having proved successful, he ordered attacks at other points. When these also achieved their objectives, he decided to seek final victory that autumn instead of postponing the attempt until 1919. All the troops on the line from Verdun to the sea were to combine in a simultaneous offensive. The great assault was launched September 26. Americans, French, British, and Belgians attacked relentlessly. "Our dogged offensive," General Pershing stated, "was wearing down the enemy who continued desperately to throw his best troops against us, thus weakening his line in front of our Allies and making their advance less difficult." Each day the advance gained momentum. By September 30 the Hindenburg line was pierced to a depth of seven miles. Ludendorff, realizing that he lacked the means with which to repair the breaks, at once suggested that steps be taken to request an armistice, a suggestion which was supported by Hindenburg.

Meanwhile the first break had also occurred in the ranks of the Central Powers. Bulgaria, her armies shattered, was forced to capitulate and on September 30 concluded an armistice. The collapse of Bulgaria, together with the continued reverses, finally convinced even the kaiser that the time had come to ask for peace. On October 3 Prince Max of Baden was made Imperial Chancellor and the next day he appealed for an armistice to President Wilson, who was the Germans' hope for a tolerable peace.

Having been forced into the war against his will, Wilson endeavored to keep the war as idealistic as possible. Repeatedly he expressed the sentiment that the United States was "fighting for no advantage or selfish object of her own, but for the liberation of peoples everywhere from the aggressions of autocratic force." When

the vindictive spirit of certain groups became articulate he stated that "the voices of humanity insist that the war shall not end in vindictive action of any kind; that no nation or people shall be robbed or punished because the irresponsible rulers of a single country have themselves done deep and abominable wrong" (speech of December 4, 1917). As these statements show, he made a sharp distinction between the German people and the German government. "We are not," he stated, "the enemies of the German people and . . . they are not our enemies. They did not originate or desire this hideous war or wish that we should be drawn into it; and we are vaguely conscious that we are fighting their cause, as they will some day see it, as well as our own." On the other hand, the German authorities, particularly the kaiser and the military clique, he regarded as "the ruthless masters of the German people." These masters, he said, had enslaved the German people. More than this, "the war was begun by the military masters of Germany." Against these masters the Allies must fight until a final and complete victory has been achieved. Then, when they are defeated, "the German people will thrust them aside" and a just and honorable peace will be made. In short, the President stated in unmistakable terms that peace could not be discussed until the "masters of the German people" were overthrown.

Nor did Wilson stop at stating with whom he would make peace; he also formulated the terms and principles on which the peace must be based. These were embodied in the so-called Fourteen Points which he proclaimed in his address of January 8, 1918. With the Fourteen Points he tried to show the way to a new world. First, there were to be no more secret treaties; all international agreements must be "open covenants, openly arrived at." Second, there must be "absolute freedom of navigation upon the sea, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war." Third, so far as possible all economic barriers to trade must be removed. Fourth, national armaments must "be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." Fifth, all colonial claims must be adjusted on the basis of the interests of the populations involved. Other principles which the President laid down were those of "no annexations" and "national self-determination." The last of the Fourteen Points, and the greatest in the President's mind, stated that "a general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants." This League of Nations should not only prevent future conflicts but also guarantee the enforcement of the terms and principles outlined in the Fourteen Points. "The free peoples of the world," he had stated



Underwood

THE RAILWAY CAR IN WHICH THE ARMISTICE OF 1918 WAS SIGNED; IN FRONT OF LES INVALIDES, PARIS

earlier, "must draw together in some common covenant, some genuine and practical cooperation that will in effect combine their forces to secure peace and justice in the dealings of nations with one another. The brotherhood of man must no longer be a fair but empty phrase; it must be given a structure of force and reality."

The Fourteen Points must be listed among the greatest pronouncements ever made by the responsible head of a great government. Outstanding leaders had in the past put forward programs for world betterment, but the central aim of all of them had been the aggrandizement of themselves, their organizations, or their countries. Not so with President Wilson. Although the idea of personal distinction undoubtedly entered into his proclamation, he was not asking anything for himself or for his country. His was a vision of a better world for mankind as a whole. There was, to be sure, no lack of adverse criticism. Some even accused him of speaking "like God Almighty," but to the peace-loving masses of the world who for years had suffered privations the pronouncement was indeed the gospel of better things to come. And by no peoples was it more gladly received than by the masses of Austria-Hungary and Germany. They believed that Wilson, as leader of the Allies, could persuade the other belligerent nations to accept his principles. That is why the German government addressed its appeal for an armistice to President Wilson.

The request which he received not only asked him "to take in hand the restoration of peace"; it also stated that "the German Government accepts the program set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his later pronouncements . . . as a basis for peace negotiations." In other words, the German government accepted the Fourteen Points as the basis for peace. Similar appeals were also addressed to the President by Austria-Hungary and by Turkey. In his reply Wilson requested clarification of the German note, asking whether "the Chancellor speaks" for the German people or "merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war." When the Chancellor answered that he "speaks in the name of the German government and of the German people," the German people generally leaped to the conclusion that the offer would be accepted. As a result excitement ran high in Germany. An Amsterdam dispatch to a London paper declared: "People in Berlin are kissing one another in the streets, though they are perfect strangers, and shouting peace congratulations to each other. The only words heard anywhere in Germany are 'peace at last.'" However, the sink-

ing of the British steamer *Leinster* with the loss of hundreds of lives of noncombatants while the negotiations were being carried on caused the President to sharpen his tone. His reply clearly stated that a change in the German government constituted "a condition precedent to peace." The answer, as Senator Reed put it, was "an unequivocal demand that the Hohenzollern shall get out."

Nevertheless, the kaiser still refused to abdicate. Although the German armies were everywhere in retreat and in danger of destruction, he did not stop trying to stir the nation to new efforts for victory in the hope of saving his throne. But the situation was beyond redemption. Mutterings of discontent were growing louder. In Berlin an enormous crowd assembled before the Reichstag building on October 25 calling for the abdication of the kaiser and the formation of a republic.

Before the end of October the second nation dropped out of the ranks of the Central Powers. It was Turkey. The capture by General Allenby of Damascus in September and of Aleppo in October had checkmated the remaining Turkish forces and rendered them helpless. There was nothing for them to do but to lay down their arms. On October 30 Turkey signed an armistice which, like that of Bulgaria, was tantamount to unconditional surrender. On October 27 Austria had also requested an armistice. In the week which followed, the Italians swept the Austrians out of northern Italy, entered Trent in the Alps and Trieste on the Adriatic, and captured 300,000 prisoners. The result was Austria-Hungary's unconditional surrender on November 3. Following this surrender the Emperor Charles abdicated and the Dual Empire disintegrated into states representing the various nationalities. Before his abdication the emperor had, in fact, appointed a liquidation ministry to hand over the imperial powers to the national governments that were taking form. Thus Germany stood alone.

Up to the end of July the majority of the German people had still been confident of victory. Then came the rude shock of discovering that their lines were crumbling. This, together with the lack of food and supplies and the collapse of Bulgaria, Turkey, and Austria-Hungary, caused a serious breakdown of morale and a growing resentment against the government that had given them false hopes. After four years of war the people wanted nothing more than peace. Although there were some among the conservatives who hoped to save the Hohenzollern rule, the majority, and particularly the parties of the left, openly demanded the kaiser's abdication when it became clear that they had to choose between the Hohen-

zollern and peace. One socialist deputy to the Reichstag even went so far as to voice the threat that "abdication would not save the kaiser from trial as the man who caused the war." A mutiny which broke out in the fleet at Kiel on November 3 set the spark of revolution spreading all over Germany. Four days later came the proclamation of a republic in Bavaria, followed by similar proclamations in other states. When the commanders decided against the employment of force to suppress the movement, the kaiser finally realized that he could not ride the storm. On the morning of November 9 he abdicated the throne and very prudently fled to Holland; there he took up his residence in the Chateau of Amerongen which had housed a former monarch in exile, Charles II of England.

In the meantime, as it became certain that the Germans were ready to yield, representatives of the Allies had gathered in Paris to formulate the terms for an armistice, and the German government had appointed an Armistice Commission to enter into negotiations. The German delegates were received by Marshal Foch on the morning of November 8 in a railroad car stationed in the forest of Compiègne. Reading in a loud voice and carefully dwelling upon each word, Foch presented the Allied terms to the group. They included, among other things, immediate evacuation of the invaded countries, surrender of large quantities of war materials, evacuation of the territories on the left bank of the Rhine, occupation by the Allied troops of the principal crossings of the Rhine (Mainz, Coblenz, Cologne), immediate repatriation, without reciprocity, of all Allied prisoners of war, renunciation of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk, surrender of all submarines with their complete armor and equipment, internment of German warships in neutral or Allied ports, and immobilization of all aircraft. Foch delivered the terms with the formal demand that they be accepted or refused within seventy-two hours. Astonished at the severity of the terms the delegates asked permission to communicate them to Berlin. A courier was dispatched to headquarters, whence the terms were telephoned to Berlin. The new government discussed them for hours before finally submitting to the inevitable and then only after instructing the delegates to protest the severity. The protests availing them nothing, the delegates signed the armistice on November 11 at 5 A.M., Paris time. Then Foch ordered the firing to cease along the entire front at 11 A.M. of the same day.

As the hands of the clock finally reached eleven, there came the sound of men cheering from the Vosges to the sea. Peace had come at last. After more than four years of suffering and bloodshed "the

fires of hell had been put out." The next day a correspondent wrote from Mons: "Last night, for the first time since August in the first year of the war, there was no light of gunfire in the sky, no sudden stab of flame through the darkness, no long, spreading glow above the black trees where for four years of night human beings were being smashed to death." Released from the tension of the conflict the peoples of the Allied world gave unrestrained expression to their joy. Paris, London, Rome, and New York went wild with uncurbed enthusiasm, an example that was followed on a smaller scale in every city and village of the Allied world. The hateful accusations that had been flung at the enemy were soon forgotten, but the voids which the war left in an untold number of homes were not filled so quickly. Millions had perished in battle, while other millions were physically wrecked or at least partially incapacitated. More men were killed in the First World War than in all the European wars that had been fought since the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789. It is estimated that of the sixty-five million who were mobilized, eight and a half million were killed or died of illness and more than twenty-one million were wounded. In addition there were nine million estimated civilian deaths from causes related to the war. In the principal European countries there was hardly a family in which some member had not been killed or maimed or was missing. As for the cost in money, the sums were so large that they become meaningless to the average mind. According to one estimate the total up to the time of the armistice was over \$300 billion.

The Paris Peace Conference

WILSONIAN IDEALISM

WORLD WAR I had not only drained many countries of their young men and depleted their finances; it had also wrought havoc with the entire fabric of society. The old monarchies had fallen to the ground like rotten fruit, and three empires—the Austro-Hungarian, the Russian, and the Turkish—had collapsed into ruins amidst which various national groups were clamoring for independence. The new states rising on the ruins of the old empires were organizing armies in order to seize the frontiers they coveted. Consequently, although the great fire of war had been quenched, nearly a score of little fires were soon burning fiercely, adding the horrors of civil war to the desolation created by the war that had just ended. Furthermore, starvation was stalking across Europe, leaving many thousands of dead in its wake. Over the entire Continent a spirit of unrest was brooding and in some lands chaos reigned supreme.

On all sides there were problems demanding immediate adjustment. There was, for example, the stupendous task of making a new map of the world and of reducing to order a territorial chaos incomparably greater than that after the fall of Napoleon. The main issue, however, was to prevent a repetition of the great catastrophe. These were the problems confronting the Peace Conference that was scheduled to meet at Paris in January, 1919. They would have taxed to the utmost the energies and abilities of any body of men even if they had been given ample time to solve them and full authority to make any change deemed necessary. But it must be remembered that the Peace Conference had neither unlimited time nor full authority.

However conflicting the aims of the various belligerents may previously have been, they all appeared to be unified in the Fourteen Points which President Wilson had laid down as a basis for the settlement. Not only had the Germans accepted this program but the Allies had also consented practically without reserve to conclude peace on the principles drafted by their American associate. Thus both sides were bound by a contract and there was no outward sign of differences. A new system of international relationships in which sectional interests and discredited diplomatic traditions were to have no place had been adopted. Territorial aggrandizement, balance of power, strategic frontiers, transfers of populations against their will were all part of a past which had been formally forsworn by the Allies. For the moment the future appeared promising and Wilson's success complete. All that remained, it seemed, was to work out the application of the Fourteen Points to specific problems.

But no sooner had the thunder of the guns died away than it became evident that the European leaders had learned nothing of the new gospel and forgotten nothing of the old. They had simply paid lip service to principles which they never seriously expected to translate into concrete enactments. With the enemy prostrate in defeat the selfish national aims and ambitions began to reassert themselves and Wilson was charged with sponsoring a program of "impossible idealism." Even before the armistice was signed Lloyd George had said: "Should we not make it clear to the German government that we are not going in on the Fourteen Points of peace?" During the weeks following the armistice he repeatedly objected to some of the principles of the Wilsonian program. This gave Clemenceau courage to come out into the open with his objections. On December 30 he announced before the Chamber of Deputies that France stood for the old alliances and the old balance of power. Before long it also became clear that the French leaders were resolved to stand for a strategic frontier on the Rhine and for the annexation of peoples for the sake of minerals. Various other leaders also proclaimed the idea that Germany was solely responsible for the war and must therefore pay the costs. On December 12 Lloyd George declared in a speech that the loser pays and one of his lieutenants went so far as to announce that he would "squeeze the lemon until the pips squeak." The secret treaties which the Allies had made among themselves early in the war were also resurrected. Though the collapse of Russia and the defeat of Rumania had eliminated some of these, there still remained commitments to Italy and Japan. It was not long before it became clear that both were

resolved to hold out for the full execution of the secret agreements.

President Wilson, who did not fail to perceive these changes, consoled himself with the idea that the peoples of Europe, if not their leaders, were on his side. "It is not men," he said, "that interest or disturb me primarily; it is ideas. Ideas live; men die." He believed that the great universal heart was really athirst for the new order as well as for peace, that the masses shared his hatred of war, militarism, and the old diplomacy, which bartered away peoples as chattels. In other words, he was convinced that the masses were passionately determined upon the kind of peace he himself desired, a peace in which there would be no room for the selfishness and narrow views that had characterized the proceedings of the powers in the past. Moreover he was convinced that with the masses on his side nothing on earth could successfully resist the establishment of the new order. On September 27, 1918, he had already asserted: "This is a peoples' war, not a statesmen's. Statesmen must follow the clarified common thought or be broken."

To make sure that the ideas of the people would prevail at Paris he decided to go there himself. As the spokesman of the masses he would see to it that "the moral forces that make for right and justice and liberty are united." The Paris journey was to him nothing less than an apostolic adventure, a sort of divine mission which would settle once and for all the questions which up to then had divided the peoples of the world and had formed obstacles to the dawning of an era of universal peace. No President in the history of the United States had assumed so important a role on the world's stage.

It was a proud day for Wilson when on December 4, 1918, he boarded the steamship *George Washington* in New York harbor. Although Republican leaders and a number of newspapers had expressed strong disapproval of his personal participation in the Conference, great crowds lined the waterfront to bid him success in his mission. As the ship carrying the President, his intimate advisers, and a group of experts on every country of the globe, moved toward the ocean, the craft in the harbor joined in a noisy farewell, the like of which New York had never heard. If he still entertained any doubts as to the support of the people, they were completely dispelled by the reception he was accorded in Europe. Eyewitnesses have stated that he was everywhere greeted with enthusiasm beyond description. Secretary of State Lansing who accompanied him later wrote in a critical vein: "No man ever received a more demonstrative welcome than did Mr. Wilson from the moment that the *George Washing-*

ton entered the harbor of Brest. It was a great popular ovation. His name was on every lip; throngs of admirers applauded him as he entered the special train for Paris and at the stations en route; and multitudes, delirious with enthusiasm, cheered him a welcome as he drove through the beflagged streets of the French capital in company with President Poincaré who met him at the Gare du Bois de Boulogne. It was a reception which might have turned the head of a man far less responsive than the President to public applause, and have given him an exalted opinion of his own power and accomplishment." On subsequent visits to England and Italy he was also greeted "with an emotion and delirium which only those who witnessed the progress could even imagine." It was for him the ultimate proof that the people of the three Allied nations stood unanimously in his support.

But Mr. Wilson erred in thinking that the masses of Europe shared his idealism. They did, it is true, hope that the American President might prove to be a sort of Messiah who would save them from the hard lot they had suffered in the past. But their ideas of justice were those of Old Testament vengeance and were the natural result of the sufferings they had endured during the war. For the people of the United States the war had been something distant. The American countryside was not devastated, nor were American cities destroyed. The people of the United States were well nourished and had made money as no others had. The war really came home to them only when the name of a relative or friend appeared on the casualty list. In Europe Belgians, Frenchmen, Italians, Serbs, and others had seen sections of their countries devastated and many homes destroyed. During the unrelenting struggle they had made vast sacrifices and suffered terrible hardships. In France and Belgium there was scarcely a home that had not been scared by the fires of war. Not only had millions of homes been bereft of the head of the household or of a son but many held the pitiful wreck of what once had been a sturdy man. All this had excited feelings of hatred and vengeance toward the Central Powers. These feelings had been lashed to a white heat by propagandists and the press. The people were told that the Germans were unspeakable barbarians, and in support of this statement tales of the most atrocious barbarities committed by them were circulated.

When the war suddenly came to an end, the people were expected to stifle these feelings overnight and to show a spirit of forgiveness toward the enemies they had been taught to hate. It was too much to expect of human nature. Actually the war mentality,

together with the thirst for vengeance, was still uppermost. The peoples of Europe, told by the propagandists that the war had been wantonly inflicted upon them by Germany, wanted compensation for their sacrifices and sufferings. No less than their leaders they preferred a strategic frontier and a coal field here or a bit of booty there to all the faint allurements of President Wilson's ideal. Above all, they expected the Germans not only to make reparation for damages they had caused but to pay the complete costs of the war. The English, for example, gave their representatives a mandate to collect the costs "to the last shilling." Nor were the French and Italians any less eager to grind their defeated enemy in the dust. Any British, French, or Italian minister who might have tried to commit his country to an altruistic venture would have lost his place at once.

It was particularly unfortunate for the President's program that Paris was chosen as the seat of the Peace Conference. A neutral city, such as Geneva or Lausanne, would have been infinitely preferable. Wilson, in fact, had advocated holding the conference on neutral soil. But the French, who insisted that it be held on French soil, were not to be denied. They believed that France, in bearing the brunt of the attack, had earned this honor. And which place, they argued, could be more fitting to consider the future of the German Empire than Versailles, the scene of its birth in 1871? When the matter was discussed by representatives of the Allied Powers, Clemenceau was firm in the choice of Versailles and succeeded in making his will prevail. Actually not Versailles but Paris with its superior accommodations became the scene of the deliberations. A worse place could hardly have been chosen for dispassionate discussion. Paris, which for years had been under a perpetual menace of invasion, was still vibrating with the hatreds of the war. "Arriving in Paris at the beginning of February," a British correspondent wrote, "I was at once struck by the bellicose temper which seemed to pervade the entire community, and even more by the vindictive tone of the press. The phrase *Nous sommes les vainqueurs* reappeared with wearisome iteration in the leading articles and furnished the staple argument for a denial of mercy to the beaten foe."¹ Later the President and his advisers regretted the choice, the President himself going so far as to suggest the removal of the conference to another city. But nothing came of the suggestion.

¹ *Contemporary Review*, vol. 117 (1920), p. 25.



ALLIED REALISM

By the beginning of 1919 all the hotels of Paris were crowded with delegations representing or pretending to represent almost every country of the globe. Only the defeated powers were not permitted to send delegations. Most of the delegations were large and included many experts on civil, military, and naval affairs in addition to hordes of secretaries, clerks, and typists. Those from Great Britain and the United States each comprised about four hundred members. Many of the smaller nations sent delegations of fifty or sixty.

The opening meeting, at which no less than thirty nations were represented, was an impressive scene. At three o'clock on the afternoon of January 18, 1919, President Poincaré of France said to the assembled representatives with a touch of emotion in his voice: "I leave you to your weighty deliberations. The Peace Conference is declared open." Thus the peacemakers were ready to begin formal discussions. But the real work was not done in the plenary sessions. Earlier at an informal meeting of the heads of the great powers it had been decided that in order to expedite the task the work should be done by the Council of Ten, comprised of two representatives each from Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States and by a series of special committees constituted to deal with such matters as the League of Nations, responsibility for the war, reparation for war damage, international economic problems, and a variety of other questions.

Plenary sessions, which all accredited representatives of the Allied Powers were permitted to attend, were convoked only a few times and were largely full-dress parades at which the decisions of the Council of Ten were announced. Except for the discussion on the League the plenary conference had little voice in the settlement; in fact, it did not receive the treaty in its totality until the day before it was handed to the German delegation. "Altogether a plenary session of the conference on the preliminaries of peace," Secretary of State Lansing, who was a member of the Council of Ten, wrote, "was a farce. It was never a deliberative assembly which reached an agreement by a frank exchange of views. The delegates were called together to listen, not to criticize or object to the program of the Council of Ten. They were there to go through the formality of registering their approval, whatever their real opinions might be." Representatives of the smaller states occasionally lifted

a piping treble of protest but no one paid any attention to them.

Eventually it was found more convenient that the important business of framing the conditions of the peace should be conducted by an even smaller group. So the Council of Ten was reduced to the Council of Four, composed of President Wilson, M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George, and Signor Orlando of Italy.² All the members of this group, popularly known as the Big Four, were men of outstanding ability. It was in Clemenceau that Wilson found his principal opponent and it was between the two that the main struggle took place. Clemenceau was cynical, witty, experienced in the ways of men, and a forceful speaker despite his seventy-seven years and his diabetes. For decades he had fought so relentlessly in the arena of French politics that he had earned the nickname "the Tiger." Becoming premier of France in the darkest hour of the war, the fierce old Tiger refused to entertain even a fleeting thought of discouragement. His was a will to victory which no reverse could shake and this will he succeeded in communicating to the army and to the nation. Wherever he went this veteran had disseminated hope and confidence. Now that the war was won, he was determined that France was not to lose the peace. Of Wilsonian idealism he was scornful. "Fourteen Points! The good Lord Himself had only Ten!" he is reported to have said. His creed was patriotism, and France was his god. Consequently he regarded everything in the light of how it would affect France. In every fibre he represented the hopes, fears, and hatreds of his countrymen.

Clemenceau knew what he wanted and was determined not to let the illusion of a better world order swerve him from his purpose an inch. "We spend a whole day arguing with Clemenceau," Wilson said, "and think we have convinced him, but find him the next morning exactly where he was before." What he wanted was indemnification for French losses and security against future German attacks. As Poincaré put it: "For the misery and sadness of yesterday the peace must be a reparation; against the dangers of tomorrow it must be a guarantee." Of the two, security was Clemenceau's chief concern. Having twice seen German armies invade and devastate France, he was determined that the danger of his country's becoming the cockpit of Europe again must be removed once and for all. "Our cities and towns," he said several weeks before the Peace Conference opened, "have been devastated. Everyone says rightly that 'it must not happen again.' I think so too." Thus he

² When the affairs of eastern Asia were under discussion, a Japanese delegate attended the meetings.

conceived the peace in terms of French military preponderance, more particularly in terms of security on France's eastern frontier. "The *idée fixe* fills his mind," a correspondent wrote, "gives it an orientation which is unfavorable to the new conception that is embodied in the League of Nations, and impels him to demand a peace treaty which will give him the kind of guarantee his military chiefs will prescribe."

Lloyd George, the prime minister of Great Britain, held something of a midway position between Wilson and Clemenceau. Possessing undeniable charm of manner, considerable brilliance of mind, and a hearty manner of address, he was a strange combination of the liberal and the reactionary. He could accept and discard political principles as easily and almost as frequently as men change their clothes. At Paris he was not so cold blooded as might appear from his promise to the British people that he would "hang the kaiser" and collect from Germany the costs of the war "shilling for shilling and ton for ton." He realized that excessive and long-term reparations could not be collected and therefore proposed that "reparations should disappear with the generation which made the war." Furthermore, he favored a minimum change of territory beyond the cession of the principal German colonies to the British Empire. In general, he advocated that the terms of the treaty be such as the German government would accept. The terms of a treaty, he stated, "may be severe . . . but at the same time they can be so just that the country on which they are imposed will feel in its heart that it has no right to complain. But injustice, arrogance, displayed in the hour of triumph will never be forgotten or forgiven." In brief, he favored more moderate terms than Clemenceau and was often chided by the latter for his moderation. But his attempts at moderation were rendered difficult by the clamors of the British jingo press which accused him of being inclined to "let the Germans off." These clamors he could never entirely ignore.

The fourth member of the Big Four, Signor Orlando, played an irritating rather than an important part. His inability to speak or understand English debarred him from participating in the discussions, which were generally conducted in that language. His aims were frankly those of an ardent Italian imperialist. Beyond these he took little interest in the discussions. France could do what she liked and Great Britain take what she wanted so long as they gave Italy what she desired. Together with the imperialist party in Italy he wanted to save the loss of thousands of emigrants who left Italy each year by securing territory in which they could settle. The lands the

imperialists wanted were on the eastern coast of the Adriatic; in fact, they wished to make the Adriatic "an Italian lake." To achieve this they were ready to scrap Wilson's entire program.

The members of the Big Four conducted the business of drawing up the treaty in the best way they could discover. Discussion was quite informal and unhampered by written rules. However, the differences of opinion with which each of the four had come to the conference speedily became manifest. Each one worked for his own ends. While Wilson held out for his new order, the other three strove respectively for a French peace, a British peace, and an Italian peace. And outside the Big Four representatives of other nations were trying to achieve their selfish goals. One factor which militated against the success of Wilson's cause was his unpreparedness to submit a detailed program. Until midsummer of 1918 victory had seemed far away. The big drive that was to bring victory had been scheduled for the spring of 1919 and by that time Wilson hoped to have his detailed plans ready. But when the Central Powers suddenly collapsed like a house of cards in the autumn of 1918, he was caught unprepared. At the time of his arrival in Paris he had only a draft of a Covenant for a League of Nations and that was roughly drawn. He did, of course, have the Fourteen Points, but they were little more than general principles which were to serve as a guide in making the settlement.

The consequence of his failure to submit a concrete peace plan was that Clemenceau and Lloyd George took the initiative on most questions requiring settlement and succeeded in making their ideas prevail at least in some degree. At the very first the principle of "open covenants, openly arrived at" went by the board. Since Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando were parties to a score of secret treaties, they could hardly agree to open covenants. Once the decision in favor of closed sessions was adopted, the President's colleagues began to take exception to other principles stated in the Fourteen Points. They soon realized that Wilson, having set his heart above all on the League of Nations, was willing to make concessions in return for support of the Covenant and they were not slow to make the most of his supreme desire as a means of gaining concessions from him. He was not unaware of the fact that the ground was slipping from under him, but he clung to the consolation that the League of Nations would rectify all deviations from the Fourteen Points.

On some questions, however, he did make a resolute and successful stand. For example, he stood firm as a rock in his insistence that

the Covenant of the League be included in the treaty with Germany. Neither Clemenceau nor Lloyd George desired to have the League and the peace treaty so inextricably bound together that one could not work without the other. But the President held his position until the two statesmen gave way. Furthermore, he resisted the French demand to separate the territory on the left bank of the Rhine from Germany and to create an independent Rhenish Republic as a buffer state between France and Germany. In his opposition to this demand he had the wholehearted support of Lloyd George, who saw that such an arbitrary partition would excite deep resentment in the hearts of the German people. For a time it appeared as if the peacemakers had reached an impasse. But Clemenceau was finally persuaded to accept a compromise which called for the permanent demilitarization of the Rhineland and its occupation by Allied troops for a period of fifteen years. He was also promised military help if France were to be attacked by Germany.⁸

President Wilson also stood firm on the question of Fiume. According to the secret treaty of London the Italians were to receive the whole of the Dalmatian coast of the Adriatic. But even this did not satisfy them. They laid claim also to the town of Fiume and threatened to refuse to sign the treaty unless their demands were satisfied. If they had asked only for Italia Irredenta, that is, for territory inhabited by Italians, Wilson would not have objected. As it was, their claims were clearly in violation of the principle of self-determination. When the Italian delegates referred to the secret treaty of London, the President said that he was not bound by that treaty and that furthermore Italy's acceptance of the Fourteen Points had invalidated all secret treaties. The verbal battle continued for weeks. Wilson might have been willing to make concessions in regard to the Dalmatian coast, but on the question of Fiume, which was the principal available outlet to the sea for the new state of Yugoslavia, he refused to give way.

Finally, in the hope that the Italian people would support him, the President issued a public statement of his reasons for refusing the demands of the Italian delegates. It was a kind of summons to the people to renounce the selfish nationalism of their Paris representatives. But it achieved the opposite of the result intended. Its immediate effect was to range Italian opinion almost solidly behind the demands of Orlando. The people believed no less than Orlando himself that the time for cashing in on the Allied promises had come

⁸ This promise was nullified by the refusal of the United States and Great Britain to ratify the treaty of alliance.

and that it might never come again. Consequently the same masses that had hailed Wilson as a potential savior a few weeks earlier now denounced him as the archenemy of Italy. Encouraged by the support of the people, the Italian delegates temporarily left the Peace Conference in protest and a band of Italian freebooters, led by Gabriele D'Annunzio, the poet and novelist, proceeded to seize Fiume, declaring that they would hold it no matter what the Peace Conference decided. Thereupon the conference gave up the attempt to settle the question.⁴

Thus President Wilson did accomplish something of value. While it is true that he failed to hold his colleagues to their pledge, it is equally true that he kept them from running away with the treaties. Freed of his influence the Allied statesmen, having previously agreed what each country was to get, would probably have settled down to the old diplomacy of secret bargaining and quickly divided the spoils. But his influence could not be ruled out. Consequently the task of peacemaking became a struggle between the old diplomacy of force and Wilsonian idealism. If the result was not a Wilson peace, neither was it a Clemenceau peace nor an Orlando peace. It was a compromise between the old and the new. In its terms it satisfied many of the demands of the old diplomacy, particularly in regard to the transfer of territory and reparations, but on the other hand it took a long stride toward the establishment of the policy of national self-determination and it also contained provisions for a League of Nations which at least Wilson hoped would lift international relations to a higher plane. Before many months had passed, however, the bad clauses of the treaty completely overshadowed the good.



THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

The Paris Conference produced five separate treaties, of which the Versailles document was the first and the pattern. All the treaties took their names from one of the suburbs of Paris. In addition to the Treaty of Versailles with Germany there were the Treaty of St. Germain with Austria, the Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey,⁵ the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria, and the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary.

⁴ Ultimately Italy concluded a treaty with Yugoslavia (Treaty of Rapallo, 1920; revised in 1921) which annexed Fiume to Italy, but gave the Yugoslavs free commercial use of the port.

⁵ This treaty failed and was superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

By the beginning of May the Treaty of Versailles was ready to be submitted to the Germans. Anyone who considers its bulk, the complexity of its problems, and its bewildering multiplicity of detail will be astonished that so gigantic a task could have been completed in so short a time. When on May 7 the treaty was handed to the German delegates, Clemenceau said to them, "The time has come when we must settle our accounts. You have asked for peace. We are ready to give you peace. We shall present to you now a book which contains our conditions." Much to its disappointment the German delegation, which was accompanied by a large number of experts on many subjects, learned that there would be no negotiations. The delegation was informed that it could present comment in writing within a maximum period of fifteen days but that oral discussion with the Allied representatives was out of question. In accepting the treaty for consideration Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, leader of the German delegation, read a long speech in which he recalled that the Allies as well as the Germans had accepted the Fourteen Points as a basis for the peace. Furthermore, while admitting that the Germans had made many grave mistakes he repudiated the accusation of Germany's sole guilt and demanded a neutral investigation of the causes of the war. However, he concluded on a hopeful note. "We shall," he said, "examine the document handed to us with good will and in the hope that the final result of our interview may be subscribed to by all of us."

Upon reading its 440 articles the delegates were unanimous in their opinion that the treaty could not be accepted unless it was fundamentally revised. Immediate departure was even suggested by some of the delegates. In Germany, where the proposed terms were soon published in the newspapers, they were denounced in unmeasured terms. Ebert, president of the German Republic, sent the delegation a telegram which declared the terms to be "unfulfillable, unbearable, and ruinous," while the president of the National Assembly at Weimar said, "Our enemies have laid before us a treaty which surpasses by far the fears of our greatest pessimists." Other leaders went so far as to state not only that the terms reduced the Germans to slavery but also that they would give rise to a war of revenge. The general feeling of the people was expressed by Erzberger, who had been chairman of the Armistice Commission, when he said, "The Treaty of Versailles is the work of the devil."

On May 29 the Germans presented their counterproposals to the Allies in a long document. After stating emphatically that the terms were inconsistent with the Fourteen Points, the text went on

to attack the various items in detail and to make counterproposals. Among the things the Germans requested were oral discussion of the terms and immediate entrance of Germany into the League "as a power with equal privileges." Curiously enough, it was not Wilson but Lloyd George who was ready to yield to many of these demands. While Wilson said that the Germans could not frighten him into making changes by threats of refusal to sign the treaty, Lloyd George openly advocated modification of the terms. This exasperated Clemenceau into saying, "The task is becoming veritably impossible. For weeks and weeks I had to fight Wilson and his famous principles. Finally, with much patience, and also with much diplomacy, I came off triumphant, and in that matter Lloyd George aided me powerfully. Now it is England which is obstructing the way and changing her mind as to everything that has been decided."

Nevertheless the Allied reply of June 16 did allow the German objections to a number of points but did not appreciably narrow the gulf which separated the principles of the treaty from the Fourteen Points. Thus, for example, the reparations clauses were made a little less harsh, a plebiscite was substituted in Upper Silesia for outright annexation to Poland, and Germany was assured of membership in the League as soon as she demonstrated her willingness to observe her international obligations. The Big Four was determined that the modified terms were final. There was to be no further discussion. Either the terms were accepted unconditionally by the evening of June 23 or the armies of Marshal Foch would advance on Berlin. Everywhere in the Allied countries the people were asking: "Will the Germans sign?" For a time it seemed as if they would refuse. Premier Scheidemann and his cabinet resigned in protest and even President Ebert contemplated resignation but was dissuaded from taking the step. Other leaders stated that they would rather see Germany invaded than accept the Allied terms. An hour later the decision was telegraphed to Versailles. The final sentences of the communication read: "Yielding to overpowering might, the government of the German Republic declares itself ready to accept and to sign the peace treaty imposed by the Allied and Associated governments. But in doing so the government of the German Republic in no wise abandons its conviction that these conditions of peace represent injustice without example."⁶

The first twenty-six articles of the treaty embrace the Covenant or "written constitution" of the League of Nations. Although the name of Woodrow Wilson is closely associated with the idea of the

⁶ Cited in Luckau, *The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference*, p. 112.

League, he was not the originator of it. It goes back at least as far as the Roman Empire. During the course of the nineteenth century peace societies had repeatedly urged the establishment of a league of states to prevent war. Nor were the details of the Covenant, as adopted, his. But it stands to his credit that he recognized the need for a league and was unwearied in advocating the establishment of one. As early as 1915 he had said that the war must not end without the organization of a league to outlaw war. During the next years the idea developed in his mind until it became the reason behind his whole program. It was the hope of realizing his plan that caused him to go to Paris. Clemenceau, who doubted the efficacy of a moral deterrent, told him that the League as he had planned it did not offer the protection France desired. "We are afraid," he said, "that your League is not strong enough. Give it an army. Give it guns and tanks and airplanes and we will consider it." In other words, he wanted the League to have at its disposal an adequate military force ready to strike at a moment's notice. To this Wilson replied, "The Covenant we offer must be based primarily upon moral sanctions with resort to force only as a last necessity." He held unalterably to his views until his colleagues agreed to the general plan and the conference voted that a League of Nations be "an integral part of the general peace treaty."

The purpose of the League, according to the Covenant, was "to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security." Thus the League was to be more than a device for preventing war. It was intended to be an agency for handling affairs of common concern and for promoting the common interest. The signatories of the Covenant were to be regarded as the original members, but "any fully self-governing state, dominion, or colony . . . may become a member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two thirds of the Assembly," which was the supreme organ of the League. Geneva was selected as the meeting place of this body and English and French were adopted as the official languages. Each member was permitted to send three representatives to the Assembly, but the whole delegation had only one vote. The second principal organ of the League was the Council. Although the analogy must not be pressed, the Assembly can be likened roughly to a parliament and the Council to a cabinet. In other words, the executive functions were vested in the Council. It was composed of nine men of which five, representing Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy, and Japan, had permanent seats, while the four others were elected annually by the Assembly and represented



L'illustration

PALACE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

smaller states. At first the great powers tried to limit representation in the Council to themselves but in the end had to be satisfied with a majority representation.⁷ In both Council and Assembly all decisions, excepting on minor points like questions of procedure, were required to be unanimous.

Two other organs of the League must not be overlooked. The first of these is the secretariat, a corps of some seven hundred persons of all nationalities headed by the Secretary-General. Its functions were to collect information on all subjects treated by the Council and the Assembly and to conduct the correspondence of the League. The Covenant further provided for the establishment of a Permanent Court of Justice. In 1922 this court came into formal existence in the Peace Palace at The Hague, with fifteen judges chosen for their ability rather than for their nationality. These judges were chosen by the Council and the Assembly and in no way represented the countries from which they came.⁸ The business of the court included the settlement of disputes referred to it by the League Council. Such was the machinery of the League to which weary Europe looked for surcease from the periodical wars which consumed the blood and substance of mankind.

Of more direct concern to Germany were the territorial changes prescribed by the treaty. Excisions were made on every frontier. In the southwest she lost the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine, with their mineral wealth, which she had taken from France in 1871. Closely connected with Alsace-Lorraine, not only geographically but also historically, is the rich valley of the Saar, also known as the Saar Basin. Although this district was not removed permanently from German sovereignty, it was placed under the administration of the League of Nations for a period of fifteen years. At the end of this period a plebiscite was to decide under what sovereignty the inhabitants desired to be placed. The coal deposits within the area were to be "the absolute property of the French state," subject to possible redemption in 1935. On the northern frontier the two small districts of Eupen and Malmédy were assigned to Belgium, while still farther to the north a plebiscite prescribed by the treaty gave a portion of Schleswig, annexed by Prussia in 1864, to Denmark. Then there were Germany's heavy losses to a resuscitated Poland. In the reassembling, at the expense of Germany, Austria, and Rus-

⁷ Even this was lost when the United States failed to ratify the treaty. In 1926 Germany took the vacant permanent seat. The same year, under the pressure of the smaller nations, the number of nonpermanent seats was increased to nine.

⁸ Two eminent American jurists were members of this court at different times.

sia, of the fragments of a Poland which had been torn apart in the partitions of 1772, 1793, and 1795 Germany lost Posen, the greater part of West Prussia, and much of Upper Silesia. Furthermore East Prussia was severed from the rest of Germany by the so-called "corridor" which gave the new Poland the "free and secure access to the sea" the Allies had promised her. In giving Poland this corridor the conference found it necessary to include many Germans in the Polish state. The city of Danzig at the top of the corridor was made a free city under the rule of the League of Nations. Finally, the future of Memel, situated at the mouth of the Niemen, was left undecided, but in 1923 the League decided that it should go to Lithuania, one of the new states that were carved out of Russia. Thus the treaty deprived Germany of nearly one seventh of her European territory and about one tenth of her population. Yet the losses were not nearly so great as those imposed by the Germans upon Russia in the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which deprived the Russians of 500,000 square miles and sixty-six million people. It may be noted, however, that the territory which Germany lost contained more than half of her iron, zinc, and lead deposits and about two fifths of her coal deposits.

In addition to much European territory the treaty took from Germany all her overseas possessions and privileges. Soon after the war started, the Allies had captured all the German colonies excepting German East Africa,⁹ a task which was made easier by the inability of Germany to send them help. Having taken the colonies, the Allies decided not to return them. "In territory outside her European frontiers," the treaty states, "Germany renounces in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions." According to further stipulations Germany was also compelled to renounce all rights, benefits, and privileges in China, Liberia, Siam, Morocco, and Egypt and "to recognize any arrangements which the Allied and Associated Powers may make with Turkey and Bulgaria as to German rights in those countries." Finally, the treaty provided that all German movable and immovable property in the aforementioned territories was to pass without indemnification to the new governments exercising authority over them. Thus the Treaty of Versailles swept away not only the German colonial empire as such but also her spheres of influence and her commercial footholds, all of which had been a source of pride for her people.


But the task of confiscating the German colonies was easier than the task of distributing them. The division of most of them had

⁹ In German East Africa the fighting continued to the end of the war.

already been arranged during the war by secret treaties, but several annoying factors, more particularly the fifth of Wilson's Fourteen Points, interfered with the outright annexation stipulated in these treaties. The Fifth Point prescribed "a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims" in which "the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined." President Wilson had stated the idea even more emphatically when he said in one of his speeches: "Every territorial settlement must be made in the interests and for the benefit of the people concerned." The Allies found the solution in the so-called mandate system under which the colonies, instead of being annexed outright, were declared the common property of the League of Nations and were then distributed to the various Allied nations to be ruled as "mandates," the distribution following fairly closely the provisions of the earlier secret treaties. The whole procedure was, in the opinion of some observers, merely "disguised annexation." The partition allocated the colonies in Africa to France, Great Britain, and the Union of South Africa. In the Far East, Australia received German New Guinea, New Zealand got German Samoa as its share of the spoils, and Japan got the German Pacific islands north of the equator (the Caroline, Marshall, Marianne, and the Palau Islands) and the rich province of Shantung.¹⁰

The next section of the treaty dealt with the question of disarmament. Point Four of the Fourteen Points prescribed the reduction of national armaments "to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." The Allies did not, however, regard this in terms of disarmament for themselves. Believing that Germany was responsible for the war, they decided to disarm Germany and to keep their own armaments as a guarantee that Germany would not again endanger the peace of the world. Everything was done to make Germany helpless from a military point of view. The nation which had been the greatest military power in the world was forbidden for all time to have an army of more than 100,000 men, including officers. Precautions were also taken to prevent the building up of a large reserve force. After crushing Prussia in the battle of Jena (1806) Napoleon had limited the size of the Prussian army, but the Prussian government managed to build up a large trained reserve by giving intensive training to one levy of recruits after the other. So that the Germans would not be able to circumvent the Treaty of Versailles in the same way, it was decreed that enlistment in the *Reichs-*

¹⁰ This was returned to China at the Washington Conference, 1921-1922.



CENTRAL EUROPE IN 1924

wehr, as the army authorized by the treaty was called, must be voluntary and that "the period of enlistment for noncommissioned officers and privates must be twelve consecutive years and for commissioned officers twenty-five." Furthermore, military training under the guise of shooting, police, and athletic clubs or any other type of association was forbidden. It did not take the Germans long to find means of circumventing the restrictions.

The treaty also stated that the armed forces of Germany "must not include any military or naval air forces." In addition, the manufacture and the importation into Germany of armored cars, tanks, and all similar constructions suitable for use in war were prohibited. The navy, too, was reduced to a minimum. According to the treaty, "the German naval forces must not exceed six battleships, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers, and twelve torpedo boats," while the navy personnel was limited to 15,000. Practically all ships in excess of this number were to be surrendered to the Allies.¹¹ No submarines were to be included in these naval forces. "On the expiration of one month from the coming into force of the present Treaty all German submarines, submarine salvage vessels, and docks for submarines, including the tubular dock, must have been handed over to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers."

There were many other clauses that cannot be listed here. All together they amounted to the practical disarmament of Germany. As additional security to France the treaty provided for the demilitarization of the right bank of the Rhine to a distance of fifty kilometers. All fortified works, fortresses, and field works in this zone "shall be disarmed and dismantled" and "the construction of any new fortification, whatever its nature and importance, is forbidden." The left bank together with the bridgeheads, as stated earlier, was to be occupied by Allied troops for fifteen years.

Another important section of the treaty dealt with the question of reparations. The horror and intensity of the war had given rise to the view that modern war is a crime and that responsibility for it can be expressed in terms of guilt. It led to the inclusion in the

¹¹ Seventy-three German ships which had been interned at Scapa Flow at the time of the armistice were scuttled by their crews just before the treaty was signed.

CENTRAL EUROPE IN 1924. *Compare this map with the one on page 12 and notice particularly the changes in Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Balkans.*

treaty of the troublesome "war-guilt clause" (Article 231), according to which Germany accepted the responsibility "for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." This idea that the war was a wrongful act by Germany became the basis for claiming heavy reparations. In England and France the public had been led to believe that Germany would pay the entire cost of the war. The French press, which was still dominated by war psychology and the quest for vengeance, even went so far as to demand in addition the repayment with interest of the indemnity Germany had collected from France in 1871. However, according to the pre-armistice note of November 5, 1918, which claimed compensation only "for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property," the Allies had renounced all claims to total reimbursement of their war expenses. If the French and British public was to be satisfied even in part, some way of stretching to the utmost the phrase "civilian population" had to be devised. It was General Smuts, premier of the Union of South Africa, who offered the suggestion that the words could be interpreted to include war pensions and separation allowances. This view was accepted also by President Wilson. Only Belgium was to be compensated for the entire loss to which she had been subjected as a result of the German invasion.

When it came to fixing the exact amount of Germany's debt to the Allies and the method of payment, there was less agreement. The maximum figure of \$15 billion suggested by experts from the United States did not satisfy the French. They held out for a sum almost three times as large and were supported in their stand by the British prime minister, who was bound by his election pledges. Unable to compose their differences the Allied representatives decided to refer the question to a special Commission on Reparation. This Commission was to determine by May 1, 1921, not only the total amount but also the manner of payment. In the meantime Germany was required to make a payment of \$5 billion in the form of gold, merchant ships, reconstruction material, coal, dyestuffs, and other commodities.

The treaty, which went into force January 10, 1920, had meanwhile become a domestic political issue in the United States. No sooner had President Wilson submitted it to the Senate for ratification than a tempest which had been gathering for some time broke loose. Some few Senators were ready to authorize ratification without

material change but the majority was either opposed to ratification in any form or wanted substantial reservations. On March 19, 1920, the supporters of the treaty failed for the second time in their efforts to obtain ratification. Although the votes may in some instances have been motivated by personal enmity toward the President, the primary reason for opposition appears to have been the conviction that further participation in European affairs was not to the interest of the people of the United States. Thus the people of the United States repudiated, through the Senate, the contract Woodrow Wilson had signed at Paris in their name.¹² This repudiation seriously impaired the whole Versailles settlement. Later Lloyd George repeatedly declared that had the United States remained a party, it would have been possible, as the wartime temper cooled, to revise the treaty in Germany's favor.



THE OTHER TREATIES

Although Wilson, Lloyd George, and Orlando left Paris immediately after the Germans signed the treaty, the work of the Peace Conference was far from finished. Peace still had to be made with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. The treaty with Turkey was signed at Sèvres in August, 1920, but before it could be ratified a new Turkish leader arose in the person of Mustapha Kemal who refused to ratify it. A new one had to be worked out at Lausanne in 1923.¹³ The terms of the other three are similar in many respects, and identical in some, with the Treaty of Versailles. Whole sections from this were simply incorporated in the others. Thus the Covenant of the League constitutes Part I of all. Reparation is demanded from all three states in the same terms as from Germany, and they are also required to accept the responsibility for loss and damage caused by the war. Finally, the treaties contain provisions for the reduction to a minimum of the Austrian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian armies.

After weeks of exhausting labor the Austrian peace treaty was completed and delivered to the Austrian delegation at St. Germain on July 20, 1920. The attitude of the Austrian negotiators was much more conciliatory than that of the Germans had been and as a result of an exchange of notes the Allies made some concessions. Nevertheless, when the revised text was published in the Austrian newspapers, it evoked expressions of protest and despair. The *Arbeiter Zeitung*, for example, styled it as being "bitter, spiteful, and unjust," adding that

¹² The following year the United States signed a separate treaty with Germany.

¹³ See p. 302.

"the entente is using its power in the most shameful manner to ill treat and outrage a defenseless people with a peace based on might." The Austrian Assembly, being in no position to resist, voted to accept the treaty under protest, whereupon it was signed at St. Germain on September 10. The head of the delegation, Dr. Karl Renner, having done all in his power to modify the original terms laid down by the Allies, tried to look at the brighter side of the situation. "We are conquered," he said after the signing; "yet misfortune has given us liberty, freed us from the yoke of a dynasty whence for three generations no man of worth has sprung, freed us from bonds with nations which were never in understanding with us nor with themselves." But the Assembly in a spirit of bitterness drew up a resolution which opened with the words, "We raise once more our voices against a peace founded on brute force."

While the German loss of territory had been confined to fragments lopped off here and there on the periphery, the old Austria was divided in such a way that only a modest remnant remained intact. In requiring the new Austria to recognize the independence of Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia the treaty reduced to its component parts the old Austro-Hungarian Empire which had been a collection of unrelated nationalities. Actually it was the war more than the peace that tore the ramshackle empire into fragments. Encouraged to revolt during the war by the promise of independence, various nationalities of the Dual Monarchy had formed republics of their own. The promise of an independent Poland had meant tearing a hole in the northeast of the Habsburg Empire, the declaration of independence by Czechoslovakia in 1918 disrupted the central part, and the new Yugoslav state took the Slav districts toward the south (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Banat of Temesvár). Thus the Dual Monarchy had ceased to exist before the Peace Conference met. By and large it remained only for the peacemakers to confirm to each one of the separate states its appropriate share of territory. In addition to apportioning territory to the new states, the treaty awarded southern Tyrol (the Trentino) with its quarter of a million Germans to Italy. It had been the promise of this territory (Treaty of London) that had brought Italy into the war.

All that remained of the old Austrian Empire with its population of about twenty-eight millions and an area of about 115,000 square miles was the German-speaking central district embracing about six thousand square miles and a population of something over six millions. This was the Republic of Austria. With a third of its

population living in Vienna, it was incapable of self-support. "We are independent with an independence which cannot be alienated," Dr. Renner stated; "yet we depend on the Czechs and the Poles for coal, on the Banat for cereals, on Italy for maritime commerce." Economically the situation was so desperate that the Assembly declared that ultimate union with Germany was an absolute necessity, hoping that the peacemakers would agree to the plan. The representatives of the United States approved the idea of union (*Anschluss*), but France and Italy were so strongly opposed to any strengthening of their old enemy that the plan was vetoed. This, the Austrians said, was an absolute denial of the right of self-determination. They were further displeased by the transfer of so many purely Austrian subjects to Czechoslovakia and Italy. They contended that this was in flagrant violation of the terms of the armistice. A resolution passed by the Assembly stated that "the four million Germans forced under foreign rule will for all time insist on self-determination as the only possible basis on which the modern state may be founded." The Assembly also declared that the reparation clauses of the treaty were impossible of fulfillment and that Austria would suffer economic collapse if her burden were not substantially lightened.

The Treaty of Trianon dealt as severely with Hungary as the Treaty of St. Germain did with Austria. Likewise regarded as an enemy, Hungary was carved up to the extent that it lost two thirds of its entire area and three fifths of its population. With this territory went the greater part of its natural resources in coal, iron, other minerals, and forests. What remained was an area of about 35,000 square miles and a population of about eight millions. Particularly objectionable was the transfer to Rumania of Transylvania with its three million Hungarian inhabitants. When the treaty was published in Hungary the press made such comments as: "It is annihilating," "The Treaty condemns us to ruin," and "It is an injustice that cries to Heaven." Requests for modification were presented at once, with a special request for plebiscites to settle the question of boundaries. The Allies, while acknowledging the difficulty of the ethnographic problem in their reply, unequivocally rejected the request with the statement that in Central Europe it was impossible to make the political frontiers coincide with the ethnic. There was nothing further the Hungarian delegation could do; so it signed the treaty on June 4, 1920.

The treaty with Bulgaria, though chronologically not the last, completed the immediate postwar settlement. As in the case of the other treaties a suburb of Paris—Neuilly—was chosen for the actual

signing. The Bulgarian government, contrary to public sentiment, had entered the war on the side of the Central Powers in the hope that it might rectify territorial grievances left over from the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. Having chosen the wrong side in the contest, Bulgaria was now called upon to pay the piper. Besides being required, among other things, to pay reparations and to limit her army to 20,000 volunteers, Bulgaria was mutilated by amputations of territory on the north, west, and south, in flagrant violation of the principles laid down by President Wilson and accepted by the Allied governments. On the west a series of small districts inhabited exclusively by Bulgars were given to Yugoslavia, which claimed them on “strategical grounds.” More important was the loss to Greece of the Bulgarian sections of Thrace, a loss which cut Bulgaria off completely from the Aegean Sea.¹⁴ It is estimated that no less than 1,700,000 Bulgarians were placed under alien rule by the treaty. So shocked were the Bulgarians when the provisions were announced that a day of mourning was proclaimed and Sofia, the capital, was hung in black. On November 27, 1919, the delegation signed the treaty after declaring that “all established principles of international justice and the free determination of nations are disregarded. The Bulgarian nation is punished with extreme cruelty.” But the Bulgarian nation never recognized the validity of the treaty.

On April 23, 1920, Viscount Bryce said in an address before the House of Lords that in the first place the peacemakers “were bound to fulfill and carry out the purposes which they proclaimed at the time of the armistice, the purposes that were stated in the famous Fourteen Points and which were accepted and made the basis of the armistice, and upon the faith of which the armistice was accepted by the enemy powers. Those principles are briefly known as the principles of nationality and self-determination.” The Balkan settlement conformed to these principles to a large extent, but in a number of instances they were completely ignored and territory was allotted on the old-fashioned principle of *vae victis, spolia victoribus* (woe to the vanquished, the spoils to the victors). Populations were moved around as if they were “mere pawns on a chessboard.” It is estimated that about eight million persons were put under alien rule, creating new minorities and new irredentas. This was most deplorable because it had not only been expected but also asserted that through the Peace Conference the Balkan problem “would be solved with reference to the most equitable observation of the principle of nationality.” “I think it is a misfortune,” Viscount Bryce stated,

¹⁴ A clause inserted in the treaty guaranteed Bulgaria economic access to the Aegean.

“that so many provisions have been introduced into these treaties which obviously come from passion rather than from wisdom, and which are likely, therefore, to bear very unfortunate fruits in the future. . . . Peace can come only with content. If the result of these treaties is to make nations discontented, to put sections of peoples under a power which to them is alien and hostile you cannot expect them to be content, and therefore you cannot expect that there will be peace. On the contrary, you are preparing for revolts and for wars.” Thus, instead of establishing a permanent peace on principles of justice and self-determination, the treaties sowed new seeds of hatred and strife in the Balkans.

On the other hand, it must be remembered that the delegates at Paris were handicapped not merely by the array on the ethnic chess-board but also by the fact that most of the new states had come into existence before the armistice. In the interval between the armistice and the meeting of the Peace Conference these states had set up their own frontiers and consolidated their positions. Any sweeping alterations of the pattern into which Europe had fallen by the time the Peace Conference started its deliberations, could have been made only through the use of force.

Europe Between Two Wars



CHAPTER FIVE

The Weimar Republic

THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC

THE so-called “revolution” which took place in Germany in 1918 was not a spontaneous national development. Its coming was not prepared by preconceived ideologies which organized the revolutionary forces. There was no reign of terror, no guillotine, no Marat, Robespierre, or Lenin. Generally speaking, there was little bloodshed. In other words, there was no revolution in the sense that there had been a French Revolution or a Russian Revolution. It was at most a revolution without a capital R. It actually amounted to little more than a change of government. It ejected the kaiser together with the twenty-five sovereigns of the states comprising the German Empire and proclaimed Germany a republic. Beyond this it left the country cluttered with the old social and economic setup.

The change that did take place came as a result of military defeat and not because the people yearned for a republic. For more than four years they had been fighting and sacrificing in the conviction of ultimate victory. As late as September, 1918, they were still confident and optimism persisted even in the high command. Then the announcement by General Ludendorff that victory was no longer possible brought with it the vast disillusionment which defeat inevitably brings. The realization that instead of wearing the palms of victory they would have to bear the thorns of defeat, that their sacrifices and suffering had been for nothing, that millions of German lives had been lost uselessly, shook their faith in the Hohenzollern government. But, aside from a group of the more radical socialists, they did not want to abolish monarchy. What doomed the Hohenzollern rule was President Wilson's statement that the Allies

would not deal with the government that had brought on the war. When the parliamentary cabinet organized by the liberal Prince Maximilian of Baden in October still proved unsatisfactory, the people decided to sacrifice the kaiser as a means of obtaining better peace terms. According to Philip Scheidemann, one of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party, "The question was: could we get better peace conditions if His Majesty abdicated and the Crown Prince renounced his rights to the throne?" Up to that time even the Majority Socialists had not demanded the abdication of the Hohenzollern and even after Wilson's statement they still tried to save the monarchy by suggesting a regency, possibly for a grandson of the kaiser.

All this time the masses, by and large, were passive, the driving force within Germany being a relatively small group of left-wing socialists. A minority group which found the Social Democratic Party too conservative had hardly seceded in 1917 to found the Independent Social Democratic Party when a split occurred within this new party. At its left there appeared a faction inspired by the success of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. The members of this third party were called Spartacists, a name deriving from a series of subversive letters written by Karl Liebknecht and signed "Spartacus."¹ The Spartacists were the most active revolutionary party in Germany. The ideology was Bolshevik and the success of the Bolsheviks in Russia was a standing summons to the Spartacists to emulate them. On the basis of Lenin's interpretation of Marx, Rosa Luxemburg, a woman of great talents, drew up a party platform prescribing a program of action which was to bring about the overthrow of the capitalist system in Germany as preliminary to world revolution. The abdication of the Hohenzollern presented the leaders with just the opportunity they had been waiting for, but it came so suddenly and unexpectedly that they were unable to make the most of it. They were almost without arms, excepting a few rifles taken from deserters.

Nevertheless they did attempt to establish a communist government. As the crisis neared at the end of October and the beginning of November, Spartacist leaders addressed gatherings in Berlin and other industrial centers urging the proletariat to rise up and establish a "free socialist republic." When it became certain that the kaiser must abdicate, self-appointed committees—the so-called workers' and soldiers' councils—formed on the model of the Russian soviets, sprang up everywhere as if by magic. On November 9 a band

¹ The Roman gladiator who proclaimed freedom for slaves.

of Spartacists, led by Karl Liebknecht, seized the royal palace and the police headquarters in Berlin. Liebknecht announced to the crowd that the proletariat was master of Germany and ordered the bells of the cathedral rung in celebration of the victory. For the moment it seemed as if the efforts of the Spartacists to establish a dictatorship on the Russian model might prove successful.

With the Spartacists taking the initiative, the old Social Democrats or Majority Socialists, the strongest party in Germany, either had to guide the revolution or find themselves treated as reactionaries. They chose the former. Even then they waited until the abdication of the kaiser had been announced and the Spartacists were marching through the streets of Berlin proclaiming the socialist republic. By this time the situation was such that Scheidemann, who was to become premier of the new republic, declared, "Now we must put ourselves at the head of the movement or there will be chaos in the Reich." On the afternoon of November 9, 1918, a delegation of Majority Socialists headed by Friedrich Ebert went to the cabinet of Prince Max and informed it that the people desired to take the controlling power into their own hands. Prince Max then turned the chancellorship over to Ebert, a leatherworker of humble background. Thus the imperial régime yielded to democracy or rather to a temporary dictatorship that was to be followed by a constitutional democracy. Ebert invited the Independent Socialists, but not the Spartacists, to cooperate in the provisional government. The Independents accepted the invitation, and a mixed committee, composed of three Majority Socialists and three Independents, took over control. The Independents soon withdrew. As assistants the Majority Socialists had the vast body of imperial officials, practically all of whom remained at their posts and continued to administer the routine of their bureaus.

The Majority Socialists were patriots and Germans first, and socialists second. They had long abandoned the Marxian theory of revolution. In 1914 their representatives in the Reichstag had voted for the war credits² and thereafter had continued to support the government in maintaining the war. Their purpose in seizing power after the kaiser's abdication was not to save the revolution but to save Germany. Although he was a socialist of long standing, Friedrich Ebert was determined that the Germany Bismarck had created was not to fall into ruins. When Prince Max said to him: "I commend the German Reich to your loving care," Ebert replied, "For that

² The only protest was a negative one. Karl Liebknecht left the session before the vote was taken.


Reich I have lost two sons." In inviting the cooperation of the Independent Socialists he was careful to make clear to them that there was to be no Leninist dictatorship but that the government was to be on constitutional lines. From the moment he took the reins in his hands there began a noticeable tendency on his part to lean toward the right. Even in his first proclamation there was little to remind one of Karl Marx. "Citizens," it began, "I beg you all urgently, leave the streets and let peace and order be your care." Nor was he in the tradition of Marx when he announced that "human life is sacred" and that "property is to be protected against illegal interference." Having ordered those Germans who were marching about the streets carrying red flags to return to their workaday tasks, he and his colleagues took steps to create a trustworthy republican force capable of carrying out their orders. Majority Socialists also joined the workers' and soldiers' councils to keep the Spartacists from gaining complete control of them.

When the councils held their first convention in Berlin on December 16, 1918, the Majority Socialists advocated the election of a National Assembly to draw up a constitution. The Spartacists demanded a dictatorship of the proletariat. Liebknecht himself denounced the idea of a National Assembly in an address to a gathering of striking workers, declaring that "whoever votes for the National Assembly votes for the rape of the working class!" After long and violent debates, however, the motion for the election of a National Assembly was carried by an overwhelming majority. Thus the German proletariat itself, much to the displeasure of the Spartacist minority, adopted the principle of parliamentary democracy.

But the Spartacists still did not give up hope of gaining control of the government. More peaceful means having failed, they decided to carry out their final revolution by force before a National Assembly could be elected. They thought it would be easy to arouse the Berlin masses against the provisional government. At a great meeting of Spartacist workmen on January 5, 1919, a revolutionary committee was formed and Ebert's cabinet was declared deposed. During the next days Berlin was the scene of continued disorder. Not only did armed groups of Spartacists seize barracks, railway stations, and the government printing offices; they also took possession of the principal Berlin newspapers, so that the Majority Socialists and the conservative parties had no means of appealing to the people. These successes, achieved so easily, encouraged the Spartacist leaders to believe that the provisional government would soon be forced to resign.

Had the Spartacists had an able military leader, they might well have succeeded in overthrowing the government and in establishing the soviet system in Berlin. As it was, their leaders did not act with dispatch. While they were vacillating, the government appointed as Governor of Berlin one Gustav Noske, who was as severe as any Prussian general. Several German writers called him "the bloodhound of the revolution." Since about the middle of December Noske, assisted by six generals of the old army, had been busy organizing a government force out of what was left of the armies. He had succeeded in mobilizing about twenty thousand men at Dahlem, a suburb of Berlin, and this force was now moved into the city proper to put down the uprising. Supported by machine guns and howitzers, they began the attack on January 9 and continued the fight until the last Spartacist stronghold was taken. During this week they captured many prisoners, some of whom were summarily executed. On the night of January 15 Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, both of whom had addressed Berlin crowds with fearless vehemence, were arrested. The former was shot by his guards while he was being taken to prison, ostensibly because he tried to escape; the latter was killed with the butt end of a soldier's rifle, and her body was thrown into one of the canals. Without their leaders, the Spartacists were unable to offer effective resistance, and the attempt to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat soon collapsed completely.

The Spartacist uprising was put down on the eve of the election of the National Assembly which took place on January 19, 1919. Every person over twenty years of age was permitted to vote, one deputy to the National Assembly being allotted for every 150,000 votes. Some idea of the general interest in the election may be gained from the fact that of the thirty-five million voters on the registers more than thirty million voted. In most of the large cities the socialists not only polled the greatest number of votes but in some centers they polled more than all the other parties combined. Nevertheless the results proved disappointing to the Majority Socialists. Of the 399 deputies elected they obtained no more than 163 and the Independent Socialists only 22, the Spartacists having held aloof from the election. The results clearly showed that the bourgeois element was still the strongest and that a purely socialist regime was out of question. When it came to choosing a meeting place for the Assembly, Ebert ruled out Berlin and other large industrial cities where it might be a prey for organizers of insurrections. It was decided that the Assembly should meet on February 6, 1919, at Weimar, where



GERMANY DURING THE PERIOD OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

Goethe and Schiller had written many of their masterpieces, where Herder had preached international conciliation and cooperation, and where Bach and Liszt had scored some of their greatest triumphs.

As the deputies took their seats in the National Theatre at Weimar, it became evident that although there had been some regrouping of the old parties of the Reichstag, the general setup was much the same. While the old conservatives, who naturally sat on the right, had taken the name of the German National People's Party, the Roman Catholic (Clerical) Center remained the same. Next to the Center was a new party, the German Democratic Party which had been formed by the middle classes and avowedly favored the establishment of a republic. The left was occupied by the Majority Socialists, and at the extreme left sat the Independent Socialists. The first question to be dealt with was the question of a government, the members of the provisional government having resigned their self-assumed authority to the Assembly. A provisional republican constitution was drawn up, Ebert was elected the first president of the Reich (the name of the empire was retained), and Scheidemann was given the position of chancellor or premier. Ebert in assuming the presidency took this curious oath: "I swear that I will truly observe and protect the constitution of the German Reich. I desire and intend to act as the authorized representative of the entire German people, not as leader of a single party. But I also declare that I am the son of the working class, grown up in the world of ideas according to socialism, and that I have no intention of denying either my origin or my convictions."

The major tasks of the Weimar Assembly were drafting a permanent constitution and making peace with the Allies. The former was achieved in an expeditious and businesslike manner. After the subject was brought forward on February 24, the work progressed steadily until the completed document was signed on August 11. It was so long and so complex that it is possible in a brief discussion to point out only a few characteristics. The basic difference between the new constitution and the one that had been in force under the Hohenzollern was this: whereas the old one had been essentially a treaty between the rulers of the various German states, the new one was

GERMANY DURING THE PERIOD OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC. *The perennial trouble centers are clearly indicated on this map—the Saar Basin, Alsace-Lorraine, and the Polish Corridor.*

the expression of the will of the sovereign German people expressed through its representatives. The new constitution began with the words, "The German state is a republic: political authority springs from the people." Many members of the Assembly hoped that it would set up complete national and political unity, a unity which would obliterate the old state frontiers and totally abrogate separate state rights. But in this they were disappointed. In the new constitution, it is true, the divisions were spoken of as *Länder* (territories), not as states. The component parts, however, still had their own constitutions and governments which exercised many powers of sovereignty independently of the central authorities. In short, Germany was still a federal state. Nevertheless, the new constitution did place the law of the empire above the law of the individual state. Thenceforth it became necessary for the states to bring their laws into accord with those of the empire.

The political system elaborated in the Weimar constitution was not borrowed from any one country. It was rather pieced together from the United States, the British, the French, and the Swiss forms of government. It provided for the election of a president as the executive head of the Republic for a term of seven years, after which he was eligible for re-election. Besides being head of the administration and commander in chief of the armed forces, he was given power to dissolve the Reichstag, appoint and receive ambassadors, and conclude treaties. He was to appoint the chancellor and the ministers, but they had to possess the confidence of the Reichstag. "Should the Reichstag by express resolution proclaim its want of confidence," the constitution declared, "the ministers concerned must resign." In brief, the president was elected for a French term of seven years, had powers like those of the president of the United States, but his ministers were responsible to the Reichstag in truly British fashion. The Reichstag was the legislative body elected for a period of four years by the suffrage of all men and women over twenty. It had the power of initiating bills, but so did the electorate if the demand for a legislative measure were supported by at least one tenth of the registered voters. Although the old upper house which represented the states as such still remained under the title of Reichsrat, it was of but secondary importance. Besides formulating bills, it could object to a bill becoming law even though it had been passed by the Reichstag. If the two houses could not reach an agreement, the president was empowered to put the question before the people for decision by a referendum on the Swiss model.

If the drafting of the constitution proceeded smoothly, the prob-

lem of concluding peace, as stated in an earlier chapter, caused many members of the National Assembly great anguish. When the terms arrived, Chancellor Scheidemann at once declared them to be "unacceptable" and resigned. The Assembly after much discussion finally decided to accept the terms subject to certain reservations. But the Allies absolutely refused to allow any reservations and demanded that the terms be accepted unconditionally. This was a terrific blow to the credit of the new government. There were in the Assembly many members, perhaps even a majority, who were monarchists at heart and had accepted the idea of a republic only because they believed that it meant a peace based on the Fourteen Points. When this belief was shattered, they came to believe that the republic had failed them; hence to many it became the symbol of humiliation. It did not occur to them that the old imperial government would have been compelled to accept more severe terms. They could not imagine any more severe terms. Hence they began to yearn for the old order, to hearken back to the old monarchy. But their hostility to the republic was negative rather than positive. Apart from a few extremists they did not actively work for the overthrow of the new government. They were not sure that the time was ripe for a change or that the Allies would permit them to make a change.

The disaffection, however, led a small group of reactionaries to believe that by a bold stroke they might succeed in overthrowing the republic. The members of this group were no less convinced than the Spartacists had been in the preceding year that once the banner of revolt was raised the nation would immediately rally around it. The moving spirit was Ludendorff, who during the revolutionary days had precipitately fled to Sweden in disguise but had later returned. He did not, however, lead the uprising in person. The leader was an obscure Prussian official named Kapp; hence the attempt is known as the Kapp Putsch. Associated with Kapp were several able soldiers of the old imperial army who had succeeded in enlisting the support of two bodies of troops that had been employed to defend the Baltic states against Russia and were about to be dismissed contrary to their wishes. Kapp issued an ultimatum to the government and when that achieved nothing the insurgents began marching on Berlin. Convinced that the defense of the capital was impossible, the Ebert cabinet fled the city on March 12, 1920, withdrawing the garrison in order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. Early next morning the revolutionists marched into Berlin unopposed and Kapp declared himself chancellor. Ebert's government responded by calling a general strike in Berlin. As the great majority of trade union lead-

ers were socialists, the order was readily obeyed. The effect was decisive. Without water, gas, electricity, and transportation services the life of the city was practically paralyzed and Kapp was mystified and helpless. Only two days after he entered the city he was endeavoring to come to some agreement with the Ebert government. But his proposals were flatly rejected. With Berlin threatening to succumb to chaos, Kapp lost his head and fled to Sweden. Ingloriously deserted by their leader, the troops withdrew while a jeering crowd lined the streets and the principal conspirators surrendered unconditionally. The Kapp Putsch had fizzled out.

Though this uprising had failed, the troubles of the government were far from over. It had survived only because its adversaries shrank from the responsibility of overthrowing it. The Reichstag election (June, 1920) which followed closely upon the Putsch showed that the republican minority was definitely shrinking. Not only did the total socialist vote decrease from 13.8 to 11 millions but the vote of the other parties who had openly accepted the republican form of government suffered substantial losses, while the two parties with monarchist tendencies had gained three million votes. This change was in part due to the fact that the Treaty of Versailles had come into force in January, 1920. Besides leaving the Rhine in enemy hands, it removed the German flag from Alsace-Lorraine, Flensburg, Danzig, Memel, the Polish Corridor, Upper Silesia, and the Saar. To those who had been officers in the imperial army, to the remnants of proud Junkerdom, and to many who had grown up in the glories of the Hohenzollern regime this spelled bitter humiliation. They told themselves that the kaiser's government would have fought to the last man to prevent this. Nor was the opposition to the republic confined to the older generation. Both in the universities and in the higher schools there was much monarchist sympathy. This, the republicans discovered, was due to the fact that education was almost completely in the hands of reactionaries. All over the country secret military clubs and reactionary societies were springing up, the members of which did not hesitate to resort to political assassination. Such tactics were made all the easier because the judiciary was, for the most part, antirepublican. The future of the republic looked very dark.



REPARATIONS AND INFLATION

The most serious problem of the new republic was economic. Germany, which in 1914 had been one of the three great industrial

nations of the world, was in a state of economic chaos at the close of the war. By the terms of the treaty, as previously stated, she lost vast territories which contained agricultural wealth, gigantic coal, iron, and zinc mines, potash deposits, and factories of every kind. The ceded area had in 1913 produced 48.2 per cent of Germany's iron ore, 59 per cent of her zinc ore, and 15.7 per cent of her coal. The severance of these territories shattered the sensitive structure of her industries. Even without reparation payments it would have been difficult to regain her economic balance. The reparations further drained her of the materials necessary to a flourishing economic life. Under the provisions of the armistice and the peace treaty she was required to hand over to the Allies not only all materials in the war zone and all public property in the ceded territories and colonies but also all merchant ships exceeding 1600 gross tons, half of the merchant ships between 1000 and 1600 gross tons, one quarter of the fishing fleet, 5000 locomotives, 150,000 railway cars, and 5000 motor trucks. Furthermore, Germany's foreign investments in the Allied countries had been seized or surrendered and her credit in the world's capital markets had been seriously undermined. In short, Germany had not only lost a great part of her national wealth and her production facilities but her foreign trade had also been seriously disrupted.

In the first days of May, 1921, the plan which the Reparations Commission had elaborated was announced. It set Germany's debt at 132 billion gold marks, an amount which according to a number of Allied economists exceeded her ability to pay.³ Of this sum she was to pay a billion marks during the summer of 1921 and two billion a year thereafter. The plan was handed to the Germans in the form of an ultimatum which they were to accept within six days or suffer an Allied invasion of the Ruhr, the most important industrial area in Germany. Accepting the ultimatum, the government paid the first billion marks before the end of August, 1921, and made additional payments during the early months of the next year. Meanwhile the exchange value of the mark declined steadily. It had already fallen during the war; in fact, wartime finance was largely inflationist because the government confidently believed that the Allies would have to pay the costs of the war. But the downward movement of the mark had been checked early in 1920 and a considerable recovery followed. In May, 1921, when the reparation ultimatum arrived, the rate was 62 to the dollar (4.2 to the dollar was par), but by

³ J. M. Keynes, the English economist, believed that it was three times as much as Germany could possibly pay.

September it had dropped to 105, by October to 156, and by the end of November to 270 or 1.5 per cent of par.

By June, 1922, the economic situation had deteriorated to such an extent that the government requested a moratorium on reparation payments for two years, stating that a financial collapse was inevitable if it were not granted. At the meeting of Allied representatives in London to discuss the request the British and French showed diverging points of view. The former, fearing that the economic ruin of Germany might well involve a general ruin, were ready to agree to a moratorium to enable her to re-establish herself economically. The French took the opposite point of view. They believed that Germany, far from being ruined, was cleverly concealing her assets. In other words, they believed that the request for a moratorium was merely a trick to evade payment. M. Poincaré proposed that instead of granting the moratorium France should occupy German coal mines and forests as "productive guarantees," that Germany would make reparations deliveries, particularly of Ruhr coke upon which iron-smelting in Lorraine depended. In this he was supported by the French people, who recalled that they had paid to the last sou the indemnity imposed upon them in 1870. They had been assured that their taxes would not be raised after the war because Germany would be obliged to pay. But when their taxes mounted and the Germans began to default, their anger against the latter increased. As an American writer put it at the time: "The French peasant still has a feeling that if Foch goes into Germany with an army, he will come back with several billion dollars in his pocket."

Poincaré did not wait long before carrying out his threat to seize German mines. On January 10, 1923, France and Belgium announced that because Germany had defaulted, a Mission of Control accompanied by an adequate force would be sent into the Ruhr to supervise the activities of the coal syndicate. The next day French troops, including armored cars, infantry, cavalry, and cyclists, streamed into Essen and took possession of the railways, the post, and the telegraph service. On the following day tanks, heavy artillery, and airplanes arrived. It was a frank appeal to force and caused more bitterness between the Germans and the French than was ever produced by war. The effect upon the mark was immediate. Before the end of the month it dropped to 40,000 to the dollar.

Would the Germans resist the invasion of the Ruhr? Armed resistance was out of question, for any military campaign against the overwhelming French forces would have ended in disaster in a short

time. There were, however, other means of resistance. Emphatically deprecating violence and sabotage, the German government announced a policy of "passive resistance" which was supported wholeheartedly by the people. All reparations payments, especially the deliveries of coke and coal, to France and Belgium were discontinued at once and German officials were forbidden to take orders from the occupying authorities. Gradually more and more workers withdrew from all the productive and distributive processes that might help the army of occupation, with the result that France received only those deliveries of coal and coke that her own staff could produce.

The struggle for the Ruhr was catastrophic for the mark. "Passive resistance" could be successful only if the entire population of the Ruhr, to the number of about five millions, were fed and supported. This required vast sums, which the government raised by issuing more and yet more paper. As a result the mark depreciated with cyclonic speed during the succeeding months. By the middle of June it fell to 100,000 for a dollar; by the middle of July, to 200,000; by August 8, to 5 million; by the middle of September, to 100 million; by October 9, to more than 1 trillion; and by November 15, to 4.2 trillion. Such astronomical figures were comprehensible only to addicts of higher mathematics.

This rapid fluctuation hopelessly complicated all business. Salaries in private and public enterprises had to be increased every week at first, and later every day. Toward the end, prices and wage scales were often out of date before the ink had dried upon them. Depreciation was so rapid that paper currency became worthless almost while it was being held in the hand. Wages paid on one day might the next day hardly be worth the paper they were printed on. The result was the so-called "flight from the mark," an orgy of buying to get rid of paper money. Immediately upon receiving their wages employees would rush off to buy food, clothing, anything that had an inherent value. To anticipate depreciation shopkeepers had to increase the selling price of their commodities from hour to hour. As one American observer put it, "The price of a meal often increased between soup and nuts." Finally merchants refused to sell their goods for marks, fixing the prices only in foreign currencies. In the agricultural districts primitive barter was revived when the farmers demanded clothing or hardware in exchange for produce. During the last three months before the mark collapsed completely, more than three hundred paper mills worked at top speed to manufacture notepaper, and 150 printing companies had 2000 presses

running twenty-four hours a day to print enough bank notes to keep up with the inflation.

Inflation shook the social structure to its very roots. While some few accumulated vast fortunes during this chaos, many families of established wealth and position were reduced to poverty. The hardest hit of all were the lower middle classes. At one fell swoop the hard-earned savings they had invested in mortgages and government bonds or put in savings banks had been rendered practically valueless and many elderly and retired people were compelled to begin the struggle for existence anew. Inflation caused less change in the condition of the masses because they did not have so much to lose. But the annihilation of his savings, insurance, and pension was no light blow to the worker. What pressed especially upon him was unemployment and low wages; in fact, the years from 1918 to 1924 were years of utter chaos and misery. High prices and food shortages, the latter caused in part by the Allied blockade which was continued even after the armistice, resulted in malnutrition, disease, and high mortality. Most seriously affected were the children. Dr. W. A. H. Gantt of the American Relief Administration wrote of his experiences in 1923: "I went into half a dozen children's hospitals in Cologne and Düsseldorf. The condition of the children there was really terrible and was as pitiful as anything that I have ever seen in Russia. Three fourths of the children were sick, not from any common child diseases such as measles, whooping cough, etc., but from nutritional diseases such as rickets, gastroenteritis, and malnutrition." These observations are corroborated by Dr. Haven Emerson who wrote in his *Report upon Health, Sickness and Hunger among German Children*:

From infancy to school age marked rickets is so common, anemia, listlessness, poor muscular tone, sunken eyes, and emaciation are so generally seen that one loses a sense of proportion and is inclined to underestimate the extent of depreciation of vitality which is almost everywhere obvious among the children of the wage earners, the lesser public officials and the 20 to 40 percent of the adult population who are unemployed. Among children of school age there is a prevalence of tuberculosis not known to physicians heretofore.⁴



THE REPUBLIC AT ITS HEIGHT

Eventually the distress became so great that mutterings of revolt were heard in various parts of the country. Rather than call off its

⁴ *International Conciliation* (March, 1924), p. 80.

policy the cabinet, which had inaugurated the "passive resistance," resigned. This opened the way for the appearance upon the political stage of the first great German political leader since World War I. Some historians have gone so far as to state that he was the ablest political leader since Bismarck. Gustav Stresemann, who as chancellor headed the new coalition cabinet that was formed in August, 1923, was not even a republican. Throughout his earlier life he had been a liberal monarchist and an aggressive nationalist. After the war he had opposed the acceptance of the peace treaty. In 1918 his monarchist reputation caused him to be rejected by the new Democratic Party, after which he laid the foundation of the German People's Party, collecting in it men who were willing to work in the service of the republic until such time as a restoration of the monarchy could be made by parliamentary means. Even when he became chancellor he had little enthusiasm for the Weimar constitution, but he did realize that only a republican Germany could gain from the recent foes that support and confidence without which it could not recover. Gradually, however, he appears to have undergone a change of heart. How completely he changed can be seen from the fact that while he proclaimed himself "a republican for lack of something better" in 1924, he declared in 1926 that he would "protect the republic with his life." In pursuit of his policy of saving Germany he was ready to cooperate with either the Nationalists or the socialists or with both.

Although Stresemann was not a man of great vision, he recognized that Germany must get out of the Ruhr adventure and that the only way out was unconditional surrender. He was no less eager than others to free Germany from what was termed "the shackles of Versailles," but he was convinced that this could best be accomplished by peaceful means. He felt that a disarmed Germany could not successfully resist her conquerors, that every attempt at resistance would bring only new exactions and fresh disasters. Above all else he saw that Germany and France must stop running their heads together. "Since Germany cannot fight," he said of the Ruhr struggle, "why continue the war with other weapons?" As a realist he was convinced that cooperation would achieve infinitely more than hostility and resistance. Accordingly he boldly proclaimed a policy of reconciliation with France. With feeling running high against France it took courage to make such a proposal, for Erzberger and Rathenau, his predecessors on this pathway, had only recently been assassinated. To carry out the policy he had to overcome the opposition not only of the Nationalists but also of his own party. Securing the co-

operation in a grand coalition of all parties excepting the communists and extreme Nationalists, he called off the passive resistance. In November, 1923, an agreement was made with the occupation authorities according to which the Ruhr industrialists were to deliver commodities directly to the Allies.⁵

The same month also saw the stabilization of the mark through the issuance of the Rentenmark on which the old paper mark was stabilized at the rate of a trillion of the old to one Rentenmark. Although it was denominated in gold, it had no gold basis. Its sole guarantee consisted in its being exchangeable for mortgage bonds, the basis of which was a general lien on all the land and houses in Germany. Actually it rested on little more than public confidence. Stabilization on such a basis was possible only because the German people were ready and willing to accept any fixed standard of values. The history of the assignats during the French Revolution had shown how quickly a currency based on land can depreciate. But the Rentenmark by and large retained its fixed value, with an approximate exchange value of twenty-five cents or 4.2 to the dollar. As the old notes gradually disappeared from circulation, economic activities became more normal. An adding machine was no longer necessary to calculate a single purchase; nor did the worker have to rush off in great haste to convert his pay into something tangible in order to beat depreciation. It was all due to the "miracle of the Rentenmark." But this was only a temporary expedient. In November, 1924, it was supplanted by the standard Reichsmark which was, at least theoretically, put on a gold basis. Thenceforth German business in general, after an initial post-stabilization crisis, improved and expanded.

The stabilization of the currency together with the renunciation of the policy of passive resistance opened the way for a reconsideration of the reparations problem. During the occupation of the Ruhr Poincaré had blocked a request to reopen the question; but when the German government repeated the request after the Ruhr struggle had ceased, the Reparations Commission appointed two committees to make a study of Germany's economic resources and her capacity to pay. The more important of the two committees, that under the chairmanship of Charles G. Dawes, who later became Vice-President of the United States, drew up the so-called Dawes Plan. Poincaré opposed it, but in May, 1924, his government was replaced by that of Herriot, a sincere friend of conciliation. A conference of

⁵ This agreement paved the way for the eventual evacuation of the Ruhr by the French forces in the summer of 1925.



International News

DR. STRESEMANN, SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN, M. BRIAND, AND DR. BENEŠ AT THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SEPTEMBER 22, 1926

Allied representatives convoked in London during the summer of 1924 accepted the Dawes Plan, the Reichstag accepted it in August, and it went into effect on September 1. The outstanding features of the Plan were, first, that it reduced the astronomical figures of former plans to sums that Germany could pay and, second, it recognized that the economic rehabilitation of Germany was essential. German reparations payments were lowered from one billion marks for the year 1924-1925 to two and a half billion marks in the year 1928-1929. For the first year a virtual moratorium was granted. Eight hundred millions of the first billion marks were to come from the proceeds of a loan floated by the German government. Thus with American collaboration the demands on Germany were cut down and a foreign loan enabled her to begin meeting her obligations on an apparently reasonable basis.

In March, 1925, president Ebert suddenly died after a short illness and it became necessary to hold a presidential election. Although he had never done anything sensational, Ebert endeavored to preserve the republic against the attacks of both extremes. Standing as a bulwark of parliamentary democracy, he was hated by both the reactionaries and the communists but was esteemed by those who believed in republican democracy and in nonviolent progress toward a new social order. There was no one who seemed obviously suited to take his place. When the election was announced, all parties put forward candidates, most of whom were more or less undistinguished. As none of them secured an absolute majority, a run-off election became necessary. The Majority Socialists and the members of the Center Party, realizing that they could not win on a party basis, gave their support to Wilhelm Marx, a Rhineland capitalist. Their combined strength, it seemed, would carry the election. But the parties of the right were not ready to concede anything. In looking about for a candidate with a wide appeal they hit upon the idea of bringing Field Marshal von Hindenburg out of retirement. They believed that Hindenburg, who as the "hero of Tannenberg" had become almost a mythical figure in Germany, could rally a majority of the voters around his standard.

Since he had resigned his command of the army Hindenburg had remained aloof from politics, living quietly in Hannover. Being in his seventy-eighth year he preferred to spend his old age in peace. His mental equipment for high office was inadequate. He was not intelligent; in fact, his mental processes were as simple as those of a child. He knew nothing of economics, nothing of finance, and nothing of politics. What knowledge he possessed was largely

limited to the science of warfare. He himself had confessed in his memoirs: "Since my days as a cadet I have never read a book that did not deal with military affairs." When asked to become a candidate for the presidency he protested that he was too old, but he finally surrendered to the repeated urgings of his friends. The decision to stand for election must have been a difficult one, for by birth, tradition, and calling he was bound to the old imperial order. A member of the Junker caste, he had been part of the Prussian army which besieged Paris in 1870 and had also been present in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles when the German Empire was proclaimed early the next year. As late as 1921 he had closed a letter to the former kaiser with the words, "May I again be permitted to assure your Majesty that throughout my life my loyalty to my Kaiser, my King, and my Master has been unbounded, and that it will always be so." Convinced that it was for the good of his country, he obtained release from his vow of allegiance to the kaiser and placed himself at the service of the republic. The election was hotly contested, with the parties of the left denouncing him as "an old man without political experience" and "a puppet in the hands of his backers." But when the election returns had been tabulated, it was found that he had won over his principal opponent, Wilhelm Marx, by some 800,000 votes.

The announcement that Hindenburg had been elected caused much alarm in liberal circles and much jubilation among the reactionaries. While the former feared for the future of the republic, the latter were certain that the first step toward the restoration of the Hohenzollern had been taken. The reactionary newspaper, *Der Tag*, for example, stated: "We breathe freely once again and welcome the new light. It is as though all we had experienced since 1918 had been no more than an evil dream."⁶ However, the new president was to disappoint the hopes of the reactionaries and allay the fears of the republicans for the time being. Having taken the oath to uphold the constitution, he resolved to keep it. He came more and more under the influence of the reactionaries during the later years of his presidency, but he did remain loyal to the republic until he finally yielded to Hitler. During his early years as president he gave dignity and balance to the republic, which was already gravely menaced. The result was that the years succeeding the election saw not only a consolidation of the republic but also considerable progress in other respects.

Stresemann, who had regarded the candidacy of Hindenburg

⁶ Cited in Goldsmith and Voigt's *Hindenburg, the Man and the Legend* (1930), p. 290.

with much anxiety, was happy to discover that he could continue his foreign policy with the full support of the new president. What was this policy? It can probably best be summed up in the motto: "If you want peace, organize for peace." Stresemann saw that Germany's national greatness could be revived only in a peacefully organized European society and that pacification was possible only if an appeasement between France and Germany took place. So long as there existed in the French mind an acute fear of German aggression, so long as Germany was menaced by such armed French invasions as that of the Ruhr, any broad policy of pacification was impossible. Hence he began in 1925 the negotiations which led to the Treaty of Locarno which was signed in London on December 1 of the same year. By this treaty Germany and France accepted for all time the frontiers created in the west by the Treaty of Versailles. It is noteworthy that the German-French and German-Belgian frontiers were thus no longer regulated by these countries alone but that France and England became guarantors of the *status quo*, pledging themselves to give unrestricted assistance against any aggressor.

Although Germany renounced its claims to Alsace-Lorraine, there was no such renunciation of territory in the east. This left the way open for a revision by peaceful means of the frontier between Germany and Poland and between Germany and Czechoslovakia. Stresemann clearly hoped for such a revision. "It is impossible," he said in 1927 after a meeting with the Polish Marshal Pilsudski at Geneva, "to get rid of the corridor by means of a war. We must therefore examine if we can regain it in a peaceful way. This is a question which concerns the whole of Europe. A solution is only thinkable by a continuation of the policy of Locarno, that is, by close relations between Berlin, London, and Paris."

Locarno was the prelude to the entrance of Germany into the League of Nations. Once public opinion was reassured as to the danger arising from the other side of the Rhine, the more virulent war prejudices disappeared and Franco-German relations assumed a new tone almost overnight. French opposition to Germany's entry into the League melted away and in September, 1926, Germany was elected a member by unanimous vote of the forty-eight states represented and was also accorded with equal unanimity a permanent seat on the League Council. In expressing the support of his government to the ideas for which the League stood, Stresemann said: "It cannot be the purpose of the divine world order that men should direct their supreme national energies against one another, thus thrusting back the general progress of civilization. The most durable

foundation of things is a policy inspired by mutual understanding and mutual respect between peoples." Aristide Briand, French foreign minister, said in reply: "Away with rifles, machine guns, cannon! Clear the way for conciliation, arbitration, peace!" Many believed that, in the words of one observer, the real end of the war had come. The entrance of Germany into the League, it is true, did serve temporarily to introduce a period of stability in European relations. But the German reactionaries were only biding their time. They regarded Germany's admission to the League as "a diplomatic defeat" and the League itself as an alliance of powers whose primary purpose was to keep Germany in bondage.

Meanwhile economic recovery was progressing by leaps and bounds. Although the weeks immediately following the stabilization of the currency in the fall of 1923 were characterized by depression in most aspects of economic activity, the upward trend began in January of 1924. A major factor in this recovery was the influx of foreign funds which relieved the desperate shortage of working capital. In fact, during the entire period up to the depression of 1929 vast sums of foreign capital continued to flow into Germany, particularly from the United States, where the postwar boom had created surplus capital looking for investment. It has been estimated that from 1924 to the end of 1928 Germany imported foreign funds to the tune of nearly nineteen billion marks (about \$4 billion). Thus she was supplied with the funds necessary to launch a far-reaching program of industrial expansion.

A veritable fever of construction and replacement ensued. Many new factories were built. Machinery in the old factories was replaced with new machinery which included every modern device for economy of labor, time, and money. The result was that Germany gradually regained the leading position in those branches in which she had led before the war, more particularly in the optical, chemical, and electrical industries and in certain phases of engineering and textiles. Notwithstanding the loss of the vast coal fields and the iron and steel works of Silesia together with the ore deposits and iron works of Alsace-Lorraine, a loss that was expected to cripple the German iron and steel industry permanently, that industry again became highly prosperous.

Hand in hand with the industrial recovery came a trade boom which in turn necessitated the expansion and improvement of the means of transportation and communication. Schemes were launched for constructing or improving roads, railways, and canals, and for extending telephone and telegraph service. The fact that the Ger-

mans had been required to deliver a great quantity of rolling stock and locomotives turned out to be a blessing in disguise, for they were gradually replaced by new, modern, up-to-date materials, including more powerful locomotives and larger freight cars. In general, new materials and installations of every kind greatly increased the efficiency of the railways. The same was true of the merchant marine. The ships which had been turned over to the Allies in accordance with the peace treaties were replaced by new ones with every modern equipment. By 1930 the merchant marine had not only approached its 1914 size but since it consisted mainly of new units it was much more efficient than ever before. Nor did the Germans stop at building cargo ships. During this period they also began the construction of two giant passenger ships, the *Bremen* and the *Europa*.

By 1929 the volume of industrial production was well above the prewar level, and exports exceeded the figures of 1913 by as much as 34 per cent. In other words, Germany's industrial strength was greater than that of any other Continental country. In certain lines she had even passed Great Britain. With the growth of industry and trade had come a steady diminution of poverty and unemployment, so that by 1929 the standard of living was at least as high as it had been before the war and the number of people receiving unemployment relief was comparatively small. During the years 1924 to 1929 small depositors put no less than ten billion marks in the savings banks, and the policies issued by life insurance companies were more numerous and for larger amounts than before the war. Thus within the space of six years Germany had "climbed up from the pit of prostration and despair to an assured position of world leadership. It is one of the most spectacular recoveries in the world's entire economic history."⁷

During the years of prosperity the German government had paid the scheduled reparation annuities promptly, but the Dawes Plan was only "provisional" and there was a desire on the part of many Germans to replace this plan by one that would be "final." Prolonged discussions by a group of experts in Paris in the spring of 1929 were followed by the drawing-up of the Young Plan, so named after Owen D. Young, chairman of the General Electric Company in the United States, who headed the committee. The new plan for the first time set the total amount Germany was expected to pay and also prescribed the period during which it was to be paid. Furthermore, besides materially reducing the size of the annual payments

⁷ Angell, *The Recovery of Germany*, p. 3.

it freed Germany from the humiliating foreign supervision provided by the Dawes Plan. The new payments were to begin on April 1, 1930, with the sum of 1,707,900,000 marks (\$400 million). This was to increase gradually to a maximum of 2,428,800,000 marks (\$570 million) in 1965–1966, after which the payments were again to decrease and finally terminate in 1988. Before the first payment was due, however, signs of the great economic crisis made their appearance.

THE TWILIGHT OF GERMAN DEMOCRACY

At the beginning of 1929 the Weimar republic seemed stable and secure. German foreign relations, particularly those with France, had improved greatly as a result of Stresemann's efforts; and economic reconstruction, aided by foreign capital, had reached a point where it promised better things to the masses. But before the year ended, a definite change for the worse set in. One of the fateful events which marked the turning point was the death of Stresemann. Prematurely worn out by his arduous labors, the noted foreign minister succumbed to a stroke in October, 1929, at the age of fifty-one. The German Republic had lost its greatest champion. To measure his achievements one needs only recall the chaos he faced when he first came into power in 1923. Not only did he play a major part in restoring order and confidence within Germany but he also restored Germany to her place as one of the most influential and respected nations of Europe. Lord D'Abernon, who as British ambassador in Berlin had worked with Stresemann, paid him the following tribute for having "raised Germany from the position of a stricken and disarmed foe to a great power": "To have accomplished this in a few years of power without the support of armed force is an achievement worthy of those who have written their names most memorably on the scroll of pacific fame." It is doubtful that he would have been able to save the republic if he had lived longer. Shortly before his death he planned to form a genuinely republican party that was to serve as the bulwark of the Weimar republic, but the plan was not carried out. With his demise sinister forces long pent beneath the surface were released. Large industrialists and great landowners whom he had compelled to put on the democratic cloak now doffed it and openly supported a dictatorship. As for the later change in foreign relations, Rudolf Olden, his biographer, stated truly that with his death, "Europe lost its great chance of peace."

What really doomed the Weimar republic, however, was the world-wide economic crisis. The storm of depression, which broke in the New York stock exchange in October, 1929, and then gradually swept over the globe, hit Germany with devastating force. German prosperity, particularly vulnerable because it was based on foreign loans, collapsed like a house of cards. The crisis put a stop to the influx of foreign money and foreign creditors began to withdraw their funds, mostly borrowed on short-term credits, at an alarming rate and thereby seriously depleted the German gold reserves. As the burden of meeting these credit withdrawals fell almost exclusively upon the banks, their resources were so greatly exhausted that they were compelled to reduce their advances to trade and industry. The situation was made more serious by the fact that many Germans, fearing horrors like those of the inflation of 1923, began to withdraw their money from the banks, either to hoard it or to transfer it abroad for safety. The shortage became even more acute when it was necessary to pay reparations. All this put such a severe strain on the banks that many of them were forced to close their doors in 1931, including the third largest bank in Germany.

Lack of capital was even more fatal to German industries. Because of the shortage of working capital many industries were forced to restrict their output. Month by month, week by week, conditions grew worse and the number of bankruptcies mounted steadily. In 1931 alone there were over 17,000, a number which was exceeded in the next year. The number of unemployed grew at a terrifying rate, first by the tens of thousands and then by the hundreds of thousands. At the end of 1930 there were no less than three million unemployed in Germany, and by the early months of 1932 the number had increased to six millions. In the months of February and March, 1932, 45 per cent of the members of the Free Trade Unions were out of work; at the end of 1932 96 per cent of the members of the building trades unions were unemployed. In addition, millions of others worked only on short time. Furthermore, wages were reduced considerably. In 1931 they were cut 17 per cent, and 1932 saw further reductions. This meant serious curtailment of purchasing power, and the cumulative effect of reduced purchasing power caused a collapse of the home market. Unemployment also meant a falling off in tax receipts. As a result the government faced such a heavy deficit that it was forced to cut the unemployment dole from ten to six marks a week and to reduce war pensions by equally drastic amounts. How grave the situation was can be seen from the fact that during the early months of 1932 a

quarter of the citizens of Berlin were recipients of organized charity. This was probably true in every other large city of Germany. Nor did the peasants escape the blight of depression. Compelled on the one hand to pay high taxes to the government and high rates of interest on their mortgages and debts, they did not on the other hand receive commensurate prices for their products.

The despair of the masses was all the greater because they had believed that after the terrible days of the war and of the inflation period that had followed, settled economic conditions had finally been achieved. Workers, peasants, and particularly the members of the lower middle class who had recovered a modicum of prosperity became disappointed with the republic. The feeling was shared by thousands of students who saw no hope of obtaining employment so long as conditions remained unchanged. In their bitterness many went so far as to blame the republican system. Only the more moderate socialists still retained their faith in the Weimar constitution. As unemployment increased and with it poverty and the fear of poverty, the hungry masses became revolutionary. While some went communist, others joined the National Socialist Party in which Adolf Hitler was the leading figure. The result was that these two extremist groups, both of which wanted a forcible deposition of democratic government, showed great increase of strength in the Reichstag elections of 1930. Whereas the communist vote rose from 3.25 to 4.5 millions, the Nazi vote increased from 800,000 to nearly 6.5 millions. At a single bound the number of Nazi deputies in the Reichstag rose from 12 to 107, making the party the second strongest in the country. This sudden rise of a party which had not been taken seriously into account astonished not only the Germans but the whole world; in fact, the Hitlerites themselves were astounded at the number of votes they polled.

In the new Reichstag the reactionary bloc, composed of the National Socialists and the Nationalists, had about 150 deputies; the Marxists, 220; and the government of Chancellor Brüning, only about 200. Thus the government did not have a majority. The failure to form a coalition of moderate parties left Brüning only one course to pursue and that was to rule as a minority government in the hope that the Social Democrats (socialists) would tolerate it rather than drive the chancellor into a coalition with Hitler. The Social Democrats did tolerate Brüning's government, but from that day onward the Reichstag ceased to function in a positive sense. Having no majority, Brüning ruled by means of ordinances or emergency decrees which the president was empowered to issue by Article

48 of the constitution.⁸ Although the Reichstag had the right to reject such ordinances, Brüning was able to govern by this means through 1931 and into the spring of 1932 because the Reichstag did not form a majority against him. This government by ordinances was, of course, a definite step away from democratic procedure. In other words this and not Hitler's accession to power was the real beginning of dictatorship in Germany. However, the aims of the two men differed. While Brüning, it seems, was trying to save the republic, Hitler's avowed purpose was to destroy it.

The growing strength of the National Socialist Party gave Hitler confidence to stand as candidate for the presidency in the election of 1932. The opposing candidate was Hindenburg, who was supported by the Social Democrats and the Catholic Center Party. The workers and the Catholics knew that he was by sympathy a reactionary, but they put their faith in his oath to uphold the constitution. This was the decisive factor in the election, and it was proclaimed by such slogans as: "He stands by you: keep faith with him!" and "Loyalty is the essence of honor." Hitler gibed Hindenburg, who was eighty-four, about his age and boasted that he was forty years younger. It did not, however, win him the election. Although he did poll some thirteen million votes, Hindenburg carried the day with some nineteen million.

In May, 1932, Hindenburg, who was becoming increasingly susceptible to reactionary influences, dismissed Brüning as chancellor and called Franz von Papen, an out-and-out reactionary, to the helm. Although the new chancellor had only forty supporters in the Reichstag out of a total of nearly 600 deputies, he proceeded to act like a dictator. When the Reichstag opposed him, he dissolved it. But he failed to obtain the support of more than one tenth of the electorate and therefore had to relinquish the chancellorship. Hindenburg tried to save von Papen's cabinet by offering Hitler a post in it, but the future Führer asked nothing less than total power. He demanded that Hindenburg give him the same power as the King of Italy had accorded to Mussolini. The president, who disliked and distrusted Hitler, sidetracked him for the time being by appointing General von Schleicher as chancellor. But the reactionary intrigue which had destroyed Brüning after two years, destroyed Schleicher in a mere two months.

⁸ Actually Article 48 applied only to cases of real emergency such as armed revolt. It does not appear to have been the intention of the framers of the constitution that the emergency decrees should supersede normal legislative procedure. This article was a weakness in an otherwise democratic constitution.

Hitler's accession to power might still have been postponed if von Papen, who hoped he might exercise some control over the Nazis, had not proposed a coalition to Hitler. Although still suspicious of coalitions, Hitler saw a chance to get control of the government if he played his cards well; so he accepted. It only remained for von Papen, who still enjoyed Hindenburg's personal confidence, to convince the president that the appointment of Hitler was the only way out of the political dilemma. Hindenburg had declared in November, 1932, that he would not appoint Hitler as chancellor because "I fear that a Presidential Cabinet led by Herr Hitler would inevitably develop into a party dictatorship. . . . I cannot answer to my oath and to my conscience for such a step." He now gave way and on January 30, 1933, gave Hitler the chancellorship. In making the appointment the president observed all the forms of democracy; nevertheless, the appointment definitely marked the end of the Weimar republic. Created by the working classes in 1918, it collapsed because the working classes did not unite to save it.

Battered and Bleeding France

THE PRICE OF VICTORY

THE day of armistice saw the French people intoxicated with victory. On a number of occasions during the course of the war only a hairbreadth had stood between the safety and the death of France. At such times faith in ultimate victory had burned low in the hearts of many Frenchmen. At no moment, however, did hope flicker out completely. Even when the enemy struck close to the heart of Paris, the cry "On les aura" (we shall have them) did not cease. When hope was redeemed by victory in 1918, it was natural that the French should rejoice. Not only was their country saved but their national pride was also satisfied.

Before many days passed, however, their joy was sobered by the thought of the price they had paid. France had suffered all the agonies that normally accompany defeat and had come out of the war scarred, battered, and enfeebled. The districts in which fighting had taken place presented a melancholy aspect. Cities, towns, and villages had literally been blasted off the map or converted into shapeless ruins by high explosives. Little more than heaps of rubble marked the places where once many towns had stood. Of the more than 4000 municipalities taken by the Germans, 1039 were completely demolished, over 1200 were at least half destroyed, and the rest suffered to a less extent. It has been estimated that in the occupied territory 75 per cent of the dwellings, farm buildings, and public edifices were either destroyed or seriously damaged. Of 1,090,000 buildings which once stood in the devastated area 890,000 had been destroyed. Many of the best farms were denuded of or-

chards, plowed into deep craters by shellfire, and covered with inextricable tangles of barbed wire.

The territory occupied by the Germans represented only a small part of the total area of France, it is true, but it contained most of the coal and iron mines and was the most highly industrialized part of the country. Before the war over 80 per cent of the iron ore and 70 per cent of the coal had come from this area. Besides this, the more advanced processes of manufacture were centered there, including about 80 per cent of the textile and steel mills. During the years of occupation practically every factory was destroyed or seriously damaged. The destruction of the buildings themselves was often only a small part of the loss. More serious was the destruction or removal of machinery, tools, and equipment of every kind, much of it difficult to replace. Equally serious was the damage to the mines. The coal mines had been the particular object of destruction because the Germans realized that the economic vitality of France depended in large measure on the coal supply. In many cases the buildings above ground, the hoists, and the ventilating systems were wrecked, and the pumps were ruined so that the mines were flooded. Other mines were dynamited or set on fire. It is estimated that in all about 220 mining operations were rendered useless.

Other losses were likewise tremendous. Agriculture suffered heavily. In the occupied regions, which included some of the best agricultural land in France, all but about 15 per cent of the cultivated soil was devastated. More than 90 per cent of the cattle disappeared, and about three quarters of the dwellings and farm buildings were destroyed or damaged. In the whole of France the number of sheep decreased by 38 per cent, the number of pigs by 40 per cent, and the production of milk by 63 per cent.

Great damage was also done to the means of transportation. Highways were torn to pieces by mines and shellfire or were deeply rutted by tanks, guns, and heavy trucks. No less than 6000 bridges were completely demolished, 700 miles of canal routes were damaged, and 1500 miles of railway wrecked.

Furthermore, foreign trade suffered grievously. By 1919 the volume of trade had decreased to a quarter of what it had been in 1913. In addition the tonnage of the merchant marine had been reduced more than a third by German submarines and by sea accidents.

The losses of capital were also great. France, which in 1913 had been a creditor nation with large investments abroad, emerged from the war with a foreign debt of nearly seven billion prewar francs. Immensely larger was the internal debt. In 1914 this had already

amounted to about 12 per cent of the total national wealth, but the cost of the war and of reconstruction raised it to about 30 per cent. The value of the franc on the international exchange had dropped steadily; in fact, by 1919 it had lost 72 per cent of its purchasing power, a condition which gave rise to grave economic disorders.

Most tragic of all was the loss of human life. France had mobilized nearly eight million men or about three quarters of the males of working age. When the din of battle died away, it was found that close to a million and a half had been killed or were missing, and the number of wounded, crippled, and incapacitated was at least as high. During the war there were also 1,389,916 more civilian deaths than births, with the result that the population which, according to the census of 1911, had numbered 39.2 millions declined to about 36 millions. This loss was particularly grave for a country whose population had been almost stationary for several decades. The excess of females over males increased from 2 per cent in 1911 to 15 per cent in 1921, and the loss of so many males of working age greatly weakened the whole economic life of France.



THE ROAD TO RECOVERY

The losses in man power and material resources were so stupendous that rapid recovery in any field of activity seemed quite ruled out, but the government attacked its task boldly. In July, 1919, a vast program of reconstruction at an estimated cost of forty billion francs was announced in the Chamber of Deputies. In the devastated regions temporary shelters were hastily erected to accommodate people who yearned to return to their native towns and villages; then the work of permanent reconstruction was started. Progress was amazingly rapid. Before many months had passed new towns were rising out of the ruins. In the country districts the peasants set to work with a will. Patiently they removed the debris of battle, filled the shell holes, and leveled the stretches of battleground so that in a short time lands of chaos were transformed into smiling fields. Meanwhile industrial restoration was also proceeding rapidly. To offset the loss of man power the government opened the immigration gates and invited foreigners to take up their abode in France. So many Spaniards, Italians, Belgians, and Poles came that the number of resident aliens increased by more than 1.3 million in four years. This immigration of foreign labor had a prodigious effect on industrial restoration. "Foreigners," said a British observer, "are becoming in fact indispensable cooperators in many large and varied

branches of French production." With their help the French were able to rebuild most of the demolished factories by the beginning of 1922. At the same time transportation facilities were being repaired and rebuilt so that commerce could resume. In short, before many years passed the material damages to buildings, mines, roads, bridges, canals, and railroads were repaired. So rapid was the restoration that in 1922 French foreign trade attained its prewar volume and was soon to surpass it.

An important factor in the rehabilitation of economic life was the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, which the Germans had detached from France in 1871. The regaining of these provinces meant, first of all, that the French population was increased by 1,700,000. More specifically it meant the addition of a vigorous group of workers to the labor power of France. It further meant the recovery of the good agricultural land in the plains between the Vosges and the Rhine. But the real significance lay rather in the natural resources and the industrial equipment the two provinces contained. Thus Alsace-Lorraine brought to France the largest and richest deposits of iron ore in Europe, added about 20 per cent to the inadequate coal supply, and provided an immense store of potash. Other contributions of Alsace-Lorraine to French industry were its metallurgical works with their up-to-date furnaces and its magnificent textile industries.

During the succeeding years prosperity maintained itself on an increasing scale. Foreign trade, for example, grew from an average of 14 billion francs during the five years before the First World War to somewhat over 119 billion francs in 1926.¹ But as 1926 proceeded, ominous clouds appeared on the industrial horizon and a sudden trade reaction set in. The cause was the fall of the franc. Its value had been artificially maintained during the war;² then it declined after the cessation of hostilities but rose again in 1921 and 1922. It declined gradually thereafter. In 1926 it dropped at a terrifying rate until in August it reached a low of 12 per cent of its prewar value. When things were at their worst President Doumergue called upon Poincaré to find a remedy. Forming a cabinet composed of men of all parties except socialists and communists, Poincaré gave most of his attention to finances. Confidence began to return at once and by the end of the year there was, if not legal stabilization, at least *de facto* stabilization, with the Bank of France announcing its willingness to buy and sell at approximately twenty-five francs to the

¹ The increase was not so great when the inflation of the franc is taken into account.

² The prewar parity rate was 5.18 to the dollar.

dollar.”³ General recovery was almost immediate. French capital that had fled France returned; trade became brisk; the tourist trade, one of the most remunerative of French industries, flourished; and exports reached record figures in 1928–1929.



POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES

The political picture of France during the period between two wars is one of confusion and instability. Cabinets rose and fell in rapid succession like fanciful creations of building blocks. The fundamental cause for the shortlived character of the cabinets was the multiplicity of parties and political groups in the Chamber of Deputies. In 1936, for example, they numbered no less than nineteen. Most of these did not correspond to organized parties on the outside. They were merely groups of individuals drawn together by some issue of the moment. Such groups coalesced or disintegrated according to the acceptance or rejection of the ideas they sponsored. There were no well-organized and disciplined parties except on the left or left center.⁴ Moreover, in the history of the Third Republic there was never a party large enough to secure a clear majority. Consequently all cabinets were necessarily coalitions and most of them were of brief duration. A further weakness which contributed much to the instability of the government was the fact that deputies were elected for fixed four-year terms. They could vote the premier out of office at will but the latter was unable to vindicate himself by calling for a general election as in England. Once elected, the deputies lasted out their four-year term regardless of change in popular sentiment. Hence the French executive was weak, while the Chamber was strong, a situation which made for instability of leadership and great inefficiency. With a Chamber of Deputies torn by the pressure of numerous groups, each at cross-purposes with the others, it became almost impossible to pass constructive legislation.

Along broader lines the political parties and groups may be classified in three categories: the conservative right, the moderate center, and the radical left. This grouping owes its origin to the fact that the deputies to the States-General thus seated themselves on the eve of the French Revolution.⁵ In France during this period the extreme right was monarchist or Fascist. In the decade of the twenties

³ In 1928 the franc was legally stabilized at the rate of 25.52 to the dollar.

⁴ Popular Democrats, Radical Socialists, United Socialists, French Socialists, and Communists.

⁵ This classification has met with general adoption throughout the world.

the well-known *Ligue de l'Action Française*, whose influence was due in large part to the support of the clergy, was the most powerful group on the right. Its leaders, who insisted that the Republic was irreligious and anticlerical, identified the cause of monarchy with that of Roman Catholicism. But the *Action Française* lost much of its strength through its condemnation by the pope (1926), who wished to dissociate the church from the cause of political reaction. In the decade of the thirties another group, the *Croix de Feu*, became the dominant group on the right. The center in the main represented the *bourgeoisie*, peasant proprietors, and small businessmen. Its members were the heirs of the French Revolution and the special guardians of the republic. The left was composed largely of socialists and communists. In political doctrine these groups ranged from republicanism to full-fledged communism and anarcho-syndicalism. What the leftist groups had in common was, above all, their hatred of Fascism.⁶



DEPRESSION AND THE THREAT OF FASCISM

During the period between the two world wars the politics of France were profoundly affected by two factors, the financial situation and the threat of Fascism. Although the years to 1929 were the most prosperous, the rising tide of economic prosperity was not reflected in improved national finances. Despite the fact that France as a country of individuals and corporations was rich, France as a government was on the verge of bankruptcy. This state of affairs resulted from the government's policy of borrowing instead of increasing taxes. During the war it had contracted a deficit of 145 billion francs but had made little effort to meet by taxation the enormous increase of expenditure. It was confidently believed that such stupendous sums would be obtained from Germany as reparations that they would free the French public from paying taxes. When there were no huge sums forthcoming immediately after the cessation of hostilities, the government further increased the public

⁶ In July, 1932, the deputies were grouped as follows: RIGHT: 14 Independents; 18 Republicans and Social Group; 8 Economic, Social, and Peasant Action; and 41 Republican Federation. CENTER: 36 Republican Center; 28 Republicans of the Left; 16 Popular Democrats; 6 Republicans of the Center; 23 Independents of the Left; and 47 Radical Left. LEFT: 160 Radical Socialists; 15 Independent Left; 12 Republican Socialists; 13 French Socialists; 131 Socialists; 9 Party of Proletarian Unity; and 10 Communists. Twenty-eight deputies were unclassified. The names of many of the groups are misleading. The Radical Socialists, for example, were very much more conservative than the name indicates.

debt through large borrowings to restore the devastated areas. Consequently "balancing the budget" became one of the pressing problems of the government. The years which followed saw many ministers and cabinets rise and fall over this question. In 1925 no less than six ministers of finance and three cabinets found it an insurmountable stumbling block. During the period of Poincaré's cabinet an increase in taxation coupled with the general prosperity produced a budgetary surplus. Expenditures, however, soon increased and when, after his retirement in 1929, taxes were reduced, the budget began to show heavy deficits and the question of balancing it again came to the forefront.

When the world depression came in 1929, it affected France much more slowly than the other large countries of Europe; in fact, until 1931 it was hardly noticeable in France. But the following years were difficult. Exports declined to a tremendous extent. In 1932 they were only 65 per cent of the 1931 total and 45 per cent of the 1930 total. The tourist trade, which in the postwar decade had been an important source of income, fell off sharply. In 1934 only 700,000 tourists visited France as against 2,125,000 in 1927. Business decline and diminishing profits caused widespread failures and increased unemployment. This condition was responsible for a large-scale exodus of foreign workers. Falling prices also resulted in distress among the farmers. In other words, the disease of economic depression ate into the very vitals of France. In 1933 four prime ministers tried vainly to halt the ravages of this disease. Gradually many lost their faith in democratic government. They became convinced that the only remedy lay in a reform along Fascist lines. This conviction was strengthened by the exaggerated reports of improvements that absolutist governments were supposed to have introduced in Italy and Germany. Nor did the Fascist or semi-Fascist organizations fail to make the most of the opportunity to aggravate popular discontent with parliamentary institutions and politicians. As a result the membership of these organizations increased by leaps and bounds. In two years the *Croix de Feu* grew from a small body of distinguished war veterans into the greatest Fascist force in the country.

The rapid growth of the Fascist and semi-Fascist groups and particularly the "lightning mobilization" of the *Croix de Feu* began to alarm the left. Many of them came to believe that the Fascist movement could be stopped only through the realization of a common front against it. Discussions were soon opened to this end, but the coalition of all left parties was not finally achieved until the spring of 1936. The common program of the Popular Front (*Front*

Populaire), the name adopted for the federation of anti-Fascist parties and groups, enumerated reforms that should be accomplished in order "to defend democratic liberties, to provide bread for workers, employment for youth, and to give to the world the great human peace." The elections in the spring of 1936 resulted in a victory for the Popular Front that surpassed all expectations. When the ballots were counted, it was found that the Popular Front could command 387 votes out of 618. For the first time the socialists formed the largest group in the chamber. Accordingly their leader, Léon Blum, was invited to form a cabinet. Departing from his traditional policy of refusing to become a member of a coalition, Blum organized one in which all the major groups of the left, except the communists, were represented. The Communist Party had been invited to participate in the government but refused "in order to preserve its liberty of action." It did, however, support the new government.

Soon after it assumed the reins of government the Blum cabinet introduced a program of economic and social legislation unparalleled in the history of modern France. The first enactments were for the benefit of labor. At this time a series of formidable sit-down strikes had spread like wildfire through various branches of industry until business activity had come to a virtual standstill. As a means of placating labor the new cabinet enacted a measure (June 20, 1936) which gave employees in industry, commerce, and the liberal professions a minimum annual vacation of fifteen days with pay after one year's continuous employment in any enterprise. More leisure for employees was provided by the forty-hour-week statute which became law on June 21 and was gradually introduced into various industries, so that it was applied to 94 per cent of the workers by the beginning of May, 1937. Nor were the peasants neglected. A national wheat office was established which was to insure farmers a remunerative price and curb excessive profits of middlemen. Other legislation included the nationalization of the Bank of France; this broke the power which the "industrial and financial oligarchy" wielded over the Bank and gave twelve of the twenty-three seats on the Bank's governing board to officials appointed by the government. A further blow was dealt this same oligarchy through the conversion into state enterprises of about a dozen armament factories, while the remainder of that industry was put more definitely under state control.

The rock on which the Blum government ultimately suffered shipwreck was the financial problem. The financial situation was extremely bad, the public debt having risen 24.5 per cent from

1930 to 1935, but it soon became critical. One important reason was the necessity for spending large sums on armaments because of the threat of war posed by Hitler's accession to power in Germany (1933). The fundamental tragedy lay in the fact that France's reserves and credit were so limited that the Popular Front could not carry out its large social program in a time of intensive rearmament. The difficulty of finding the necessary funds increased year after year. At the same time both the employers and the workers remained unsatisfied. While the former complained that the forty-hour week wiped out the margin of profit, the workers insisted that rising prices were neutralizing the benefits they had gained from the new legislation. When the Popular Front took power, prices in terms of gold were generally about 25 per cent higher than British and American prices. From many sides a clamor arose for devaluation of the franc. For some months Blum resisted the demand but finally gave way. The Act which permitted a depreciation of 25.2 per cent brought only a temporary relief. Production rose but slowly, the rise being due to increased rearmament rather than to other factors. On the other hand, the condition of both the franc and the treasury were steadily deteriorating. By June, 1937, the government did not know where to turn for money. When Blum asked temporary dictatorial powers to put through a capital levy and to establish control of foreign exchange, the Chamber passed the bill. But the following day the Senate speedily gave Blum his *coup de grâce* by deciding that they would not even debate the bill. The premier's only course was to resign.

Blum's cabinet was replaced by a more conservative Popular Front government under Camille Chautemps. Although the more orthodox financial measures of the new cabinet brought temporary relief, no basic solution of the problem was forthcoming. Except in the armament industry production continued to lag, and rising prices continued to nullify the higher wages won by the workers. While capital was demanding repeal or at least modification of the Popular Front reforms, the workers were agitating for still higher pay to meet the increasing cost of living. Rising prices coupled with a rise in unemployment engendered a new wave of labor unrest, which vented itself in a renewal of strikes (December, 1937). At the same time dissension was developing in the ranks of the Popular Front between the more conservative and the more radical wings. This dissension was encouraged by the declining strength of Fascism, the threat of which had caused the formation of the Popular Front. When, like its predecessor, the Chautemps government sought to

obtain dictatorial power to prevent financial collapse, the socialists and communists refused their approval and thereby forced Chauvemps' resignation. Blum then organized a cabinet but it lasted less than a month.

The fall of the second Blum cabinet marked the final collapse of the Popular Front. On April 10 a new government was formed by Edouard Daladier who belonged to the conservative wing of the Radical Socialists. This cabinet was more representative of the center than of the left. With the menace of the totalitarian dictatorships growing greater each day, parliament gave Daladier's government wider powers to rule by decree than those it had permitted his predecessors. The new premier used his powers to decree a rise of 8 per cent in taxes, to unify the budget, and to modify the forty-hour-week law. Although a forty-five-hour week was permitted for many industries, a sixty-hour maximum was decreed for all industries contributing to the rearmament program. Rates for overtime pay were also severely slashed. It was hoped that increased armament production would enable France to meet the growing danger from across the Rhine.



FOREIGN POLICY

The key to French foreign policy during this period is the search for security, more specifically for security against German aggression. The methods may have varied but the objective remained the same. During a period of less than half a century France had twice been invaded by huge German armies, and the last time it had taken years of struggle to dislodge them. To prevent another such invasion became the cardinal goal of diplomacy. At Versailles, as stated earlier, the French representatives were occupied almost exclusively with two aims: (1) payment by Germany; (2) security against future aggression. When the peacemakers had finished their work, the people were far from satisfied that security had been achieved. "It was in this respect," Poincaré said, "that we suffered our greatest disillusionment after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George before leaving Paris had signed guarantee pacts which promised France the aid of the United States and England in case of an attack by Germany. However, these pacts were never ratified. France remained alone in the presence of Germany." Thus the dread of a German attack continued to harass the French like a nightmare.

During subsequent years the desire for security was so para-

mount that many foreigners regarded it as an obsession. While Germany was exhausted and internally disrupted, France had the strongest army in Europe and a preponderant position in the councils of Europe. In other words, France seemed to have security to spare. But the French were not concerned about the immediate future. They were looking ahead to a time when Germany would recover both her military and her industrial strength. Germany, it is true, lay prostrate at the moment, but the French realized only too well that the giant had been laid low not by their single-handed efforts but by a coalition of many nations. They knew that by themselves they would never have driven the Germans from French soil in 1918 any more than they were able to do so in 1870. They also knew that Germany retained an enormous basic superiority both in man power and in the capacity to produce war materials. Against the seventy million inhabitants of Germany, France had only forty millions and unless the birth rate rose sharply the possibility of increasing the population was anything but promising. Furthermore, the French were aware that the Germans had not accepted the Treaty of Versailles as final, that they would renounce it at the first opportunity. "The Treaty of Versailles," Briand wrote, "will always be a source of irritation. It was the fruit of war, of victory. It can be called, and is called, a treaty imposed by force, under duress, that the defeated party is morally justified in repudiating when it can do so." In short, the French, who feared the inevitable resumption of the Franco-German duel, were searching for means to prevent it.

In lieu of the Anglo-American guarantee pact France was obliged to content itself with other forms of security. One of these was to support the League of Nations as a means of preserving peace and the *status quo*; in fact, the French joined every movement and subscribed to every plan that promised to make for peace. But the plan which on the whole appealed to them as best fitted to give the security they desired was the reestablishment of the balance of power. More specifically, they aimed to build up an unquestioned preponderance of power on the side of the defenders of the established order. They made various overtures to Great Britain, but the British for the time being relapsed into their island isolationism. They were not only determined to keep clear of Continental entanglements but were opposed to having any power become too strong. By preserving a certain balance of strength between the nations Britain could continue to play the part of mediator on the Continent. Hence, although negotiations continued until 1922, the British were unwilling to offer France any further guarantee beyond

the promise of aid in case the Germans should actually invade the country. Prior to World War I France had been allied to Russia but now this ally was lost by revolution. In the words of a Frenchman: "We had found in Russia a powerful ally against Germany. This asset was lost to us, though the war was won. . . . So we have to set out to find a new combination against the menace on our eastern border." Accordingly French diplomacy crisscrossed Central Europe with allies. In 1920 France concluded an alliance with Belgium and during the subsequent years also signed treaties with Poland (1921 and 1925) and Czechoslovakia (1924 and 1925). In all three cases the treaties provided for mutual military aid. It was hoped that the armies of these three countries, combined with the French army, would insure military superiority even if Germany did evade the disarmament terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Soon thereafter Rumania (1926) and Yugoslavia (1927) were added. Thus the policy of keeping Germany in a subordinate position and "encircled" was relentlessly pursued.

After the French occupation of the Ruhr in January, 1923, Franco-German relations, as previously stated, became so strained that a rapprochement between the two nations seemed out of question. The atmosphere soon cleared, however. Leading men in both nations realized that there could be no stability in Europe so long as France and Germany continued to live on past grievances, rancors, and hatreds. The Locarno Agreements, which were salve to the sore spots for a few years, were signed in 1925. Stresemann declared: "We have undertaken to initial this treaty because we believe that only on the lines of friendly neighborliness can there be a real development of states and peoples." When Germany was admitted into the League of Nations the next year, it appeared as if a spirit of international friendship would prevail.

But the hopes of those who believed that the Locarno treaties would inaugurate an era of permanent friendship were doomed to disappointment. After 1929 relations between the two nations gradually deteriorated. French fears had been temporarily relieved but Nazi militarism revived them again. Nor did the Locarno Agreements prove more satisfactory to the Germans. They had not removed such major causes of friction as the German demand for arms equality, for colonies, and for the removal of the war-guilt clause from the Treaty of Versailles. This was fuel for the Nazi Party which was vigorously fanning the flame of national sentiment in the hope of gaining enough strength to take over the government. After Hitler's accession to power (January, 1933) French policy

toward him was of necessity one of appeasement.⁷ Not only did the French fear the growing German military power, but the guarantees they had established against aggression were crumbling. As Germany grew stronger and French prestige waned, the alliances France had forged lost much of their effectiveness. In 1934 Poland, one of the mainstays in the system, signed a nonaggression pact with Germany. Two years later the Belgians renounced their military agreements with France, and in 1937 Yugoslavia signed a treaty of friendship with Italy, Germany's ally. A shift from France toward Germany also took place in an economic sense. Since Germany offered a better market for agricultural products than France, which was largely self-sufficient, a number of agricultural states were drawn into the German economic sphere. It appeared as if France would have to resign herself to accepting any change in the *status quo* that Germany might make. But the situation changed in 1939 when both Britain and France openly committed themselves to defend Poland against Nazi aggression.



FRANCE'S UNEASY DOMINIONS


In addition to other difficulties France also had problems of empire. Predestined, as it were, to exploration and colonization by her geographical position and particularly her extensive seacoasts, France had been a colonizing nation since the early seventeenth century. During the first period of colonial expansion, which reached its climax in 1750, she extended her conquests over a large part of India and over the territories in North America then known as New France. But she was unable to hold the territories that had been brought under her flag by the enterprise of her explorers and fur trappers. From 1750 to 1815 a succession of wars, followed by the Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, resulted in the almost complete dismantling of the French colonial empire, with Great Britain acquiring the lion's share. At the end of the Napoleonic wars only a few fragments of the old empire remained—some islands in the West Indies, some trading factories in India, and some fishing posts off Newfoundland. All the rest had been lost except Louisiana, which Napoleon had sold to the United States. In 1830, however, the business of replacing the lost colonies with a new empire began

⁷ The exception was the foreign ministry of M. Barthou (February to October, 1934). Barthou believed that the only way to ensure peace was to "call Hitler's bluff" at the earliest possible moment. He was unable to do so because he did not know how far he could count on British support.

again with the acquisition of Algeria. Napoleon III did little to restore France overseas, but after the establishment of the Third Republic several statesmen vigorously pushed the task of building the new empire, so that it was soon second only to that of Great Britain. In 1920 its area reached the enormous total of about four million square miles. As the area of France proper was only a little over 200,000 square miles, the foreign possessions were thus about twenty times as large as the mother country. In population, too, they outstripped the mother country, the colonies having an estimated population of sixty million whereas France in Europe could boast only some forty million.

This vast empire, comprised as it was of many races and creeds, was chaotic and far-flung. But much of it was nearer home than the old empire had been; in fact, only the blue waters of the Mediterranean separated the mother country from some of her most important colonies. Along the northern coast of Africa the tricolor waved over Algeria, Tunisia, and parts of Morocco. From the Mediterranean the colonies reached down the west coast of Africa in a magnificent sweep. With the exception of a few strips and one large block of territory, France held all the land on the west coast to a point considerably south of the equator, including Senegal, French Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, and French Equatorial Africa. When the First World War broke out, French troops had invaded and taken possession of the German colonies of Togoland and the Cameroons. These formally passed under French control as mandates in the peace settlement. In addition to the colonies on the west coast there was French Somaliland on the east coast, and Madagascar, third largest island in the world, off the southeastern coast. To the east of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean the Reunion Islands acknowledged French suzerainty. Besides all this there were two widely separated areas in Asia, Syria in the western part and Indo-China in the Far East. While Syria was one of the mandated territories France received after World War I, French Indo-China, consisting of a number of provinces, had been acquired from 1861 to 1892. In area the latter was larger than France herself, with a population about one half that of the mother country. As reminders of the days when she fought Britain for colonial supremacy France also had a few shreds and patches of territory in India. Moreover, the Pacific Ocean was studded with microscopic islands under French rule as well as one large island, New Caledonia.

The American possessions of France were insignificant compared to the vast possessions in Asia and Africa. In the North Atlantic,



Undersood

ST. PIERRE MIQUELON. THE LAST REMNANT OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE IN NORTHERN AMERICA

the scene of their earlier colonial conquests, the French had only two small fogbound islands, St. Pierre and Miquelon, embracing an area of ninety-three square miles of rocky and barren land inhabited by less than ten thousand people whose principal industry was cod fishing. In the south the French flag still flew over the islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique. French Guiana, an immense forest watered by many rivers and situated on the continent of South America, completed the list of possessions in the new world.

The commercial promises of the colonies were almost limitless. North Africa, which had been the granary of Rome, still produced vast quantities of wheat, oats, and barley. In addition Algeria and Tunisia exported fruits, tobacco, and wool, and also marble, stone, crude metals, oils, and chemicals. Among the chief products of Morocco, besides cereals, were wool and linseed. Many thousand gallons of wine were annually shipped across the Mediterranean and blended with French wines. Equatorial Africa had vast undeveloped resources of rubber, copper, and palm oil. Madagascar was rich in forests, minerals, precious stones, and graphite. Plants for textile materials and for tanning, dyeing, and medicinal purposes were also raised in large quantities, together with such food products as rice, sugar, coffee, cocoa, and vanilla. Indo-China offered infinite possibilities for the production of rice, silk, cotton, timber, metals, and rubber. New Caledonia, one of the richest countries in the world, exported coffee, tobacco, manioc, mother of pearl, and, above all, nickel. Until the development of the Canadian nickel mines France dominated the market through her control of the New Caledonia mines. Copra, sugar, rum, and pearls were produced in quantity on the French islands of the Pacific. Upon both Martinique and Guadeloupe sugar was the staple product and other important crops included coffee, cocoa, tobacco, and cotton. Finally, there were the varied products of French Guiana including hardwood, dyes, and plants suitable for the manufacture of textiles and medicine.

Despite the prodigious wealth and resources of this empire, few Frenchmen were interested in it. Colonies were not needed to absorb the excess population of France because there was no excess. Because of the shortage of man power, colonies of Spaniards, Belgians, Poles, Swiss, Russians, and other nationals had been planted in France proper. Consequently most Frenchmen regarded their colonial empire as a sort of luxury. The expansion movement was, therefore, promoted by a handful of statesmen with "secret" funds. Whenever the people were asked for money to meet the expenses of

empire, they complained loudly. A wider colonial interest did not develop until the Germans entered the competition for colonies. It was German interference in Morocco, for example, that crystallized French ambitions in that colony. To those who had not been previously interested in colonial activities World War I demonstrated that the French Empire not only offered a splendid field for future exploitation in times of peace but also served as an invaluable source of man power for the French forces. During the war the colonies furnished no less than 700,000 fighting men, while more than a million others manned war factories, ports, and means of transportation. More than this, from the first day of the war the colonies sent the mother country vast quantities of such essential supplies as cereals, meats, oils, metals, and timber.

After the war when the search for security became paramount, statesmen decided that one way to compensate for the growing shortage of men and the falling birth rate would be to make the colonies part of a greater France. In discussing the position of France in Europe Poincaré stated in 1923 that France was no longer a country of forty million but of a hundred million. It was a declaration to the enemies of France that in the next war they would have to fight not only the military contingents of forty million Frenchmen but also the conscripts of sixty million natives of Indo-China, Madagascar, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Somaliland, and other colonies. Universal conscription became the law in the colonies as well as in France. But the colonies were to represent an extension of France not merely in a military sense; they were to be French in every sense. It became the aim to assimilate rather than dominate the colonies. Consciously, deliberately, and avowedly the colonial administrations took up the task of gallicizing the native populations, of teaching them to regard themselves as Frenchmen rather than as Africans, Asians, or what not, of stimulating a French consciousness in them. Perhaps the most vital cog in the machinery of assimilation was the schools that were opened in the various colonies. Here children were taught French and steeped in French traditions. French citizenship was bestowed on natives when they were regarded as ready for it. Participation in the government was also granted to the more adult colonies. Thus the three departments of Algeria were permitted to send representatives to the Chamber of Deputies to make laws that were binding on all Frenchmen. By 1930 eight of the thirty colonies had some sort of representation in the parliament.

Outwardly it appeared for a time as if France were meeting with marvelous success in this program. While the anti-European move-

ment was flaring up with unexpected intensity in India, the Middle East, and even in Egypt, a comparative calm was reigning in the French colonies. The absence of open trouble made many Frenchmen dream of a complete assimilation of the native populations into the *civilisation française*, of making all French soil one with *la Patrie*. But appearances were deceiving. Despite a certain outward acquiescence most natives had little appreciation of the material or intellectual benefits of Western life that were laid at their feet. Many would not even send their children to the schools the French opened. Although to superficial observers France seemed to stand secure in the loyalty of her colonial subjects, revolutionary movements were actually surging below the surface. The visions of political liberty and democratic government which motivated these movements came largely from France. Those aspects of French culture which the Arabs absorbed most readily were the nationalistic tendencies. But instead of a French nationalism either a local or an Arab nationalism developed. In other words, the native populations began to insist on living their own lives.

Not long after World War I North Africa was honeycombed with Moslem secret societies whose object was to liberate all Islam from the rule of the "Christian infidel." In Tunisia in 1922 the underground agitation for freedom culminated in the march of a dusty white-robed procession of thousands of Mohammedans to the palace of the Bey of Tunisia to lay before him a petition urging him to drive out the foreigner and resume his ancient power. With a prompt show of force the authorities dispersed the gathering and suppressed the newspapers which were the mouthpieces of the agitators; then to quiet the unrest the French made certain desired reforms. It was the policy of the iron hand and the velvet glove, the former making a show of force and the latter smoothing things over by concessions to the desire for self-government. This policy settled little beyond driving the independence movements underground. Some time later the movement would break out anew and the iron-hand and velvet-glove policy would again be employed. This was true in Algeria and Morocco as well as in Tunisia. In the decade of the thirties disturbances and popular uprisings became more frequent. After a series of riots in Algeria an English observer wrote: "The remarkable novelty in this demonstration is the fact that there were more Europeans than natives amongst the demonstrators against French colonial rule. . . . There is the danger of natives being encouraged against the regime by Europeans."⁸ Under the term

⁸ *Review of Reviews* (London), vol. 86 (1935), p. 49.

"Europeans" this observer undoubtedly grouped all those who had acquired a veneer of European civilization, for the anti-French movement did draw much of its strength from younger men who had been educated in France or in the French schools of North Africa.

Nor was the unrest confined to North Africa. Everywhere in the French as in the British Empire the tide of native feeling against foreign domination was rising. The natives of Madagascar, of Syria, of the French possessions in India, and of Indo-China were all demanding freedom. There was even an organization, the *Rassemblement Coloniale*, which endeavored to coordinate the work of the various independence movements in the different parts of the empire. In the more backward regions of Africa there were no organized movements for independence, but the desire to be free was nevertheless strong and found outlet in strikes, disorders, and riots. How the colonial peoples felt can be seen from a letter written by a native of the Cameroons (after this territory was transferred to the French) to the League for the Defense of the Negro People. "We don't want the Germans, who have killed a great part of the population of our country," he wrote, "and who would do it again if they became our masters. Neither do we want the French, who are always unjust to us. We don't want anybody. We want to be independent—that is our cry. Although this cry is stifled by those who are stronger than we, it expresses our earnest desire. . . . The white man is a stranger here, and he knows it. If he does not, the day will come when he will be forced to recognize it."



CHAPTER SEVEN

Soviet Russia

ORGANIZING THE REVOLUTION

THE Bolshevik revolution of November, 1917, was more a revolution of theory than of occasion. The Bolsheviks raised the standard of revolt in the name of a communistic social philosophy, each item of which was built upon historical interpretation. As an ideal, communism reaches back to the very beginnings of Western political thought. Plato envisaged a communist state in his *Republic* and after him many others advocated the abolition of private property as a remedy for social injustice. But it was Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels who really organized communism into a definite philosophy in their *Communist Manifesto*, published in 1848. This pamphlet, together with the other writings of Karl Marx, supplied the basis for the philosophy of the Bolsheviks. According to it, society is made up of those who own property and those who have nothing but their ability to labor. The class which owns property molds society according to its own desires. It controls the government, makes the laws, and builds the institutions of the commonwealth. More positively, it keeps the masses of workers in subjection and exploits them for its own interests. The instrument wherewith the capitalists keep the workers in subjection is the state. The bourgeois state, Engels said, is always "a force for suppression," a method for protecting the property owners. To put an end to this suppression and exploitation the proletariat must forcibly destroy not only middle-class control of public affairs but also the bourgeois theories of life and morality. "Only a revolution," Lenin wrote, "can destroy the capitalist state. When that destruction has been accomplished, a dictatorship of the proletariat must be set up and the means of production must be nationalized." "The

proletariat," the *Communist Manifesto* states, "will use its political supremacy in order gradually to wrest the whole of capital from the capitalist class, to centralize all the instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat as the ruling class."

But the dictatorship of the proletariat is not the final goal. It is only the means to an end. The ultimate aim is the creation of a classless and stateless society. The proletarian state is needed at first because a direct transition from capitalism to communism is not possible. However, it will continue only until the last vestige of capitalism has been destroyed. Then its utility will cease and, in the phrase of Engels, it will "wither away." Having its origin and justification in the class struggle, the state can exist only so long as there are classes. In a completely communistic society there will be no classes because they are the product of economic inequality, particularly of the private ownership of the means of production. In his *State and Revolution* Lenin put his stamp of approval on Marx's statement: "The working class will," he said, "in the course of its development replace the old bourgeois society by a society which will exclude classes and their antagonisms; there will no longer be any political authority in the proper sense of the word, since political authority is the official expression of the antagonism of classes within bourgeois society." Nor will there be wages or money in the new society. All will cooperate freely for the common good on the principle "from each according to his ability; to all according to their need." This ideal of a communal society in which the necessity of a compulsive state has ceased to exist does not differ greatly from the dreams of utopians of all ages, although Marxian socialism is often termed "scientific."

The man who took the lead in attempting to translate the Marxian theories into practice was Vladimir Ilyich Ulianov, better known as Nikolai Lenin, the name he adopted to meet the needs of illegal revolutionary work under tsarism. Born at Simbirsk on the Volga on the 10th of April, 1870, he very early became a revolutionist. As a boy he read Marx and other revolutionary literature, with the result that revolution became his absorbing passion. He had a number of sisters and brothers, all of whom were also revolutionaries. In 1887 his brother Alexander, who had joined a group of terrorists aiming to end autocracy by destroying the autocrats, was apprehended in a plot to assassinate Tsar Alexander III and was hanged. Instead of stirring revenge in his heart, the death of his brother appears to have convinced young Lenin that attempts on individual autocrats, however successful they might be, were ut-

terly futile as a means of achieving fundamental social change. It fortified his conviction of the correctness of Marx's analysis of society, particularly of the idea that a real movement of liberation can be successful only through organization of the proletariat as a class. He began at once to prepare himself for the task of overthrowing tsarism and establishing a communist order. In 1891 he entered the University of St. Petersburg and successfully passed the examinations which qualified him for the practice of law, but instead of practising law he devoted himself to revolutionary activities. He wrote articles for the subterranean press, was active in the dissemination of revolutionary literature in Russia, and carefully trained disciples in the technique of revolution. For his activities he was arrested and imprisoned or exiled a number of times, but nothing could abate his ardor or shake his faith.

Soon after the turn of the century his plan took definite shape. Like Marx he believed that history was working ceaselessly and inevitably toward the ultimate triumph of his cause, that just as certainly as feudalism had given rise to capitalism the latter would give way to the proletarian state. But he was also convinced that the capitalists who run the bourgeois state would not relinquish their privileged position voluntarily. "The substitution of a proletarian for the capitalist state," he wrote, "is impossible without a violent revolution." Hence he vehemently denounced those members of the Russian Social Democratic Party who believed that the seizure of power could be accomplished by the constitutional method of obtaining a majority in parliament. With all his inflexible resolution he threw himself into the task of organizing a select group animated by a militant revolutionary creed. This group, which became known as the Bolsheviks, he dominated by sheer moral and intellectual force, holding it uncompromisingly on the path toward revolution. During the Revolution of 1905 he continued his journalistic activities but otherwise stayed in the background because he felt that the time was not propitious for the Great Revolution. In his mind the sequence of events was crystal clear. The Revolution of 1905, he said, was the prologue to the real one, for which "we must prepare more tenaciously, more systematically, more persistently." He would freely express his conviction that a great war was brewing and that in this war Russia would go down under the weight of her infirmities. During the resulting confusion the Bolsheviks would seize the helm and establish the communist order. In short, he knew exactly what he wished to achieve and how he meant to achieve it.

When the March Revolution broke out in 1917 Lenin was living

in Switzerland as an exile, but with the assistance of the German military authorities he was transported across Germany in the famous "sealed car" and arrived in Petrograd the middle of April. Finding the situation favorable to his plans he and Trotsky and the Bolsheviks began at once to prepare the overthrow of the provisional government. Early in November he decided that the moment was right to strike. During the night of November 6 Bolshevik troops quietly and systematically occupied the main telephone and telegraph offices, the railway stations, and the government buildings excepting the Winter Palace which was the seat of the provisional government. The next day they besieged the Winter Palace. When the members of the provisional government were informed that the guns of a cruiser and of the Peter and Paul fortress were turned upon them, they realized that resistance would be futile. That same evening the all-Russian Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies met in Petrograd. After declaring that "all local power shall be transferred to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies," the congress established a new government in the form of the Council of People's Commissars, with Lenin as the president of the council. Other members were Trotsky, who was given the post of Commissar of Foreign Affairs, and Stalin, who was made Commissar for Nationalities. The former was, next to Lenin, the key man; Stalin played a relatively unimportant role. The change of government had been effected with but little bloodshed.¹ The bloody stage was still to come. In some of the other cities, particularly in Moscow, there was some street fighting but by the end of the month the soviets held power throughout the country.


The new rulers began at once to fulfill the promises that had won them popular support. On the evening of November 8 Lenin appeared before the Congress of Soviets and after stilling the tumultuous applause said in a matter-of-fact manner: "Comrades, let us proceed to the construction of the socialist order." The program he presented emphasized three things: immediate peace, control of all land by the peasants, and a "real workers' control over production." After the proposal of an immediate peace "without annexations and without indemnities" had been accepted, Lenin read a short decree abolishing private property in land. Privately owned land, including church and monastery land, was confiscated without indemnification, and the administration of all land was transferred to committees and soviets of peasants' deputies. These "agencies of the people" were to divide the land equally among the peasants

¹ The losses in taking the Winter Palace were five sailors and one soldier killed.

according to the size and labor capacity of each family. Only persons who would cultivate the land with their own labor were to be allotted holdings, the hiring of labor being expressly forbidden. This system of small holdings was in accord neither with Marxian doctrine nor with the desires of Lenin. It was the program of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, which had a strong following among the peasants.

During the months that followed, other phases of the new order were inaugurated. The banks were "nationalized," that is, they were taken over by the government. Private buying and selling was at first restricted and later prohibited under penalty of severe punishment. All debts contracted by previous governments were repudiated and all foreign investments in private industry were confiscated. To reinforce the victory of the proletariat an eight-hour day was proclaimed but cash wages were abolished. Each worker or employee was given ration cards for free food, lodging, clothing, transportation, and other necessities. Without these cards nothing could be obtained except by illegal means. All did not, however, get the same allotment. Factory workers received more food than civil servants, and the latter were allowed more than the members of the former "privileged classes." Under the slogan, "Loot the looters," apartment houses and private dwellings were expropriated by the local soviets to provide living quarters for the workers. Requisitioning committees confiscated the supplies of private stores and even compelled the *bourgeoisie* to surrender their "superfluous" food, clothing, and household articles.

The nationalization of industry, contrary to the picture conjured up by the popular imagination in the West, was not carried out in a sudden and sweeping manner. The fact is that the Soviet government proceeded somewhat cautiously in this respect. On November 14, 1917, it issued the Decree on Workers' Control which gave the workers' committee the right to be consulted "on matters of sales and purchase, of fixing the output program, and even of determining the selling price." In other words, the workers' committee was given a share in the control of an industry but it was not allowed to interfere in the executive work of running the enterprise. Article 9 specifically forbade the workers' committee "to take possession of the enterprise or to direct it," except by permission of the higher authorities. Although a number of companies passed into state ownership during the subsequent months, it was not until May, 1918, that an entire industry, that is, the sugar industry, was nationalized. The nationalization of other individual industries fol-



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lowed, but the decree which declared all industrial and commercial enterprises with a capital of a million rubles or over to be national property was not issued until June 28 of that year. Besides the large manufacturing industries, this nationalization included mining, insurance, water transport, and the few railroads that had been operated by private companies.

Since the Bolsheviks were only a minority, it was necessary for them to uphold their rule by force. "Our task now consists," Bukharin stated in *The Program of the Bolsheviks*, "in strengthening the Soviet government by all means in our power and by clearing it of various undesirable elements."² Like the Jacobins, the Bolsheviks used the Red Terror to achieve their ends. Not only was the former land-owning gentry which had formed the social basis of the tsarist autocracy wiped out but the *bourgeoisie*, innocent and guilty alike, were also subjected to a persecution that exceeded by far the horrors of the French Revolution. "We are not making war on individuals," wrote Latsis, one of the creators of the Red Terror; "we are exterminating the *bourgeoisie* as a class." The *Program of the Bolsheviks* stated: "We have a dictatorship of workers and peasants whose aim is to crush the *bourgeoisie*." But the so-called privileged classes were not the only ones to feel the weight of the Red Terror. All who were opposed to the Bolshevik plans either actively or passively—whether workers or peasants, Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, or republicans—were declared counterrevolutionaries and enemies of the people. As such they were ruthlessly destroyed or crushed into submission. To prevent any organized opposition all other political parties were forbidden and persecuted. All political meetings excepting those organized by the Bolsheviks were prohibited. As early as November 10, 1917, a decree to close all hostile newspapers was issued. Although this decree was not immediately put into effect, the government did gradually destroy such freedom of the press as had previously existed. Only the press controlled by the government authorities was allowed to exist.

The most efficient agency in the defense of the dictatorship was the All-Russian Commission for Combating Counterrevolution, Spec-

² *Revolutionary Radicalism*, vol. 2, p. 1701.

THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. *The region once called Russia is now a federation of republics, each of which was in 1944 accorded the theoretical right to enter into direct relations with foreign states.*

ulation, and Sabotage, better known as the Cheka, a word composed of the initial syllables of the Russian words for "Extraordinary Commission." This commission, organized in December, 1917, gradually increased its power to include summary arrest, trial, and execution. Its policy was stated by the *All-Russian Cheka Daily* in its first issue: "Let us abandon all long, fruitless, and futile speeches about the Red Terror. The time has come, not by words, but by deeds, to carry on the most pitiless, sternly organized mass terror." Wholesale arrests, usually in the dead of night, were made of all those suspected of opposition. Their families seldom heard anything further until those who had been arrested were either condemned or freed. Executions were carried out in secret, usually by shooting. To the Bolsheviks the establishment of their system was so obviously desirable that they did not count the cost in blood. How many persons the Cheka put to death cannot as yet be ascertained with any degree of certainty. During the first phase of the terror the government, desiring to strike fear into the hearts of all opponents, published a fairly accurate list; later, however, secrecy was observed in this regard because the frankness in reporting executions had proved injurious to the reputation of the regime abroad. While official apologists have set the figures too low, opponents have naturally exaggerated them. A number of writers have estimated that the executions ran into the hundreds of thousands, and one estimate goes as high as 1.7 million.³

In addition to the opposition within the territory they controlled, the Soviet government also had to meet aggression from the outside by the so-called White armies and by foreign troops. The first center of armed opposition was the Cossack country of the South, especially round the Don. Having long cherished a considerable independence, the Don Cossacks did not stop at raising the standard of revolt themselves; they also offered hospitality to all who were opposed to Bolshevik rule. Large numbers of former imperial officers, members of the outlawed nobility, former landowners, supporters of the church, members of the professional classes, and even peasants flocked to the Don. Before the end of 1917 the first White army led by former imperial officers, came into existence in the Cossack country.⁴ At its greatest strength it numbered no less than 400,000 but it was poorly armed and at times short of supplies. The formation of this anti-Bolshevik army raised echoes of revolt else-

³ See Melgounov, *Red Terror in Russia* (1926), p. 111.

⁴ It was commanded successively by Alekseev, Kornilov, Denikin, and finally Wrangel.

where. In the North another White army was organized under Admiral Kolchak. This army had the assistance of about 45,000 Czechs who having deserted from the Austrian army were on their way via Vladivostok to fight for the Allies on the western front. Nor were the Czechs the only foreign troops to oppose the Bolsheviks. The Allies, believing that the Russians would continue the war against Germany if the Bolshevik rule were terminated, sent the White armies instructors, supplies, and money and dispatched contingents of troops to various points. The British landed forces at Murmansk and Archangel; the French occupied Odessa; and contingents of British, French, Japanese, and American troops were sent to Vladivostok.⁵

All the anti-Bolshevik armies were at first successful. While the southern White army advanced as far as Orel, about 250 miles from Moscow, another was threatening Petrograd from the west. In the east the White army under Kolchak took almost all of Siberia and established a counterrevolutionary government at Omsk.⁶ By the fall of 1919 the territory controlled by the Bolsheviks was reduced to the central part of European Russia. But the tide was soon to turn. The earliest Red army, a force composed of volunteers, was makeshift and ineffective. In the summer of 1918 the government decreed compulsory conscription and put upon the shoulders of Trotsky as Commissar of War the task of welding the recruits into a competent fighting force inspired with a deep hatred of the Whites. Both the Red and White armies employed a system of mass terror. Anyone suspected of aiding the enemy was summarily executed. Railroads and bridges were destroyed and roads were torn up. Ultimately the Reds won. In the spring of 1920 the White armies of the north, northwest, and Siberia either surrendered or were driven out of Russia. The White army in the south held out a little longer, but was finally thrown back upon the Black Sea and compelled to evacuate Russian soil. One of the major reasons for the defeat of the Whites was their failure to win the sympathy of the peasants, many of whom believed that they would have to give up the land they had seized during the revolution if the Whites were victorious. On the

⁵ The reason some of these contingents were sent was to keep Russian military supplies from going to the Central Powers.

⁶ The advance of the Czech and White armies brought death to ex-Tsar Nicholas II and his wife, his children, and a number of attendants who were living at Ekaterinburg in the foothills of the Urals. Fearing that the counterrevolutionary armies might advance far enough to liberate the imperial family, the local Soviet decided to execute the entire party. On July 18, 1918, they were shot without trial.

other hand, the Bolsheviks, like the revolutionaries of 1792 in France, were inspired by an overwhelming enthusiasm for their cause.



THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

When the last of the White armies left in November, 1920, the internal economy of the country was in a chaotic state. The attempt to inaugurate communism had failed. In industry the system of workers' control had largely broken down because the workers were unprepared to take over the management and few of the former owners were willing or able to carry on under the new system. The output of factories, mills, and mines had decreased each year until in 1920 it was only 13 per cent of the 1913 figure. The railroads, owing to deterioration of rolling stock, mismanagement, and lack of goods to be transported, were nearing a standstill. Furthermore, the fiscal machinery of the country had run down so completely that the annual deficit was more than 90 per cent of the expenditure. Above all, agricultural production had declined to 55 per cent of the prewar average. In lieu of money taxes the state had systematically confiscated the produce of the peasants and had permitted them to keep only enough for food and for the next year's sowing. For their produce the peasants received commodity cards theoretically exchangeable for manufactured goods. But, since industrial production had declined so greatly and all the goods that were being manufactured were needed for the army, the peasants got none or at best very little. Irritated by the requisitioning, many peasants decided to produce only enough food for their own needs; others resisted and promoted a series of revolts. On top of it all a severe drought in the summer of 1920 caused a failure of crops in a large part of Russia. Famine became so widespread that despite foreign help, particularly from the United States,⁷ some five million persons died either from starvation or from the results of malnutrition.

With famine stalking the land, industry and transportation threatening to collapse completely, and the peasants in open hostility, the Soviet government was confronted with the choice of either changing its policy or being buried under the ruins of economic catastrophe. Lenin decided on a change of policy. In 1921 he abandoned "pure communism" and inaugurated the New Economic Policy, better known as the NEP. This new policy did not repudiate

⁷ See H. H. Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia* (1935).

communism, nor did it involve a fundamental change in principle or aim. It was merely a temporary concession to more moderate practices, a concession based on the principle enunciated by Lenin, "Our doctrine is not a dogma but a guide to action; not a sacred theory but a working tool." The adoption of NEP, as Lenin explained it, was taking one step backward in order to take two forward. While retaining a monopoly of foreign trade for the state, the NEP permitted private trading side by side with state retailing, granted greater freedom of management in the large industries, and allowed the existence of small private industry. For the peasants the main change was the abandonment of the policy of requisitioning surplus produce. Instead of surrendering their surpluses, the peasants paid a tax in kind. Whatever produce was left after the tax was paid they were free to sell in the open market. As an aid to the revival of economic life a regular currency system was restored and the internal stabilization of the ruble was achieved. All this, together with the cessation of war and with good harvests in 1922 and 1923, resulted in a gradual and at times energetic recovery. Private traders and shops flourished and industry and commerce generally revived to such an extent that in 1927 they surpassed the level of 1913. New life was also infused into agriculture, with the result that the tilled area reached the prewar acreage.

But Lenin did not live to see the later developments of the NEP. In 1922 a paralytic stroke laid him low and compelled him to retire from the government. He returned after a short rest but was forced to retire again and died on January 21, 1924. As the outstanding leader of the Bolshevik revolution he fundamentally affected the course of European history. A man of dominating personality, he organized a party—disciplined and utterly loyal—to serve as the spearhead of advance toward world revolution. Stalin said of him: "Lenin was born for the revolution. He was the true genius of revolutionary struggle and the greatest master of revolutionary leadership." Regarded by his colleagues with something akin to awe, he was accorded by the rank and file of the party the veneration others usually bestow on supernatural beings. He did succeed in achieving for his party the supreme power; but the world revolution he hoped for did not materialize nor did he succeed in establishing a truly communistic society in Russia. Nevertheless, as the father of Bolshevism he will remain for all time one of the key figures of European history.

Lenin's death was followed by an epic contest for his mantle between Trotsky and Stalin. The creeds of the two men did not

differ substantially; both were communists and fanatical revolutionists. Their differences were of a tactical nature. Whereas Trotsky stood for uncompromising effort toward world revolution, Stalin's first concern was to establish the revolution firmly in Russia. Trotsky was unquestionably the more brilliant and picturesque personality but, as it turned out, Stalin was the better politician. He had a tremendous advantage in the fact that as secretary-general of the Communist Party he held a position of vital political importance. The most striking feature of his career is that until he was actually in the seat of power everyone, including Lenin, believed him incapable of seizing it. Lenin, it appears, had chosen him for the position of secretary-general because he believed him to be an "obedient figurehead." In this, however, he was mistaken. Moved by an intense hunger for power and possessed of a native shrewdness, Stalin at once began to make the most of his position to obtain personal control of the party by placing his henchmen in strategic positions throughout the organization. During his last illness Lenin seems to have realized that he had erred in his judgment. Demanding the removal of the secretary-general, Lenin wrote, "Otherwise his accursed pigheadedness and his unbounded egotism and stupidity will cause many splits and much strife later on within the party. He is no true communist and is full of bitter personal hatred toward Trotsky." But Stalin had already so consolidated his position that it was impossible to dislodge him. Thus the death of Lenin saw Stalin in control. Trotsky, though still the most popular living figure in Russia, was without any real political influence. He had been quietly paralyzed as a prelude to being eliminated. In 1927 he and his followers were expelled from the party and then (January, 1928) driven into exile.⁸

The new dictator was not a man of striking appearance or spectacular gifts of leadership; "not a man," one observer wrote,⁹ "who appeals to the sympathies of crowds or stirs their imaginations. He is not an electric person. Let us be blunt: he is frankly unattractive." On the other hand, most observers credited him with strength of will, energy, fearlessness, and considerable shrewdness. Like Mussolini and Kemal Atatürk, he rose from the lowest grade of society. He was born in 1879 as the son of a cobbler in a small town in the Caucasus, in the state of Georgia. His real name was Josef Dzugashvili. Later as a means of covering his revolutionary activities he used various pseudonyms of which Stalin, meaning "of steel," permanently

⁸ Trotsky went first to Turkey and finally to Mexico, where he was assassinated in 1940.

⁹ Paul Scheffer in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 8 (1930), p. 550.

replaced his real name. His mother, a devout member of the Russian Orthodox Church, dreamed of making her son a priest and when young Josef was fourteen sent him to the Orthodox Seminary in Tiflis. But instead of becoming a priest he became a revolutionist. He became convinced, in his own words, that "Russian capitalism was the most atrocious and bestial in the world; the government of the tsar the most corrupt, cruel, and inefficient." In 1898 at the age of nineteen, he left the seminary, joined the Social Democratic Party, and when the split occurred in 1903 sided definitely with the Bolsheviks, working ceaselessly for the revolution during the subsequent years. For his activities he was sent to Siberia four times. Thrice he managed to escape, but upon his fourth deportation in 1913 he remained in Siberia until the March revolution of 1917. During the civil war from 1918 to 1921 he fought in the field and and when it ended began to play the political game which won for him the mantle of Lenin.



THE FIVE-YEAR PLANS

When Lenin inaugurated the NEP, many Western observers interpreted the change as the beginning of a return to full-fledged capitalism. Before many years passed, however, it was demonstrated that this view was fallacious. Not only did the government retain its hold on the base of Russian economic life; it also continued through its monopolistic control of education, the press, and other agencies of propaganda to instill communist ideas into the minds of the people. In 1922 Lenin said: "We will solve this problem, no matter what the cost: that NEP Russia shall become socialist Russia." Above all, the government soon began to eliminate the potential sources of capitalist revival. Very early the restrictions upon private traders or *nepmen* were increased so drastically that by the spring of 1924 more than 300,000 firms were wiped out. When certain phases of private enterprise continued to thrive despite shackles and limitations, a policy of wholesale and direct repression was adopted. Plans were also made to eliminate the "capitalist elements," particularly the *kulak*¹⁰ or well-to-do peasant, from agriculture. When in 1926 and 1927 the complaints of the dyed-in-the-wool communists became especially loud because the government was permitting "capitalism" to develop unhindered in the villages, Stalin

¹⁰ The *kulaks* were peasants who had managed through the exercise of shrewdness and thrift to acquire more land and more livestock than the other peasants. Many *kulaks* also had modern farm machinery and employed hired labor.

assured the communists at the fifteenth Congress of the party that the government would rid the villages of its bourgeois elements and habits of thought. Stating that police measures alone would not solve the problem, he went on to say: "The solution is to be found in the transformation of the tiny scattered peasant farms into a vast and centralized industry on the basis of cooperative farming and in the adoption of collective farming based on a new and higher technical knowledge."

In 1928 all the diversified efforts of the government were joined in a long-range plan conceived on a grand scale and known as the *Piatiletka* or Five-Year Plan. By the execution of this plan the government hoped to achieve a number of aims. First of all, there was the aim of transforming Russia from a predominantly agrarian to a predominantly industrial country. The slogan was "to overtake and to surpass the capitalist countries in production." And this was to be achieved at a rate unequaled in the history of capitalism. A second aim was to increase the productivity of agriculture which, because of the antiquated methods employed by the peasants, was very low. Thus it was hoped that the fulfillment of this plan would give Russia a high degree of self-sufficiency. A primary consideration in the attainment of this self-sufficiency was national defense. Feeling themselves isolated and disliked, the Bolsheviks not only feared an invasion but they had also not forgotten the experiences of World War I in which a nonindustrialized Russia found herself at the mercy of an industrialized enemy. But the final goal of the first and also of the Five-Year Plans that followed was the complete liquidation of capitalism in Russia and the establishment of a completely communist economy in the shortest possible time. Stalin himself said later: "The basic task of the Five-Year Plan in transforming the U.S.S.R. into an industrial country was to eliminate completely all capitalist elements; to widen the front of socialist forms of economy; and to create the economic foundation for the abolition of classes in the U.S.S.R. for the creation of a socialist society."¹¹

On the industrial front the Five-Year Plan set certain definite goals. It proposed in general to increase the total value of production from 18.3 billion rubles in 1927-1928 to 43.2 billion in 1932-1933. Special emphasis was placed on heavy industry. In other words, energies were to be largely concentrated on the building of factories, the output of machinery, and the development of transportation rather than on the production of shoes, clothing, and household goods. The heavy industries were to be more than trebled. The

¹¹ From a speech by Stalin printed in the *New York Times*, January 29, 1933.

output of coal, for example, which was 35.4 million tons in 1927–1928 was to reach 75 million at the completion of the Plan. The production of oil was to increase from 11.8 million to 21.7 million tons. Ten million tons of pig iron were to be turned out by 1932–1933 instead of the 3.3 million tons produced in 1927–1928. Forty-two power stations were to be constructed, which would increase the annual output of electrical energy from 5 billion to 22 billion kilowatt hours. The Plan further projected the rehabilitation of old factories and the building of a number of new ones for the manufacture of steel, machinery, tractors, agricultural implements, and automobiles. The manufacture of agricultural machinery, for instance, was to increase by four times. To provide the materials for building the new plants the output of bricks was to be increased by five times and that of cement more than tripled. Finally the chemical industry, which was then in its infancy, was to be expanded to the extent of producing twenty-three times the amount of superphosphates and seven times the volume of sulphuric acid that was produced in 1927–1928.

The special emphasis put upon the development of heavy industry resulted in an extreme scarcity of consumers' goods, that is, of clothing, shoes, and household articles. In other words, the people had to forego not only comforts but also necessities. The raw materials, machine tools, and equipment for the big steel and electrical plants could only be purchased abroad and the government had to pay for them either in foreign currency or in gold. Possessing but little gold and less foreign credit, it was obliged to cut imports to the bone even at the expense of prime necessities. Russia, for example, needed cotton from the United States but preferred to spend such credit as it had on drills, compressors, and turbines, with the result that there was a textile shortage. More than this, to get the necessary exchange values to purchase even the indispensable needs of heavy industry the government was compelled to export such things as grain and sugar which its own population needed. This was the cause of the people's hardships. As compensation for their short rations they had the conviction that more coal, cast iron, steel, locomotives, turbines, and chemicals must ultimately mean more shoes, shirts, clothing, and more food too. To spur on the undernourished workers to give their best efforts to their work the government organized so-called Socialist Competitions, one factory or shop challenging another to achieve a higher level of productivity and quality. Another means to increase the output was the introduction of the unbroken working year, that is, factories, shops, and offices operated 360 instead of 310 days a year, Sunday being abol-

ished. The rest days were staggered in such a way that only one-fifth of the workers were absent at one time.¹²

In January, 1933, the government announced that the Plan had been practically fulfilled in four years. "At the end of the fourth year of the Five-Year Plan," Stalin said, "We have succeeded in realizing 93.7 per cent of the program of general industrial production as conceived for the five years, having increased industrial production more than threefold in comparison with the prewar level and more than twofold in comparison with 1928." To arrive at the 93.7 per cent fulfillment Stalin must have employed ingenious statistical methods. It is true, in some branches of industry, notably the production of oil and the manufacture of tractors and machinery, the goal was nearly or actually attained. According to the Plan, for example, only 825 locomotives were to be turned out in 1933, but as early as 1931 no less than 812 came out of the factories. In a number of other respects, including the building of railroad cars, the actual achievement exceeded the goal set by the Plan.¹³ On the other hand, in many respects attainment fell far short. This was particularly true of iron, steel, and coal. Since these are the materials most needed in heavy industry, the failure to produce them according to the Plan caused a drop in other products. The following table will give some idea of the achievements of the Plan:

	<i>Planned</i>	<i>Achieved</i>
Coal, million tons	75	65.4
Iron ore, million tons	19.4	12
Cast iron, million tons	10	6.2
Steel, million tons	10.4	5.9
Rolled steel, million tons	8	4.3
Oil, million tons	21.7	22.3
Tractors, thousands	55	50.6
Brick, million pieces	9.3	4.8
Cement, million barrels	41	22.5
Footwear, million pairs	145	84.7
Rubbers, million pairs	75	51.8
Paper, thousand tons	900	471
Sugar, thousand tons	2,600	826

Nevertheless, the fact that the goal was not reached in every instance does not detract from the tremendous achievement of the

¹² After the outbreak of World War II the old week with Sunday as the day of rest was restored.

¹³ What the statistics do not show is that quality was often recklessly sacrificed to quantity.

four years. The progress in almost any line appears astonishing when one considers the colossal difficulties under which the government had to work. Among these were the lack of building materials, the critical shortage of skilled labor and technicians, the comparative absence of foreign credits, the scarcity of food, and the backwardness of the people. Despite all the obstacles, mistakes, and failures Russia was during these four years transformed, as Stalin said, "from an agrarian country to an industrial country, the ratio of industrial production to agricultural production having risen from 48 per cent at the beginning of the Five-Year Plan to 70 per cent at the end of the fourth year." More than this, the Soviet Union achieved a heavy industry which ranked high for its equipment. Hundreds of old industrial plants were rebuilt or enlarged during the four years and no less than fifteen hundred new factories, many of them giant plants, were built. While the number of establishments employing 100 to 500 workers was more than doubled, establishments with more than 5000 employees were increased from 83 to 170. Never before in history had so many gigantic enterprises been constructed within so short a period. Among the more notable achievements were the mammoth steel plants of Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk, the huge tractor plants at Kharkov and Stalingrad, the great automobile factories at Moscow and Nizhnii Novgorod, and the Dnepropetrovsk hydroelectric project.

Although the Five-Year Plan made no specific mention of agricultural collectivization, intensive efforts were made during this period to collectivize agriculture. The purpose, beyond the establishment of communism, was to increase productivity. According to the Plan, it was to be increased from 16.6 billion to 25.8 billion rubles. Such an increase was necessary if the country was to supply the growing urban population with adequate food. Any considerable increase of food production, however, was difficult if not impossible so long as the multitude of petty peasant holdings continued. In 1928 there were something like 26 million peasant holdings, many of which were tiny. Peasants with such small holdings could not profitably make use of modern machinery nor were they interested in improved agricultural methods. "The solution," Stalin said, "consists in the incorporation through example and as the result of conviction, but not of force, of the smaller and smallest farms in a great industrial organization for communal, collective, and cooperative farming, employing agricultural machinery and tractors and making use of scientific methods to intensify agricultural production. There is no other solution. Our agriculture will in no other way be able to

catch up with and surpass the agricultural methods of the most highly developed capitalist countries." Theoretically the plan appeared very simple. A group of at least fifteen peasants would agree to pool their holdings and also their livestock, seeds, and agricultural implements. The large farm (*kolkhoz*),¹⁴ as the collective property of the group, would be run by an elected management committee and each member would share in the proceeds according to the amount of land he contributed and the work he performed. Funds for the initial requirements and the construction of new buildings would be advanced by the government; also funds to establish stations which would rent tractors and harvester combines as they were needed.

But the first attempts to win over the peasants to collective farming did not prove very successful. They were not prepared psychologically for cooperative cultivation. For centuries they had longed to possess the land they cultivated, and their conception of revolution had been acquisition of land. Even before the Bolsheviks came to power, the peasants had started to seize and divide among themselves the land of their lords. Hence they tended to be apathetic or even hostile to the idea that they should surrender their holdings. The government succeeded in convincing many poor, landless peasants of the economic advantages of collectivization, but the more prosperous would have none of it. As a result only a small fraction of the arable area was cultivated collectively on July 15, 1929. The idea of voluntary enlistment having proved unsuccessful, vast numbers of peasants were herded into collective farms by force. Zealous communists, in fact, proceeded much faster with the process than the government had intended, much faster than it was possible to train efficient managers and produce the necessary power machinery.

A special feature of the compulsory collectivization was the "liquidation of the kulaks as a class." Many thousands of peasant households registered as kulaks were broken up, the government seizing the property and sending the personnel to Siberia for convict labor. This forced deportation and the reintroduction of the requisitioning system aroused much bad blood. Rather than surrender their livestock to the government or to a *kolkhoz*, or because the requisitioning did not leave enough grain for feed, many peasants slaughtered their cattle, sheep, and pigs, causing a serious shortage of meat and milk. It is estimated that during the winter of 1929-1930 alone the peasants destroyed about a quarter of their

¹⁴ There were also *sovkhozy* or state farms managed by government officials and worked by hired labor. Bolshevik economists called them "grain factories."

cows, a third of their sheep, and half of their pigs. Furthermore, on many of the collective farms the peasants allowed a large share of the crops to rot in the field rather than hand them over to the officials. Gradually the food situation became so critical that Stalin ordered forcible collectivization to cease, whereupon many of the collective farms that had been hastily established collapsed.

Upon the announcement of its completion the First Five-Year Plan immediately gave way to a second which was to run to the end of 1937. As in the previous Plan quotas were set for the period. The Plan was soon changed, however, because the international situation had begun to deteriorate; in January, 1933, Hitler and the Nazi Party, both openly hostile to Bolshevism, rose to power. The government was forced to revise the Second Five-Year Plan in order to make increased provision for the manufacture of war materials. Special attention was also given to a more rational distribution of industry and to the establishment of new industries. During the first period raw materials had often been transported long distances when they could have been produced near the place to which they were transported. "We are doing some quite incomprehensible things," said the commissar of heavy industry in 1933. "We carry coal all the way to Vladivostok, but half of it is consumed on the way by the engines which haul it; yet there are very good mines near Vladivostok which produce perfect coal, and this ought to be utilized for local needs."¹⁵ Much was done to eliminate such unnecessary transportation. In general, considerable progress was made in the development of heavy industry, particularly in the production of coal, metals, and war materials. Much was also done to improve the transportation system, which was one of the weakest links in the chain of Russian economy. Two and a half times as much as in the previous period was spent on building new railways and reconstructing the old lines. Since the aims of the Second Five-Year Plan were generally less ambitious than those of the First had been, the disparity between plan and fulfillment was less at the expiration of the period.

However, in the production of consumers' goods the Plan was less successful than in the development of heavy industry. When the Plan was inaugurated, the chairman of the State Planning Commission promised the workers that "the production of consumers' goods will increase two or three times and the level of consumption . . . will establish the position of the Soviet Union in 1937 as the most advanced country in the world." But the best energies of

¹⁵ Cited by S. P. Turin in *Slavonic Review*, vol. 11 (1933) . p. 59.

the people were again given to the development of heavy industry, with special emphasis on war materials. Nevertheless production increased sufficiently to permit the government to abolish rationing for all consumers' goods at the beginning of 1936. Thereafter they could be bought without restriction. But if the quantity was sufficient, the quality was still very low. As in the manufacture of most things, quality was sacrificed to quantity.

Steps were also taken to increase the productivity of the individual worker which during the tsarist period had been so low as to become proverbial. During the confusion following the revolution it fell still lower but it began to rise with the introduction of the NEP. At the end of the First Five-Year Plan, however, it was still very low in comparison with that of the leading capitalist nations. This low productivity deprived the modern plants, which had been constructed during the period of the First Five-Year Plan at such great cost, of much of their economic value. To make the workers more efficient the government adopted a system of rewards and punishments, rewarding efficient workers with an increase of wages and punishing inefficient ones with a reduction. Whenever possible the wages were put on a piecework basis, with due regard for the skill required. Moreover a systematic effort was made to give technical training to as many workers as possible. To attract large numbers to the courses the government established a special wage scale according to which a skilled worker received two and, in some instances, three times as much as a common laborer. In other words, the scheme laid the foundations for the rise of a new working-class aristocracy.

In 1935 the appearance of Stakhanovism helped speed up the industrial output. The originator of this movement was Aleksei Stakhanov, a Donets miner who, using a pneumatic pick and aided by two timbermen, succeeded in hewing 102 tons of coal in his six-hour shift. "Such performance," Stakhanov himself naïvely stated,¹⁶ "was absolutely unheard of; seven, eight, and nine tons had been the maximum output in our pits. This output of 102 tons was a world record." The feat was played up by the press from one end of Russia to the other, with the result that Stakhanovism spread like wildfire. Every industry soon had its Stakhanovites who set phenomenal records of individual productivity. A worker in a Leningrad shoe factory, for example, demonstrated how to speed up shoe binding from 700 pairs per day to 2500 pairs. Besides being accorded special honors, such Stakhanovites had their wages doubled

¹⁶ *The Stakhanov Movement Explained by Its Initiator* (1939), p. 8.

or trebled and were also rewarded with special living quarters, trips to Moscow, tours in the Caucasus, or permission to buy and operate a private automobile. Their example spurred other workers on to the extent that many habitually exceeded the old standards by a considerable margin. There can be little doubt that the attempt to speed up work was not only harmful to the quality of the product but also caused considerable damage to machinery. Despite all efforts the productivity of the individual worker was in 1937 still below that in other leading industrial nations. This was admitted in the official newspaper *Pravda* on August 30, 1937; at the same time, however, it was stated that the output of the individual worker was four times as high as it had been in 1913. Actually it was not four but about two and a half times as high; nevertheless the achievement is impressive.

Above all, the government went far toward completing the collectivization of agriculture during the period of the Second Five-Year Plan. Beginning in 1933, it sought to make collective farming more attractive by endeavoring to satisfy to some extent the instinct of the Russian peasant for private enterprise. As early as January, 1933, the old system of grain procurement, according to which the peasant might sell his surplus only to authorized government agencies at a fixed price, was replaced by a new one. Thenceforth the collectives were required to deliver only a definite quota to the government at a low price. The remainder, after the tractor service had been paid in kind and the seed and fodder fund had been set aside, was to be divided among the members in proportion to the quantity and quality of work each had performed. It could then be sold in the open market for what it might bring. Furthermore, members of the collective farms were permitted to do some private farming and cattle raising. Hitherto zealots had insisted that a peasant upon joining a collective must surrender all his property, even his fowls. But in 1934 the government announced the right of the peasant family to keep certain things, and in the succeeding year a congress of delegates from the collectives that had made the best records drew up a model constitution which was ratified by the government. This constitution stated specifically that "living quarters, family cattle and fowls, and the buildings necessary for their use are not socialized but remain for the private use of the member's family." In the grain, cotton, and beet regions each peasant was allowed up to two cows, one brood sow and her brood, ten sheep and goats, twenty hives of bees, and unlimited chickens and rabbits. In regions devoted to livestock an even larger number

was permitted. Beyond this, each family could also have its kitchen garden and its orchard.

The measures succeeded beyond all expectation. By 1937 the collectives and state farms included about 93 per cent of the former peasant holdings. Nor was this all. Since 1933 the standard of agriculture on the collective farms had gradually improved. An increasing number had begun to introduce scientific fertilization, a proper rotation of crops, and other fundamental measures for increasing the yield. The result was that the government was able to terminate bread rationing in 1935. In the summer of 1933, despite inadequate preparations, 89.8 million tons of grain had been harvested, probably the largest crop that had been gathered in Russia up to that time. During the next two years the harvest remained about the same; but in 1936 a new record of 107 million tons was established, nearly 20 per cent above the best previous harvest. Even then the average yield per acre was so low that a higher yield may reasonably be anticipated as more and more collectives improve their agricultural methods. In 1937 more than 98 per cent of the entire crop was gathered from collectives or state farms.

In January, 1938, Russia started a Third Five-Year Plan which was to cover the years from 1938 to 1942. In general it was a continuation of the first two Plans and aimed to "overtake and surpass the leading capitalist countries not only in technical perfection but in volume of output, that is, to have greater production per person than they do." The productivity of labor was to increase by 65 per cent and the quality of production was "to be improved in every way in all branches of industry." Like the two preceding Plans it was primarily for the development of heavy industry, the increased quotas of consumers' goods being very modest. Special emphasis was put on protection against invasion from the West by the establishment of more industries in central and eastern Russia, for despite the developments of the preceding decade in the Urals and in Siberia the western part of the country was still the great center for the manufacture of armaments and munitions. Before the Third Five-Year Plan was carried out in its entirety, the Nazi armies invaded Russia (June, 1941). By this time, the Soviet Union which in 1928 had still been primarily an agricultural nation, was one of the great industrial nations of the world. Its output was more than nine times that of 1913, and the number of workers engaged in industry had risen from eight millions in 1913 to over twenty-five millions. In respect to gross industrial output the Soviet Union had advanced to first place in Europe and second in the world.

What, it may be asked, did the worker gain from this industrial development? The gain of the industrial worker was not so great as that of the peasant; nevertheless it was considerable. First of all, wages increased. According to official statistics the average wage of the worker in Soviet industry for 1937 was about 250 rubles a month as compared with an average annual wage of 703 rubles in 1928. But the increase was not evenly distributed. While a favored few—Stakhanovites, authors, engineers, and actors—received from one to three thousand rubles a month, few workers outside of Moscow and Leningrad got as much as two hundred rubles. Second, living conditions improved greatly during the period of the Five-Year Plans. Although the primary object was the development of heavy industry, a considerable increase in the production of food and consumers' goods was achieved. Third, the worker probably paid less rent in 1937 than a low-paid worker in a capitalist country. Since the state owned the land there was no expensive ground rent to pay, but because of the urban housing shortage the Russian was living in a worse place than the average worker in capitalist countries. Fourth, in 1937 there was no unemployment problem. Everyone capable of working could get some kind of job if he was not politically suspect. Because of the rapid expansion of industry there was, in fact, a dearth of workers. Fifth, in 1937 social insurance was much broader in scope than it was in most capitalist countries. Every person working in the cities was included in the government old-age insurance and in addition there was insurance against illness, accidents, death of the breadwinner of the family, burial expenses, and other things. In short, if the condition of the worker was not so good as in most capitalist countries, it was far better than it had been under the old regime.

Perhaps the statements that follow will throw further light on the condition of the worker in 1937. A Russian historian wrote that in 1937 "the average workman had 3.6 changes of underwear, and the average workingwoman had 4.4. Of shoes they have 1.5 pairs. Of course, compared with pre-Soviet years when most workers had no city clothes and no change of underwear, the present level shows great progress; but it should not be forgotten that more than a quarter of a century has passed since then and workers' requirements have greatly increased."¹⁷ A British correspondent reported at the beginning of 1937: "With potatoes at a ruble a kilo and rye bread a few kopeks cheaper, the Russian workingman at home lives mainly on these staple commodities, eked out perhaps by salt

¹⁷ Yugov, *Russia's Economic Front* (1942), p. 212.

fish and vegetables in season. He rarely sees meat outside the factory dining room and never butter. . . . A poor shirt costs him a week's pay, and a month's wages will not buy him the shoddiest suit of clothes. Rent is low, though his whole family, including a stray grandparent or aunt, is quite likely to be sleeping in a single room. But the Soviet factory worker has few regrets. He is better off than he has been. . . . He is better off—so radio, press, trade union leader, and party official all conspire to assure him—than the worker in any capitalist country.”¹⁸

If the Five-Year Plans effected improvement in the condition of both the peasant and the industrial worker, they did not tend to bring about the establishment of a classless society. Actually the period witnessed a marked departure from the Leninist idea that all workers were to share equally the benefits of the proletarian state. Industrial necessity encouraged the rise of a privileged group within the ranks of the workers. The principle was no longer “to each according to his needs” but, as stated in the constitution of 1936, “to each according to the work performed.” The members of this privileged group, because of the specialized nature of the work they performed, enjoyed an income and therefore a buying power far above that of the average manual worker. Although the contrast between the two extremes was not so great as that between the very wealthy and the very poor in a capitalist state, it did demonstrate that Bolshevism too has its haves and have-nots. The members of the privileged group could either spend their excess income on luxuries, deposit it in savings banks, or invest it in state loans. Even their children enjoyed distinct advantages over those of ordinary workers. They had not only the right to inherit the savings and personal property of their parents, including a house or an apartment (but no land), but they could also attend schools and universities which the children of the poor could not afford.¹⁹ In general, the striking differentiation in earning and spending power was on the eve of World War II creating a growing emphasis on aspects of life which a few years earlier would have been roundly denounced as “bourgeois.” Moreover, it was producing a budding class-consciousness. It was becoming the ambition of more and more workers to rise above the average and to enter the privileged “middle class.” The Bolsheviks, for their part, contended that the inequality in monetary reward did not mean that classes were being formed as in bourgeois countries. State ownership of production, they

¹⁸ *International Conciliation*, No. 335 (1937), p. 805.

¹⁹ After September 1, 1940, all students in the higher classes of secondary schools and in all universities and higher educational institutions were required to pay fees.

argued, would prevent the rise of dynasties founded on the ownership of land, railroads, etc.



GOVERNMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION

Anyone can remember that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which straddles two continents, is the largest country in the world. Embracing no less than one sixth of the land surface of the globe, it is not only larger in Europe than any European country; it is also larger in Asia than any Asiatic country. In climate it ranges "from the Baltic to the Pacific, from the icy darkness of the Arctic Circle to the vineyards of the Crimean Riviera and the cotton plantations of sunny Turkestan." Although not so populous as China, the U.S.S.R. had a population of more than 193 millions at the end of 1940.²⁰ This population does not constitute one nationality in the sense the Germans or French do. It includes scores of racial stocks which speak about 250 distinct vernaculars and vary widely in their customs and beliefs. The bulk of the population is made up of those generally called Russians, including the Great Russians, the White Russians, and the Little Russians.

Besides being territorially the largest country in the world, the U.S.S.R. probably has richer natural resources than any other country. It has all the basic raw materials of modern industry except rubber. And even the lack of natural rubber is offset by the fact that it has unlimited materials for the production of synthetic rubber. It is particularly rich in water power, coal, oil, and timber. Its oil deposits are so extensive that they could supply the world for centuries, and it is one of the world's largest producers of gold.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was not established immediately after the Bolsheviks rose to power in 1917. The new regime was organized in 1918 as the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, which was considerably smaller than the later U.S.S.R. because so much of the country was at the time held by anti-Bolshevik forces. But in 1922 the first All-Union Congress established the U.S.S.R., composed of four republics. Others were gradually carved out in subsequent years until the number reached sixteen in 1940.²¹ The administrative system consists of soviets (or

²⁰ Statesman's Yearbook, 1942. According to the official census of 1939, before the addition of the five new republics (1940), the population was over 170 millions.

²¹ The original four were the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukrainian, White Russian, and Azerbaijan Republics. Gradually seven others (the Georgian, Armenian, Turkmen, Uzbek, Tadzhik, Kazakh, and Kirghiz Republics) were added, and in 1940 the Karelo-Finnish, Moldavian, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian Republics were admitted to the Union.

councils elected by the "laboring masses") grouped in the form of a pyramid. The base is formed by the factory, town, and village soviets. Above these basic local authorities come the district and regional soviets; then the Supreme Soviets of the individual republics. During the early years the system rested on the principle of indirect elections, that is, the members of the higher soviets were chosen not by the electorate but by the lower soviets which had been elected by the people. But in 1936 the principle of direct election of all soviets from the highest to the lowest by secret ballot was established, and all persons over eighteen years of age were permitted to vote if they earned their living by productive labor or were not specifically disbarred.

At the apex of the pyramid stands the Supreme Soviet, which is in theory the ultimate authority over the U.S.S.R. as a whole. Elected by the people like the other soviets, it consists of two chambers, the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. While the members of the former are elected from all over the U.S.S.R. in the proportion of one deputy for every 300,000 people, the members of the Soviet of Nationalities are elected to represent the various republics and autonomous territories. As the highest organ of government the Supreme Soviet, in a joint session of its two chambers, appoints the Council of People's Commissars which, as previously stated, is a kind of cabinet that exercises supreme administrative authority and actually governs the country. The Supreme Soviet also appoints the Supreme Court, which is the highest judicial organ and has supervision over all other courts. The legislative function is exercised by the Supreme Soviet itself, the two chambers forming a legislative assembly often called the "Soviet Parliament." No bill can become law unless it is approved by a simple majority of both chambers. However, since the Supreme Soviet with its more than a thousand members is an unwieldy body, it has met only at intervals of two years or longer. During the periods between sessions it is represented by a Presidium of thirty-seven members, constituting a sort of "collective presidency," which exercises many of the functions of the Supreme Soviet.

Although the state is officially, as stated in the constitution of 1936, "a socialist state of workers and peasants," hostile critics have described it as a dictatorship of the Communist Party or, more specifically, as a dictatorship of the man who stands at the head of the party. The proletariat and the peasants, it is true, have a larger share of power and opportunity than they possessed in the tsarist state, but the real power is the Communist Party, the only legally

organized party in the country. Numerically it was small in comparison with the population as a whole. Numbering about 200,000 in November, 1917, it grew to about two million members and a million candidates (communists who were being tested to see if they were worthy of membership in the party) in 1932. But periodical expulsions of those whose zeal for communism had slackened or who were guilty of "heresy" decreased the membership to about a million and a half in 1939. Even when the candidates are added to this number, the total represented only about 1.5 per cent of the population. All members were carefully chosen and subjected to an iron discipline. Any lapse from this discipline was summarily punished by expulsion. The supreme organ of authority is the All-Union Party Congress which usually convenes every two years. In the intervals it is represented by the Central Committee, which in turn elects a secretariat, an Organization Bureau (Orgbureau) which carries out administrative functions, and a Political Bureau (Politbureau) which formulates the policies of the party and is the real source of authority. Theoretically the members of the Politbureau are chosen by secret ballot; actually the membership is predetermined by the Secretary General of the Party, in other words by Stalin who as the principal officer of the party is virtually its dictator.


When a new constitution, often called "Stalin's constitution," was adopted by the All-Union Congress of Soviets in 1936, the Bolsheviks proclaimed it the most democratic constitution in the world. And on paper it gives much support to this claim. According to Article 125, for example, the citizens were guaranteed "freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and meetings, freedom of street processions and demonstrations." Furthermore, the new election system included all the features of constitutional democracies. Article 135 stated that "all citizens of the U.S.S.R. who have reached the age of eighteen, irrespective of race and nationality, religion, educational qualifications, residence, social origin, property status, or past activity, shall have the right to take part in the elections of deputies and to be elected, with the exception of insane persons and persons condemned by court with deprivation of electoral rights." Again, according to Article 127, "citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed inviolability of the person. No one may be subject to arrest except by an order of the court or with the sanction of a state attorney." No wonder that many foreign observers, after reading the constitution, concluded that Stalin was establishing a constitutional democracy on the Western

pattern, more particularly on the pattern of the United States. Unfortunately this was not the case.

The catch is that the freedom granted by the constitution must be exercised in "the interests of the working people." And the sole judge of what constitutes the interests of the working people is the Communist Party or, in other words, the Stalin regime. Stalin himself stated before the All-Union Congress that the constitution did not alter the position of the party. "I must admit," he said, "that the draft of the new constitution actually leaves in force the regime of the dictatorship of the working class as well as it preserves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party." In practice the regime assumed that anyone who could not conscientiously subscribe to the teachings of the Communist Party was abnormal and therefore not fit to enjoy soviet freedom. A high official of the Commissariat for Justice explained it in the following words: "We have universal suffrage, enjoyed by all except the insane and people disfranchised by court ruling. The same applies to freedom of meeting. There can be no meetings of the insane or criminals, such as Monarchists, Mensheviks, and Social Revolutionaries."²² Nor were the elections carried out as students of the Western democracies hoped they would be, i.e., that any number of candidates would be nominated and that election meetings would be held at which the views of the various candidates would be expounded. What actually happened was that the local committees of the party set up a single official candidate in each constituency, thereby making a farce of the idea of a "free election." In other words, the voter was free to vote for the one candidate.

According to communist theory, the state will eventually "wither away" and society will be "one gigantic cooperative running itself without supervision of officials, soldiers, police, or industrial managers." But the state, far from withering away, has grown stronger and more bureaucratic with the passing years. The Communist Party, headed by Stalin, has extended the authority of the state to a point where it regulates the life of every individual down to the last detail. In short, it has constructed one of the most powerful and most arbitrary state machines in history. The task of enforcing absolute obedience was not left to the Communist Party or even to the law courts but was entrusted to the dread GPU or secret police, which exercised practically unlimited power over the citizens. It could not only send to the state penal camps those who were suspected of being hostile but could also impose the death sentence without the

²² Cited by W. H. Chamberlin in *American Mercury*, vol. 42 (1937), p. 181.



Sovfoto

THE KREMLIN, MOSCOW

formality of a trial.²³ It was at once the eye and the sword of the state. Its procedure was so secret and so arbitrary and its agents were so ubiquitous that a general spirit of distrust was aroused. Since no one could be sure of who might be an agent of the GPU, everyone became suspicious of everyone else. The whole nation began spying on itself. As a Soviet joke had it: "Considering that the Soviet Union has 150 million inhabitants that are being spied upon and there are 150 million spies to do the spying, the country must have at least 300 million inhabitants."



RELIGION AND CULTURE

"Revolution is a storm, sweeping aside everything that stands in its path," are the words the communists inscribed on the City Council building in Moscow. Since religion stood in the path, it too was swept aside. For the Orthodox Church, which was the official religious organization of Russia, not much can be said. Up to the eighteenth century it had been at least semiautonomous, but under Peter the Great it lost every vestige of independence. After this tsar succeeded in making his will as supreme in the church as it was in the state, the activities of the church were largely devoted to the service of the state. Its primary function was to lend its sanction to the despotism of the tsar. Accordingly it taught its members that unquestioning obedience to the tsar and contentment with one's earthly lot are the highest virtues, virtues which will be rewarded in heaven. Often the poorly paid and poorly educated clergy were compelled to act as spies for the purpose of apprehending those who entertained revolutionary ideas. More than this, the church, in regarding secular education as evil, was in large part responsible for the widespread illiteracy and general backwardness of the people. In general, the church was decidedly reactionary. It fought change with all the means at its disposal and when the revolution broke out became one of the rallying centers of the counterrevolutionary forces.

Hence the communists aimed some of their heaviest blows at the church. While affirming the right of freedom of conscience, the government decreed the separation of church and state on February 5, 1918. The priests were permitted to remain but, as one leader put it, "should be maintained by those who wish to accept their poison

²³ In 1934 the GPU was subordinated to the People's Commissariat of the Interior, but this did not, it seems, restrict the power of the secret police. The GPU was replaced by the NKVD, which during World War II gave way to the MVD.

from them or by those who are interested in their existence." In short, all state aid was withdrawn. Furthermore, all property owned by the church was "nationalized" and large numbers of churches were converted into clubs and antireligious museums. By permission of the local soviet a congregation could continue to use such property as church buildings, chalices, and vestments which were necessary for the performance of its rites, but all congregations were forbidden to engage in social and cultural activities. Because they were counterrevolutionary in their sympathies many priests and bishops suffered imprisonment and even death during the Red Terror. The general attitude of the party toward the church was later stated in the *Programme of the Communists*: "In nearly all capitalist countries the church is just as much a state institution as is the police; and the priest is as much a state official as is the executioner, the gendarme, or the detective. He receives a government salary for administering his poison to the masses. . . . At the time of the tsar the Russian priests not only deceived the masses but even made use of the confession to find out what ideas or intentions their victims entertained toward the government; they acted as spies whilst discharging their 'sacred duties.' " ²⁴

However, the communists were opposed not only to the Orthodox Church; they were uncompromisingly hostile to all religions. Judaism, Mohammedanism, and the other religions were regarded as being no less "opium for the people" than Christianity. To the communist every religion was a narcotic to dull the pains caused by capitalism and to divert the attention of the masses from the evils of the present with the promise of a reward in the hereafter. "Religion," said Lenin, "is an opiate for the people, a sort of spiritual vodka." In harmony with these sentiments the communists coined such slogans as "Religion is a deception," "Religion is the opium of the toiling people," "Religion is a weapon of reaction," and "All religions and churches, all religious organizations, are armies of bourgeois reaction serving as a defense for the exploitation of the working classes." These slogans were then used as the basis for a devastating attack against all religions. Not only was the complete renunciation of religious faith made a condition of membership in the Communist Party and its junior organization, the League of Communist Youth, but priests, monks, ministers, rabbis, and all who derived their income from religious institutions were disfranchised.²⁵ In addition the government eliminated religion from the

²⁴ *Revolutionary Radicalism*, vol. 2, pp. 1745-1746.

²⁵ The right of franchise was restored to them in the constitution of 1936.

schools by prohibiting the giving of any religious instruction to children under eighteen in groups of more than three. In place of the old religious orthodoxies a new orthodoxy was set up—communism. New objects of reverence were substituted for the old. The words of Marx and Lenin, and, later, Stalin, became holy writ, and the ikons were replaced with pictures of Lenin and Stalin. Communist ceremonies were even devised to replace the religious observances connected with birth, marriage, and death.

The most active antireligious group was the League of Militant Atheists, approved and partially supported by the government. While the government strictly controlled the publication of religious writings, it permitted this society to issue a flood of antireligious pamphlets and magazines. The society also sent lecturers and organizers all over the country to tell the people that “religion is a delusion and God a cosmic scarecrow, set up by rulers and *bourgeoisie*, to frighten the masses into subjection.” It was also permitted to send lecturers into the schools to address the children, distribute its pamphlets, and display its posters. Such activities were in accordance with the official plans to make teaching in the schools definitely antireligious. Lunacharsky, the commissar for education, stated in an article in *Pravda* (March 26, 1929): “Theatres, concerts, moving pictures, radio, visits to museums, richly illustrated scientific and especially antireligious lectures, well-arranged periodical and nonperiodical children’s literature—all this must be set in motion, developed, completed, or created for the great objective of most quickly transforming the whole growing generation into an absolutely atheistic one.”²⁶

Although the crusade caused a collapse of organized religion during the period following the revolution, the decade of the thirties witnessed a revival both of religious feeling and of religious activity. The very attempt to stamp out religion had the effect, in many cases, of strengthening and driving it more deeply into the lives of the people. On the other hand, the antireligious impulse gradually lost its fervor. By 1938 the Union of the Godless had ceased to exist in sixteen provinces. The communists themselves realized their failure to destroy religion. In 1937 an article in *Izvestia* said in part: “Lately the religionists in the Soviet Union have been steadily growing in numbers and becoming increasingly active.” The next year another of the official newspapers made the confession: “It is much more difficult to uproot religion from the

²⁶ Cited in Chamberlin, “The Struggle for the Russian Soul,” *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 144 (1929), p. 394.

consciousness of the workers than to liberate them from the exploitation of capitalists.”²⁷ In the same year the official attitude underwent a change. Although the antireligious propaganda did not cease, it became much milder. Moreover, Soviet agencies were directed to discontinue the closing of churches, and atheists were ordered to refrain from offending the religious sentiments of believers. After the outbreak of war in June, 1941, the League of Militant Atheists was dissolved, all antireligious publications were stopped, and a liberal attitude toward worship was adopted.

The official attitude toward literature and art was different. Instead of trying to destroy them, the communists wished to mold them to their own purposes, to create a specific soviet culture. The means employed to achieve this goal varied from time to time but the goal always remained the same. “The Bolsheviks,” said one soviet critic, “are interested in such things as serve the ends of the workers and their social scheme. All else may be sifted out as worthless.” Writers, for example, were expected “to express in images the new aspect of the country, the changing mode of life, the new thoughts, feelings, and aspirations of the people.”²⁸ Each branch of creative art and thought was carefully controlled by various organized groups with the unlimited support of the Communist Party. These groups diligently scrutinized all works of creative art for heresies against the Bolshevik regime. Even the works of sympathetic writers and artists were carefully pruned of anything that was not strictly in accordance with the latest policy of the party. There was no such thing for a writer or an artist as remaining neutral. “Whoever is not with us, is against us” was the principle according to which everything was judged. As a leading member of one of the groups stated the issue: “Art will be proletarian or there will be no art.” In short, there was little freedom of cultural or artistic expression except within the boundaries of communist thought. Political considerations were the dominant factors in cultural life.

The policy of the government can be seen in its attitude toward literature. During the early years it was so beset with the problem of consolidating its position and of winning the civil war that it left the task of keeping the writers in line to various proletarian groups, insisting only that the writers “go with the proletariat.” The result was the rise of many schools and hues of proletarian literature. After the promulgation of the First Five-Year Plan the government began to demand that writers put greater emphasis upon the “suc-

²⁷ Cited in Timasheff, *Religion in Soviet Russia* (1942), p. 98.

²⁸ Cited in Miliukov, *Outlines of Russian Culture*, ed. by M. Karpovich, part 2, p. 118.

cesses of socialist construction." In other words, it insisted that writers devote their talents to the furtherance of the Five-Year Plan. Soviet writers, vying one with another in carrying out this prescription, produced a large crop of writings but they were, with few exceptions, low in artistic value and dull in content. This period lasted until 1932 when the Central Committee decided to abolish the various proletarian groups and to organize all writers in a single Union of Soviet Writers in an effort to make Soviet literature more homogeneous. Although more variety was permitted in regard to style and form, writers being advised to improve their style by studying the old Russian classics, all members had to subscribe to the political platform of the government. The aim of the Union as defined in its statutes was "the creation of works of high artistic significance, saturated with the heroic struggle of the international proletariat, with the grandeur of the victory of socialism, and reflecting the great wisdom and heroism of the Communist Party."²⁹

Thus the new literature differed in spirit from the Russian classics. Whereas, for example, the typical hero of the old literature was a weakling who struggled vainly against his environment, the hero of the new is a supremely confident person, one who has the will to carry out his designs, to translate his ideals into everyday life. Furthermore, the new literature is characterized by a strong note of optimism in contrast to the pessimism of nineteenth-century Russian literature. Whereas the poems and novels of the earlier period often closed in a tone of hopelessness and despair, those of the new breathe an all-embracing spirit of confidence in the future.

Although Soviet literature was on the whole far behind the old Russian literature in regard to artistic mastery, some notable works did appear during the period up to the outbreak of World War II. Outstanding among these are the novels of Michael Sholokhov, a Don Cossack. Born in 1905 in the northern Caucasus, the part of Russia which forms the setting for all his works, he began writing at the age of eighteen. His fame rests on *The Silent Don*, a long epic of Cossack life published in four parts, the first in 1928 and the last in 1940. It relates in great detail the story of a group of Cossack families from the period preceding the First World War through the Russian Revolution to the year 1921. Translated into most of the civilized tongues of the globe, it appeared in the United States in two parts, *And Quiet Flows the Don* (1934) and *The Don Flows Home to the Sea* (1941). Since it presents a picture of the socialist reality, it satisfied the requirements of the censors; but there is little

²⁹ Cited in Struve, *Soviet Russian Literature* (1935), p. 238.

of socialist heroism in it. Its Tolstoyan realism has caused many critics to compare Sholokhov with Tolstoy himself and with such other giants as Dostoevski, Gogol, and Gorky. In between the publication of the parts of this work Sholokhov wrote and published *Seeds of Tomorrow* (1933), translated into English as *Virgin Soil Upturned* (1935), which deals with the building of a kolkhoz or collective farm in a Cossack village. The composer I. Dzerzhinsky has written operas based on *And Quiet Flows the Don* and *Seeds of Tomorrow*. The latter was also dramatized in a four-act play.

Probably the greatest cultural achievement was in education. When the Bolsheviks took over the reins of government, Russia was educationally one of the most backward countries of Europe. Although educational policy varied under the different tsars, in general they did little to promote the spread of education among the masses; in fact, some of them were openly hostile toward popular education, believing that an educated people would not submit to their autocratic rule. In the nineteenth century Shishkov, minister for instruction under Alexander I, who toward the end of his reign became reactionary, said with the approval of the tsar: "To teach the mass of people or even the majority of them how to read will bring more harm than good."³⁰ Such facilities as existed were largely intended for the nobility and the middle classes and the educational opportunities for even these classes were not on a level with those of such countries as Great Britain and Germany. Consequently, according to the census of 1897, about 78 per cent of the people were illiterate. During the reign of Nicholas II, the last tsar, considerable progress was made in the spread of popular education, but the legacy which the Soviet government inherited was still one of darkness. It is estimated that in 1919 more than 60 per cent of the population could neither read nor write, while many others could read but not write. In some of the Asiatic provinces less than one per cent of the inhabitants were literate.

The communists regarded the extermination of illiteracy as their most important task in the sphere of education. "You cannot build a communist state with an illiterate people," was a slogan which Lenin repeated frequently. Beyond desiring to lift the people to a higher cultural level the leaders had a more definite aim. This aim, like that of education in any other country, was to inculcate in the minds of the citizens the ideals of the society in which they live. In other words, the aim of Soviet education was to create "as quickly as possible useful fighting troops for communism." The communists

³⁰ Cited in Bach, *Educational Changes in Russia*, p. 4.

realized not only that youth is most susceptible to propaganda but also that the school is the best place to reach the youth of a country. Accordingly the Act on National Schools prescribed that "the whole work of the schools must aim at developing the proletarian class consciousness and the instincts proper to it in the pupils, emphasizing the solidarity of all workers against capital, and preparing the children for useful productive and social activity." Every textbook, no matter what its subject, was of necessity couched in Marxian phraseology, and every new textbook had to receive the imprimatur from a special censorship of the State Publishing Department. On the other hand, Lenin warned the officials not to make the scope of education too narrow. In a speech to a conference of the Komsomol he said: "We cannot limit ourselves to communist conclusions and learn only communist slogans. You will not build up socialism like that. You will be a communist only when you have enriched your minds with the knowledge of all that humanity has created."³¹

A further reason for the fight against illiteracy was the urgent need for skilled workers for factory and farm, particularly after the inauguration of the First Five-Year Plan, for the development of which education was essential. Lunacharsky, the commissar for education, set forth as one of the aims of education "supply of the actual needs of national economy by preparation of workers in different branches and categories of qualifications."

Within the limitations imposed on it, education made phenomenal progress. By the year 1931-1932 so many new elementary schools had been opened that compulsory education for all children between eight and eleven was proclaimed. Actually, however, the average attendance for the whole Soviet Union in that year was 67.3 per cent of all children of school age. But the government did not stop at providing schools for children. It also rapidly increased the schools for illiterate adults. Furthermore, facilities were provided for the development of skilled workers. Many apprentice schools were opened in connection with factories, and vocational schools to train specialists were established in various parts of the country. New schools of higher learning were also founded and the curricula of the old universities were revised to meet the new needs. All this resulted in a gradual decrease in the number of illiterates. It is estimated that by 1930 those who could neither read nor write numbered only 33 per cent of the population. In 1939 more than thirty million children were attending school as compared with

³¹ Cited in *Slavonic Review*, vol. 17 (1939), p. 135.

eight million in 1914. In other words, almost all the children of the U.S.S.R. were receiving free elementary education. In 1933 Stalin stated in a speech that 90 per cent of the adult population had achieved literacy, but this estimate was too optimistic; a more sober estimate has it that 81.2 per cent of the population above the age of nine could be classified as literate in 1939.³²



SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

When the communists seized power in 1917, their leaders were certain that the Russian Revolution was but the first step toward world revolution. They believed that this world revolution was not only inevitable but imminent, that the capitalist world would soon collapse and communist states would be set up in Europe and Asia. Even Lenin himself shared this optimism. On April 5, 1919, he stated in *Izvestia*: "We are sure of our victory over the international imperialists, and this for two reasons: first, because they have taken to fighting among themselves; and second, because the soviet movement is growing rapidly throughout the world. . . . The imperialists are digging their own graves and there are plenty of people in their own countries who will bury them and pack the ground solid over their coffins."³³ Other communist leaders also prophesied the fall of capitalism in the near future. Zinoviev, the first president of the Communist International, for example, wrote: "Old Europe is dashing at mad speed toward the proletarian revolution. . . . Separate defeats will still occur in the near future. Black will, perhaps, still win a victory here and there over red. But final victory will, nevertheless, be to the red; and this in the course of the next months, perhaps even weeks. The movement is proceeding at such terrific speed that we may say with full confidence, within a year we shall already begin to forget that there was a struggle for communism in Europe, because in a year the whole of Europe will be communist. And the struggle for communism will be transferred to America, perhaps to Asia, and to other parts of the world."³⁴

In March, 1919, the communist leaders created an international organization to hasten the coming of the world revolution. It was the Third Communist International³⁵ or Comintern. Not that the new body was officially connected with the Soviet government it-

³² Yugow, *Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace* (1942), p. 251.

³³ Cited in Dennis, *Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia* (1924), p. 73.

³⁴ Cited in Florinsky, *World Revolution and the U.S.S.R.* (1933), pp. 42-43.

³⁵ The First International lasted from 1861 to 1872 and the Second from 1889 to 1914.

self. The connection was indirect but nevertheless real. The Communist Party of Russia controlled both the Soviet government and the Third International. The call to the communists to assemble at Moscow was signed by Lenin and Trotsky, most of the officers elected were Russians, and Moscow was made the headquarters of the organization which directed communist parties and communist activities in all other countries. "The Communist International," its statutes stated, "has for its purpose the struggle by all available means, including armed force, for the overthrow of the international *bourgeoisie* and the creation of an international Soviet republic as a transition stage to the complete abolition of the State." The manifesto issued by the first congress read in part: "The Communist International calls on the entire proletariat of the world to take part in this last struggle. Arms against arms! Force against force! Down with the imperialistic conspiracy of capital! Long live the international republic of proletarian soviets!" To this the manifesto of the second congress added: "The international proletariat will not lay down its sword until Soviet Russia has become a link in the federation of the Soviet republics of the world."

But as the months passed, the communist leaders had to confess that they had been too optimistic. Not only had the world revolution failed to materialize but such limited communist experiments as those which had taken place in Hungary and Bavaria had proved short lived, leaving in their wake an intense hatred of Bolshevism. At the end of 1919 the Soviet government stood alone, all other European states having broken off diplomatic relations with it. When the civil wars ended and the Russo-Polish War was terminated (October, 1920) a new situation confronted the Soviet government. After years of desolating war and famine, Russia was in a state of economic collapse. What the government needed above all for the economic restoration of the country was foreign capital; but a state that was aggressively communist in its internal affairs and in its relations with other countries did not attract foreign capital. So the government decided to modify its policy. As militant communism gave way to the NEP in internal affairs, so in foreign affairs the party decided to embark on a policy of partial cooperation with the capitalist states. The new policy bore fruit almost immediately. Before the end of 1921 the Soviet Union had signed trade agreements with Persia, Afghanistan, Turkey, Poland, and, most important of all, with Great Britain, and during the succeeding years trade relations were resumed with many other countries. This resumption of trade gradually led to the recognition of the Soviet government by

the other states of Europe and the world. In 1924 it was officially recognized by Great Britain, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Greece, China, and Mexico. Japan fell in line the next year, and Iceland and Uruguay in 1926.³⁶ Thus the U.S.S.R. entered the arena of world politics.

Soviet cooperation with the capitalist states became all the more necessary after the inauguration of the First Five-Year Plan in 1928. To carry out this and the succeeding Plans, machines and equipment of all kinds were needed, and also experts, engineers, foremen, and workmen with special technical knowledge, all of which could be obtained only from the capitalist nations. Accordingly cooperation instead of world revolution was accentuated. The formula was "Friendly relations with any state irrespective of its internal regime." The first two congresses of the Communist International opened with denunciations of the capitalist system, but as early as the third congress (1921) both Lenin and Trotsky told the delegates that a revision of tactics was necessary, that they must go more slowly. The world revolution, they said, was surely coming some day but not as soon as they had expected. With Stalin emphasizing the idea of "socialism in a single state," after Lenin's death, the Comintern was naturally pushed into the background. Between 1924 and 1935 only one international congress was held (Moscow, 1928) and that for the purpose of sanctioning the First Five-Year Plan, the Plan which was temporarily shelving the idea of world revolution.

Another marked characteristic of Soviet foreign policy was its emphasis on peace; in fact, after 1928 the maintenance of peace became the main object of Soviet diplomacy. A communist leader stated the issue quite clearly when he said: "The defense of peace and of the neutrality of the Soviet Union against all attempts to drag it into the whirlwind of a world war, is the central problem of Soviet foreign policy." The government needed peace in order to proceed with the industrialization of the country. War would have interrupted the execution not only of the Five-Year Plan but also of the other constructive processes upon which the success of the regime depended. Hence the period from 1930 to 1933 saw non-aggression pacts signed with the Baltic countries, France, Finland, Poland, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and with any other country willing to sign one. Nevertheless, no effort was spared in creating a strong Red army for defense against foreign invasion. In 1930 Stalin said in addressing the Communist Party: "Our policy is a policy of peace and strengthening of trade relations with all

³⁶ The United States did not accord formal recognition until 1933.

countries. . . . The result of that policy is the fact that we have succeeded in maintaining peace and have not allowed our enemies to draw us into conflict, despite a number of provocative acts and adventurist assaults by the warmongers. For the future no less we shall continue this policy of peace, with all our strength and with all our resources. We do not want a single foot of foreign territory. But we shall not give up a single inch of our own territory either, to anyone. That is our foreign policy."

Russia's diplomatic situation, however, soon began to deteriorate. In 1931 the Japanese invaded Manchuria and established a strong military force with which the Russians frequently became embroiled in border clashes. Such border incidents were embarrassing to the Soviet government whose Far Eastern army, although planned as early as 1929, still existed largely on paper. Before long the diplomatic situation also grew worse in the West. In January, 1933, the Nazis rose to power in Germany and began to rattle the swords and beat the drums of war. Both the Japanese and the Germans had definite programs of conquest. While the Japanese were taking the first steps toward what they hoped would result in their complete domination of the East, the Germans were looking eastward to the Ukraine which Hitler had said in *Mein Kampf* Germany needed for *Lebensraum*. In the face of this double threat the Soviet government felt that the nonaggression pacts alone offered insufficient assurance and it therefore decided to join the League of Nations. Although the leaders had previously denounced the League in no uncertain terms because it was upholding the Versailles settlement, they were now ready to cooperate in an attempt to stabilize existing conditions and to guarantee existing boundaries. Thus the U.S.S.R. entered the League in 1934 as a permanent member of the Council. During the ensuing years it was to play an important part in world affairs.



CHAPTER EIGHT

British Economic and Imperial Problems

BRITAIN'S GOVERNMENT

DESPITE the shocks it had endured, the British government emerged from World War I but little changed. Its frame, often called a constitution, is so elastic that it can readily be stretched and contracted to meet emergencies. Consequently at the end of the war Britain was still governed by king and parliament. The hereditary monarchy remained an integral and powerful part of national life but it was a "constitutional" monarchy although the king held his position by hereditary right, and the government was a parliamentary democracy. At one time the power of the sovereign had been relatively absolute. Although he was advised by a small council of nobles, he was quite free to please himself as to the laws he made. But the legislative and much of the executive power had been gradually absorbed by parliament, more particularly by the House of Commons. In theory the king's power was still great in 1918. No law could be made without his assent; he summoned parliament to meet, he prorogued and dissolved it; justice was executed in his name and all proclamations were issued by him—in short, every formal act of government was executed in the king's name. Actually he was responsible to and dependent upon parliament. He could make few public decisions and then only with the support of a cabinet minister who if challenged had to answer to the House of Commons for his conduct.

Of the ministers who made up the cabinet the most responsible and most important was the prime minister. If any one man ruled Britain it was he. The prime minister, it is true, is nominally appointed by the king, but the choice is limited to persons who have the support of the House of Commons. Without the support of the

House the prime minister could not hold his high office for a day. He in turn selects the cabinet ministers who as a body are a sort of executive committee of parliament. One writer has stated the difference between the United States and the British cabinets as follows: "In Britain ministers are the colleagues of the premier; in America they are the servants of the President. In England they are collectively responsible for the policy of the ministry; in America they are severally responsible, each for the administration of his own department, to the President; but the policy is the President's, not theirs. In England they must, by convention, sit in parliament; in America no person holding any office in the United States shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office. In England the initiative in legislation is virtually vested in the cabinet; in America neither the President nor his ministers can initiate legislation, although by presidential messages he may recommend it."¹

Of the two houses which compose the parliament, the House of Commons is chosen by the vote of the people while the House of Lords consists of peers who hold their titles for life. Early in the nineteenth century the right to vote in parliamentary elections was still sharply restricted, but a succession of Reform Acts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries gradually widened it. Progress was slow but steady so that by 1914 most men enjoyed the right to vote. A further step forward was taken in 1918 in the Representation of the People Act, which for the first time extended the vote to women. By its provisions women over thirty with certain qualifications² were accorded the franchise. It also widened the franchise for men so as to include all over twenty-one. Although the House of Lords still plays a part in the government, the power of imposing taxes and of raising revenue is reserved for the House of Commons. Until the eve of World War I the peers had been able to retard progressive legislation and sometimes to block it altogether. In 1911, they were deprived of this power. Thereafter money bills became law if the Lords did not assent to them within one month after they received them. Other bills the Lords may retard but cannot prevent their becoming law.

¹ *Fortnightly Review* (February, 1920), p. 202.

² Besides being thirty years of age a woman had to be either a local government elector or the wife of one. Qualification for the local government franchise was six months' ownership or tenancy of land or premises. One of the objections to the Act was that no woman would admit to being over thirty. In 1928 the age for women voters was reduced to twenty-one.



DECLINE OF BRITISH INDUSTRY AND TRADE

The House of Commons which was sitting at the end of the war had been elected in 1910 for a maximum period of five years. But since a political contest might have hindered the war effort, the House with the active approval of the country prolonged its own life by temporary enactments from year to year. In 1918 Britain was ruled by a coalition cabinet formed in 1916 by David Lloyd George, a Liberal. Although the prime minister and his leading colleagues were Liberals,³ the government had gradually become more and more Conservative both in membership and in policy. As the prime minister in the crucial days of the war, Lloyd George had never faltered, never lost heart. After the armistice the belief that he had been largely instrumental in winning the war gained wide acceptance. Nor did he and his supporters miss an opportunity to cultivate this impression. In showing a newspaper reporter about his beautiful residence, known as Chequers, he pointed to a room and remarked: "This is the room where the war was won." Before the general election of December, 1918, Lloyd George skilfully appealed to the country to support "the men who had won the war." He assured the people that he would make Germany pay the cost to the last farthing, gave the impression that he was ready to hang the kaiser, and promised that he would make Britain "a fit place for heroes to live in." The people, who were just celebrating the hard-won victory, responded by returning him to Westminster with a vast majority at his back, the coalition securing 526 parliamentary seats out of a total of 707.

Having promised "a happier country for all" Lloyd George set about the task of achieving it. He called to his side men with big ideas and bade them reconstruct the national life under state direction. Little heed was paid to the cost. The idea of public thrift was to him an old-fashioned doctrine, as obsolete as mid-Victorian art. Money was spent freely on education, housing, agriculture, and other projects. And the money did not come out of German but out of British pockets. To provide the necessary funds the people were taxed and taxed. Wiser men sounded the warning that the extravagance of the government would lead to national bankruptcy, but Lloyd George and his colleagues continued merrily on their prodigal way. So that it could the more easily bear the tax burden, labor was encouraged by the coalition cabinet to be "audacious" in its de-

³ A large section of Liberals under Mr. Asquith stood aloof.

mands upon capital. Labor needed little urging. Widespread strikes forced employers to increase wages and shorten hours. All went well while the industrial boom lasted. But in 1920 the fictitious prosperity collapsed and a trade slump came.

Previously Britain had for many decades been the workshop of the world. It was in Britain that power machinery was invented and first used. This gave the British a great advantage over other nations. They could manufacture certain articles, particularly textiles, more cheaply and efficiently, and the world was ready to consume these articles in ever increasing volume. In the textile industry no less than 75 per cent of the manufactures were exported. The demand for British goods was so great and the profits were so large that agriculture was more and more neglected. The great landowner became an industrialist, and the farm laborer became a mill worker. While receiving high prices for manufactured goods, the British could buy food cheaply from other countries. Thus Britain became more dependent on external trade than any other country in the world. British ships went forth laden with manufactured goods and coal, and returned with food and raw materials. In 1913 foreign countries supplied 73.9 per cent of the food and 67.6 per cent of the raw materials used in Britain. In other words, the use of power machinery transformed a poor country which had been an exporter of raw materials into a comparatively rich nation exporting manufactured goods and importing food and raw materials. This development, which began in the eighteenth century, continued right through the nineteenth. At the end of the century British wealth was proverbial and London was the financial center of the world. During the early years of the twentieth century foreign competition, particularly on the part of Germany, increased considerably and caused apprehension and political reactions. Nevertheless, the export trade continued to grow by leaps and bounds. During the period from 1900 to 1913 it increased by almost 80 per cent.

During World War I the situation changed. Intent upon winning the war the British concentrated their attention on the production of war materials; hence they had few manufactured products to sell abroad. Such foreign trade as continued was seriously curtailed by the German submarine campaign. Nations which had previously depended upon Britain for textiles, iron and steel products, and other manufactured goods had to go without them, buy elsewhere, or manufacture the goods themselves. At the time not much thought was given in British circles to this dislocation of trade. It was confidently believed that with the return of peace the old order would

prevail. This belief was strengthened by a sudden and intensive trade boom immediately after the armistice. In the fall of 1920, however, this boom came to an end and was followed by a prolonged depression. The years after the war, instead of bringing a return to normality, raised one of the gravest problems with which a modern nation has been forced to contend.

The chronic "trade anemia" was caused by the combined operation of a number of forces. First of all, the fact that Britain produced but few civilian goods during World War I impelled its customers to develop their own industries. In other words, countries which had previously supplied their wants by importing British goods made themselves more or less industrially self-sufficient. Second, countries which had been pressing Britain in the world markets on the eve of the war became more serious competitors after its close. The end of the war saw not Britain but the United States holding first place in export trade. Nor was the United States the only serious competitor. Belgium, France, Germany, and Japan, among others, had also made serious inroads on Britain's foreign trade. In Belgium and France, for example, the factories destroyed by the Germans were replaced by modern industrial plants and the Germans themselves were not slow in scrapping antiquated machinery and obsolete methods in favor of modern equipment and improved methods. In these countries as well as in the United States mass production of standard articles was introduced as a means of producing cheaper goods.

In all this Britain lagged behind. Much of its equipment was obsolete and its organization and methods were unsuited to the new conditions. In some cases the capital requisite for purchase of new equipment was lacking; in others the unions refused to sanction the use of labor-saving machinery because they feared it would increase unemployment. Some industrialists and mine operators who could afford to do so refused to modernize their methods, preferring to retain those they had previously developed or inherited. The use of antiquated methods coupled with high wages put the British at a disadvantage in competition with other countries. Other factors helped to aggravate the depression, not the least of them being taxes. High taxes, made necessary by the war debt of thirty-five billion dollars and the severe strain the dole system put on the national treasury, severely handicapped industry and dried up much of the purchasing power of the people. Finally, in 1925 the British restored their currency to its prewar value in gold, at a time when the currencies of Germany, France, and Italy were badly depreciated.

This step, by raising the price of British goods, further handicapped the British in their race for world markets.

British manufactures consequently lost ground in foreign markets. At every turn they were met by American, German, or French goods at prices so low that they could not meet them. Since Britain's prosperity had for more than a century been largely dependent upon overseas markets, the repercussions at home were severe. More than this, since the British by and large adhered to a policy of free trade, there were few tariff barriers to keep foreign goods from flooding the home market. The resulting curtailment of both foreign and home markets checked production and threw large numbers of workers into idleness. Some industries, of course, suffered more than others. Thus textiles alone provided more than 25 per cent of the total unemployment. Previously a large volume of trade had been achieved by the sale of cheap, coarse cloths in the East, particularly in India and China, but after the war various factors contributed toward depriving the British of this market. Among them were the civil strife in China, the boycott of British goods in India, the establishment of cotton factories in India, and, above all, the competition of the Japanese, who got a firm hold on the Asiatic textile market by underselling their competitors.

Other British industries suffered even more. One of these was shipbuilding. Toward the end of the nineteenth century about 80 per cent of all ships built in the world came from British shipyards, and at the outbreak of World War I Britain's share was still 60 per cent. After the war, however, the importance of these shipyards began to decline despite the great demand for tonnage. Again the British could not meet the competition of other countries. The same was true in the iron and steel industries. In the development of the motor car, for example, the British, with their old-fashioned methods, were soon far outstripped by American manufacturers. Probably the darkest spot in the industrial picture was coal mining. Coal had, in a sense, been the very foundation of British prosperity. Not only was it used to generate the steam which turned the wheels of industry, but it had made possible the smelting of ore. Large quantities had also been exported in vessels whose furnaces were stoked with coal. During the period before World War I about two thirds of all coal exported in the world came from British mines. Among the reasons which caused the decline of British coal mining were the antiquated methods employed by the operators. So long as there was no serious competition they were able to sell their coal at a profit, but exports declined when such countries as Germany and

France modernized their methods. Moreover, the use of coal in general was decreasing because of the development of hydroelectric power on land and the increasing use of oil as the motive power in ships.

At first it was believed that the slump was a temporary result of the war and that Britain would soon recover its prosperity. But when the slump became chronic, the question of how to raise the country out of the bog of depression became the government's major problem. During the years preceding 1929 and in that year there was some degree of improvement, but after 1929 conditions took a sharp turn for the worse. In 1930 and 1931, for example, production of pig iron and steel declined to about one half the 1929 levels. Unemployment increased in the same ratio, many workers remaining totally unemployed for years. To avoid national catastrophe these people had to be supported. In 1920 Lloyd George's coalition government had extended the scope of the Unemployment Insurance Act to include most workers. The sudden upsurge of unemployment and the continued depression soon exhausted the funds allocated for this purpose and made it necessary for the government to meet the deficit by loans. The sums spent in various forms of relief up to the end of 1923 alone totaled £400 million. As the number of unemployed increased, particularly after 1929, the problem of financing the "dole," the name given to unemployment compensation, became increasingly difficult.



CABINETS AND GOVERNMENTS

Meanwhile various cabinets and administrations had failed to provide a solution for the economic depression and the resulting widespread unemployment. Lloyd George's government, which had won by a landslide in 1918, lost its support because the results of its prodigious expenditures were pathetically small. As long as the trade boom lasted, nobody cared how much public money the administration was spending to make things pleasant all around. But when the slump came and the people discovered that the national treasury was empty, their faith in the prime minister evaporated. Leading men of all parties became convinced that his continued presence at the helm would spell nothing less than complete ruin. In 1922 the Conservatives brought matters to a head by withdrawing from the coalition, a move which forced the resignation of the prime minister. Lloyd George tried to rally the country behind him with the slogan of "Retrenchment," but the jig was up. Receiving

but little support in the general elections, he retired from the political scene. Thus, amid general rejoicing, the wartime coalition government came to an end.

In the general election of 1922 the Conservative Party won a clear majority of seventy, while the Labor Party increased its strength to 138. The tenure of the Conservatives was but shortlived. Regarding protective tariffs as the only remedy for the industrial slump, the cabinet precipitated a new election on the issue. Not only were both the Laborites and the Liberals opposed to protection but public opinion in general was not ready to support it. The result was a sweeping defeat for the Conservatives. Neither the Laborites nor the Liberals obtained a majority, but together they had a majority of over ninety. As the Labor Party had more members in the House than the Liberal Party, the king requested Ramsay MacDonald, leader of the Labor Party, to form a cabinet. Thus Britain received its first Labor government. The position of this government, however, was precarious, since it could be maintained only through the sufferance of the Liberals, who were of no mind to further the program of the Labor Party. Hence the government was unable to redeem the pledges it had made before the election. As early as the fall of 1924 the Liberals withdrew their support over the question of a loan to Russia. When the House of Commons voted an inquiry into the relationship of the Labor Party with the Soviet government, MacDonald, fearing that the inquiry might produce damaging revelations, asked the king to grant a dissolution.

In the ensuing election the Conservatives won a majority of two hundred over all other parties combined. The representation of the Labor Party declined and the Liberal Party, now hopelessly split into two factions, was reduced to a remnant of its former strength. For the next four and a half years the Conservatives gradually lost their popularity, partly because they failed to find a remedy for the depression and unemployment, partly because they failed to redeem their pledge of reducing public expenditures. Consequently they lost their majority in the general election of 1929. The Labor Party, which secured the largest representation, now got its second opportunity to form a government with Ramsay MacDonald as prime minister. Again Labor did not command a majority but had to rely upon Liberal support. The supreme issue was the economic situation, but the Laborites and Liberals could not agree on a bold policy for the relief of unemployment. Hardly had Labor come into power when the great Wall Street collapse took place. British foreign trade took another turn for the worse,

and unemployment in Britain as in other countries increased. The figures rapidly rose from 1.1 million to 2.5 million, necessitating the borrowing of large sums to pay the dole.

Ramsay MacDonald, as the leader of the party having the largest representation in the House, remained prime minister and formed a National Government containing representatives of all parties for the single purpose of restoring the financial position of the country. By sharply curtailing expenses this government managed to balance the budget but in spite of these measures the country was driven off the gold standard. When the people were asked to express their approval or disapproval in a general election (October, 1931) they returned only fifty Laborites to the House, while the Conservatives secured 471. This acquisition of strength encouraged the Conservatives to revive the question of a protective tariff as the only way out of the slough of industrial depression. Not that there were no customs restrictions in Britain. At various times and for various reasons duties had been imposed on a number of articles, but there was no general tariff. This state of affairs satisfied neither the free traders nor the protectionists. In 1932 the Conservatives used their power to pass a number of Acts which imposed duties on most imports, excepting food and raw materials. These Acts made Britain in the inclusiveness of its tariffs, though not in their height, as protectionist as any country in the world. Imports coming from within the empire were exempted from duty. Having given the Dominions preferential treatment, Britain in turn asked the Dominions for concessions. As early as August, 1932, the so-called Ottawa agreements were signed by which all the Dominions except Ireland accepted the principle of reciprocal concessions.


As the decade of the thirties moved toward its end Britain experienced some degree of economic recovery. A comparison of 1937 with 1929, the highest previous year, shows an increase of over 20 per cent in industrial production and a commensurate increase in the number of employed. In part this revival must be ascribed to the tariff protection, which gave manufacturers most of the home market. Among the other factors were the efforts of the government to reorganize and modernize British industries, so that they could compete with those of other countries. Partly by legislation and partly by other methods much was done to bring about the amalgamation of the many individual mines and the modernization of processes. In 1937 many textile manufacturers assented to a government request to modernize their machinery. Even more important was the intervention of the government in a deliberate effort to develop and encourage heavy industry.

**A KING ABDICATES**

On January 20, 1936, King George V, who had ruled Great Britain since 1910, passed away at the age of seventy. No British ruler had used more wisely "the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, and the right to warn." He had been a plain man doing his plain duty. His simplicity of manner and of outlook had endeared him to his people. Probably no British monarch before him was so highly respected. Whereas thrones had toppled all over Europe, the British throne had been made infinitely stronger during his reign. His death, therefore, caused genuine mourning. His son, who took the title of Edward VIII, had traveled widely in Britain and in the empire and had long been a popular figure. For forty-two years he had prepared for the throne. He had done all that the people expected of him except one thing. He had not married. He was the first bachelor to ascend the British throne since George III in 1760.

Great things were expected of the new monarch, but in less than a year he had abdicated and his brother, the Duke of York, had become king as George VI. The reason for his abdication was his desire to marry Mrs. Wallis Warfield Simpson, an American who had been divorced twice. Prime minister Stanley Baldwin, when advised of Edward VIII's intention, refused to sanction the marriage because he feared that the chain of empire, in which the king was the main link, would snap over the "scandal." The Church of England also opposed marriage to a woman twice divorced. Others who supported the opposition included the royal family, most members of the Houses of Commons and Lords, and a majority of the newspapers. For his part, the strong-willed king insisted that his marriage was a private act which did not affect his public position. When this availed him nothing, he suggested to Mr. Baldwin that he marry Mrs. Simpson without making her his queen. The answer was: "No such thing as a morganatic marriage is known to our law. . . . His Majesty's Government are not prepared to introduce such legislation." Pointing out to Edward that "in the choice of the Queen the voice of the people must be heard," he pleaded with him to sacrifice his personal interests for the good of the empire. But the fair-haired Edward stood like a rock against the wave of appeals.

Britain and the world did not have to wait long for the final decision. On December 9, a little more than a fortnight after the issue was first raised, Edward VIII notified the cabinet that he had decided to abdicate. When they urged him to reconsider, he answered: "His Majesty . . . regrets that he is unable to alter his



THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

decision." The next day he signed a formal abdication. In a message to the empire he said: "I have found it impossible to carry the heavy burden of responsibility and to discharge my duties as king as I would wish to do without the help and support of the woman I love." It marked the first time a British king and emperor voluntarily stepped down from his throne. On the day originally set for the coronation of Edward VIII his brother was crowned as George VI. The wife of the new sovereign, Lady Elizabeth Bowes-Lyon, daughter of a Scottish earl, became Queen Elizabeth and their ten year old daughter Elizabeth became heir apparent. George VI, who had lived a quiet life, did not at his accession enjoy his brother's popularity. Many felt that the prestige of the crown had been greatly diminished and would never be the same again. These fears were unwarranted. The storm subsided almost as quickly as it had arisen; the ship of state righted itself and sailed smoothly on.



THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

The British monarch, in addition to being king of Great Britain, was also the sovereign head of the British Empire. This empire was an agglomeration of territories sprawling over more than a quarter of the globe. Its units were scattered so widely as to justify the statement, "The sun never sets on the British Empire." The population, representing all colors and creeds, was listed in 1922 as 440,923,000 or more than a fifth of the entire population of the earth. Of this number no less than 319 million lived in India and not more than 65 million were of European origin. The components of the empire included first of all, the Dominions of Canada, Newfoundland,⁴ Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Irish Free State (Eire), all of which were virtually self-governing independent nations so far as their internal affairs were concerned. India had a special status as a sort of semidominion. Next in rank were the crown colonies, which differed widely in the extent of self-government accorded them. The better known crown colonies are the Bahamas,

⁴ Because of financial difficulties Newfoundland reverted to the status of a crown colony in 1933.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS. *Since this map was drawn, the status of India has changed; for greater details, consult the map on page 649.*

Bermuda, Jamaica, Trinidad, Gibraltar, Malta, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Ceylon, Burma, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Furthermore, there were protectorates of various kinds; in other words, native states under British rule or guidance. Most of these, e.g., Nigeria, Uganda, and the Gold Coast, were in Africa, an important exception being Sarawak in Borneo. Finally, the empire included the mandates, former German colonies or Turkish dependencies, taken over in 1919 under authorization of the League of Nations. These included Palestine, German East Africa, German Southwest Africa, Western Samoa, German New Guinea, Arab Iraq, and lesser bits. Not since Roman times has there been such a hodgepodge of territories and peoples.

When World War I broke out, there were many, including the Germans, who were certain that the imperial structure would collapse under the strain of the war. They were convinced that there would be widespread and determined revolts in Ireland, India, Egypt, and South Africa. During the course of the war there was, it is true, a rebellion in Ireland that was soon put down, and there were uprisings in South Africa and some disturbances in Egypt and India. But the trouble was insignificant in comparison with the wholehearted support the empire gave the war effort. The decision of the cabinet to plunge the empire into war was never challenged. The citizens of South Africa soon forgot their grudges, the Irish sent a large number of men into the battle against the Central Powers, and even the Moslems of India did not throw in their lot with Turkey which was the home of the head of their religion. From every land and clime the citizens of the empire, fired with a common loyalty and obligation, rallied to the flag, and all the Dominions unhesitatingly put their naval and military forces under the control of the British authorities. The war was won without the loss of an inch of territory; on the contrary, as a result of the peace settlement the empire was extended by some 800,000 square miles.

Nevertheless, a far-reaching change in the attitude of the colonies toward the mother country did take place. The war served to hasten and intensify a local national feeling in the Dominions. "The Dominions," as a citizen of one of them put it, "have reached self-consciousness in the war and a sense of national pride and nationhood." Each of the greater Dominions emerged from the war with a wholly crystallized determination to play a new role in the imperial association. As regards internal affairs the Dominions had become virtually independent in practice if not in theory.⁵ On the

⁵ The royal veto, though obsolete in Great Britain itself, could still be exercised on Dominion legislation but had been exercised only on rare occasions.

other hand, in foreign affairs, in the general issues of war and peace, the Dominions had been expected to accept the ruling of parliament, in which assembly they had neither voice nor vote. What they wanted was a share in making the policies from which war might flow. As early as 1915 the Canadian minister of justice stated: "Our recognition of this war as ours, our participation in it, spontaneous and voluntary as it is, determines absolutely once and for all that we have passed from the status of the protected colony to that of the participating nation." Not long thereafter a former prime minister of Australia voiced the sentiment of his country in the words: "I have been prime minister, but all the time I had no say whatever about imperial policy—no say whatever. Now that can't go on." General Smuts, prime minister of the Union of South Africa, stated emphatically that the old prewar British Empire was "gone in the sense of colonies or subordinate nations clustering around one master nation."

In 1917 the Imperial War Conference added its voice to those demanding a change. The Conference drew up a statement which asserted that its members "are of the opinion that the readjustment of the constitutional relations of the component parts of the empire is too important and intricate to be dealt with during the war. . . . They deem it their duty, however, to place on record their view that any such readjustment, while thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-government and complete control of domestic affairs, should be based upon a full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth." In the years immediately following World War I no legal steps were taken to grant the demand of the Dominions, but the process of development from a colonial to an equal status continued. Thus the Dominions were separately represented at the Peace Conference and were also accorded memberships in the League of Nations. Furthermore, Canada in 1920 received the consent of the British government to the appointment of a Canadian minister at Washington. Although he was not appointed until 1926, Canada in 1922 did proceed to negotiate, without the participation of the British government, a treaty with the United States in regard to halibut fisheries.


Finally in 1926 the Balfour Committee of the Imperial Conference sought to clarify the issue. It defined the Dominions as "autonomous communities within the British Empire, in no way subordinate to one another in any respect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." The definitions and statements of the Conference of 1926

constituted a body of conventions or understandings, but they were not legal rules. In law the Dominion legislatures were far from "equal in status" with the British parliament. In 1929 a technical committee was appointed to study the matter; the result was the Statute of Westminster, passed by parliament in 1931. It affirmed that "no law hereafter made by the parliament of the United Kingdom shall extend to any of the Dominions as part of the law of that Dominion otherwise than at the request and with the consent of that Dominion." In brief it made each of the Dominion parliaments equal in its sphere.

Thus the Statute of Westminster wiped out the last vestiges of the old British Empire. "The day of the centralized empire is past," said premier Bennett of Canada; "we no longer live in a political empire. . . . With the adoption of the Statute of Westminster the old empire disappears." In its place the statute constituted the British Commonwealth of Nations, an empire resting solely on voluntary cooperation. Every Dominion became master of its own destiny. The sole remaining legal tie that united the otherwise independent nations was their common allegiance to the person of the British sovereign. In other words, the king displaced parliament as the formal and actual pivot of the empire. It is one of the most remarkable changes of modern times. Although it may appear as if the Statute of Westminster weakened the ties, it actually strengthened them. As Sir Austen Chamberlain put it, "In emphasizing liberty, unity has been assured."

Meanwhile the solidarity of the empire was being put to a severe test by events in Ireland. The Home Rule Bill, about which Gladstone had thundered, was forever at the point of being passed but final action was never taken. In 1914 the Home Rule Bill was really passed and signed by the king but because the British Empire was at war with Germany the operation of the Act was suspended for the duration. This greatly displeased the people of southern Ireland. On Easter Monday, 1916, a revolt broke out, with the insurgents proclaiming Ireland a republic. The British succeeded in forcibly suppressing the uprising but did not eliminate the causes of the discontent. The hidden fires of rebellion were being stoked by the Sinn Fein Party⁶ which became the dominant political factor in southern Ireland. After southern Ireland had voted Sinn Fein in the parliamentary elections, the members who had been elected to the House of Commons flatly refused to go to England, stating that

⁶ The words "Sinn Fein" mean "we ourselves alone," a motto adopted by the founders of the party.



IRELAND

Eire, as the Irish Free State has been officially called since December, 1937, consists of Leinster, Munster, and Connaught provinces and three counties of the former Ulster province. Northern Ireland embraces Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry, and Tyrone counties of Ulster.

Ireland had never by its own consent been part of the United Kingdom. Instead they organized the Dail Eireann (Gaelic words meaning Irish Parliament) which set up a republican government to supplant the British regime.


The British government, construing this as open revolt, at once took measures to suppress the movement. A special force of ex-soldiers known from their uniforms as the Black and Tans was raised to deal with the situation. For two years a civil war raged in the unhappy island, taking its toll in lives and property. At length in 1920 the British government tried the solution of setting up two parliaments, one for the six counties of Northern Ireland (sometimes called Ulster), which are strongly Protestant, and the other for the rest of Ireland, which is Catholic. Both were to be subordinate to the British parliament in Westminster. Southern Ireland, led by the Sinn Fein Party, refused to have anything to do with the plan. The existing anarchy finally impelled the more reasonable forces in the Sinn Fein to negotiate a treaty with the British in 1921, whereby southern Ireland became the Irish Free State with a Dominion status similar to that of Canada. With the establishment of the Free State the Gaelic language was resurrected from the past and made the official tongue. This still did not satisfy the more extreme Sinn Feiners, led by Eamon De Valera, an American by birth whose American citizenship had saved him from execution at the hands of a firing squad after the Easter Rebellion of 1916. Again civil war flared up. This time Sinn Feiners were arrayed against Sinn Feiners. It was not until 1923 that the followers of De Valera decided to participate in the elections and attend meetings of the Dail. Adherents of the Irish Free State could now feel that its position was secure. In September of the same year the Free State entered the League of Nations, and the following year Irish representatives attended the Imperial Conference in London.

Although De Valera and his followers cooperated with the government, they were still not satisfied. Upon the advent of his party (Fianna Fail) to power in 1932, De Valera proceeded to introduce various political and constitutional policies aimed at diminishing British control over his people. In 1937 he capped his efforts with a new constitution which went into effect on January 1, 1938, in the twenty-six counties of southern Ireland. It was written for "the whole of Ireland," but Protestant Northern Ireland firmly refused to unite with the South. Besides changing the name of the Irish Free State to the State of Eire (pronounced Aireh), the old Irish name for Ireland, the constitution broke the last ties with Britain by abolish-

ing the office of Governor-General. Even the name of King George VI was not mentioned except in a clause providing for cooperation with Britain in international affairs. Thus Ireland remained in the British Commonwealth of Nations. During the subsequent months the British and Irish composed, with one exception, all their outstanding differences. Only the question of Irish unity was not settled; the northern counties still remained detached from the rest. Even the election of Dr. Douglas Hyde,⁷ a Protestant, as president of Eire in 1938 failed to persuade the 1,290,000 inhabitants of Northern Ireland that a political union was desirable. When World War II broke out in 1939, Eire adopted a policy of neutrality while Ulster joined Britain in the war.

Another vexing problem was that of Palestine, revered by Christian, Jew, and Moslem alike as the Holy Land. A narrow strip of land about the size of Vermont at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, Palestine had for years repeatedly been the scene of bitter conflict. Among the nations which contended for its possession were the Hebrews, Philistines, Babylonians, Persians, Syrians, Romans, Arabs, and Turks. The conflict in the twentieth century arose from a clash of Arab and Jewish nationalist aspirations. Toward the end of the nineteenth century a nationalist movement, generally known as Zionism, was organized for the purpose of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine where persecuted Jews could find refuge. As early as 1903 Zionist leaders appealed to Britain for aid in obtaining permission from the sultan of Turkey for such colonization. When the Turks remained cold to the proposal, Britain offered the Zionists a district in East Africa, but the offer was refused. Then came World War I. Realizing that an Arab uprising would greatly weaken Turkey, the British decided to fan the embers of Arab nationalism into a consuming flame. They made certain vague promises to the effect that Turkey's Arab provinces would be granted independence. The result was that the Arabs, interpreting the promise as including Palestine, threw in their lot with the Allies. In 1917 the Zionist leaders succeeded in obtaining from Lord Balfour, then British foreign secretary, a statement which has since become famous as the Balfour Declaration. "His Majesty's Government," it said, "view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."

⁷ De Valera as prime minister remained the dominant power.



THE NEAR EAST

As a result of British efforts during the First World War, the Arab lands of the former Turkish Empire were set up into a number of states which between the two World Wars were mandates of Britain or France.

The British promises resulted quite logically in contradictory claims. On the one hand, the Zionists interpreted the Balfour Declaration as promising them a Jewish state in Palestine; on the other, the Arabs were no less emphatic in insisting that Palestine had been promised to them as an independent state. The Jews, in support of their claim, maintained that their history had been mainly the history of Palestine and that it was the country of their national literature. The Arabs for their part asked, "Under what reasonable pretext do the Jews claim Palestine, which has not been their home for more than 2000 years?" They contended that Palestine had been their home for 1300 years and that they represented the predominant element of the population. Actually about three quarters of the population was composed of Arabs, the remaining quarter being made up equally of Jews and Christians.⁸

Arabs and Jews, both being Semitic and claiming descent from Abraham, had lived in harmony and mutual tolerance under the rule of the Turks. But under British rule the flames of hatred swept over Palestine like a forest fire. Although they benefited from the new prosperity, the Arabs resented the introduction of modern machinery and improved methods, preferring to adhere to their ancient ways. The continuing Jewish immigration caused them to fear their domain would be transformed into an occidental state; hence they demanded cessation of Jewish immigration and of the sale of land to Jews. When the influx continued, the resentful Arabs launched a campaign of terrorism. Guerillas harassed the country, murdering Jews wherever they could find them. Naturally the Jews retaliated in kind, so that fear and anarchy gripped the country. After quelling serious disorders in 1920 the British hoped that the Arabs and Jews would gradually compose their differences in a common Palestinian citizenship, but the reverse was true. Feelings became more bitter with the passing years. Despite all attempts of British soldiers to suppress guerilla bands, the Arabs continued to challenge British authority. The conflict assumed the dimensions of a holy war when after 1933 larger numbers of Jews came to Palestine to escape the Nazi persecutions. By the beginning of 1936 the number of Jews had increased to 350,000, but they were still outnumbered by the Arabs more than two to one.

During the period between the two World Wars the British had proposed various solutions but to no avail. In 1922 the British High

⁸ According to the official census of 1922 there were 83,000 Jews in a population of 757,000. During the succeeding years the ratio changed rapidly. In 1945 it was estimated that the Moslems numbered 472,100 and the Jews 444,912.

Commissioner sought to calm the unrest by proposing a Legislative Council in which both parties would be represented. The Arabs would have no part of it. They insisted, in turn, upon Arab independence, claiming that Palestine was the only Arab country that was not moving toward independence. In 1935 a similar plan was projected with a council of fourteen Arabs, seven Jews, and seven Britons. Both Arabs and Jews denounced the plan. While the latter feared that a council on which they were outnumbered two to one would be inimical to their interests, the Arabs continued to insist on complete self-government. In 1936 after fifteen years of bloody strife the question was turned over to a British Commission for study. The commission styled the situation "an irrepressible conflict" and proposed a plan of partition according to which Palestine was to be divided into three parts: the north and a long coastal strip was to be given to the Jews; the interior, together with a coastal strip down to Egypt, was to be joined to Arab Transjordan; and an area around the Holy Places was to be held by the British. Arabs and Jews alike violently denounced the plan. While the Jews felt that the territory allotted them would limit their expansion, the Arabs continued to stand on their demand for the whole country.

All this prompted a correspondent of the *London Times* to write that "between Jew and Arab the British official has sometimes found himself in the position of a third party whose attempts to prevent two neighbors from stoning each other merely bring him well under the fire from both."



CHAPTER NINE

Fascist Italy

THE RESURGENCE OF DICTATORSHIP

FEW things seemed better established at the beginning of World War I than the reign of democracy. After the French Revolution broke the ground through the destruction of the last relics of feudalism and by undermining the absolutist superstructure which had been erected during the previous centuries, representative government slowly took root and was well established in a number of states before the end of the nineteenth century. As the years went on, more and more people shared the conviction that it was only a question of time when free political institutions would be the rule everywhere; in fact, to many the triumph of political democracy seemed inevitable. Thus one may read in a Rectorial Address of 1876 to the students of Aberdeen University: "There is no use mincing the matter: unless the world goes back, democracy must go forward. The will of the people must more and more prevail." Near the turn of the century the historian Lecky declared: "I do not think that anyone who seriously considers the force and universality of the movement of our generation in the direction of democracy can doubt that this conception of government will necessarily, at least for a considerable time, dominate in all civilized countries." ¹ Just a few months before the outbreak of the war one of Italy's distinguished historians wrote: "The fruits of the French Revolution are still ripening. Everywhere the classes opposed to the aristocracy—tradespeople, artisans, and peasants—are organizing and taking an interest in public affairs. They are learning to read the papers and to make use of their political rights. They are beginning to demand explanations, to discuss and criticize those

¹ *Democracy and Liberty*, vol. 1 (1896), p. 212.

various forms of authority which formerly they blindly obeyed.”²

The conviction that popular government would soon be the order in all civilized countries was further fortified by World War I. The triumph of democracy throughout the world was, in fact, the moral aim of the war effort on the Allied side. As President Wilson put it in 1917: “Our object is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles.” Accordingly the Allies adopted as their battle cry the slogan, “Make the world safe for democracy.” And there was every indication that their efforts would be crowned with success. Not only did they win a crushing victory but the three dynasties (Romanov, Habsburg, and Hohenzollern) which had been widely regarded as bulwarks of reactionary absolutism vanished with undignified haste. It appeared as if nothing could prevent the complete triumph of democracy.

Nor did the immediate aftermath of the war arouse any fears for the future of democracy. No sooner did the war end than Europe broke into an orgy of constitution making. Among the states which adopted democratic constitutions during the years 1919 to 1922 were Germany, Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, and the Irish Free State. As late as 1920 Lord Bryce was still able to confirm his lifelong belief in popular government. “Seventy years ago,” he wrote, “the word Democracy awakened dislike or fear. Now it is a word of praise. Popular power is welcomed, extolled, worshiped.”³ But he also felt bound to utter a word of warning. “If it be improbable, yet it is not unthinkable,” he said, “that as in many countries impatience with tangible evils substituted democracy for monarchy or oligarchy, a like impatience might some day reverse the process.”

If Lord Bryce had lived but a few years longer, he would have seen his fears realized. The “improbable” happened not only in a single instance but on a wide scale. Just at the moment when the doctrine of democratic government appeared to be on the verge of a complete triumph in Europe a widespread autocratic reaction set in. It became in fact the outstanding political phenomenon of the period between the two wars. The first dictatorship was that which emerged from the Russian Revolution of 1917. To be sure, a democratic government, often called the Kerensky government, was the

² Guglielmo Ferrero in *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 111 (1913), p. 1.

³ *Modern Democracies*, vol. 1, p. 4.

first fruit of the revolution, but its existence was brief and precarious. Hardly six months later it gave way to the "dictatorship of the proletariat" which in practice resolved itself into the dictatorship of one man. Lenin, although a vigorous advocate of the transfer of all power to the people, found it necessary to establish a personal dictatorship "as a means of preparing the people for democracy." This was followed in 1922 by the Fascist march on Rome which established Mussolini as the dictator of Italy. In 1925 Mustapha Kemal (Kemal Atatürk) secularized the Ottoman state and initiated his autocratic rule. The next year saw Pilsudski become the dictator of Poland. Three years later King Alexander established a royal dictatorship in Yugoslavia. Then, in 1933, came the strokes whereby Hitler superseded the Weimar Constitution in Germany. Besides these major instances, partial or temporary dictatorships were established in a number of other countries. By 1934 the reaction was so widespread that it covered most of the ground which had been gained in the twentieth century.

It is interesting to observe that the countries in which dictatorships were established, e.g., Russia, Italy, Germany, and Spain, were those which had no previous record of a successful liberal or democratic government. On the other hand, the idea of dictatorship gained little popular support in such countries as England, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, and Belgium where liberal or democratic governments had functioned successfully for many years prior to the First World War. In the latter states the people had learned how to exercise the sovereignty, while in the former the masses were largely unprepared to work with success the complicated mechanism of a democratic constitution. Having been subject to monarchies for centuries they had not obtained sufficient apprenticeship. Furthermore, efficient democracy requires a certain standard of popular education, and these peoples were handicapped from the start by widespread illiteracy. In addition to the unpreparedness of the people the new democracies inherited problems that severely tested the mettle of the older democracies. These problems arose largely from the disintegrating effects of the war on the social, economic, and political structure. They included stabilization of the currency, reconversion of industries to peacetime purposes, providing employment for demobilized soldiers, liquidation of huge war debts, regaining old markets and opening new ones.

In many of the new states the parliamentary system failed conspicuously in its efforts to deal with the tremendous problems of reconstruction. The system of proportional representation, adopted

in most of the new monarchies, returned to the popular chamber a large number of small party groups, not one of which could hope to muster a majority. The result was an anarchy of conflicting groups and the chronic evil of ministerial instability. Cabinets were formed by coalitions, and few coalitions lasted long enough to achieve anything. Blocs, groups, and coalitions were formed and reformed like the shifting pieces of glass in a kaleidoscope. Under such conditions lawmaking degenerated into a *melée* of factional bickering while month after month passed with nothing achieved. Meanwhile extremists both of the right and left were busy fomenting further dissensions as a means of discrediting the existing governments. Socialists and communists, spurred on by the success of the Bolshevik Revolution, freely fed the flames of unrest by denouncing the *status quo* and offering a panacea for all the ills afflicting society. At the same time democratic government was subjected to a heavy barrage from the advocates of dictatorship on the right. More than this, they vigorously contested with clubs as well as with propaganda the claims and movements of the left. In their propaganda they played up especially the communist menace, thereby rallying large sections of the upper classes to their support. The parties of the right had been strong from the first because the revolutions had not been thoroughgoing enough in many countries to deprive the old antidemocratic forces of their former power. In Germany, Poland, and Hungary, for example, the power of the military caste, the nobility, the great landowners, and the old bureaucracy had remained practically untouched.

As confusion increased, the masses who in many countries had accepted democratic institutions with tremendous enthusiasm began to regard them with constantly diminishing respect. Democratic performance was weighed against democratic promise and found wanting. Many began to feel that democratic government had failed not only in internal affairs but also in raising their respective nations in the world's regard. This, for instance, was the feeling in Italy and Germany before dictatorship emerged. Prospective dictators were not slow to promise that this feeling would be assuaged. In general, they lavishly made extravagant promises to everybody. They appealed to mass emotions with military displays, striking uniforms, badges, and insignia. While some among the masses put faith in the promises and actively supported the autocratic movements, others supinely permitted dictators to foist an authoritarian government upon them. Thus was ushered in the day of the dictators.

The new dictatorships were of different forms; but whether they

were monarchical (Yugoslavia), presidential (Turkey), military (Poland and Spain) or whether their stated philosophy was Nazi or Fascist, all showed a striking similarity in governmental technique. Whereas the inalienable rights of the individual are the guiding motives of democracy, the supremacy of the state was the basic principle of the new dictatorships. The democratic attitude toward the individual has been stated as follows: "Man is a creature of God. The state is a creature of man. It follows that the state exists for the sake of man and not man for the sake of the state. . . . The state is a means and not an end."⁴ In contrast the new dictatorships asserted the Hegelian tradition that the state is an end in itself and man but a means. "The state is everything—man is nothing but an atom or a cell in this higher superhuman structure." In the latter states the ordinary citizen not only had nothing to say about the government or the laws under which he lived but he was also completely deprived of protection against acts of force by the agents of the state. Although most of the dictators, including Hitler and Mussolini, claimed that they were serving group interests and were acting as servants of the people, the state each established was little more than the apparatus of one party which comprised a minority, usually a small minority, of the nation. This minority absorbed the functions of the state and used it to achieve party ends.

For centuries it had been customary for most governments of the Western world to limit their supervision to such things as the administration of justice, police and military protection, the care of roads—in short, to the broader aspects of life. But the new dictatorships absorbed and monopolized all powers and directed all activities of individuals and groups. In other words, they were totalitarian. And the means employed by each dictator to make his state totalitarian was the party. It was this, among other things, which differentiated the new dictatorships from those of preceding periods. Neither the Roman emperors nor the dictators of the succeeding centuries up to the opening of World War I had at their command a hand-picked and highly disciplined party upon which they could rely to make their rule an all-absorbing one. Consequently Stalin and Hitler could be and were more totalitarian in their rule than the Caesars, Napoleons, Romanovs, or Hohenzollerns ever were. No sooner did one of the new dictators rise to a commanding position in the state than the dictatorial party proceeded to disband and outlaw all other parties. Gradually trade unions, industrialists, capitalists, banks, churches, education, youth organizations, the courts,

⁴ Coudenhove-Kalegi, *The Totalitarian State against Man* (1938), p. 15 ff.

the cinema, broadcasting—in fact, every phase of life—were subjected to the strict control of the party. Thereafter, there was no longer anything like “private life.” As the Nazi Dr. Ley put it: “There is no such thing as a private individual in National Socialist Germany.” The state, for example, decided whether a citizen might marry, whom he might marry, the kind of wedding ring he might give his bride, whether he might have children, which names he might give them, and how he must bring them up. In short, the life of every individual was regulated down to the minutest detail. Anyone who refused to bend under the totalitarian yoke was speedily and remorselessly crushed.



POSTWAR ITALY

The origins of Italian Fascism were very different from those of Bolshevism. Whereas the latter gained its opportunity as the result of a series of military reverses, Fascism was the offspring of disappointed national victory. To understand the postwar state of mind in Italy one must remember that when the war broke out in 1914 and during the months that followed, the masses of Italy had no desire to fight. The old-fashioned conservatives and a majority of socialists and Catholics were at one in opposing Italy's entry and were supported in their stand by most members of the middle class and by the workers. But there was a powerful, if small, group in favor of war. This group included the army officers and those nationalists who saw in the war an opportunity for Italian expansion. Their cause was strengthened by lavish promises of territory on the part of the Allies if the Italian government would put its military strength against the Central Powers. An agreement was finally drawn up (the secret Treaty of London) and in May, 1915, a reluctant parliament declared war. The following months saw the Italians pay a heavy price. Besides disabling a large number of youths, the war claimed the lives of about 600,000 Italian soldiers. It also drained the meagre resources of the state, leaving it with a debt of over twelve billion dollars. For their sacrifices the people reaped little in the way of glory, for the defeat at Caporetto was so disastrous that it cast a shadow over the final triumph. The one thing that buoyed up Italian hope was the promise of extensive territory and of better times.

But the settlement shattered the first of these hopes. When the spoils were divided, there was deep disappointment and indignation because Italy's share was so small. While France helped herself to

253,000 square miles with more than six million inhabitants and Great Britain obtained 989,000 square miles with a population of over nine millions, Italy's share was only 23,726 square miles with 1,672,000 inhabitants. Although Italy did obtain most of her claims on the eastern shore of the Adriatic, both Dalmatia—the most important of the territories promised her—and Fiume were denied her through President Wilson's veto. Later the Italians did, it is true, obtain Fiume, but for this they were indebted rather to D'Annunzio than to their allies in the war. The fact that they did not receive all the territory they had been promised in the Treaty of London made them feel that their efforts were not appreciated by the Allies. What mattered most to the Italians was that the dream of the Adriatic as a *mare clausum* had failed to materialize. It was principally for this that they had entered the war. While the peace conference was still in session mobs milling about in the streets of Rome shouted "Death to Wilson" and demanded that he return the model of the she-wolf suckling Romulus and Remus which had been presented to him on his visit to Rome a few months previously.

The promise of better times also remained unfulfilled. At the end of the war Italy's finances were in a state of chaos, her trade was badly dislocated, and her railways in confusion. More than this, in the months that followed, conditions became progressively worse. To stimulate the fighting spirit of the troops lavish promises of economic reform had been made during the war. When the soldiers were demobilized, they demanded that the promises be fulfilled. The greatest grievance was the constant rise in the cost of living. Although prices had gone up as much as 300 to 400 per cent, wages had not risen in proportion. Such bread as the masses could buy was of the poorest quality, and other articles of everyday consumption were both high and scarce. Lodgings were practically unobtainable in many towns. In the agrarian districts discontent was as prevalent as in the towns and cities. During the war there had been much talk about expropriating the land for the peasants. Upon their return from the war they insisted on their rights to the land; and when the government did nothing, peasants in the south seized a number of estates. Thus dissatisfaction and irritation pervaded most grades of Italian society. Everyone except the profiteers and some munitions workers was worse off than before the war. On all sides the general discontent vented itself in labor strikes and agrarian uprisings.

The government, to which the people looked for relief, was so

weak and disorganized that it exercised little effective authority. Having had little to do with politics the average man had not become politically conscious by 1870, when Italy was united on the basis of a monarchical constitution. In the following decades, various factors prevented the participation of the masses in politics. First, in 1871, the year of the first census after unification, the rate of illiteracy in Italy as a whole was 68.8 per cent. In Sicily and Sardinia the percentage was as high as 85. Although the government did much during the subsequent period to foster education, nearly half the population was still illiterate in 1911. Second, when the Italian state was founded, the pope ordered the Italians to ignore it. The order, it is true, was not obeyed by all, but it did exclude many from political life.⁵ The result was that the whole government, national and local, was controlled by the bureaucracy and a small section of the wealthier classes, with the actual control exercised by political bosses. In the Chamber of Deputies there were no strong parties with definite principles, only small coteries whose delicate shadings of opinion were unintelligible to the man in the street. It became the goal of politics to combine enough of these groups to obtain a majority. Such coalitions usually fell apart very soon, causing ministries to rise and fall in rapid succession. During the years from 1918 to 1922 five almost equally weak cabinets were overthrown. Parliament was always starting and stopping, never arriving at a real solution of the problems confronting it. Under such conditions it was clear that the future belonged to a strong party with a remedial program.

During the months immediately after the war two parties made a bid for power, the Catholic People's Party and the socialists. As soon as fighting ceased, Don Sturzo, a Sicilian priest, recruited a large number of priests and Catholic laymen with more or less socialist leanings, as the nucleus of the People's Party. Although Catholic, it was not clerical, and it offered a program of both patriotic and radical reform. In the first election (1919) it scored a startling success in returning ninety-nine deputies to the Chamber. But its influence soon declined because of inner disagreements and its equivocal position to both nationalism and the church.

A much stronger bid for power was made by the socialists. The members of this party were recruited chiefly from the workers in factories, the railway, postal, and telegraph employees, and the agricultural laborers of the Po Valley, with a sprinkling of university

⁵ In 1901 Pope Pius X decreed that Roman Catholics could vote at such elections as the bishop of the diocese considered desirable.

students and middle-class intelligentsia. Already a powerful force in politics before the war, the socialists strengthened their influence by consistently opposing Italy's entry into the war. After the war the membership of the party was reinforced by many disillusioned ex-service men. In addition, the success of the Russian Revolution stirred the party to life. As a result it was able to return 156 deputies to the Chamber in the election of 1919, but it still lacked efficient leadership and a fighting party spirit. Such leaders as it had were moderate men who accepted the monarchy and were willing to work through parliament. Seldom did a party show less sense of opportunity. Had it shown a bold front and mustered all the potential forces available in a comprehensive program of revolution, it could easily have taken over the country. Under existing conditions its propaganda met with a ready response, and even its enemies were resigned to a proletarian revolution. But the socialists were badly divided in regard to both program and tactics. More than this, many of the things they did served only to foment a conservative reaction.

In the late summer of 1920 it seemed to them that the time for action had come. Taking advantage of a lockout in the metal industries, some 600,000 workers proceeded, without striking a blow, to occupy the factories of northern Italy, principally of Lombardy and Piedmont. Helmeted and armed, they occupied the factories without the least resistance from the employers, the police, or the government. Many peasants, encouraged by the success of the workers, took it upon themselves to seize the land they were cultivating. Both steps were taken with such suddenness and ease that many unthinking partisans believed all land and industry would henceforth become the property of the workers. But the factory owners did not concur. Firmly refusing to cooperate with the movement, they left the management of the industries to the workers. In three weeks conditions reached a stage of confusion which compelled the socialists to confess failure. The workers marched out as they had marched in, and the employers again took possession. The great coup toward which all propaganda had been directed, ended in a fiasco. From that moment Italian socialism began to decline.



THE GENESIS OF FASCISM

Meanwhile, outside parliament, there had arisen a new organization, the Fascist⁶ Party which was destined soon to dominate Italy.

⁶ From the Latin word "fascēs" which signified the bundle of rods carried by the Roman lictors. The word originally meant "banded together."

This party, in turn, became the instrument of personal power for its creator, Benito Mussolini. Born in 1883 as the son of a blacksmith in a small village of the Romagna region, Benito early absorbed many of his father's socialist ideas. His mother, who was a primary school teacher, wished her son to enter the same profession, but he did not display much interest in his studies. As he later put it: "I had no real hunger for scholastic endeavor." At the age of nineteen he did teach school for a year. Finding the work monotonous, he set out for Switzerland at the end of the term. There, in his own words, he did "whatever came to hand." He worked for some time as a casual laborer and finally obtained employment on a socialist newspaper. In Switzerland, at the time the refuge of socialist and radical leaders, he met among other outstanding personalities Nicolai Lenin who was then an exile from Russia. During this period Mussolini read, if not systematically at least cursorily, the writings of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Georges Sorel, and Machiavelli. In his spare time he also attended some lectures at the University of Lausanne and was particularly impressed by Pareto's lectures on political economy. But his radical opinions and revolutionary activities caused him to be banished from one canton after another. In 1905 he was back in Italy, where he began to serve the term of military training which he had previously evaded.

After this brief term Mussolini resumed his career of socialist journalist. In 1908 he went to Trent, then under Austrian rule, where he worked on the staff of several papers. However, his radical opinions and revolutionary activities soon caused his arrest and expulsion from Austria. In Italy he continued his socialist activity, eventually becoming editor of *Avanti* (*Forward*), the principal organ of the Italian Socialist Party. In this paper he excoriated nationalism, militarism, war, religion, the power of the state—in short, most of the things he later exalted. His antireligious sentiment vented itself in such statements as "God does not exist." For his anti-militarist activities he was arrested in 1911 and released only after an imprisonment of five months. The crisis of his life came during the First World War. Although opposed to Italy's entrance on the side of the Central Powers, he soon began to advocate intervention on the side of the Allies. In a speech at Parma in December, 1914, he said: "It is necessary to act, to move, to fight and, if necessary, to die. Neutrals have never dominated events. They have always gone under. It is blood that moves the wheels of history." His stand evoked such a storm of socialist criticism that he resigned his editorship, after which he was expelled from the party. Undaunted,

he denounced his erstwhile comrades, telling them that he would bring about a real revolution; then he founded a newspaper of his own, *Il Popolo d'Italia*,⁷ which played an important role in swinging Italian opinion toward war. Late in 1915 he volunteered for active service, serving as a private until he was painfully wounded by the explosion of a trench mortar in February, 1917. Upon his recovery he was released from the army and at once resumed his turbulent part in Italian politics.

No sooner was the war over than Mussolini recognized his opportunity and threw himself into the task of founding a party which would launch him into power. The official birthday of the Fascist movement was March 23, 1919. On that day a group of about a hundred Fascists met at Milan, in answer to a summons sounded by *Il Popolo d'Italia*, to form the first of the *Fasci di Combattimento*.⁸ The first Fascist program, like that of the socialists, aimed at a workers' republic and demanded such immediate measures as a tax on capital amounting to partial expropriation of all wealth and confiscation of all the possessions of religious communities. This program was, however, gradually modified until its original radical character was completely obscured. Scarcely two years after its birth Fascism underwent a whole revolution from radical to conservative. Adopting as its slogan the words, "Per l'Italia" (For Italy), it offered a mixed program in which those who were suffering from post-war discontent might find pickings to their taste. Mussolini also sought to satisfy the Italian thirst for the theatrical and spectacular by adopting a distinctive uniform and the Roman salute and by staging colorful parades. The result was that people from all sides joined the Fascist ranks. Fascism gradually pervaded the bureaucracy, the police, the courts, and the army. Meanwhile industrialists who feared the socialists and hoped the Fascists would regiment the workers, subsidized the new movement. By February, 1921, Mussolini had perhaps 100,000 followers.

Very early Mussolini organized his followers into a disciplined army of Black Shirts, with its general staff, its officers and ranks, its code of discipline, and its decorations. The first article in the code stated baldly that the Fascist Party was, above all, a "militia." This militia, putting emphasis on action rather than on ideas, at once declared war on the socialists. Groups of Fascists armed with sticks and revolvers went about destroying the printing presses of their opponents, breaking up public meetings, and beating strikers into

⁷ This paper later became the principal organ of Fascist expression.

⁸ Literally "fighting groups." The name was later applied to the local cells of the party.

submission. As early as April, 1919, hooligan bands attacked the offices of *Avanti*, the socialist daily, sacked it, and set it on fire. As the movement grew stronger, the Fascisti created a veritable terror throughout the length and breadth of Italy. The trade unions were systematically smashed and opponents of the Fascist movement were savagely beaten. Where they encountered stubborn resistance, the Fascists did not hesitate to resort to assassination. In this conflict between Fascists and socialists the total toll of human life ran into hundreds. Toward all this the government affected an air of neutrality in which a certain leaning towards the Fascists could soon be detected. Before long they succeeded in infecting the bureaucracy, the army, and the navy to such an extent that the government did not dare to challenge their power even if it had wished to do so.

The successful skirmishes with the socialists attracted many new recruits, so that by October, 1922, the Fascisti numbered about 300,000. With socialism crushed, it remained for them to capture the state. On October 24, 1922, Mussolini before a general congress of Fascisti at Naples openly called upon the government either to settle the most urgent problems of internal and external policy or to resign and hand over the administration to the Fascist Party. "Either the government will be given to us," he stated, "or we shall seize it by marching on Rome." During the night of October 27 bands of Fascists seized public buildings and railway stations, and raided munitions depots in northern Italy; then they began the "march on Rome." On the morning of the 28th some ten thousand Fascists armed with revolvers and sticks arrived in Rome. Fascist historians later made much of this incident, but they failed to point out that Mussolini instead of "marching" rode into Rome in a railroad sleeping car. When prime minister Facta finally decided to invoke martial law, Victor Emmanuel III, among the weakest of kings, refused to sign the decree. As soon as this became known to the Fascists they hurried to Rome in larger numbers. Thoroughly frightened by this development, the king asked Mussolini to form a new ministry. Thus Mussolini became premier.



ENTRENCHMENT IN POWER

When the king asked Mussolini to form a new cabinet, there were only thirty-five Fascist deputies in the Chamber. It was therefore necessary for the Duce (the leader), as Mussolini was now called, to take ten non-Fascists into his cabinet as against four Fascists. The ten included representatives of the Nationalist, "Demo-

cratic," and Catholic People's parties. Only the socialists refused to collaborate. In addition to being premier, Mussolini retained in his own hands the portfolios of both Home and Foreign Offices. On November 16 he laid his program before the Chamber and asked for unlimited power until the end of 1923. He stated that if the Chamber did not grant it, he would act without regard for the constitutional power of parliament. On November 25 the Chamber voted him and the new cabinet the plenary power by a vote of 275 to 90. Only the socialists had the courage to vote against him.

Once installed in power it became the primary concern of the Fascist regime to consolidate its position and to maintain itself in office at all costs. One of Mussolini's first cares was to build up sufficient armed strength to overawe the opposition, which was by no means quiescent. To strengthen the army and also his own hold on the army, he raised its peacetime strength from 175,000 to 275,000. But knowing that many of the officers had no desire to participate in the suppression of the anti-Fascists, he organized his followers into a well-trained militia, the members of which took the oath of fidelity not to the king but to him. To this militia was intrusted the task of terrorizing the opponents of Fascism. Next Mussolini proceeded to strengthen the Fascist hold on the administration by weeding out non-Fascists. Pressure was exerted upon municipalities to dismiss mayors and councilors who were not sympathetic to the cause and to put proved Fascists in their places. With equal thoroughness all the government services, particularly the police departments, were purged and restaffed. This not only assured control of the administration to the Fascist Party but also rewarded those who had supported the cause and were now clamoring for jobs.

Meanwhile the militia or Fascist bands were ruthlessly trampling down all opposition on the principle enunciated by Mussolini, "If consent fails, there is always force." At first the full fury was turned against the socialists because they dared to oppose the Fascist rule; but when the power of the socialists was weakened, the militia turned against others who were unsympathetic. While some were forced to drink large quantities of castor oil to "purge" them of their erroneous ideas, others were beaten, had their homes wrecked, or were put to the dagger. During the period from November, 1922, to October, 1923, there were more than two thousand cases of assault, arson, and murder. Among the victims were many outstanding leaders of thought and culture. In 1923, for example, the houses of Benedetto Croce, Italy's most prominent philosopher, and Fran-

cesco Nitti, the ex-prime minister and a noted scholar, were destroyed. Non-Fascist newspapers and their representatives were the special target of the attacks. Often the correspondents of these papers were set upon in public, or the sale of the papers was prevented by force. Later newspaper buildings were stormed, printing presses were smashed, and the buildings were often set on fire. Thus Mussolini and his Fascists tried to cow their critics into silence by methods that Machiavelli would have understood and admired. It was all in accord with Mussolini's statement: "I believe that Machiavelli is still the best guide in politics."

No amount of coercion, however, could allay unsympathetic opinion, particularly in the Chamber. The hostility there was in fact growing stronger, for the representatives of the Catholic People's Party had joined the opposition in April, 1923. Since it was essential for the Fascists to control a majority in the Chamber, they devised a plan to attain it. Fascist leaders framed a new electoral law which guaranteed two thirds of the seats to the party receiving the largest number of votes. The bill encountered strong resistance but was finally passed. Before the end of the year, at which time his dictatorial power was to terminate, Mussolini obtained the king's signature to a decree which dissolved the Chamber and made a new election necessary. During the campaign, opposition parties were forbidden to hold public meetings or to distribute electioneering literature. Furthermore, Fascist organs not only stigmatized all political adversaries as traitors but also heaped scorn on Fascists who ventured to hold dissenting opinions. Despite all this, the opposition parties polled three million votes in the election held in April, 1924, against the four and one-half million cast for the Fascists. But the latter did, of course, receive a majority of the seats, a fact which enormously strengthened Mussolini's hands.

Nevertheless, Mussolini still had to face a strong minority in the Chamber. One of the most courageous of his opponents was Matteotti, a young socialist deputy. Having previously published a scathing indictment of Fascist rule, Matteotti now (May 30, 1924) made a speech in the Chamber in which he contested the validity of the Fascist majority, thereby signing, as it were, his own death warrant. A few days later he was seized in the streets of Rome, taken into the country, and murdered. The news of the murder caused great excitement, and the anti-Fascist press was not slow to state that Mussolini was the instigator of the crime. Not until nearly two years later were the murderers brought to trial and then in a small provincial town. To allay public indignation three

of them were sentenced to six years of penal servitude; but they were released two months later.

During the following period the Fascists carried on a relentless campaign to prevent expression of opposition to their rule and to concentrate all power in their hands. Freedom of the press, which had already been restricted after the Matteotti murder, was now completely abrogated by the suppression of all opposition newspapers. A law promulgated in 1925 abolished elected councils in all municipalities of not more than 5000 inhabitants, entrusting their administration to officials nominated by the government. This law terminated free local government in 80.2 per cent of the municipalities. A short time later a decree supplanted municipal self-government in Rome by an administration in the hands of government appointees. In May, 1926, a law called the Legal Discipline of Collective Labor Relations Act was passed which decreed in effect that only Fascist organizations were to be recognized. Thus all anti-Fascist unions were deprived of their legal right to exist. Late in the preceding year parliament had also passed a law which greatly extended the power of the premier by prescribing that "no question can be included in the agenda of the Senate or Chamber without the consent of the premier." This meant that the Chamber could no longer even take notice of a bill introduced by one of its members unless it had Mussolini's approval. The law also gave the premier the power to have passed any law he wished, even if the opinion of the Chamber was unfavorable. Finally, this law, by making the premier responsible solely to the king, made his continuance in office independent of an adverse vote of the Chamber.

Since it was the aim of the Fascist state to be absolute master over all aspects of life, it also extended its control over economic processes. On the whole, the government abstained from a direct share in industrial enterprises, but it did make certain that all economic activities served the interests of the state. Control was achieved through the organization of associations or syndicates of employers and employees, the special purpose of which was to deal with disputes between capital and labor. The employees in every branch of industry were expected to form such an organization and if it was "recognized" by the state it could enter into collective bargaining which was binding for all engaged in that industry. Equally the employers in each industry were expected to form an association which after being "recognized" by the government could enter into agreements with the employees. In order to be recognized an organization of employees or employers had to include 10 per cent

of those engaged in a specific industry. While there was no definite obligation on the part of any employee or employer to join, both, whether they joined or not, were bound to accept the agreements in regard to wages and conditions of labor which the "recognized" associations made. Furthermore, nonmembers no less than members had to pay dues. Only one "recognized" association was permitted for each trade or industry. Thus the old trade unions were outlawed. Trade-union leaders who sought to continue the old organizations were imprisoned or deported. In this way their power was gradually broken.

Both the employers' associations and employees' syndicates were directed by officers appointed by the government. The control, however, weighed more heavily on the employees because of the close relationship between many of the large employers and the Fascist hierarchy. In the syndicates only minor posts were filled by rank and file members. In other words, the role of the employees was largely restricted to paying dues and obeying orders. They could not resort to strikes or lockouts, for lockouts as well as strikes were styled "crimes against the public economy." All labor disputes had to be settled by arbitration. If the employers' and employees' associations of any industry failed to reach an agreement, the dispute was referred to an industrial court (established by law of April 3, 1926). It was the duty of the court while hearing a case to persuade the parties to come to a friendly settlement, but if they did not the court's decision was binding.



MUSSOLINI AS ABSOLUTE RULER OF ITALY

Thus the Fascist party penetrated into every crevice of the polity, absorbing all the functions of government in accordance with their slogan, "All power to Fascism." Mussolini became as nearly absolute as human ingenuity could make him. As premier of Italy, president of the Fascist Grand Council, and Leader or "Duce" of the Fascist Party, he was master of the political, economic, and social framework of the country. Few men have ever held more absolute power. His cabinet was little more than a group of officials chosen to carry out his will. He could not only prevent the Senate and Chamber from discussing laws that were not to his liking; he could also make laws on his own responsibility if circumstances implied "an urgent necessity." Furthermore, since the command of the army and navy had been transferred from the king to him, he could declare a state of siege without first getting the approval of king or Chamber. Nor



Press Association

BOYS OF THE FASCIST YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS PARADING BEFORE IL DUCE

was there a constitutional organ which could limit his autocracy. The last semblance of a parliament expressive of the popular will was wiped out by a law of May 17, 1928, which made the entire kingdom a single constituency returning four hundred deputies. These were chosen in the following manner: the Corporations of Employees and Employers, presided over by Mussolini's nominees, submitted a list of candidates from which the Grand Council, composed of Mussolini's appointees and friends, chose four hundred candidates⁹ whose names were then presented to the voters for approval. Since only one list was submitted, the electorate could vote either "yes" or "no" upon the ticket as a whole. And the number of those who dared invoke upon themselves the wrath of the Fascists by casting a negative vote was small.

Within the party, which was the only one permitted to exist, all power emanated either directly or indirectly from Mussolini. Every individual upon becoming a member had to take an oath which bound him "to obey without question the commands of the Duce." Next to the Duce the highest authority was the Grand Council, of which Mussolini was chairman. It included, among others, the members of the Cabinet, those who had won public recognition for their services to the revolution and any others who might be nominated to it by Mussolini. Just below the Grand Council was the National Directorate, which constituted the executive branch of the party. Each province also had a Provincial Directorate and a party secretary. Farther down were the local cells, *Fasci di Combattimento*, under the leadership of an appointed secretary and an advisory committee. The militia was composed of about 400,000 selected men who were the recipients of special favors. In 1930 the party consisted of approximately a million members out of a population of about forty-two million. At first every Italian was eligible for membership, but after 1925, with the exception of a few honorary appointments, no one was permitted to become a member unless he had worked his way up through the youth organizations, *Balilla* and *Avanguardia*.¹⁰

The student who looks for a constructive program or a consistent body of principles in Fascism will be disappointed. From the beginning it stressed action rather than theory. Mussolini himself stated that when he organized the first *Fascio di Combattimento*

⁹ The Grand Council had the right to substitute candidates of its own if it so desired.

¹⁰ The *Balilla*, composed of boys under fourteen, was a military adaptation of the Boy Scout movement. The members of the *Avanguardia* were, in turn, recruited from the *Balilla*. There were also organizations for girls.

"I had no specific doctrinal attitude in my mind. . . . My own doctrine, even in this period, had always been a doctrine of action." The simple truth is that when the opportunity presented itself for a party with a bold and determined leader to ride to power, Mussolini seized that opportunity with alacrity. Action was based on the philosophy, "Get in power and stay there." Everything else was secondary. Instead of setting any goals, the Fascists attempted to solve only specific problems. As the slogan, "*Per l'Italia*," shows, the primary accent was put on patriotism. Said Mussolini some months before the march on Rome, "Fascism should demand that within the frontiers there no longer be Venetians, Romagnoles, Tuscans, Sicilians, Sardinians, but Italians, only Italians." The only thing the Fascists definitely promised was to free Italy from the menace of Bolshevism.¹¹ Nor did the frightened industrialists, financiers, and professional people who gathered round the Fascist standard ask for more. So far as the party had principles, they were largely negative; it opposed all the basic ideas of the liberal democratic state.

It was only after the Fascists were installed in power that some of the leaders, and particularly Mussolini himself, felt the need of a philosophy to justify their actions and to create unity of thought in their ranks. Hence they set about the construction of a philosophy. The core of the Fascist myth is the Hegelian dogma of the state as the ethical whole. "Fascism conceives of the state as an absolute," Mussolini wrote, "in comparison with which all individuals or groups are relative, only to be conceived of in their relation to the state." Thus Fascism rejected individualism and regarded the individual merely as an incident in the life of the state. Like socialism it put the community before the individual. According to this doctrine the individual can attain self-realization only through subjection to authority. The duties of the individual were summed up in a slogan which was displayed everywhere in Italy, "*Credere, obbedire, combattere* (believe, obey, fight)." Democracy had no place in the Fascist state. In the words of Mussolini, "Fascism combats the whole complex system of democratic ideology and repudiates it. . . . Fascism denies that the majority by the simple fact that it is a majority can direct human society." The great mass of citizens, according to Fascist theory, are incapable of governing themselves; hence this task devolves on "the chosen few" who have the peculiar gift. Even this elite group needs a man who can "crystallize its ideals." This was the theoretical justification of Mussolini's rule.

Finally Fascism, as stated by Mussolini, "believes neither in the

¹¹ The fact is that Bolshevism was at the time no longer a menace.

possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace. It thus repudiates the doctrine of pacifism—born of renunciation of the struggle and an act of cowardice in the face of sacrifice. War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of approval upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it. Thus a doctrine which is founded upon this harmful postulate of peace is hostile to Fascism." In other words, Fascism regarded violence as a virtue.



FASCISM IN ACTION

Under the Fascist regime there was improvement in a number of respects. For example, it made some progress in the creation of order and discipline so that there was greater safety for life and property throughout the nation. Some improvements were also made in urban cleanliness, public health, and sanitation. Since the spheres in which improvement took place were limited, foreign correspondents frequently wrote about the decrease in the number of beggars, the better service in the hotels, and the more punctual train service. A more important accomplishment was a careful survey of all the resources of the country, which led to the discovery of hitherto unknown mineral deposits and other natural wealth. The government also gave special attention to the development of water power, with the result that the manufacture and use of electricity was nearly tripled. Electric power was applied to many industries, many miles of new electric railways were constructed, and many miles of already existing railways were electrified.

The first four years of the dictatorship were a period of prosperity, but the prosperity was more apparent than real. It was a by-product of inflation. The lira, which had stood at 21.2 to a dollar in 1922, gradually fell until in August, 1926, it reached a low point of 30.5 to a dollar. During this period foreign merchants were able to buy cheaply in the Italian market because the exchange rate favored them. As a result of increased foreign trade, employment ratios rose and wages increased. But despite the determined effort of the government to keep them down, prices rose much more than the income of the wage earner. In 1926 at the insistence of Mussolini the lira was stabilized at approximately 20 per cent above the franc. This stabilization on a high level had an unfavorable effect on foreign trade. Exports slumped badly, forcing manufacturers to curtail production, which in turn caused unemployment. Wages, which had already fallen in 1925 and 1926, were systematically forced down by the government in the succeeding period. For example, in October, 1927,

a reduction of 10 per cent was imposed. Despite Mussolini's assurance that the government would permit no further reduction, the rate continued to fall.

Then toward the end of 1929 came the world economic crisis that followed upon the Wall Street crash. Mussolini's statement that "the American crisis in the fall of 1929 exploded like a bomb" was an exaggeration. The Duce was too eager to place upon it the blame for a decline which in Italy had started several years earlier. The whole machinery of Fascist propaganda worked overtime to convince the workers that if conditions were bad in Italy they were vastly worse in other countries. Actually the immediate effect of the crash was less severe than in other countries; but the longer the depression continued, the more the early advantage was swept away. Wages continued to decline and unemployment increased. It has been estimated that during the period from 1926 to 1934 wages in the main industries were reduced between 40 and 50 per cent. During the same period agricultural wages suffered a reduction of 50 to 70 per cent. Since the price level was not lowered to any corresponding degree, the result was that by 1934 purchasing power had declined by at least one third, a decline that was further aggravated by increasing taxation. At the beginning of 1935 unemployment, expressed in percentage of the population, was heavier in Italy than in most of Europe. Even the vaunted schemes of public works had slowed down. The condition of the country in general was so serious that there were ominous rumblings of revolt. In short, Fascism had not solved Italy's problem. It failed to provide the economic progress and material security which it had promised and for which it had demanded the sacrifice of individual liberties.

If the Fascist regime failed to raise living standards, it did introduce some improvements into agriculture. It continued the policy of mechanization and of making agricultural education more popular as well as more scientific. Some of the old estates were broken up into small plots which the peasants could buy through long-term payments. But the most marked achievement in agriculture was the reclamation of land. Italy had only about 120,000 square miles, on which about 40 million inhabitants lived. Of this land about one third was marsh or land otherwise unfit for cultivation. Although production had shown a steady rise as a result of the introduction of scientific agriculture, the government could not hope to become independent of foreign sources of supply unless it put more land under cultivation. To do this necessitated the draining of vast stretches of marshland. Not that there was anything new or revolu-

tionary in such a reclamation program. Since 1860 many major tasks of reclamation had been completed by private capital and the government had also appropriated large funds for this purpose. It is estimated that between 1860 and 1922 no less than 597,000 hectares (one hectare is equivalent to 2.471 acres) had been drained. Thus the Fascist program, when viewed historically, was but an extension of one inaugurated previously.

Another achievement of Mussolini's government was the working agreement he concluded with the Roman Catholic Church. During his days as a socialist Mussolini had been an open opponent of religion. It was to him "a psychic malaise of the brain" and "an institution which strives toward political power in order to maintain the exploitation and ignorance of the people." Nor did his attitude change for some time after he stepped out of the socialist ranks. Even in his first Fascist program he proposed the nationalization of church property. It was only after he became premier that he began to adopt a milder tone toward religion. In Italy the papacy and the state had been estranged for fifty-nine years. When the Italian army formally invested the Holy City in 1870, the pope (Pius IX), as a protest against the "despoliation" of the church, voluntarily became the "Prisoner of the Vatican" and announced that neither he nor his successors would ever leave it again until Italy had repaired the wrong that had been done. He also issued the famous *Non expedit*, which forbade all good Roman Catholics to participate in Italian politics. The *Non expedit* was withdrawn early in the twentieth century, but the pope still remained the prisoner of the Vatican. Mussolini, upon becoming premier, very soon realized, as Napoleon had more than a century earlier, that the support of the church would greatly strengthen his position. Hence he began wooing the Vatican by devotion to Catholicism in public, by restoring the crucifix to the schoolrooms throughout Italy, and by introducing religious education into the schools under church supervision. In 1926 he went so far as to open secret negotiations with a view to arranging a settlement of the "Roman Question." After protracted negotiations agreement was finally reached in the Lateran treaty which was signed in February, 1929.

This treaty was actually composed of three documents: a political treaty, a financial convention, and a concordat. The political treaty set up Vatican City as a sovereign state and formally recognized the pope's exclusive jurisdiction over it, including his right to enter into direct diplomatic relations with other states. The Holy See, for its part, solemnly recognized Italy as a legitimate kingdom

under the House of Savoy, with Rome as its capital. By the terms of the financial convention Italy agreed to pay the Holy See 750 million lire in 5 per cent government bonds. This was accepted as complete settlement of the obligations incurred in 1870 when the government took possession of the Papal States. The final document, the concordat, regulated the relations of church and state within the kingdom. Among other things, it made Roman Catholicism the official religion, recognized the legal existence of monastic orders and their right to own property, provided that the religious ceremony of marriage should also be binding in the eyes of the law, and made religious instruction compulsory in both elementary and secondary schools except by the express wish of the parents. On the other hand, the Vatican agreed that every new bishop would swear not to enter into any agreement or take part in any public meeting that might be in any way detrimental to the state.

The Lateran treaty, it was hoped, had removed the last misunderstandings between the papacy and the Italian government. Gratified by the accord, the clergy urged their parishioners to vote for the government list, with the result that an overwhelming number of affirmative votes were cast in the March elections (8,519,559 voted "yes" and only 135,761 "no"). In July Pope Pius XI emerged into the Square of St. Peter's. As for Mussolini himself, his personal prestige was greatly enhanced by the solution of the "insoluble Roman question."

But early hopes for cordial cooperation between the Vatican and the government were not fulfilled. The two were soon at odds over the interpretation of the agreements. The pope, for example, interpreted the marriage clause to mean that anyone who had been baptized in the Catholic faith would be required by the state to be married by the church. Mussolini, however, made it clear that any subject of the state was at liberty to adopt either the religious or the civil ceremony, according to the dictates of his conscience. Another point of disagreement arose over Mussolini's statement that freedom of discussion and conscience would be permitted in matters of religion and that all forms of worship would be freely allowed. To this the pope replied: "It is clearly and loyally understood that the Catholic religion and the Catholic religion alone is the state religion, with all the logical and juridical consequences that the state implies." In the same open letter he said in reference to Mussolini: "We certainly never expected to hear heretical and worse than heretical expressions about the very essence of Christianity and Catholicism."

One of the most serious disagreements was on the question of education. While the pope, in conformity with Catholic doctrine, maintained that the education of the young was mainly or exclusively the business of the church, Mussolini had other ideas. In presenting the Lateran treaty to the Chamber for ratification he made it quite clear that he did not propose to entrust the task of educating the children of Italy to the church. "Any other regime than ours," he declared, "may believe it useful to renounce the education of the young generations. In this field I am intractable. Education must be ours. Our children must be educated in our religious faith, but we must round out this education and we need to give our youths a sense of virility and the power of conquest." A short time later the pope seized the opportunity in addressing the pupils of a Jesuit school to state: "We can never agree to anything that compresses, decreases, or denies the rights which nature and God gave the family and the church in the field of education." During the subsequent period both sides reiterated their ideas, and the deadlock remained complete.

Another significant change brought about by the Fascist regime was that affecting the administration of education. Great progress had been made during the period from 1870 to the outbreak of World War I toward wiping out the widespread illiteracy, but much still remained to be done, particularly in southern Italy. In many of the agricultural districts of the South not only schools but also the desire for education was lacking. Many peasants, shepherds, fishermen, and the like considered reading and writing a luxury which their children could well forego. When the extent of the existing illiteracy was brought home to the government as recruits were called to service during the First World War, a commission was appointed to investigate and make recommendations. In 1920 Benedetto Croce, who was then minister of public instruction, began the task of educational reform, but the general chaos prevented the introduction of thoroughgoing measures. The Fascists, on assuming power, almost at once turned their attention to the educational system. Schools were opened in districts where they had been unknown, training facilities for teachers were improved, better discipline was established, compulsory attendance for children from six to fourteen was strictly enforced, and classes were opened in which adult illiterates could learn to read and write. To defray the cost of these reforms the appropriations for the ministry of national education were increased 47 per cent between 1922 and 1930. The result was that illiteracy, which was 27 per cent in 1923, was reduced

to 21 per cent by 1927. It is estimated that by 1930 over 90 per cent of the children of school age were receiving instruction.

It was the intention of the Fascists that the educational system would be formative rather than informative. In other words, the end they had in view was not to create intelligent citizens but to make good Fascists. The lesson impressed on pupils and students from the primary school through the university was unquestioning loyalty and devotion to Fascism. This was openly admitted by Fascist writers. One of them, for instance, stated in a school calendar: "Every school, every class in every school, every subject in every class, must educate the youth of Italy to understand Fascism, to renew itself in Fascism, to live in the historical climate created by the Fascist revolution." To make sure that this was achieved, all the textbooks used in the schools were prepared by a government commission according to the prescription that "textbooks in history, geography, economics, and law and elementary school readers must be in accordance with the historical, political, juridical, and economic requirements established since October 28, 1922." Describing as they did the achievements of Fascism and exalting the greatness of its leaders, they became the means of drilling into impressionable children and adults the contention that Fascism was the country's only salvation. The primer was full of pictures of Fascists in black shirts, of Fascist symbols, and of Fascist soldiers. On the first page of the speller could be found such words as Duce, Mussolini, Fascismo. Readers for the succeeding grades were stuffed even more with propaganda. In the fourth reader the children were told how the Duce had saved Italy from Bolshevism. Thus education for Fascism was emphasized and carried through from grade to grade. It was Mussolini himself who coined the slogan, "The textbook and the musket make a perfect Fascist."

Nor was the indoctrination of the young confined to the regular school system. In the youth organizations, the *Balilla*, *Avanguardia*, and *Giovani Fascisti* for boys and the *Piccole Italiane* and *Giovane Italiane* for girls, veneration of the Fascist government and its leaders assumed the form of a religious cult. Instruction began with the sentence: "Let us salute the flag in the Roman fashion; hail to Italy; hail to Mussolini." Among other things the children were told over and over again that "the Duce is always right." Some idea of the influence of these organizations may be gained from the fact that in 1932 half the school children were members of either the *Balilla* or the *Piccole Italiane*. Upon entering a university former members of the youth organizations could join the *Centurie Uni-*

versitarie charged with the task of spreading propaganda among the students and of spying on professors and students suspected of opposition to Fascism.

For some time after the establishment of the regime the universities continued to be centers of liberal thought, but gradually they also lost their freedom. A decree promulgated early in 1927 stated that "professors in royal universities and instructors in secondary institutions and other professors of similar rank are to be dismissed from service when they do not give full assurance of faithful fulfillment of their duties or if they place themselves in a state of incompatibility with the general political aims of the government." A few months later the former secretary of the party said in an address: "The intellectuals above all ought to learn to trust and follow him [Mussolini], even as our soldiers do who have declared Mussolini is always right." Those holding the lesser university positions were soon regimented, but because of protests from abroad against the suppression of academic freedom the Fascists hesitated for some time before they extinguished the last sparks. In 1931, however, university employees of all ranks were called upon to take the following oath: "I swear allegiance to the King, his royal successors, and to the Fascist regime . . . to exercise the functions of teaching and to fulfill all academic duties with the purpose of forming active and regular citizens devoted to the country and to the Fascist regime." Although some of the most prominent professors forfeited their positions by refusing to take the oath, the majority submitted.

Another problem the Fascist regime tried to solve was the declining birth rate. This problem was not peculiar to Italy. The birth rate was declining in all the larger countries inhabited by people predominantly of the white race. The decline in Italy was in fact less drastic than in many other countries. Nevertheless the rate had fallen from 39.3 per thousand in 1876 to 25.6 per thousand in 1929. To check this decline was, as the Fascist Grand Council described it, "the problem of problems," for without a growing population "there is neither youth, nor military power, nor economic expansion, nor a secure future for the fatherland." "For five years," Mussolini said in 1927, "we have continued to assert that the population of Italy is like a river overflowing its banks. This is not true. The Italian nation is not growing but diminishing in size. . . . Let us be frank with ourselves: what are 40 million Italians compared with 90 million Germans and 200 million Slavs? Let us look at our western neighbors: what are 40 million Italians compared with the

40 millions of France and the 90 millions in her colonies, or with the 46 millions of England and 450 millions of inhabitants in her colonies? . . . In order to be influential Italy must begin the second half of the present century with at least 60 million inhabitants."

The Fascist regime had already taken steps to stimulate growth of the population. As a means of discouraging celibacy and childlessness it had in 1926 imposed a flat tax on all bachelors between twenty-five and sixty-five and also increased the income tax of both bachelors and the heads of small families. Stringent laws were passed to prohibit the dissemination of birth control propaganda and the practice of abortion. On the other hand, special preferences in public employment were accorded to the heads of large families in addition to important tax exemptions and special awards. Parents of large families were honored by having their photographs exhibited in public. But the results were on the whole discouraging. In 1927 the number of births increased, but in the next year a decline set in again. By 1936 the birth rate dropped to a new low of 22.4 per thousand. In 1937 marriage loans to young people were introduced in imitation of the Nazi measures. At the birth of each child a part of the loan was canceled and after the birth of the fourth child the entire loan was written off. If the marriage remained childless, the loan had to be repaid in full. Even these measures did not result in any considerable rise of the birth rate.




THE QUEST FOR EMPIRE

One of the reasons why the Fascist regime was so eager to increase the birth rate was the need of a large population for the creation of a great Italian Empire. Mussolini summed up the situation in the following words: "With a declining population a country does not create an empire but becomes a colony." During his early days as a Fascist Mussolini still retained the socialist opposition to imperialism, but soon after his accession to power he experienced a change of mind. Lest he rouse the fears of other nations he stated that Fascist imperialism was a question of "peaceful expansion." Meanwhile, however, he was strengthening Italy's military forces. "The fundamental duty of Fascist Italy," he said in 1927, "is the preparation of all armed forces on land, sea, and in the air. We must be able to mobilize 5,000,000 men. . . . Then, between 1935 and 1940 will come the tragic moment in Europe's history and we can let our voice be heard." "Fascism," he wrote again, "does not think that permanent peace is possible or desirable," because "only war

raises all exhibitions of human energy to their maximum tension. It puts the stamp of dignity on nations which are able to wage it openly. No other test can take its place."

Mussolini's program was an ambitious one. He was convinced that it was his destiny to become a modern Caesar who would reconstitute the greatness of ancient Rome by means of twentieth-century conquests. He would again make the Mediterranean an Italian sea. A Fascist deputy said in support of the Duce's plans, "Look at the Mediterranean, *Mare Nostro*, where Italians have ever been victorious. This sea has been ours and will be ours once more." Mussolini hoped that in addition to demonstrating Fascist greatness a successful imperialist war would supply Italy with sources of raw materials, for Italy possessed only scanty quantities of iron, coal, copper, and potash and had to depend entirely on foreign imports for petroleum, cotton, rubber, and phosphates. Such colonies as Italy had, which included Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, and Libya in Africa, neither provided these raw materials nor did they attract Italian colonists. Hence Mussolini demanded new colonies. "Italy," he stated, "demands the acknowledgment by other powers of her undoubted need of sun and earth. If they do not acknowledge it, Italy will be forced to take what she has a right to." By 1934 conditions were undoubtedly so critical that they encouraged him to take risks. The economic depression was still unsolved, foreign trade was still declining, and the policy of public works as a means of providing employment was beginning to lose its efficacy. The remedy, as he saw it, was a military adventure which would absorb the whole nation in its preparation and accomplishment.

As conditions in Europe became more propitious for an imperialist venture, he had to choose his objective. The obvious choice was Ethiopia, also called Abyssinia. It was the only considerable area in Africa which still maintained its independence, the rest of the continent having been divided among the powers during the scramble for colonies in the decades before World War I. The population of Ethiopia, estimated at between five and a half and seven and a half millions, was a chaotic jumble of varicolored tribes professing Christianity, Mohammedanism, Judaism, and heathenism. The country itself, embracing an area of some 350,000 square miles (about three times the size of Italy), was for the most part arid desert, uninviting and unsuited for the habitation of Europeans. The only parts where Europeans could live comfortably were the highlands, a rich agricultural country which produced barley, millet, wheat, coffee, and hides. Even so, economically the game was



THE PARTITION OF AFRICA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

not worth the candle. But the possession of Ethiopia did have strategic importance. A glance at the map will make this apparent, for without Ethiopia the provinces of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland were hemmed in and isolated. Finally, there was also the desire for revenge. As far back as 1889 Italy had claimed a protectorate over Ethiopia, but her claims had been crushed by an overwhelming defeat in the battle of Adowa (1896) at the hands of the savage tribesmen. An armed conquest of Ethiopia would wipe out the rankling memories of Adowa.

Ignoring the growing opposition to his plans in Great Britain, which saw in the move a threat to the empire's communications as well as a breach of Italy's obligations as a member of the League of Nations, Mussolini steadily pressed his preparations for war.¹² A carefully staged border clash between Ethiopian and Italian colonial troops in December, 1934, furnished the pretext for dispatching a large military force to the Italian East African colonies. In October, 1935, the invasion began with the advance of Italian troops across the border from Eritrea. The Ethiopians, with foreign military advice, offered a courageous opposition which held back the Italians for months. In the end, however, the untrained warriors with their spears, knives, obsolete rifles, and inadequate artillery could not cope with Mussolini's well trained troops equipped with airplanes, tanks, incendiary bombs, and all the other weapons of modern warfare. When the Italian troops reached a point sixty miles from Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, in May, 1936, the native defense collapsed. The emperor, Haile Selassie, fled the country and a few days later the Italians entered Addis Ababa.

In Rome Mussolini was acclaimed by enthusiastic crowds when he announced the victory. The Fascist Grand Council and the cabinet declared Ethiopia annexed to Italy as a colony, and a colonial government headed by a viceroy was established in Addis Ababa. More than this, Victor Emmanuel III assumed the title of "emperor." But the conquest was far from complete. At no time did Italian control extend beyond the areas around the towns. In

¹² The moment was propitious for the adventure because the attention of Great Britain and the other European nations was riveted on Hitler's rearmament of Germany.

THE PARTITION OF AFRICA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. *The large holdings of the British, French, and Belgians contrast sharply with the territories held by the Italians.*

the rest of the country the Italians could move only in large forces accompanied by tanks and armored cars. Irregular bands of native tribesmen harassed the Italians at every turn. Probably more Italians were killed during the two years after the war than during the war itself. Even in the areas around the towns few Italians would venture out after nightfall, for, as one writer put it, "if these areas were Italy during the daytime, they were Ethiopia at night."



CHAPTER TEN

The Succession States of the Habsburg Empire

THE COLLAPSE OF THE HABSBURG EMPIRE

SUDDENLY, or so it seemed to the outside world, in the fall of 1918 Austria-Hungary, a state of the first political and military magnitude, vanished from the map as if it had been subjected to the withering blast of some destroying angel. Actually it collapsed because it lacked a real *raison d'être*. The artificial character of this state, which corresponded to neither a nation nor a language, had become painfully apparent. Except in a bureaucratic sense this relic of earlier centuries had become almost meaningless. It was not a nation-state but a collection of ill-assorted provinces and peoples whose customs, traditions, religions, and educational and economic standards were widely divergent. Regarded from the standpoint of nationality it included no less than ten major groups and many minor ones. On the eve of the war the population was composed of the following nationalities: Germans, 12,011,081; Magyars, 10,067,917; Czechs, 6,442,577; Poles, 4,976,642; Slovaks, 1,968,452; Ukrainians, 3,998,900; Slovenes, 1,256,256; Serbs and Croats, 5,545,207; Rumanians, 3,224,728; and Italians, 771,054. The situation would have been difficult if each nationality had been a compact group within a defined area, but the contrary was largely the case. Regarded from the political standpoint it was the most complex organism of Europe, with no less than twenty-one legislative bodies of various importance and functions.

This mosaic of territories and national groups was the creation of the Habsburg dynasty. Throughout the centuries the Habsburgs had added new territories to old ones by treaties, inheritance, war, and above all by marriage. The practice of acquiring territory

through matrimonial ventures is expressed in the widely quoted paraphrase of Ovid:

Bella gerant alii tu, felix Austria, nube!
Nam quae Mars aliis, dat tibi regna Venus!

Others wage war, but you, fortunate Austria, marry!
For what Mars gives to others, Venus bestows on you!

In acquiring new territories right and left the Habsburgs paid no attention to the nationality of their new subjects. As a result they collected a conglomeration of peoples which was characterized by diversity rather than unity. In the eighteenth century a number of rulers, including Maria Theresa (1740–1780) and Joseph II (1765–1790), sought to effect the Germanization of the heterogeneous units. Generally speaking, the means they employed in the hope of securing the predominance of German culture was the inexorable suppression of the culture of the subject groups. But their efforts met with little success. After trying in vain to unify the nationalities under their rule the Habsburgs endeavored to keep their peoples in subjugation by the ancient principle of *divide et impera* (*divide and rule*). This policy was boldly announced as far back as the Congress of Vienna (1815) by the Emperor Francis II. "My peoples," he said, "are strangers to each other. That is all the better. They do not catch the same political disease at the same time. If the fever takes hold of you in France, all of you catch it. Hungary is kept in order by Italian troops, and Italy is kept down by Hungarians. Everybody keeps his neighbor in order. My people do not understand each other. Their antipathies make for security, and their mutual hatreds for the general peace."

The collapse of the Habsburg Empire had long been expected. Revolt had, in fact, been characteristic of the nation ever since the days of William Tell. So long as the spirit of nationalism was quiescent, the task of holding the component parts together was comparatively simple; but when nationalism became aggressive, the threat of dissolution became very real. Prince Metternich, during whose time (1773–1859) this spirit was awakening, compared the Habsburg state to an old, rickety, worm-eaten building. In 1867 the Habsburgs sought to bolster the shaky structure by transforming the empire into a so-called Dual Monarchy; in other words, they gave full acknowledgment to the separate existence of Hungary. The new government was a federation of two equal states under the common rule of a single sovereign who was emperor of Austria and king of Hungary. Having obtained self-government, however,

the Magyars denied to the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary that liberty, equality, and justice which they had claimed for themselves as a natural right. For another fifty years the empire continued to exist without any spirit of solidarity. During this time the various groups were growing increasingly self-conscious and restive. Two kinds of separatist movements were developing: national and irredentist. While some wished to form independent states, others had aspirations of being united to an outside neighboring state of the same blood and nationality. It was the hope of preventing its own dismemberment that impelled the Austro-Hungarian government to make the fatal decision for war against Serbia, a war which soon broadened into the First World War.

How futile the decision was! Instead of arresting dissolution, the war accelerated it. For a time, it is true, the unfortunate subject peoples were kept in awe by an army of spies, by military police, and by the unrestricted activities of the hangman and the firing squad. Thousands were imprisoned, hanged, or shot in order to strike terror into the hearts of those who were contemplating revolt. This policy, in filling the hearts of the subjects with a deep hatred of the Habsburgs, only served to hasten the final reckoning. As soon as the outcome of the war became inevitable, the bonds which held the ramshackle empire together gave way. It may be worth noting that after the death in 1916 of Francis Joseph who had ruled since 1848, his successor, the Emperor Charles, wished to reorganize his empire on a federal basis. But his advisers and the German government were not in favor of the plan and did not permit him to proclaim it until October 16, 1918. By this time it was too late to arrest or control the breakup of the empire. The door of independence had been opened and the subject peoples were rushing blindly toward liberty.

The one man outside the boundaries of Austria-Hungary who may be said to have hastened the dissolution was President Wilson, by solemnly proclaiming the right of each nationality to be the arbiter of its own destiny and to choose its own form of government. Encouraged by the President's pronouncements, the Czechs who had supplied the Habsburg armies with Skoda guns, the Slavs who had long been straining at the leash, and the Croats whose regiments formed the flower of the Austro-Hungarian army, proclaimed their independence. The actual deathblow was administered by President Wilson on October 18, 1918, when he recognized the independence of the Czechs and Yugoslavs. Emperor Charles, after trying desperately to prevent complete collapse, finally withdrew (November 11,

1918) and before many hours had passed every national group had renounced its allegiance to the Dual Monarchy. Out of the ruins new states arose at once. The Hungarians, Czechs, Poles, and Yugoslavs formed their own states, and the Austrians set up a republic in the territory that was left them. Because of the intermingling of national groups in this area, complete adherence to the principle of self-determination was impossible. Although the political boundaries were made to coincide substantially with the national majorities, there were exceptions which soon gave rise to a new irredentism.



AUSTRIA'S STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE

The breaking away of the Hungarian, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, Polish, and other groups left only the small German nucleus around which the Habsburgs had originally assembled their conglomeration of nationalities. The terms of the postwar settlement pared this nucleus down still further. In the National Assembly, which adopted a provisional constitution on November 12, 1918, there had been representatives of the German South Tyrol and of German Bohemia which according to the principle of self-determination should have formed part of the new Austrian republic, but the treaty of St. Germain accorded the former to Italy and the latter to Czechoslovakia. This left Austria with a territory of 32,000 square miles and a population of 6,067,430, according to the census of January, 1920. Of this population approximately one third lived in Vienna. In other words, the Vienna which before the war had been the capital of the third largest empire of Europe became the center of a few counties whose resources were at best sufficient to support a moderate sized provincial town. The new Austria was not only a landlocked country cut off from all international trade routes but its agricultural area was so small that it was unable to produce enough food for its people. Previously the Austrians had received grain from Hungary, meat from Hungary and Galicia, and sugar, potatoes, vegetables, and beer from Bohemia. Now these commodities were excluded by tariff barriers. Austria still had iron and steel industries, but it had no coal, its most important coal districts, those of Bohemia, having been allotted to the succession states which immediately imposed hard conditions on export.

Since any attempt to preserve the economic unity of the Dual Monarchy by forming a federation of the succession states was out of question because of racial hatreds, the Austrians turned to what they

regarded as the natural solution of the Austrian question—*Anschluss* (union) with Germany. Not that they wished to be absorbed by Germany; they hoped to remain a self-governing federal state within the German Republic. Such a step was regarded as being in accordance with Wilson's Fourteen Points, on the basis of which the armistice had been signed. Therefore on November 12, 1918, the National Assembly declared that "German Austria is a constituent part of the German Republic." This declaration also had widespread support outside the Assembly. Originally the monopoly of a handful of Pan-Germans, *Anschluss* became a popular cry in many other quarters. The only group that did not take it up were the (Catholic) Christian Socialists, who feared that Austria would be dominated by Protestant Prussia. On the other hand, the Social Democrats were enthusiastic in their support of the idea. But the desire for union was frustrated by the opposition of France and her satellites. Later the Treaty of St. Germain as well as the Treaty of Versailles forbade any such union without permission of the Council of the League of Nations.

To the many Austrians who favored *Anschluss* the prohibition was a sore disappointment, but the demand for it did not cease. Apart from any other consideration, the fact that it was forbidden made it desirable. There were, however, some who felt that Austria was irremediably doomed to economic collapse unless the union was effected. Dr. Karl Renner, leader of the Social Democrats, said: "You all know that German Austria has no chance of existing among the present constellations. The only thing we can do is to remain alive until the hour of liberation comes, until we as Germans can decide to join the state to which by the nature of things we belong." The reason for the other nations' opposition was simply the fear that a new German national state which included Austria would be a serious menace to the equilibrium of Europe. To what degree this fear was shared even by the Swiss may be seen from the following statement published in the *Basler Nationalzeitung*: "With a Greater Germany on the horizon, we shall witness all around us a furious nationalistic reaction. A greater German Empire reaching from Hamburg to Pressburg would push all other states to the wall by its more vital power."

As the months passed, Austria's financial position steadily deteriorated. In the words of one observer: "Some eighteen months have now elapsed since the armistice and it is no exaggeration to say that Austria is today financially, industrially, and morally in a far worse plight than she was at the cessation of hostilities. Her cur-

rency is depreciated to such a degree that it is virtually unrecognized abroad; her industries are, with few exceptions, at a standstill.”¹ As the country was not able to grow sufficient food for the population, the government was forced to import foodstuffs and sell them at a loss. The result was that the budget showed an ever increasing deficit, with the national debt expanding by billions each month. Finally in February, 1922, Austria was saved from collapse by large loans from Britain, France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia. In the same year the government signed the Geneva Protocol (October 4) which guaranteed it a loan of about \$130 million sponsored by the League of Nations on condition that fiscal reforms be instituted and the budget balanced. The value of exports gradually increased and agriculture developed by leaps and bounds. A new currency also helped inspire confidence. By 1926 the situation had improved so greatly that control by the League was terminated.

If the economic situation was not a happy one, neither was the political. The two major parties were the Social Democrats and the Christian Socialists. The former were moderate socialists who had wandered far from the path of strictly Marxian doctrines. Most of their strength was concentrated in Vienna, where they controlled the municipal government. In Vienna their goal was to create a model city. They provided pensions and unemployment insurance for workers, demolished old tenements and constructed modern apartment houses for workers, opened kindergartens and provided ample playgrounds for children, and set up prenatal clinics which gave free medical attention to mothers. At a time when Bolshevism was taking a temporary hold in a number of countries including Hungary, the Social Democrats prevented its establishment in Vienna. But they also resisted the pressure of the reactionary peasant provinces that was exerted through the Christian Socialist Party. Besides being composed chiefly of peasants this party was completely Catholic. This would not be unusual in a country whose population was about 93 per cent Catholic. Despite its name, the party had little about it that was socialist in the generally accepted sense of the word. As the years passed, it became more and more reactionary.

Between these two parties, and therefore between the urban and rural populations, a deep hostility developed which heavily over-balanced loyalty to the new state. While the Christian Socialists or Clericals, as they were also called, feared the socialist legislation of the Social Democrats, the latter denounced the reactionary policies of the Christian Socialists. The mutual antagonism was further

¹ *Living Age*, vol. 304 (1920), p. 381.

aggravated by the divergent economic interests of the agricultural and industrial classes. At one time the provincials went so far as to forbid the exportation of foodstuffs to Vienna. The Social Democrats, for their part, had the power to bring tremendous pressure upon their opponents by organizing strikes, demonstrations, and processions. Since both parties were returned to parliament in almost equal numbers, a strong government by one party was out of question. More than this, the fundamental opposition between a "black" countryside and a "red" Vienna obstructed all attempts at constructive national legislation. It was the tragedy of Austria that the two parties were unable to put aside their differences in order to extricate their country from the bog into which it was sinking. On the contrary, the antagonism became more bitter with the years. In the later twenties it assumed a more sinister aspect when various semimilitary organizations came into existence and were appropriated by ambitious party leaders for political purposes. These organizations defied one another and at times threatened to defy even the state. In general, they produced further restlessness, engendered suspicions, and committed various acts of violence. The two most formidable semimilitary organizations were the *Schutzbund* of the Social Democrats and the peasant *Heimwehr*, the latter organized by Prince von Starhemberg and later allied with the Christian Socialists.

During the first two years of its existence (1918-1920) the republic was governed by a coalition, but at the elections held in the autumn of 1920 the Social-Democrat representation declined and the Christian Socialists secured a majority. The latter polled some 1,198,780 votes and secured 82 seats; the Social Democrats polled only 1,037,638 and obtained 62 seats. Thenceforth until Austria was absorbed by Germany in 1938, the Christian Socialists with the help of the smaller bourgeois parties controlled the government. Both the foreign and the internal policy of this party was largely favorable to the interests of the peasants, despite the fact that the country was 60 per cent industrial. More and more the Christian Socialists lost the strong democratic influences of the early revolutionary days and became clerical and conservative. Their leader during the decade of the twenties was Monsignor Ignaz Seipel, a Catholic priest and a man of ascetic life. From 1922 to 1929 as chancellor he directed the fortunes of Austria.

Although the various loans that had been made to Austria were an invaluable aid, they did not solve the country's basic economic problems. During the years after 1922 Vienna recovered some of its

former prestige as a banking and trading center, but 1929 saw the collapse of the Kredit Anstalt and the beginning of the depression. Trade withered under the blast of the depression. As always in hard times, customers for the luxury goods in which Austria specialized were scarce. The consequent drop in customs receipts was a severe blow to the national budget, which closed with a deficit amounting to more than \$40 million in 1931. This decline in trade was naturally accompanied by an increase in unemployment. It is estimated that in 1932 every twelfth Austrian was unemployed. As the economic situation deteriorated, the number of Nazis increased from a mere 7000 in 1928 to no less than 100,000 in 1931, the converts having been made largely among the small *bourgeoisie* and the unemployed of all classes. The movement derived much of its strength, both moral and material, from the German Nazi movement; in fact, Hitler regarded the Austrian Nazis as a branch of his own party. The aim of the Austrian Nazis as a constituent part of Hitler's National Socialist movement was the union of Austria and Germany, and they left no stone unturned to achieve their goal. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, appalled by the terrorist methods of the Nazi regime in Germany, promptly renounced all ideas of *Anschluss*.

After 1932 economic improvement set in again but it contributed little toward mitigating the political disorders. In 1929 Chancellor Seipel had retired and, after a succession of chancellors, Dr. Engelbert Dollfuss, also a Christian Socialist, took over the office in 1932. The new chancellor was small of stature, only four feet eleven inches tall. One of his favorite statements was, "After all I am still a millimeter taller than Napoleon." The standard joke in Austria was that he could be reproduced life-size on a postage stamp. But what he lacked in size he more than made up for in determination. Insisting on the right of Austria to remain independent, he vigorously rebuffed the efforts of the German and the Austrian Nazis to seize control of the country. He responded to the Nazi terrorism and intimidation by proscribing the party. But the Nazis, as a secret organization, continued to perpetrate innumerable acts of violence. In his efforts to curb the Nazis Dollfuss frequently resorted to dictatorial methods. Finally on March 4, 1933, he suspended parliamentary government, abolished freedom of speech, press, and assemblage, and proceeded to rule as a dictator. These measures were at first regarded as temporary, but in September he announced that he had no intention of restoring parliamentary government. He was determined, he declared, to transform Austria into a corporative



Acme

CHANCELLOR KURT SCHUSCHNIGG INSPECTING AUSTRIA'S FIGHTING
PLANES; APRIL, 1936

authoritative state in accordance with the principles enunciated by Pope Pius XI in his encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*.

To withstand the Nazi assault Dollfuss was obliged to join forces either with the *Heimwehr* or with the Social Democrats. He chose the former because the choice was more in keeping with the conservative attitude of his followers. But the price Prince Starhemberg and his *Heimwehr* asked for collaboration was the suppression of the Social-Democratic regime in Vienna. For years Starhemberg had made no secret of his determination to follow the lead of Italy and Germany and destroy the socialists by force. Now the opportunity had come. In February, 1934, the *Heimwehr* closed the Social Democrats' main organ, the *Arbeiterzeitung*, raided socialist centers, arrested Social-Democratic leaders, and sent socialists by the thousands to concentration camps established on the model of the German camps. When the Social Democrats responded by calling a general strike, martial law was declared and a bloody civil war broke out, as a result of which many hundreds of lives were lost. Later the property of the party and of the trade unions was seized, and the latter were dissolved. Dollfuss by approving the action of the *Heimwehr* again made it clear that he was not a champion of liberty.

Meanwhile Nazi hostility toward the Austrian government had become steadily more bitter. The fact that Dollfuss refused to lie down and be eaten enraged the Nazis and impelled them to attempt a daring coup. On Wednesday, July 25, 1934, hardly a month after Hitler's bloody purge, a group of 144 Nazis, disguised as regular soldiers of the Austrian army, invaded the chancellery in Vienna as part of a plan to arrest the cabinet. The conspirators shot Dollfuss, who was then allowed to bleed to death without benefit of physician or priest. But the plan to put a Nazi cabinet in power miscarried and the conspirators finally surrendered to the government.

Dollfuss' successor, Dr. Kurt Schuschnigg, who was also a member of the Christian Socialist party, took energetic steps to put down the Nazi revolts that broke out all over Austria. The ringleaders of the premature Putsch were tried and executed, many others were sentenced to long prison terms, and thousands were confined in concentration camps. For several months thereafter the Nazi agitation remained quiescent, but it was soon renewed with fervor. On top of this, dissension broke out in the cabinet. Starhemberg, who had long nourished ambitions of becoming dictator, managed to usurp power because of his *Heimwehr*; but toward the end of 1935 he was finally ousted by Schuschnigg and at the same time his *Heimwehr* was rendered innocuous. Prospects for independence appeared

brighter when in 1936 an accord was signed in which Germany recognized Austria's "complete sovereignty" and adopted measures to end the trade war which had been carried on between the two countries since the attempted Putsch of July, 1934. Hitler's government even went so far as to promise to discontinue propaganda in Austria. Nevertheless, the illegal Nazi movement not only continued but actually intensified its activities. Ultimately the Nazis, despite Schuschnigg's efforts to maintain independence, were to achieve *Anschluss*.



HUNGARIAN IRREDENTISM

The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian front on the Piave at the beginning of November, 1918, and the subsequent signing of an armistice precipitated a crisis in Hungary. After four years of sanguinary fighting the country emerged from the war completely defeated. Besides the economic disorganization resulting from the collapse of the Dual Monarchy, there was widespread demoralization engendered by the sudden realization of defeat. In addition the army had completely broken up after the conclusion of the armistice and hundreds of thousands of soldiers returned, not as a disciplined army but as an undisciplined mob. In some parts of Hungary chaos reigned supreme. Three governments were established in quick succession. The reason for their rapid passing was their inability to obtain better peace terms. Although they had lost the war, the Hungarians were not inclined to give up any territory. The one thing all Magyars, irrespective of party, had in common was a desire to keep prewar Hungary intact. But while the Paris Conference was deliberating, her neighbors were seizing as much territory as they could. The Czechoslovakian Republic having been proclaimed at Prague, the Czechs and Slovaks occupied those districts in which the Slovak racial element predominated. Simultaneously Croatia-Slavonia was incorporated in Yugoslavia, and Serbian troops invaded the most fertile districts of southern Hungary. At the same time Rumanian troops proceeded to occupy Transylvania, whose union with Rumania had been a definite aim for two generations. Thus the dismemberment of Hungary was a *fait accompli*.

On November 16, 1918, Hungary proclaimed herself a republic, and a provisional government was formed under Count Michael Karolyi, who though an aristocrat was also a liberal and a pacifist. Karolyi hoped to maintain a moderately liberal regime, but he was also determined to retain all of Hungary's prewar territory. This

he hoped to do by convincing the Allies, who were soon to sit in judgment at Paris, that the Hungarians were pacifists and had been forced into the war by the Habsburgs. As proof of his pacifism he purged the government of all who had been associated with the war policy. This, however, failed to save Hungary from losing most of its territory to the subject nationalities. When in March, 1919, the Allies presented to Budapest their provisional decisions and it became clear not only that Hungary would lose its non-Magyars but that three million Hungarians would also be transferred to Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, Karolyi found himself discredited, and he resigned.

The Karolyi government was followed by four months of Bolshevik experimenting. A number of Hungarians who had been prisoners of war in Russia had organized soviets on the Russian model upon their return home. When Karolyi resigned, Béla Kun, a friend of Lenin, set up a communist regime in Budapest with the support of the soviets. This was accomplished without bloodshed and with comparatively little trouble. Only after its establishment did the Hungarian Soviet Republic resort to repressive measures. One reason for the communists' success was their promise that if Hungary turned communist, Russia would help the Hungarians hold their prewar boundaries. The new soviet republic took steps at once to put a communist program into effect. The socialization of large landholdings, mines, banks, industries, and other commercial institutions was proclaimed, all titles and ranks were abolished, separation of church and state was decreed, and taxes for church purposes were abolished. In addition, a system of education was devised to wipe out illiteracy. But as the weeks passed, the regime lost much of its support even among the workers. At no time did it control the whole country and as early as the middle of May an anti-Bolshevik government was established in Arad.

It was through his efforts to save Hungary from being dismembered that Béla Kun hoped to restore his popularity. And for a time he and his associates did succeed in securing their position by appealing to the patriotism of the Hungarians to aid in the formation of an army which he hoped would keep annexations by the succession states to a minimum. Desperately attacking the Czechs, he won several victories in June. But his successes were short lived. The Allies, who feared above all things that Bolshevism would take firm root in Central Europe, permitted the Rumanians to advance into Hungary up to a certain point. Kun rashly undertook an offensive against them and was heavily defeated. When on top of this

the trade unions withdrew their support from his government, he realized that his cause was irretrievably lost. On August 1 he and his associates resigned and crossed over into Austria, leaving behind a legacy of hatred and revenge.

After various attempts to set up a stable government failed, a law of 1920 formally re-established the monarchy. But Hungary remained "a kingdom without a king." Admiral Nicholas Horthy, who had formerly commanded the Austro-Hungarian fleet, was given the supreme power with the title of "regent," but for whom he was serving as regent was not stated. Although the majority desired to see the throne once more occupied by a permanent representative, the National Assembly, while admitting the validity of King Charles' claim, felt that the time for his return had not arrived. Twice during 1921 he made unsuccessful attempts to reinstate himself on the throne. On both occasions Horthy, in view of the international situation, refused to cooperate. Charles' first attempt was largely responsible for bringing into being the Little Entente,² formed for the purpose of preventing the restoration of the Habsburgs. His second attempt (October, 1921) provoked the most severe protests from the Little Entente, the foreign minister of Czechoslovakia going so far as to state that the restoration of the former reigning house would mean war.

Theoretically the Horthy government was a democratic kingdom with a regularly elected upper and lower house, but this parliament served only to mask a firmly established dictatorship. The voting was minutely controlled by administrative corruption and intimidation, and every opposition was summarily suppressed. This spirit gave rise to the "White Terror" soon after the Horthy government was established in power. All radicals and even the liberals were attacked, beaten, or imprisoned. Large numbers were also put to death.³ Since the government of Béla Kun had been composed almost exclusively of Jews, the rage of the reactionaries was vented especially on the Jews, regardless of their individual innocence. But the violence was only an incidental accompaniment of the general reaction which became the order of the day. What distinguishes the history of Hungary from the history of most other European countries was the attempt to restore the old political and social regime in its entirety, so far as that was possible. Horthy and Count

² Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia.

³ The spirit of vengeance and suppression remained so bitter that in August, 1932, two young Hungarian communists were executed for having returned from Moscow to Budapest to establish a communist bureau there.

Bethlen, who was prime minister from 1921 to 1931, re-established in a large degree the feudal regime of the period before 1914. Many of the estates which had been broken up were restored, so that 40 per cent of the land was held in estates of over 1400 acres. The great landlords, representing 1.3 per cent of the population, owned and controlled 50 per cent of the land, while 75 per cent of the peasants were landless. During the period that followed, the growing land hunger of an impoverished peasantry caused crisis after crisis. In the words of one observer: "Crying need and ostentatious wealth, seething unrest and smiling contentment are to be found side by side."

On June 4, 1920, the Hungarian delegation signed the Treaty of Trianon under protest. Having taken part in the war on the wrong side, Hungary had to pay the penalty. By and large the peace did little more than put its stamp of approval on the partition that had already been made. Hungary was reduced in area from 109,000 to 35,800 square miles and in population from about twenty millions to about eight. The territory it retained was a little larger than the state of Maine. In other words, Hungary forfeited approximately two thirds of its territory and considerably more than half its population. At the same time the economic resources—arable land, minerals, and forests—were reduced to a fraction of their former figures. Cut off from the sea, Hungary was almost isolated from the rest of the world by the tariff barriers of the states which surrounded it. But the most irreconcilable feature of the treaty for the Hungarians was that, the principle of self-determination notwithstanding, more than three millions of their kinsfolk were consigned to the position of national minorities in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. No country was made to pay a larger penalty and in none did the peace engender greater bitterness. The settlement was denounced equally by all classes as an outrage against justice and humanity. Time and again Hungarian writers declared that it was to be classed with the eighteenth-century partitions of Poland.

Nor did the Hungarians become resigned to the fact that large Hungarian populations were subject to alien rule. The resentment against the treaty and the desire to regain the lost possessions run like a heavy unbroken line through Hungary's history between the two wars. Officially the government had to play the role of good boy in obediently following the dictates of the peace settlements, but unofficially plans were being laid for the recovery of the ceded Hungarians, if necessary by force of arms. Foreign policy was carefully shaped with a view to achieving this end. The question was everlastingly discussed and such discussions were an important factor in

exciting a hatred of the neighboring nationalities. During her travels in Hungary in 1925 the novelist Rebecca West reported a Hungarian she casually met as saying: " 'You see, we hate the Austrians. And we detest the Czechs. Is it not iniquitous that a country which fought alongside us against the Allies should be allowed to sit at the Peace Conference and dictate terms to us and be given a slice of our territory and a whole million of our people? Also we loathe Rumania. Seventeen hundred thousand of our people they have taken, and the finest part of Hungary! And we detest the Serbs! And—' 'Then whom,' I asked, 'do you like?' 'No one but ourselves! And, after all, Madam,' he added, growing philosophical, 'when one comes to think of it, there is really no reason why one should!'"⁴

The resentment against the treaty was kept alive and even intensified by various methods. For example, statues representing Hungaria Irredenta were erected and postcards were sold representing Hungary divided into four parts and bearing the words, "Nem, nem, soha (No, no, never)." Propaganda was also carried on in other countries, particularly in England, for the revision of the treaty. In Italy Mussolini on a number of occasions declared himself in favor of revision of the Hungarian frontiers. In a speech at Milan in 1936 he said: "Until justice is done to Hungary there can be no final coordination of interests in the Danube basin. Hungary is truly the great mutilated nation. Four millions of Hungarians live beyond her frontiers." Such statements, added to the agitation within Hungary, kept the succession states on tenterhooks, causing them not only to form the Little Entente for the express purpose of putting up a solid front against Hungary but also to stand ready for any emergency. Meanwhile Hungary, hemmed in by neighbors powerful enough to hold it in check, smoldered for twenty bitter years. The first small change in the boundaries was made when Germany, in dismembering Czechoslovakia, tossed Ruthenia to Hungary.



THE PROBLEM OF MINORITIES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The first of the new states to rise from the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was the Czechoslovakian Republic. The Czechs, who inhabited Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, had been under Habsburg rule for centuries and were particularly antipathetic to foreign control. After the Napoleonic wars in the early nineteenth century a vigorous nationalism developed in Bohemia, the natural accompaniment of which was a desire for complete independence. The

⁴ *New Republic*, March 11, 1925, p. 64.

opportunity to achieve this desire was, however, not to come until the end of World War I. At the outbreak of the war the Czechs were placed in the embarrassing position of being called upon to fight for the Habsburg Empire. Long before the close of the war Czech soldiers openly deserted and joined the Allied army in the hope of achieving their dream of independence. But this was only one phase of the struggle. At the decisive moment the Czechs had the good fortune to have able leaders and the good sense to follow them. The man who organized the national resurrection was Dr. Thomas G. Masaryk, a coachman's son who had distinguished himself as a scholar and a college professor. Besides having a capacity for organization, Masaryk was a man of courage, tenacity, and vision.

When the war broke out, he decided that the time had come to translate the longing for independence into reality. He took into his confidence another college professor, Dr. Eduard Beneš, a man half his age, and together they formulated a program of action. Having laid their plans, they escaped from Bohemia and for the next four years traveled about ceaselessly expounding, explaining, and pleading their cause by word and pen. Besides gaining the support of the Allies, they organized an army to fight on the side of the Allies, the nucleus of this army being formed by Czech prisoners taken in battle by the Allies themselves. At the same time they also created and directed an underground movement in Prague. As the Austro-Hungarian hope for victory gradually faded, the Czech patriots became more audacious in their denunciation of the Habsburgs and more insistent in their demands for independence. The Austrian government's proposals for federalization were answered with statements like the following, made by a Czech patriot in the Austrian parliament (July 22, 1918): "We regard Austria as a century-old crime against the liberties of humanity. . . . It is our highest national duty to betray Austria whenever we can. We shall hate Austria for all eternity. We shall fight her and, God willing, shall in the end smash her to pieces."

Meanwhile the Slovaks had decided to make common cause with the Czechs, and the support of the Allied powers had been won. On August 13, 1918, Great Britain published its formal recognition of the Czechoslovak nation and the United States followed suit on September 2. A provisional Czechoslovak government, organized in Paris, formally proclaimed a Declaration of Independence on October 18. It read in part: "The Czechoslovak state shall be a republic. In constant endeavor for progress it will guarantee complete freedom of conscience, religion and science, literature and art, speech

and the press, and the right of assembly and petition. The church shall be separated from the state. Our democracy shall rest on universal suffrage: women shall be placed on equal footing with men, politically, socially, and culturally. The rights of the minority shall be safeguarded by proportional representation; national minorities shall enjoy equal rights. The government shall be parliamentary in form and shall recognize the principle of initiative and referendum."

Ten days later the Czechs actually established their rule in Prague by the simple expedient of informing the Austrian government that its rule in Bohemia had come to an end. Amidst tremendous demonstrations of joy a National Assembly was summoned on the basis of the number of votes polled by the various political parties in the last election of the Austrian Reichsrat. At its first meeting (November 14, 1918) Czechoslovakia was declared an independent democratic republic, and Masaryk was enthusiastically chosen its first president. He stated his creed in the following words: "I shall defend democracy against dictatorial absolutism, whether the right to dictate be claimed by the proletariat, the state, or the church." Dr. Beneš became foreign minister, then prime minister, and in 1935 succeeded Masaryk as president. By the constitution adopted on February 29, 1920, the legislative power was vested in a National Assembly composed of two bodies, the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate, both elected by universal, compulsory, and secret voting on the basis of proportional representation. The two bodies in joint session elected the president for a term of seven years. The cabinet was formed of ministers chosen by the president on the advice of the leader of the political party in power.

The boundaries of the new state as they were definitely established by the Treaty of St. Germain (September 10, 1919) included Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, to which Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia were added. With an area of 54,877 square miles it was about the size of the state of Illinois but had a population of about fourteen millions. Despite the declaration of the Allied statesmen that self-determination would be the operative principle of the peace, the new Czechoslovakia was a miniature edition of the old Habsburg state. After abolishing German-Magyar domination over the Czechs and Slovaks, the peacemakers proceeded to establish a Czechoslovakia with large minorities. The Czechoslovaks comprised only 65 per cent of the population, the rest being made up of Magyars, Ruthenes, Poles, and Germans, with a sprinkling of Jews.

The most numerous minority group were the Germans, generally known as the Sudeten Germans, who numbered more than three millions or almost a quarter of the population, concentrated in northern and western Bohemia. They protested their inclusion in the Slav state and pleaded the right of self-determination. Furthermore, Austria asked for a plebiscite in the Sudeten districts, but this was refused.

In adding the districts inhabited by Germans to the Czech state, the peacemakers acted on a number of motives. First, there were strategic reasons. The Sudeten mountains formed a natural frontier for the protection of the new state. This was especially important because the peacemakers were intent on blocking Germany's *Drang nach dem Südosten*. Second, the separation of these districts, which were heavily industrialized, would have meant economic disaster for Czechoslovakia. The reasons are stated by one writer as follows: "The abandonment of the historic frontiers—more sharply defined by nature herself than almost any other in Europe—would have had a treble disadvantage. It would have left Czechoslovakia so entirely defenseless as to be really incapable of independent life; it would have deprived her of a large proportion of those mineral resources upon which Bohemia's prosperity has always rested; and it would have cut off the German districts themselves from their natural market." The fact still remained, however, that the inclusion of the Germans was a violation of the principle of self-determination.

President Masaryk and his government attacked the problems confronting the new state with vigor, tact, and determination. For purposes of organization the so-called National Coalition was formed by the five major Czechoslovak parties, leaving the German and Magyar parties and the communists in opposition. Notwithstanding the fact that chaos was reigning in most of central Europe, Czechoslovakia was administered with calm assurance from the very beginning. Of all the new states it was probably the only one in which reform was carried out more or less systematically. For example, at the very outset a law was passed expropriating all large estates and confiscating the Habsburg lands. As a means of making an orderly distribution, a Land Office was set up. Although much was done to satisfy the land hunger of the peasants, the execution was not so radical as the plan but what was accomplished did contribute greatly to social peace and national unity. Another achievement was the establishment of a stable currency. While other nations were issuing unlimited quantities of paper money, the Czechoslovakian government stopped printing it and several years later also balanced the

budget. The price they paid was a temporary economic depression accompanied by severe unemployment; on the other hand, the currency during the period between 1920 and 1924 stood beside the Swiss franc as the only good currency of central and eastern Europe. As early as 1922, when the German mark began its dizzy slide into nothingness, the Germans and still more the Austrians began buying and hoarding Czechoslovakian currency in their flight from their own paper money.

Another sphere in which the new government achieved remarkable success was education. Although the districts inhabited largely by Czechs and Germans (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia) had the lowest percentage of illiterates (about 3 per cent) in the old Austro-Hungarian empire, education in Slovakia and Ruthenia had been grossly neglected by their prewar masters. The few schools that the government had supported in these provinces were totally Magyarized. There was not a single state school in either Slovakia or Ruthenia in which the medium of instruction was Slovak or Ruthenian. Consequently illiteracy was widespread. To remedy this condition the government found it necessary to set up an entirely new educational system in these provinces. Since there were few teachers available to teach the Slovak and Ruthenian children in their respective mother tongues, normal schools were opened for the training of such teachers. As quickly as additional teachers were ready, new elementary schools were opened. The result was that by 1927 there were in Slovakia 2692 elementary schools using the Slovak language as a medium of instruction. During the same period other schools were also opened, including German, Ruthenian, and Magyar elementary schools and German and Czechoslovakian high schools. In 1930 the secondary schools were divided according to languages as follows: 226 were Czechoslovakian, 96 German, 10 Magyar, 2 Polish, and 8 Ruthenian. In 1922 a law was passed which made attendance compulsory for the eight years between the ages of six and fourteen. Gradually the curricula of the secondary schools were remodeled to provide technical and manual instruction for boys and domestic science for girls.

The new state had a great advantage in being well endowed with natural resources and established industries. In the extent and variety of its minerals, it ranked high among European countries. Besides possessing varying quantities of most of the metals commonly used in industry, it produced more than enough coal to meet its domestic requirements. The coal deposits and iron mines, together with excellent transportation, combined to make Bohemia, Moravia, and



Czechoslovak Information Bureau

PRESIDENT MASARYK OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HIS SUCCESSOR, EDVARD BENES

Silesia one of the most active industrial centers of Europe. Particularly noteworthy were the sugar, spirit, beer, and textile industries, but also important was the manufacture of china, machinery, hardware, furniture, and leather and paper goods. About 80 per cent of the textile industries and engineering works of the old Habsburg Empire were concentrated in Czechoslovakia. The new state was also in the enviable position of being almost self-supporting in regard to food; in fact, it was able to export many such products as oats, barley, and hops. Furthermore, most of the raw materials for the sugar, beer, spirit, and glass industries were produced within the republic. Czechoslovakia also had extensive forests which after supplying the domestic needs yielded a surplus for export. In short, the new state possessed the material foundations for prosperity and during the first decade of its existence did enjoy a large measure of prosperity.

Gradually, however, some of the problems which during the first decade had been quiescent became acute. The most serious was that of minorities. The rights which the Treaty of Versailles accorded to national minorities in all the new states were further elaborated in Czechoslovakia by a special law of February 29, 1920, which decreed that the language of the minority must be accepted by the courts and by the administrative officials in the districts in which it was spoken by 20 per cent of the inhabitants. In the districts where a minority numbered less than 20 per cent the law provided that no disadvantage was to accrue to any person through ignorance of the official language. All minorities also had proportional representation in the parliament and other bodies. There may have been some discrimination against minorities on the part of lesser officials, but denationalization was forbidden by law. During the first years, it is true, most of the administrative posts were staffed by Czechs, even in Slovakia. This was due in large degree to the scarcity of Slovaks who were qualified for such work. Thanks to the autonomous status of Bohemia and Moravia under the old monarchy, the Czechs had trained officials who stepped into the administration when it was organized. In the Slovakian districts Slovaks were substituted for Czechs as soon as they could be trained. On the whole, the minorities received better treatment than in any other of the new states.

Nevertheless, the minorities became increasingly restive, particularly during the second decade of the republic's existence. In Ruthenia, which had been granted a status of autonomy, considerable discontent was fomented by Hungarians who regarded the

province as *Hungaria irredenta*. Nor were the Czechs and Slovaks as united as the name Czechoslovakia implies. Although blood relatives, they differed widely in temperament and outlook. Until they joined in the new state they had had separate histories, traditions, and institutions. The Slovaks, who were largely an agricultural people, had been isolated no less from Bohemia than from the rest of the world by the Magyar policy of repression. Consequently they had remained backward while the Czechs, who lived largely in industrial areas, were educated and progressive. A further cause of division was the religious question. Before World War I more than 90 per cent of the Czechs had been Roman Catholic; but as soon as Czechoslovakia became independent, an anti-Catholic movement was set in motion with the result that many Czechs left the Roman Catholic Church, some of them joining an independent church which used the Czech language. On the whole, the Czechs tended to be a skeptical, freethinking people. This caused offense to the Slovaks, who were mostly devout Catholics over whom the priesthood exercised a strong influence. But the main grievance of the Slovaks was the failure of the government to grant them administrative and cultural autonomy. They claimed that according to an agreement made in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on May 30, 1918, Slovakia was to receive complete autonomy within a federal state, including a separate political and financial administration, a separate assembly, and separate courts of law. To this claim President Masaryk replied that in adopting the constitution the representatives of Slovakia had expressed themselves for a complete union. Whatever objections they may have had against the Prague government they could not deny that Masaryk had their interests as much at heart as those of the Czechs, for he was himself of Slovak descent. Whereas it was his purpose to forge a complete union of the two peoples, the autonomists continued their agitation for a separate administration.

By all odds the gravest problem was that of the German minority. When the new state was organized, Masaryk invited the Sudeten Germans most heartily to cooperate in the work of the administration. But instead of supporting the government, they organized separatist movements in the hope of remaining in a German Austria which they thought would become part of a federal Germany. After the Peace Conference ignored their wishes, they adopted either a hostile or a negative attitude toward the new state and often indulged in niggling criticism of its policies. Their chief complaint was that a due proportion of Sudeten Germans were not appointed as state officials. There was some justification for this complaint, but

the fact that the government did not choose more of its officials from the German minority must be ascribed in part to the hostile attitude of the Sudeten Germans. The real root of this attitude was that they resented the fact that the "upstart" Czechs whom they had ruled until 1918 had gained ascendancy over them. In 1926 a beginning was made toward wider collaboration between Czechs and Germans when Masaryk succeeded in bringing two Germans into the cabinet and several years later a third member was added. Curiously enough, in the next year 80 per cent of the German members of parliament helped elect Masaryk for a second term of seven years, while many of the Slav members registered dissent. When Masaryk, who resigned in 1935, died two years later, a leader of the German Social Democrats wrote: "The German elements that remain faithful to the ideas of humanity have lost a great friend in Masaryk."

Unfortunately the foundations of German-Czech collaboration which Masaryk had laid were in an advanced stage of disintegration by this time and a little more than a year later the entire structure that had been erected under his supervision was to collapse. One factor which contributed much toward widening the breach was the world depression of 1929. Although all of Czechoslovakia was hit by the crisis, the effects were catastrophic in the area inhabited by the Sudeten Germans, the most highly industrialized district of Czechoslovakia. The entire area became, so to speak, an industrial graveyard. Factories that had once employed thousands of hands stood empty and derelict by 1930, while others employed only a small fraction of their former staffs. The unequal incidence of the effects of the depression was ascribed by the Sudeten Germans to government policy. They complained, for instance, that most of the textile contracts for the army were placed with Czech firms in the interior of the country and that, in general, the Czechs might have taken more vigorous steps toward extricating them from the slough of depression.

By 1935 it was evident that the Czechs had missed their opportunity to win over the Sudeten Germans. In May of 1935 a new party, born of economic distress and political dissatisfaction, made its appearance in parliament. It was the Sudeten Party led by Konrad Henlein. At first their demands were very moderate. Professing loyalty to the state, they demanded a greater measure of cultural autonomy, participation in the administration in proportion to their numbers, equal distribution of government contracts, and subsidies to relieve distress in the Sudeten areas. This was little more than the Sudeten Germans had previously demanded. The real difference was

that the new party had the backing of Nazi Germany. While professing allegiance to the Czechoslovak government, Henlein was taking orders from Hitler. The plan of the Nazis was, of course, to foment revolt and then to intervene. Jan Masaryk, son of the founder, said at a later time regarding the problem: "Our German minority was treated far better than any other in Europe and if it had not been for the shocking propaganda from across the border we and our Sudeten Germans would have settled our differences with dignity and without bloodshed." With the support of Hitler's Nazis the Sudeten Party became the second strongest party in 1937, having forty-four seats in Parliament against the Agrarian Party's forty-five. Before many more months passed, the Sudeten Party was to become the Trojan horse which opened Czechoslovakia to German invasion.

POLAND HARASSED BY INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TROUBLES

Poland was a succession state of the Austro-Hungarian Empire only in a limited sense, for much more of its territory had been a part of the Russian Empire than of the Dual Monarchy. As every schoolboy knows, divisions of Polish territory among Prussia, Russia, and Austria toward the end of the eighteenth century (1772, 1793, and 1795) erased Poland as a state from the map of Europe. Few events in modern history have made so ineffaceable an impression upon the mind and conscience of mankind. The extent of the Polish kingdom, the service it had rendered as a bulwark against invasion from the East, and the methods employed by Prussia, Russia, and Austria to effect its destruction made a potent appeal to generous minds everywhere. In the eyes of many, Poland became the symbol of freedom in chains. But the division of territory did not obliterate Polish nationalism. Not only did the people remain a unit in their national culture and historical memories but they also clung tenaciously to the hope of restoration. Subjection to foreign rule, in fact, served to draw them closer together than they had been before they lost their political independence. Every great European convulsion inevitably revived the Polish question. In 1807 Napoleon formed a part of the old Polish commonwealth into a semi-independent state under the title of the Duchy of Warsaw and endowed it with a liberal constitution; but this was undone after his fall. Although the Congress of Vienna (1815) again repartitioned Poland among Prussia, Russia, and Austria, Tsar Alexander I organized most of the Polish territory under his rule into a Polish kingdom. This state was also short lived. When the Poles revolted in 1830,

the liberties which the tsar had granted them were withdrawn and Poland again disappeared from the map.

While they were awaiting liberation the Poles increased in number until in 1914 there were nearly three times as many on their native soil as there had been in 1795. All were impregnated with nationalism. Every attempt during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to Russify or Germanize them had served only to strengthen their national sentiment. When the war broke out in 1914, the Russian Poles found themselves arrayed against the Austrian and German Poles on the battlefields of eastern Europe, with both sides making a bid for their support. First the Russians announced that upon the achievement of victory the Prussian and Austrian parts of Poland would be united to Russian Poland to form a united and autonomous kingdom. Next the Central Powers, after overrunning Russian Poland, announced on November 15, 1916, that Poland "will become an independent state, with an hereditary monarchy and a constitution." As a first step they set up a Council of Regency in Warsaw to direct matters until a sovereign could be chosen. As early as the autumn of 1917 France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States had recognized the Polish National Committee, which had been formed mainly through the efforts of Ignace Paderewski, the great Polish musician. It will be recalled that the thirteenth of President Wilson's Fourteen Points provided for the erection of an independent Polish state which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations. The collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 and of the Austrian and German Empires in the following year brought the long awaited opportunity to establish an independent Poland.

Although he was by no means the first to dream the new Poland, Josef Pilsudski became, as it were, the George Washington of Poland. Born in 1867 of peasant stock, he early became a socialist and a revolutionary. Above all, he became a bitter enemy of Russian domination, vowing to fight Russian oppression until Poland was free. While attending the University of Kharkov he became a member of a group that was active in the never ceasing struggle for freedom and independence. He and several of his comrades were, however, apprehended and sentenced to five years of penal servitude in Siberia. He returned a hardened conspirator. He became one of the leaders of the Polish Socialist Party and the founder and editor of a socialist newspaper dedicated to the cause of independence. In 1900 he was arrested again, but by simulating insanity he managed to have himself transferred to a military hospital, whence

he escaped to Austria. From that time until the outbreak of World War I he devoted himself to the organization of rifle clubs in which young Poles were clandestinely taught the elements of military training. According to his plan the members of these clubs were to form the nucleus of an army of liberation. When the war came, he incorporated his "sharpshooters" into the Austrian army and led them into battle against the Russians. After the defeat of Russia he organized a Polish military force to fight against Germany but was arrested and incarcerated until the defeat of Germany in 1918. Upon his release he hurried to Warsaw, where the Council of Regency was happy to turn the regency over to him. Thenceforth, until his death in 1935, he remained the dominant figure in the country.

Poland was formally recognized by the United States on January 30, 1919, and by the other powers during the succeeding weeks. It still remained, however, to draw the boundaries of the new state. This was a task for the Paris Conference, which opened in January. But there was no agreement on the question as to whether the new Poland should be a large state or the small Congress Poland of 1815. While the French, who looked upon Poland as a possible future ally against Germany and a buffer against Soviet Russia, stood for a Poland that would be as large as the Allies could make it, Britain was fearful of the consequences of including large minorities. The one question upon which the Allies were agreed was that Poland should have free and unfettered access to the sea. The nearest and most convenient route being by way of Danzig, this German city was made a republic under the League of Nations, and a Corridor which separated East Prussia from the rest of Germany was cut straight across a German-speaking tract. In the Free City of Danzig the Poles were accorded certain rights with respect to access to the quays and the establishment of storehouses, but the citizens of the Free City were not pleased with this arrangement. Final delimitation of all the boundaries of the new state was a matter too difficult to be accomplished in Paris; hence the settlement of a number of questions was postponed. These questions were (1) the boundary with Russia, (2) the question of Eastern Galicia, (3) the question of Upper Silesia, (4) the boundary with Lithuania. Under Article 87 of the Versailles treaty the settlement of these questions was referred to the principal Allied Powers.

But the Poles were not content to wait for a decision by the Allied Powers. Regarding the manner in which Poland was treated by the Peace Conference as "cruel injustice," they began to clamor for territory to which they had no ethnological claim. They dreamed

of a nation comparable to that of the Golden Age of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries, a Poland that had extended from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Since the Peace Conference had not restored such a Poland, the Poles decided to establish one by force of arms. Early in 1920 Pilsudski sent a military expedition against the Bolsheviks. At first the Polish efforts met with considerable success. The army advanced steadily in the direction of Kiev. As they approached, the Russian resistance stiffened but they did manage to take the city. The loss of Kiev caused the Russians to concentrate larger forces in the west, which they were able to do because they had crushed the White armies of Kolchak and Denikin. Soon they were able to launch a counteroffensive which drove the Poles back in a disorganized retreat. City after city was retaken until the Russians were almost at the gates of Warsaw. Confident that they were winning a final victory, they had advanced too fast and had become disorganized. This gave the Poles, who with the help of French officers had reorganized their army, an opportunity to deliver an effective counteroffensive which caught the Russians unawares. Carrying the Russians before them the Poles advanced until on October 3 they reached Minsk. By this time the situation looked so desperate to the Russians that they accepted the Polish terms and on October 12 a preliminary treaty was signed at Riga. The terms included Russian recognition of Polish sovereignty, renunciation of all subversive propaganda in Poland, and the abandonment of all claims to Eastern Galicia, the destiny of this region to be settled between Poland and the Allies.

According to the Treaty of St. Germain the country to the east of the River San (Eastern Galicia) with its capital of Lvov (Lemberg) was not to be added to Poland. The Allies were to be its temporary sovereigns and its permanent status was to be settled by a plebiscite to be held in 1944. This did not, however, deter the Poles from occupying it and treating its population as if they were Polish. They also decided to take matters into their own hands on the Lithuanian side. In October, 1920, a band of irregulars captured Vilna, the capital of Lithuania, and this only two days after the Poles had concluded a pact with the Lithuanians under which they recognized the sovereignty of Lithuania over Vilna. In the following year the Poles exerted strenuous efforts to acquire the whole of Upper Silesia, a highly industrialized region containing important coal fields. According to the Treaty of Versailles its fate was to be decided by a plebiscite. When the plebiscite was held (March, 1921), two thirds of the population voted to remain with

Germany, only the southeastern part voting in favor of union with Poland. This did not satisfy the Poles. After bands of irregulars tried to annex most of Upper Silesia by force, the League of Nations stepped in and divided the territory into two parts, giving Poland a large piece. But the Poles still wanted more than the allotted territory.

When the Allies finally got around to deciding the other disputed boundaries, the decisions were based on the accomplished fact. In other words, they sanctioned Poland's new boundaries which had been established by force since the conclusion of the Versailles treaty. At their meeting in Paris on March 14, 1923, the Allied Council of Ambassadors sanctioned the eastern frontier of Poland as established by the Treaty of Riga, thereby including in Poland territory that was indisputably Russian. The same Ambassadors' Conference also decided to give the whole of Eastern Galicia to Poland, despite the fact that more than 70 per cent of the inhabitants were Ruthenians (Ukrainians) and only about 14 per cent were Poles, the rest being Jews. This the conference did without in any way ascertaining the wishes of the people involved. Finally, the conference also decided to permit Poland to retain possession of Vilna and the Vilna districts despite the far stronger claim of Lithuania. In short, the dimensions of Poland that the Allies sanctioned in 1923 were twice as large as they had been when the Treaty of Versailles was concluded. In these decisions the fear of Bolshevism and France's desire to have a strong ally played an important part.

The source of future trouble lay not so much in the size of the Polish state as in the minorities which had been included in it. More than one third of the total population consisted of disaffected minorities, solid in their hatred of the Poles and in their desire to be free. The existence of so many aliens within the state was a threat to internal tranquillity and a source of external friction. To the mother countries of these groups this state of affairs was a constant challenge. Under these circumstances the creation of a strong army became the only guarantee of peace within and without. Such an army the Poles sought to create despite the fact that the national treasury was in no condition to meet the expenses.

There were other problems facing the new state, including such tasks as repairing the war devastations, building up an internal administration, and welding the Poles, to say nothing of the minorities, into a single unit. The tasks were anything but simple. By far the larger part of the territory comprising the new state had been subject to invasion. The ebbing tide of war had left behind it bleak

fields and demolished factories. There was a grave food shortage, and disease was rampant everywhere. Typhus was decimating towns and villages and there were no medicaments and no physicians to fight the scourge.⁵ Although many thousands were clamoring for employment, the financial means as well as the raw materials were lacking for reopening the factories that had not been destroyed. Furthermore, the new nation found itself swamped in a deluge of varying kinds of currency. There were German marks, Austrian kronen, Russian rubles, and many other kinds of paper money, but almost no gold or silver. Even among the Poles themselves there was little homogeneity. For more than a century the three fragments of the old Poland had been subjected to three quite different administrative and educational systems which left their distinctive marks on each group. When the three were reunited, they found themselves unlike in many respects.

The problems of reconstruction would have taxed to the utmost the energies of a most enlightened and experienced government, but the men who directed affairs were almost completely lacking in political experience. Marshal Pilsudski, in whose favor the Council of Regency had resigned its power, received the unanimous approval of the Constituent Assembly when it met in February, 1919, and he remained chief of state and commander in chief of the army until the autumn of 1922. Soon after he took over the reins of government, Ignace Paderewski, who had been pleading the Polish cause in western Europe and America, arrived in Warsaw. He had a long conversation with Pilsudski and, although the two men did not see eye to eye on a number of subjects, the marshal invited the musician to form a cabinet. This Paderewski did with himself as premier and foreign minister. He also became the principal Polish delegate to the Peace Conference. As such his position was difficult, for he was expected to obtain more territory than the peacemakers were willing to give. When he failed to obtain the outright possession of Eastern Galicia, he lost support at home. Realizing this, he resigned on December 9, 1919, and retired into private life. He was great as a musician, but as a politician he failed to achieve a shining success.

In March, 1921, after two years' deliberation, the Constituent Assembly finally completed and adopted the constitution. It provided for a parliament of two houses, an Assembly (Sejm) and a Senate, elected by popular vote, the right to vote being accorded to

⁵ The shortage of food and medicines was temporarily relieved early in 1919 by the arrival of supplies from the United States.

every citizen who had reached the age of twenty, without distinction of sex. The executive power was vested in a president and a cabinet, the former to be elected for a term of seven years by the members of the two houses in joint session. After the constitution was framed, Pilsudski ostensibly retired to private life, although he still remained head of the General Staff. But parliamentary democracy did not give Poland a responsible and stable government. Parliament groaned under the burden of thirty parties, each of which in the words of one of its members, "was strong enough to sabotage the efforts of the others but incapable of achieving any real constructive work." The succeeding years saw a procession of unstable and short-lived ministries. No less than sixteen cabinets passed across the scene up to May, 1926. In these circumstances many eyes turned to Pilsudski, who by a bold coup gained complete control. The two houses of parliament forthwith elected him president, but the marshal to everyone's surprise declined the offer, taking instead the post of minister of war. Upon his suggestion his friend, Dr. Ignace Mościcki, was elected president but Pilsudski remained the real power behind the throne. Foreign writers often referred to him as a "dictator" but the term could be applied to him only with qualifications. He did not abrogate the constitution nor did he proceed to rule without parliament. His rule rested in the main on the support of the army, and his cabinets were composed mainly of military men. Most of the time his government had a subservient bloc in the Sejm which voted as it was told.

One of the early achievements of the republic was agrarian reform. Important in this respect was the division of the large estates. Whereas about 16,000 large landholders owned much of the land, two thirds of the agricultural population averaged less than five hectares (twelve and a half acres) to a family, which was not sufficient for subsistence. Discontent among the agricultural masses was so pronounced that reform was imperative. Division of the large estates scarcely had the consent of the landed magnates, though there were some who, being financially embarrassed, were glad to part with their holdings for a price. But the political power of the peasantry, together with the support of the left generally, was sufficient to overcome the opposition of the landowners. As early as July, 1919, a resolution was passed, and enacted as a law in the following year, which drastically limited the amount of land that could be held by any one man. The maximum varied from 60 to 100 hectares (150 to 250 acres) according to the district. During the next two decades some eight million acres were transferred to

the small farmers, partly as a result of the agrarian reform laws and partly through voluntary parceling by the landlords. In 1939 Poland was no longer a country of great landlords but one in which more than 80 per cent of the land was owned by small farmers. At the same time the scattered small holdings of many peasants were consolidated. For centuries many holdings had been divided into strips that were often scattered over two or three villages. The consolidation of these strips enabled the peasants to use power machinery and, in general, to practice a more scientific agriculture.

Although Poland is endowed with all the requisites for material prosperity, economic conditions were generally bad during the period between the two wars. Thanks to the incorporation of a part of Upper Silesia, it became one of the foremost countries of Europe in mineral wealth. It had a supply of coal for centuries to come, huge resources of water power, and a great reserve store of energy in the oil fields of Galicia. Furthermore it possessed considerable quantities of zinc, lead, and silver and extensive deposits of limestone, chalk, marble, gypsum, and kaolin. It also contained some of the largest salt mines in the world. The most important industry was coal mining.

But industrial development as a whole was in the infant stage, with only about 10 per cent of the population employed in industry. Although labor was plentiful, scarcity of capital arrested industrial development. Such industry as existed, outside of mining, was largely divided between cottage industry (artisans working in their own homes) and a number of gigantic industrial enterprises created or controlled by foreign capital. When the international depression of 1929 came, it caused an outflow of foreign capital from Poland, thereby weakening private enterprise considerably. In 1937 a fifteen-year plan was initiated for the industrialization of the overpopulated district of central Poland, but before much progress could be made the country was engulfed by the tide of war.

Like most countries of eastern Europe Poland was predominantly agricultural, nearly three quarters of its population deriving a livelihood from the cultivation of the soil.⁶ In the hands of the most frugal peasants in Europe the sandy soil produced large quantities of rye, barley, oats, and potatoes. As a result of the introduction of modern machinery and the wider*use of fertilizer, production increased considerably during the years 1927-1929. As an exporter of rye and barley Poland held first place in Europe and its production of pota-

⁶ In 1939 about 61 per cent derived a livelihood from agriculture as against 72 per cent in 1919.

toes was exceeded only by Germany and Russia. Nevertheless, since much of the produce was raised for export, the position of agriculture was precarious. Every unfavorable world trend affected it adversely. Consequently the income of the Polish farmer was much below that of most other European farmers, largely because of the low price he received for his produce. The position of the peasants became particularly difficult after 1929 when prices of agricultural products declined sharply. Having no accumulated resources to draw on, the peasants sank into a poverty that is difficult to imagine. During the decade of the thirties the government adopted various measures for relief, but financial limitations restricted the aid it could give.

Meanwhile after a decade's trial the constitution had been found wanting, largely because of the weakness of the executive branch. To remedy this a new constitution was drawn up in 1935 which increased the power of the president. The new constitution was hardly "an expression of liberalism." According to its provisions the president was to be chosen by an electoral college composed of the highest officials and seventy-five electors, two thirds of whom were selected by the Sejm and one third by the Senate. Furthermore, the president's power was strengthened in that he was given the right to issue decrees which had the force of law when the Sejm was not in session. A change was also made in the election of the members of the Senate. Two thirds were to be elected by a specially selected group of voters (the "elite") and the remaining third appointed by the president. A little more than a fortnight after the constitution was officially inaugurated Marshal Pilsudski died, leaving a political as well as a personal vacuum. One of his last acts was to appoint an old friend, General Smigly-Rydz, inspector general of the military forces, a post which carried with it supreme control of the army in both peace and war. Thus Pilsudski's cloak was bestowed on Smigly-Rydz but only in a limited sense. The latter did not wield the power the former had exercised. President Mościcki, who had been re-elected in 1933 without a dissenting vote and whose authority had been strengthened by the constitution of 1935, exercised a larger share of the power than he had while Pilsudski was living. Nevertheless the army remained "the power behind the throne."

One of the domestic problems for which the Poles failed to find a solution was the problem of minorities; in fact, this became more acute with the passing years. The only possible way they could have won over the minorities was by treating them with disarming liberality. This they failed to do. In general, they gave little attention

to the susceptibilities of the minority groups. The Poles, it seems, had learned but little during the period they were oppressed by other nations. No sooner were they given control over large minorities than they began to treat them in the same manner they themselves had been treated by the tsar's government and this despite the treaty they had signed. The protection of the minorities was an idea which President Wilson took across the Atlantic in his "bag of good resolutions and laudable intentions" in December, 1918. It was incorporated in a Minorities' Treaty which Poland was required to sign as a necessary condition to her recognition as a sovereign independent state. In the treaty, duly signed on July 28, 1919, the government promised "to protect the interests of the inhabitants of Poland who differ from the majority of the population in race, language, or religion." In other words, the state undertook to assure the minorities complete protection of civil and religious rights. Nevertheless, a systematic policy of Polonization was carried out and those who refused to be absorbed suffered many disadvantages and were subjected to petty persecutions from small officials and from police methods. As a result they became restive and resentful, and the situation as a whole was a threat to both internal and external peace.

There was, first of all, the Jewish problem. Poland had the highest percentage of Jews among the countries of Europe. According to the census of 1931 there were no less than 3,114,000 persons of the Jewish faith in Poland. In other words, the Jews formed between 10 and 14 per cent of the total population. However, since 75 per cent of them lived in towns, they constituted more than 28 per cent of the urban population. In Warsaw, for example, there were 340,000 persons who spoke Yiddish as against a Polish population of approximately 800,000. These Jews were less inclined to be absorbed than those of any other European state. Some few, it is true, were assimilated and were styled "Poles of the Jewish faith," but a growing Jewish nationalism, stimulated in part by the attitude of the Poles, acted as a check upon even limited assimilation. When the census of 1931 was taken, only 381,000 out of a total population of more than three million Jews identified themselves as Poles. The number decreased still further by 1939. Thus, whereas the Jews of Germany represented a thoroughly German element, the Jews of Poland remained a foreign element and as such fomented a vigorous anti-Semitic movement. While Pilsudski was living he was able to hold it in check, but after his death it ran wild. Sponsored by the National Democratic Party, it gradually penetrated the ranks of the state of-

ficials. Certainly the fact that anti-Semitism was cultivated in Germany did not fail to affect the attitude of the Poles. In practice anti-Semitism took the form of an economic boycott of the Jews. As a result many were gradually driven out of the various trades, professions, and crafts in which they had taken root. Since they played such a predominant role in many spheres of economic activity, anti-Semitism served to weaken the general economic structure. Its effect upon the Jewish masses was to force them deeper into the morass of poverty and degradation.

Friction between the Poles and other minorities was equally severe. The traditional hatred of the Ukrainians and the White Russians for the Poles was further intensified by the efforts to Polonize them. There was also much racial bitterness between the Poles and the Lithuanians. But the greatest source of international friction was the German minority. With a view to Polonizing the Germans, the authorities had closed many German schools. Parents who sent their children to the German schools that remained open risked their jobs or exposed themselves to administrative chicanery. In general, those who spoke German were placed under a disadvantage. This treatment was a valuable weapon in the hands of those Germans, particularly the Nazis, who were carrying on agitation for revision of the German boundaries. The Poles retaliated by accusing the German government of even grosser mistreatment of the Polish minority in Germany. In November, 1937, Poland and Germany concluded an agreement guaranteeing just treatment for Polish and German minorities in the two countries. Thereafter the Germans complained frequently that the German minority in Poland was "being crowded to the wall, deprived of land, industry, jobs, and schools." Finally, in 1939 the treatment of the German minority in Poland became a pretext for the invasion of Poland.

But Poland's biggest worry was the fear of being crushed in the giant nutcracker of which Germany formed one arm and Russia the other. A country's foreign policy is usually determined by various elements such as its trade and commerce, its history and traditions, and other factors. In the case of Poland geographical position was most important. Situated between Germany and Russia, two vastly stronger states, her primary function was to maintain friendly relations with both and also between the two, for in a war between Russia and Germany Poland was destined to become the battleground. Thus Poland's fate was bound up in the future relations between Germany and Russia. Poland was particularly vulnerable because, apart from the Carpathians and the Pripet marshes, it had no natural

frontiers, no chains of mountains, not even a rudimentary Maginot Line. Having mostly flat land frontiers, it was open to easy invasion. Hence it was Poland's further task to build up a force that would be strong enough to resist attack from whatever quarter. The budget for military matters was so large that the government was forced to neglect public education and public works. Military expenses consumed nearly half of the country's revenues during the years preceding World War II.

During the years immediately after World War I the Poles, having defeated the Russians, did not fear them too much. The great enemy was Germany. To protect themselves in this direction they concluded an alliance with France on January 9, 1921, followed by a military convention the next year. The specific sources of irritation between Poland and Germany were Upper Silesia, the Corridor, Danzig, and minorities. The Poles knew only too well that the Germans did not accept the Versailles settlement as final. Stresemann himself categorically stated in a letter to the Crown Prince (September 7, 1925) that "rectification of the eastern frontiers of the Reich, recovery of the Polish Corridor and of Danzig, and alterations in the boundary line of Upper Silesia" were included in Germany's territorial demands. Fear of Germany even increased when the Nazis began to launch a world-wide propaganda to convince neutral opinion that the Polish frontier was one of the major injustices of the Peace of Versailles. Believing that neither France nor Great Britain could be counted on to preserve the *status quo*, the Warsaw government began to cultivate friendly relations with Russia and on July 25, 1932, signed a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union. Hitler, who before 1933 had demanded a rectification of the Polish frontier, suddenly dropped the revisionist campaign so far as Poland was concerned. Fearing a combination of Russia and Poland and desiring a free hand to accomplish the annexation of Austria, the Führer offered the Poles a ten-year nonaggression treaty. The treaty, signed January 26, 1934, stated among other things that the two governments "under no circumstances will resort to arms." This treaty led some Poles to believe that Hitler and his Nazis had abandoned the idea of revising the Polish frontier. Later when it suited his purpose Hitler denounced the treaty and sent the German Jugernaut to crush Poland.

Turkey Faces Toward the West

THE END OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

THE Ottoman Turks, so called after Osman, their first outstanding leader, were originally an Asiatic tribe which achieved dominion over Asia Minor. About the middle of the fourteenth century they seized a foothold on the European continent and then went on to conquer the decaying Byzantine Empire. They subdued the Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians, and Rumanians, and finally in 1453 succeeded in taking Constantinople, which became the capital of the new empire. The empire reached its zenith in the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520–1566), at which time it comprised not only Asia Minor, the Balkan Peninsula, and parts of Hungary and Russia but also Syria, Palestine, Arabia, most of the islands of the eastern Mediterranean, and even the coastlands of North Africa almost to the Strait of Gibraltar.

Thereafter the story of the Ottoman Empire is one of decline. In the seventeenth and more particularly in the eighteenth centuries it manifested unmistakable signs of decrepitude. The causes of the decline were many and complex. Outstanding among them was the fact that the string of able sultans ended with Suleiman. Under his weak successors the government soon lost whatever efficiency it had formerly possessed, and the subject peoples became more and more restless. In addition there was the coincident growth of hostile powers and the constant threat of attack from the outside, particularly from Russia and Austria-Hungary. The former, bent on securing an outlet in the Mediterranean, did not stop at casting covetous glances at Constantinople and the Dardanelles but also made the most of every opportunity to hasten the collapse of the Ottoman rule. Thus the empire was on the defensive through most of the eighteenth cen-

tury. With rare exceptions every treaty of peace drove the Turks a step back toward Asia.

During the first half of the nineteenth century the disintegration which had previously set in was considerably hastened by the infiltration of Western nationalist ideas. The concept of nationalism found ready acceptance among the subject peoples and gave rise to independence movements which Russia was not slow to encourage. It appeared as if the death of the "very sick man of Europe," as Tsar Nicholas I had styled the Turkish Empire, was imminent. What saved the empire from speedy extinction was the fact that the other great powers did not wish to see Constantinople pass into Russian hands. Great Britain and France, who had previously remained in the background, now entered the picture. Seeing in Russia's plan to dominate the Dardanelles a threat to their maritime and colonial interests, they sought to revive the dying empire by artificial stimulation so that it would serve as a bulwark against Russian ambitions.¹ Although their efforts postponed final collapse, they failed to stop the disintegration. Weakness and corruption were too deep rooted to be eliminated and nationalism had achieved too great a momentum to be checked. The disintegration was particularly speedy and violent in the Balkan Peninsula, where a number of independent states including Greece, Rumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro came into being during the nineteenth century.

In 1914 the Ottoman government sealed its doom by deciding to stake its fortunes on the triumph of the Central Powers. The armistice, which was signed October 30, 1918, saw the Ottoman forces decisively beaten and Arabia, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine in the possession of the Allies. The sultan's government had to accept the will of the Allies without question. In other words, the chronic "sick man of Europe" was officially dead and it remained only to strip the corpse completely before burying it. By the terms of the armistice the sultan's government undertook to demobilize all its military forces except such as were necessary for policing the frontiers and maintaining internal order. • A few days after the signing of the armistice a powerful British fleet, accompanied by some French ships, anchored in the Golden Horn. Troops landing from these ships marched into Constantinople and occupied both shores of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The Treaty of Sèvres, signed on August 10, 1920, imposed the severest terms on the sultan's government.

¹ On the eve of World War I Emperor William II of Germany succeeded in effectively bringing the sultan under his control. German imperialists had a special interest in Turkey because the Bagdad railway connecting Germany with the Near East ran through it.


Although it was permitted, mainly as a concession to Mohammedan feeling, to retain the city of Constantinople, the whole of eastern Thrace together with the Gallipoli Peninsula was transferred to Greece, and the Straits were placed under the control of an Allied commission. In Asia the sultan's government agreed to surrender Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and the peninsula of Arabia proper. Furthermore, the treaty provided for the creation of an independent Armenian state and for an autonomous Kurdish state to the south of it. Finally, it handed over to Greek administration the chief seaport of Asia Minor, Smyrna, with a considerable hinterland extending over one hundred miles along the coast and almost equally far into the interior.

Had the treaty stood, it would have left Turkey an insignificant, disarmed state in the interior of Anatolia. But the events of 1919 and the succeeding years changed the complexion of things. Although the sultan's government had no alternative but to accept the treaty, opposition to it soon developed in certain circles. The Turkish people, who had been engaged in almost continuous war since 1911, were dispirited and beaten, eager above all for peace and quiet, but when the Greeks sent troops to take possession of Smyrna (May, 1919) their pride was cut to the quick. In various parts of Anatolia influential Turks formed patriotic groups known as Committees for Local Defense, which attracted many embittered ex-army men who still had their arms. All that was needed for a full-fledged revolution was a leader who could rally the country.



REVOLT AGAINST THE TREATY OF SÈVRES

Such a leader was at hand in the person of Mustafa Kemal, an army officer of outstanding ability and determination who subsequently assumed the name of Kemal Atatürk. Having as a youth devoured all the revolutionary literature he could lay hands on, Mustafa Kemal during early manhood became a member of a secret revolutionary society that aimed to break the sultan's despotism and set up a constitutional government. In addition he vowed to free Turkey from the blighting influence of Western imperialist nations. Before the war broke out in 1914 he had already launched the slogan, "Turkey for the Turks." When the war was imminent he voiced his opposition to participation in it, but once the government had committed itself he devoted his every energy to the fight, his most outstanding achievement being the part he played in frustrating the British efforts to establish themselves on the Gallipoli



THE BRITISH "LIFELINE"

This map shows vividly the components of the struggle in western Asia—Russian pressure southward; the oil fields and pipe lines of the Arab territories; the "buffer" role of Greece, Turkey, and Iran; and Britain's "lifeline" to the Far East.

Peninsula. Thus he emerged from the war with a far-reaching military reputation. The terms of the armistice which concluded hostilities convinced him that the Allies were condemning Turkey to death. He decided that the only hope for his country lay in resistance. He tried to persuade the politicians surrounding the sultan to permit him to reorganize the army and lead it against the Greeks, but Mohammed VI and his henchmen were more interested in their own personal security than in the fate of the people. Instead of supporting his plans for resistance, they appointed him inspector general of the troops and sent him to eastern Anatolia to supervise the disarmament of the forces in that district.

But Kemal did not give up his idea of resistance. Upon arrival in eastern Anatolia he proceeded at once to reorganize the troops stationed there into an army for defense against the Greeks. More than this, he also set to work uniting the various Committees for Local Defense that were already working for the protection of Turkish rights into a nationalist party called the People's Party. In 1919 two congresses of nationalist delegates from all over the country convened in eastern Anatolia and an executive committee presided over by Mustafa Kemal was elected with headquarters at Ankara. When the sultan's government learned what was going on, it sent Kemal peremptory orders to return to Constantinople at once. Instead of complying he answered, "I shall stay in Anatolia until the nation has won its independence." Then he sent word to all towns still in Turkish hands to elect delegates to a Grand National Assembly. The assembly, composed of 350 deputies, met at Ankara on April 23, 1920, and during the succeeding days drew up a constitution and declared itself the sole lawful representative of the nation. In short, a new Turkish government came into being. Mustafa Kemal was chosen president of the Grand National Assembly, but not as yet of Turkey. Hoping to gain the support of many who were still loyal to the sultan, he declared in his speeches that a new government was necessary because the sultan was a prisoner in the hands of the Allies and therefore incapable of independent political action. Ankara was made the seat of the new government.

Meanwhile Kemal had also been organizing for national defense against Greek invasion. It was a task which would have seemed hopeless to a less determined person. Not only was the Greek army supported by the Allies, but most of the Turkish soldiers who had just returned from the front wanted anything rather than further fighting. They were utterly war weary and begged to be left in peace to till their fields. But Kemal did not permit apathy or lack

of arms to deter him. Night and day he worked with fierce tenacity and indefatigable energy in assembling the remnants of the army, in finding arms for his troops, and in exciting in them the will to resist the Greeks. Finally he succeeded with the help of his close friend, Ismet Pasha, and other able assistants in creating an effective fighting force. The Greeks, after occupying Smyrna in 1919, pushed on into Anatolia the following year without suffering reverses; but in the early months of 1921 the Turkish army, led by Ismet Pasha, defeated them twice at İnönü. Upon receiving reinforcements the Greeks advanced on Ankara until they reached the Sakarya River, where they were finally stopped by the Turks under the personal command of Kemal (September, 1921). After spending some months reorganizing his forces, Mustafa Kemal decided in August, 1922, that the time had come to take the offensive. The attack caught the Greeks completely by surprise. Everywhere their lines were broken and soon their entire army was in retreat, a retreat which in its final stages became a rout. The demoralized Greeks fled helter-skelter to the coast, where they embarked for home. On September 9, 1922, the Turks reoccupied Smyrna.

Having expelled the Greeks from Anatolia, Kemal made preparations to drive them out of eastern Thrace. To do this he had to cross the Straits, which were still occupied by an Allied force. As the Turkish army approached, the French and Italian contingents withdrew but the British did not. For a time it seemed as if a clash between British and Turks would take place but they finally concluded an armistice which provided for the restoration of eastern Thrace to Turkey upon the final signing of a peace treaty. The Allies invited not only the Kemalists but also the sultan's government to the peace conference. This situation of having two recognized governments in one country moved the Grand National Assembly to take the step of abolishing the sultanate once and for all on October 1, 1922. A few days later representatives of the Ankara government took over the administration of Constantinople (called Istanbul by the Turks) and Sultan Mohammed VI fled to Malta on board a British warship.

In addition to being the secular ruler of the Ottoman Empire the sultan had also been caliph.² Mustafa Kemal would have liked to abolish the caliphate at the same time the sultanate was abolished, but he was not yet strong enough to risk touching the religious

² The word "caliph" means "successor to the prophet." As the successor of Mohammed the sultan was regarded not only by the Turkish Moslems but by all the Moslems of the world as their spiritual master.

sentiments of the Moslems both inside and outside Turkey. Hence the new government decided to retain the caliphate and Abdul-Medjid, another member of the house of Osman, was elected caliph with powers solely spiritual.

The peace conference opened at Lausanne in November, 1922.³ During months of diplomatic wrangling Ismet Pasha held firmly to the demands of the Ankara government with such success that when the treaty was finally signed on July 24, 1923, it granted the Turks almost all they had demanded. Not only was eastern Thrace returned but the nationalist government also received, by and large, the boundaries it had claimed in Anatolia. Armenia was divided between Turkey and Russia. All pecuniary claims for loss and damage suffered by both sides during the period since the first of August, 1914, were reciprocally renounced. Furthermore, the capitulations, i.e., the special privileges which foreigners had previously enjoyed in Turkey, were abolished. As a step toward the achievement of racial unity in the new Turkey, provisions were made to exchange the Orthodox Greeks living in Turkish territory for the Moslem Turks living in Greece. The rest of the Christian minorities were to enjoy free exercise of their religion and the same civil and political rights as Moslems. Only in a few issues did the Turks fail to achieve their demands. Noteworthy in this respect is the provision which forbade them to fortify the Straits without the consent of the powers.⁴ Thus alone among the defeated nations of World War I the Turks, after rejecting the Treaty of Sèvres, succeeded in negotiating a treaty with the Allied Powers on a footing of equality. Of all the treaties ending the war only the Treaty of Lausanne represented a genuinely negotiated treaty.



WESTERNIZATION OF TURKEY

The treaty was the preliminary to the unconditional recognition of Mustafa Kemal and his government.⁵ At the first meeting of the Grand National Assembly after the signing of the peace Kemal's status at home was also clarified. In October, 1923, the new state was officially proclaimed a republic and Kemal was chosen by the Assembly to be its first president. Although the government was

³ It was attended by representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, Turkey, Greece, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and the United States. While taking part in the deliberations the United States representatives did not sign any documents. A special treaty between Turkey and the United States was concluded after the signing of the treaty of Lausanne.

⁴ This consent was given at the Montreux Conference in June, 1936.

⁵ Soviet Russia had recognized the government as early as August, 1920.

theoretically managed by a written constitution and an elected assembly, it was not the rule of many but of one. All power in the state was concentrated in Kemal's hands. From the lowest clerk up to the prime minister every official was a member of the People's Party, the party created and controlled by him. There was no opposition party. In a country in which democratic procedure was still beyond the comprehension of the average individual a dictatorship was the only form of government possible at the moment. Halidé Edib, staunch exponent of constitutional government and leader of the feminist movement in Turkey, wrote: "In such a country a strong centralized government, if not a dictatorship, with stabilized forces backing it, is inevitable and perhaps necessary."⁶ Many of Kemal's acts, it is true, were high handed and arbitrary, but in general his rule was benevolent. Kemal himself lost his temper when foreign writers called him a dictator. He liked to feel that he was exercising his authority within the limits of the constitution. Above all, he believed that he was creating a democratic tradition which would make a dictatorship impossible in the future.

With the external troubles settled and his position established, Kemal lost no time in making it clear that he intended to make Turkey a modern Westernized state. "If our bodies," he said, "are in the East, yet in spirit we look westward. We aspire to modernize our country." He had already torn up the political fabric; now he would change social ideas and habits, customs, manners, and even dress—in short, everything that bound the people to their Oriental past.

Westernization was not a new departure. It had been going on to some extent for more than a century and may be said to have begun when the first unit of Ottoman troops was equipped and drilled in the Western fashion by Sultan Selim III (1789–1807). Although some later sultans were so openly reactionary that they sought to construct bulwarks against the infiltration of Western ideas, others did endeavor to introduce changes along Western lines. Each attempt, however, to impose reforms from above was greeted by the people with reactionary demonstrations which showed how far they were from being ready to change their Oriental ways.

A more determined effort to introduce social as well as administrative reforms was made in 1908 and subsequent years by the Young Turk movement, which was supported by many young officers who had either traveled or studied in Europe. But the leaders of the movement were too much occupied with international matters and

⁶ *Turkey Faces West* (1930), p. 223.

too busy maintaining their hold on the government to achieve thoroughgoing changes. Thus the end of World War I saw the Turkish masses still clinging to their old customs. Nevertheless the Young Turk movement was an essential preliminary to the Kemalist reforms in that it prepared the minds of many leaders for the changes that were to come.

Whereas the Young Turk movement had been characterized by a confusion of aims, Mustafa Kemal was sure of his own aim and was determined to achieve it. He realized that before he could get his people to accept Western ideas and practices he must break the iron grip of the religion of Islam. The "good-for-nothing priests," Kemal said, had in the past "decided the form of the constitution, the details of the lives of each Turk, his food, his hours of rising and sleep, the shape of his clothes, the routine of the midwife who produced his children, what he learned in schools, his customs, his thoughts, even his most intimate habits."⁷ As the first step toward secularization Kemal suggested the abolition of the caliphate. When the Assembly hesitated he spurred them on by declaring that the caliphate was "an antiquated and useless institution." As a result the law abolishing the caliphate was passed on March 3, 1924. Next the antiquated system of laws based on the Koran was replaced by modern civil, penal, and commercial codes borrowed from the West, and the religious schools and colleges were either secularized or put under government control. The government also published decrees dissolving the monastic orders and closing convents and monasteries because they were centers of reaction. Finally in 1928 the Assembly decided to make the state entirely secular by striking from the constitution the clauses which stated that Islam was the established religion. For the official oath in the name of Allah, affirmations on the individual's honor were substituted, a favorite form being "I vow on my honor as a Turk."

The jettisoning of the effete ecclesiastical establishments opened the way for other changes. One of these was putting the Turk into European clothes. Kemal decided that if the Turks were to think like their Western neighbors they must also look like them. Accordingly he insisted that the people cease wearing the fez, which was the "hallmark of the Ottoman and the Moslem." "The fez," Kemal said, "is the sign of ignorance." First he succeeded in getting the soldiers to wear peaked caps by showing them the practical advantages of these caps and by explaining to them that the fez was not a Turkish but a borrowed garment; then he set out to convert

⁷ Cited in Armstrong, *Grey Wolf*, p. 241.

the people to the wearing of the Western hats and caps. When many refused to give up the fez because it had a religious significance,⁸ Kemal ordered the Assembly to pass a law which made the wearing of the fez a criminal offense. Those who refused to obey the law were arrested, some being given prison sentences, others bastinadoed and in extraordinary cases even hanged. This was a "language" the average Turk understood and the opposition collapsed, every Turk hurrying to find a hat, a cap, or anything with a brim. During the years that followed, other European customs and practices were gradually introduced. The international clock was adopted in place of the day which had begun at sunrise, the Gregorian was substituted for the Islamic calendar, and provisions were made for the gradual introduction of the metric system. Another noteworthy change made it obligatory for all Turks to adopt family names (1934). The use of surnames having disappeared under the influence of Islam, certain given names had become so common that in the schools it was found necessary to designate the pupils by number. As for Kemal himself, the Assembly voted to bestow on him the surname Atatürk, meaning "Father of the Turks." He in turn chose for Ismet Pasha, his prime minister, the name of İnönü, in commemoration of the victory he had won over the Greeks at the place of the same name.

A further aim of Kemal was to free his people from ignorance and to raise them to the intellectual level of the Western peoples. It is estimated that in 1927 less than 13 per cent of those over twelve years of age were literate. The widespread illiteracy was due not only to a lack of schools but also to the fact that it was difficult to use the cumbersome Arabic alphabet. To remedy this Kemal appointed a commission in 1928 to draw up a new alphabet on the Latin model, and the Assembly set a date after which the use of the old script would be illegal. Teachers were then trained to give instruction in its use, and schools were opened throughout the country to teach it to the people. Kemal himself even traveled about the country demonstrating how much easier it was to learn the new alphabet than the old one. In certain regions where the people were most apathetic the police literally dragged persons to school. As a result nearly half of the country's adult population was able to read and write after a period of ten years. The Assembly also passed a law making primary education compulsory for all children beginning at the age of seven. But because of a shortage of trained teachers the law could not be generally enforced. Nevertheless, each year

⁸ The religious significance of the fez rested on the custom which required a Moslem to keep his head covered and to touch the ground with his forehead while praying.

saw an increase in the number of children attending school. It is estimated that by 1935 about 40 per cent of all children between the ages of seven and twelve were in primary school.

Nor did the efforts of the Kemalists cease with the introduction of the new alphabet and the promotion of primary education. To bring Turkey a step nearer to Europe, provisions were made for the establishment of a variety of vocational and professional schools. The best graduates of these were often sent to Europe and the United States for further study, many of them becoming leaders in the Westernization of Turkey upon their return.

Much was also done to promote interest in the fine arts. Because the Koran prohibits images or likenesses of anything in heaven, earth, or water, painting and sculpture were unknown arts in Turkey. The religion of Islam was also opposed to most forms of music as being sensual, only a simple form of folk music being permitted. But the opening of cultural centers in the larger cities, together with the relaxing of religious ties, was instrumental in arousing considerable interest in Western art and music. Kemal took the lead in violating the Islamic ban on graven images by ordering two statues of himself set up, the first in Constantinople and the second in Ankara. He further brought in music from the West, including classical compositions, Viennese waltzes, and American jazz. Dancing schools were also opened to introduce Western styles of dancing.

Finally, the government attempted to teach the masses some simple rules of hygiene and health. Little did it matter to the average Turk that his environment was filthy, his water supply polluted, and he himself disease ridden; his hour would strike only when Allah willed. It was the doctrine of kismet, a form of fatalism taught by the priests of Islam. As a means of dissipating the apathy of the masses the government instructed the priests to teach Moslems to protect themselves against bacteria and microbes as they would against vicious dogs. Measures were also taken for the protection of the water supply used for drinking purposes, the disposal of sewage, the draining of malarial swamps, the construction of sanitary outdoor toilets, vaccination against smallpox, and the prevention of other diseases.

Probably the most outstanding reform was the emancipation of women. The idea, like most of the others, did not originate with the Kemalists. A beginning had already been made in this direction during World War I. Previously Turkish women had lived the secluded life of a bygone age when the harem existed. Since prac-



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THE NEW AND THE OLD IN WOMEN'S CLOTHES IN TURKEY

tically nothing was done for the education of girls, few women were able to read or write. They were veiled at fourteen, married a year or two later, and thereafter spent most of their time in the privacy of their home. Most of them seldom went out and when they did were accompanied by members of their families or by an escort of other women. In public a woman concealed her figure in voluminous black clothes and covered her face with the exception of one or both eyes. In public conveyances there were special screened sections to protect women from the gaze of men.

During the First World War polygamy had been made subject to the agreement of the first wife, higher education had been opened to women, and in the cities many women had become clerks and civil servants to fill the places of men called to arms. It remained for the Kemalists to raise women to an equal status with men. The first change took place in women's attire. Fearing to arouse resentment, Atatürk did not attempt to achieve this change by law. He asked women schoolteachers, the wives of army officers, and other progressive women to discard the veil and adopt European styles. Soon most women who did not wish to appear old-fashioned adopted the new mode. In the agricultural districts the change was, of course, accepted much more slowly. In 1926 the Civil Code gave women equal rights with men in marriage, making it possible for a woman to divorce her husband, whereas a man could no longer divorce his wife without her consent. The same Civil Code also gave women equal rights in the ownership of property and in all legal matters. Four years later they received the right to vote in municipal elections and to hold municipal offices. In 1934 they were given equal suffrage in national elections. The next year, with women voting for the first time, seventeen women were elected to the Grand National Assembly. Business and the professions were also opened to women. Before long many were not only working in shops, banks, and business offices but also serving as teachers, physicians, lawyers, and even judges. In short, the eve of World War II saw Turkish women dressed in the latest European fashions, mingling in society, and taking part in almost every business and profession, as in any Western country.



ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN TURKEY

During all this time the Kemalists did not neglect economic development. Turkey is essentially an agricultural country, its chief products being tobacco, wheat, barley, figs, and raisins. But its

yield per acre was low and its agricultural techniques backward. In the years from 1923 to 1925 its agricultural yield was so poor that thousands of tons of wheat had to be imported. Such a condition was intolerable to the Kemalists and they promptly took steps to remedy it. In addition to easing the peasant's burden of taxation, the government began in 1924 to give all farm youths instruction in improved agricultural technique during the period of military training. Next the facilities for advancing credits were improved, better seeds were distributed, and cooperative marketing societies organized. The government also fostered various irrigation schemes and set up model farms on which the latest machinery was demonstrated. The result was that imports of wheat decreased rapidly after 1925 until they disappeared entirely in 1930. Thereafter Turkey began to export wheat. Furthermore, there was a large increase in the production of barley, and the production of rice was trebled in a decade. But probably the most striking agricultural success came as a result of the introduction of the sugar beet. Whereas no sugar was produced in Turkey prior to 1926 and the imports had been approximately 60,000 tons per year, production of sugar beets had by 1934 reached a volume which made the importation of sugar unnecessary.

The Kemalists also made immense strides in the direction of industrializing the country. At the time of their accession to power, industry consisted principally of foreign-owned cigarette factories, a few textile mills, and cottage industries that produced carpets and pottery. With but few industries Turkey was, so to speak, a seller of raw materials and a buyer of manufactured goods. "Industrialization," Atatürk said, "is one of our national problems. We shall create every industry, great or small, for which there are in our own land the economic conditions necessary to its work and development." To promote the establishment of large-scale industries the Assembly in 1927 offered free grants of land, to a maximum of ten hectares, for factories and railroad sidings. But as free capital for financing new industries was scarce and the government was opposed to permitting foreign concessionaries to come in, the state itself entered the industrial field. The method it employed was to establish a number of banks, each of which devoted its attention to special industries. The banks furnished funds for the building of factories and closely controlled the production of goods in the new plants. In 1934 the government embarked on an ambitious five-year plan which emphasized the production of textiles, cellulose, pottery, iron, steel, coke, coal, and chemicals. It was so successfully executed

that by 1939, for example, Turkey was manufacturing about 80 per cent of its requirements of cotton yarn and cloth and almost all its requirements of woolen yarn and cloth. It is claimed that more than six hundred factories of various kinds were built between 1927 and 1939. In 1939 a second five-year plan was inaugurated aiming, above all, to increase the production of minerals and electricity and to improve harbor and shipping facilities.

Besides building many factories the Kemalists spent lavishly on railways. In 1923 Turkey had a little more than 4000 kilometers of railways, all of which were foreign owned. The Germans owned about 67 per cent and the rest was owned by British and French interests. Early in 1924 work was started on the first state-owned railways and by 1935 the government built no less than 2600 kilometers of new lines. In addition the government purchased the foreign-owned lines during the years 1934–1936. Thus by the outbreak of World War II Turkey had an extensive network of railways to serve both economic and strategic requirements. The state also owned and operated the postal and telegraph services and held a monopoly of all coastwise shipping.

Side by side with the Westernization policy the government sponsored a strong nationalistic program. Kemal Atatürk decided to make his slogan, "Turkey for the Turks," a reality and to cultivate in his people a feeling of racial pride. Many trades and professions were closed to non-Turks. Turkish goods were widely advertised, and the Turkish flag was prominently displayed in many places. After the abandonment of the Arabic script, Kemal ordained that Turkish words be substituted for the Arabic and Persian words with which the language was weighted down. The Koran was also translated into Turkish and in 1932 the suras from the Koran were recited for the first time in Turkish during prayers in a mosque at Istanbul. In the words of the patriot poet, Zia Goek Alp,

A land in which the call to prayer resounds from the mosque in the
Turkish tongue,
Where the peasant understands the meaning of his prayers.
A land where the schoolboy reads the Koran in his mother tongue,
O son of the Turk, that is thy Fatherland.

Though the Turks became proud of their nationality, they did not become arrogant or aggressive. All dreams of Pan-Islam or of a great sphere of Turkish influence having been abandoned, the government did not have any irredentist claims. The central idea of foreign policy was peace, "peace at home and peace with the

world," as Kemal put it. Peace was essential to recovery from the many years of war and to the program for the creation of a new Turkey. To insure peace, treaties were negotiated with Russia, Afghanistan, Iran, Italy, Great Britain, and other countries, and a rapprochement even took place with Greece, the hereditary enemy. In general, Turkey's relations with all the countries with which it had dealings were quite cordial. This does not mean, however, that Turkey was "a shrinking violet in the international garden." The government, having renounced imperialism itself, was determined not to let other states interfere in its affairs or take some of its territory. The idea was well summed up by Dr. Tewfik Rushdi, the foreign minister, when he said: "Turkey does not desire an inch of foreign territory, but will not give up an inch of what she holds."

Kemal Atatürk's iron physique, which for so many years had defied the laws of nature, finally crumbled and he died on November 10, 1938. Amid universal mourning the Turks laid the remains of their beloved leader to rest in the Museum of Ethnography built on a hill overlooking the city of Ankara. His real monument is the achievements of his energetic life. In the face of overwhelming odds he had the courage to defy the Greeks and the Allies at the conclusion of World War I. He emerged victorious from the bitter struggle that followed, and the Treaty of Lausanne sealed his triumph. Thenceforward he turned his energy and his genius to rebuilding the ramshackle state on new and strong foundations. Great as his achievement of establishing an independent and territorially compact state is, the fact that he gave Turkey a new soul is more important. When he began, the Turks were a backward Oriental people bound by the shackles of outworn superstitions; at his death they were well on the way toward becoming a modern progressive nation. All this he accomplished in a few years. Few if any revolutions have achieved so much in so short a time as the one he organized. Ruthless to his foes but charming to his friends, he is enshrined in the memory of his people as the "Father of the Turks."

Immediately after Kemal Atatürk's death İsmet İnönü was unanimously elected to the presidency by the Grand National Assembly. The new president had been associated with Kemal for about twenty years and had watched over the new state as prime minister for thirteen years. He was not only strong and experienced but also a man whose name carried great weight and respect throughout the country. He was deeply committed to the same ideals of Westernization and national self-sufficiency that Kemal had espoused. In foreign affairs he continued the policy of his predecessor.



CHAPTER TWELVE

Nazi Germany

THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM

FEW great movements in history have attained supreme power in so short a time as did National Socialism. In 1919 a small number of dissatisfied ex-soldiers in Munich organized a political party which for some years gave little promise of growth; fourteen years later this party was exercising absolute authority over the lives of sixty-five million people.

No single explanation of this phenomenon can suffice. The reasons for its success are to be found in a medley of complex economic, psychological, and political factors. Among the more important were the defeat in World War I and the cumulative severity of the Treaty of Versailles. While the former produced a sense of humiliation and stimulated a desire for revenge, the latter created an acute sense of grievance. Having expected a treaty based on the Fourteen Points, the Germans resented the loss of territory, the demand for reparations, and the severe limitation of military power. But above all, they resented the "war guilt" clause (Article 231), which they interpreted as placing upon them and their allies the entire responsibility for the war. Other factors which increased their feeling of bitterness were the French occupation of the Ruhr and the inflation which wiped out the savings of the lower middle class.

More important in their direct bearing upon the success of the National Socialist (Nazi) movement were the world-wide depression and the magic of Hitler. The depression and unemployment that followed the boom of the late twenties not only brought the war-guilt resentment to the fore again; it also destroyed whatever respect the republic still commanded. There never had been much zeal for the republic. The people had accepted it unenthusiastically

and under compulsion. From the start it had been associated in the minds of many with humiliation. It is doubtful, in fact, whether it did represent a desirable ultimate form of state for any important political group. When depression and unemployment came, public opinion was inclined to hold the republican government ultimately responsible. More than this, the great depression prepared the Germans to follow anyone who promised them bread and jobs. This gave Hitler his opportunity and he was not slow to make the most of it. By the consummate skill of his demagoguery he succeeded in convincing millions that he was the Messiah they were looking for, that he could give them what they needed and desired.

To understand National Socialism it is necessary to know something about the life and ideas of its leading spirit. Adolf Hitler was born in the Austrian village of Braunau on April 20, 1889, the son of a minor customs official. The elder Hitler hoped that his son would also become an Austrian official, but young Adolf showed no inclination to follow in his father's footsteps. In fact, he manifested little ambition for anything. Most of all he liked to sit by himself and dream. He was, in the opinion of his mother, "moon-struck." His only interests at school seem to have been history and geography. His history teacher at Linz, where he attended secondary school, was a Pan-Germanist, one who passionately desired the union of all people of German stock in one national state. This zeal for German nationalism the teacher was able to inculcate in his pupil. Young Adolf soon learned to regard the Habsburgs with contempt because they lacked a sense of German patriotism and to detest the Austrian Empire because it was an empire of nationalities and not a national empire. The German nationalism which was engendered in him by his teacher became the motive power of his life. It is the key to all his acts and all his ideas.

Until he was nineteen, it appears, young Hitler just loafed. But the death of his mother in 1908, preceded by the death of his father in 1903, compelled him to shift for his own living. Packing up his few belongings in a suitcase, he set out for Vienna to become "somebody," as he put it in his autobiography. He wanted to become an artist. The Academy of Art, however, refused to admit him because he could not draw. "Test drawing below standard," was the verdict of his examiners. The next five years, as he himself has described them, were "years of misery and desolation." Having no money and little talent for anything, he eked out a precarious existence by selling postcards or working at such odd jobs as a bricklayer's assistant, who carried bricks and mortar. Much of the time he had to

sleep in the humblest lodging houses, commonly known as flop-houses. "That I became hard and am able to be hard," he wrote, "I owe to that period of my life."

To his Vienna experiences he also attributed many of the convictions which guided his life and the National Socialist movement. Besides deepening his sense of nationalism, they gave birth to the anti-Semitic prejudices which intensive reading later elevated into the creed that caused so much misery in Germany and other countries. The sight on a Vienna street of a Polish Jew dressed in a caftan, he asserted, convinced him that Jews could never be Germans but were a race apart. Furthermore, in Vienna he also conceived a violent animosity to Marxian socialism because he regarded its supposed internationalism, its pacifism, and its theory of class struggle as unnatural and unwholesome. When he left Vienna for Munich in 1913 he was, in his own words, "a convinced anti-Semite, a mortal enemy of Marxian philosophy, and a Pan-German."

Since the question of making a living presented the same difficulties in Munich as it had in Vienna, the outbreak of war was in one sense at least welcome to him. Instead of returning to fight with the troops of the Dual Monarchy, he joined the Bavarian army and served on the western front. During the war he was twice wounded, was promoted to the rank of corporal, and received the decoration of the Iron Cross.

The armistice again saw him confronted by the problem of earning a living. Unable to find employment he decided to become a politician. In the summer of 1919 he joined with a small group of malcontents like himself in forming the German Workers' Party, which was later reorganized as the National Socialist German Workers' Party. Almost from the beginning he seems to have become the leading figure in the movement. At the meetings of the party, usually held in the small back room of a Munich café, and at other impromptu gatherings, he discovered his talent as an orator. He himself says in his autobiography, "I could speak! After thirty minutes the people in the tiny room were electrified." Thereafter he missed no opportunity to harangue a crowd whenever he could collect one. His favorite theme, even at this time, was denunciation of the Treaty of Versailles. With his frenzied oratory he would play on the emotions of his audiences until, as he said, "I had before me a surging mass full of sacred indignation and boundless wrath."

In 1920 Gottfried Feder drew up for the party a program containing twenty-five points. Among other things it demanded "union of all Germans by the right of self-determination," "abrogation of

the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain," ousting of all non-Germans from the Reich, abolition of unearned incomes and the "slavery to interest" (*Zinsknechtschaft*), nationalization of all trusts, and agrarian reform consistent with the national needs. Above all, it proclaimed the violent anti-Semitism which later became one of the main planks in the Nazi platform.

The new party aimed to be both nationalist and socialist. It was nationalist and German in that its aspirations were for Germans only; socialist, in the sense that it emphasized the obligation of the state to control everything that concerns the needs of its citizens; and a workers' party because it hoped to attract particularly the laboring classes. The organization was along military lines. In imitation of Mussolini's Black Shirts Hitler organized a party militia of Brown Shirts, called the SA (*Sturm Abteilung*) or Storm Troopers. The earliest recruits appear to have been largely unemployed veterans and ne'er-do-wells, with a sprinkling of social outcasts. Originally devised merely to maintain order at party meetings, the Storm Troopers were soon to earn a reputation for unmitigated black-guardism when Nazi leaders made terror an integral part of their system. The Storm Troopers gradually increased in number until they became a veritable army. In 1931 Hitler wrote in the *Völkischer Beobachter*, "There has grown out of a little group of all-daring fighters an army of the swastika which has already passed the second hundred thousand." In 1932 its membership rose to 300,000. When the organization of the party became nationwide in 1929, a second unit, the SS (*Schutz Staffel*) or Elite Guard, a black-garbed corps of seasoned veterans subject to duty anywhere in Germany, was organized. Nor did Hitler's indebtedness to Mussolini stop with the idea of a party militia. He also transplanted the ancient Roman salute which Mussolini had revived. As the latter adopted the *fascio* as the symbol of his party, Hitler imported the swastika from India as a symbol for his party. In addition, the Fascist anthem was imitated in a similar rhythm, and Mussolini's title of "Duce" was translated into "Führer" for Hitler.

During the first years after the party was organized, it attracted such men as Captain Roehm, Hermann Göring, and Dr. Alfred Rosenberg, but it was not widely known outside of Bavaria. It first came into the limelight in 1923 as the result of an attempted *coup d'état* or Putsch, more generally known as the "Beer-Hall Putsch" because it was plotted in the back room of a Munich café. The crisis caused by the occupation of the Ruhr convinced not only Hitler and his associates but also General Ludendorff and his nationalist fol-

lowers that the moment was right for a successful Putsch. So the two men joined forces. The plan was to seize the Bavarian government as a means of liberating Bavaria from Berlin and all the "evils" of the Weimar system. But the attempt was a ludicrous failure. When the Hitler-Ludendorff followers marched into the Odeonplatz in Munich on the appointed day, a few shots fired by the police quickly scattered them and put an ignominious end to the attempt. That Hitler escaped unscathed was due to the fact that placing prudence before valor he threw himself flat upon the pavement when the firing started. Both Hitler and Ludendorff were arrested and tried for treason. The latter was acquitted because of the services he had rendered to his country during the war. Hitler was sentenced to five years' imprisonment, but a too lenient government released him before he had served a year. Meanwhile, in the general election of May, 1924, the Nazi Party succeeded in electing no less than thirty-two members to the Reichstag.



THE NAZI BIBLE

While he was confined in the fortress of Landsberg Hitler wrote the first, and after his liberation the second, volume of *Mein Kampf* which became the Bible of the National Socialist movement. In it he expounded his *Weltanschauung*, in other words, the ideas, feelings, and beliefs that would guide him if he came to power. Written in atrocious German, the work is frankly Machiavellian in its disregard of all moral considerations. The idea that the end justifies the means or, as he puts it, that "success is the only earthly judge of right and wrong" is repeated time and again. Thus he wrote: "The rightness of propaganda must be judged exclusively by its real effect." The work is not, however, a systematic exposition. Hitler's mind lacked the intellectual discipline necessary for a logical arrangement of ideas. Hence the contents are a hodgepodge of history and fiction, wisdom and folly, fantasy and statesmanship. Most of the ideas are stated over and over again. This together with the digressions makes the book uninteresting and laborious reading.

Nevertheless *Mein Kampf* is a powerful work. Politically, it is probably the most influential book that has appeared in the twentieth century. Published by the author and issued in two volumes, it did not at first gain wide circulation. It was only when it appeared in a one-volume "people's edition" at one third the original price that large numbers were sold. After Hitler's accession to power gigantic quantities were produced and it became a duty not only

for the members of the party but for all civil servants to buy it. In 1939 the sales passed the five million mark, making it one of the best sellers of all time.

In *Mein Kampf* Hitler presented a creed he hoped to carry through to the end. Its central idea was that of race. Like the Frenchman Gobineau, author of the nineteenth-century essay "On the Inequality of Races," Hitler believed that "the racial question gives us the key to all problems of history."¹ He did not trouble to define race or to distinguish between "race" and "nation." All questions of definition, proof, and origins he summarily brushed aside, appealing to the reader's consciousness of the reality of race. After stating that all races are not equal, he proceeded to divide them into three groups: the culture creators, the culture bearers, and the culture destroyers. Only the Aryan or Nordic race belongs in the first category and it alone is responsible for all spiritual, cultural, and economic progress. The Germans, he asserted, are the foremost Nordic nation, the only other great European nation with any comparable claim being the British. Regarding the races to be classed as culture bearers he was purposely vague, but he did classify the Jews and the Negroes as culture destroyers. Unfortunately the Aryan race had degenerated as a result of intermarriage with inferior races. "The mixing of blood, the pollution of race," Hitler stated, "has been the sole reason why the old civilizations died out." If civilization is to be preserved and extended, the Nordics must keep their blood pure. They must be permitted to marry only Nordics. This is desirable in the interest not only of the Nordics themselves but of all humankind because they are practically the sole source of civilization and progress. "As much as we possess in the field of arts and sciences," he wrote, "almost all of it has been created by the Aryan. . . . Subdue him and darkness will sink upon the earth."²

Besides setting down the aims of National Socialism in regard to internal affairs Hitler also included much about the external aims of his party. If Germany is to become a world power, she must acquire more territory. The expansion of the nation necessitates such a step, for a growing nation must have *Lebensraum* (room to live). But where are the Germans to find more territory? Are they to acquire oversea colonies? Hitler vigorously opposes the acquisi-

¹ The writer to whom Hitler, either directly or indirectly, is most indebted for his race theory is Houston Stuart Chamberlain, a German of English ancestry who wrote *Die Grundlagen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* (*The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*).

² Hitler used the words "Nordic" and "Aryan" as interchangeable terms.

tion of colonies separated from Germany proper. The new territory much be closely connected with the fatherland so that it will never be lost. To find such land, he said, the Germans must turn their gaze to the east. Russia has vast stretches of land that would be ideally suited for German *Lebensraum*. Moreover, he was sure that the Bolshevik regime would inevitably collapse and the Germans could then win new territory through "the might of a victorious sword." "Frontiers of states," he wrote, "are made by men, and men can alter them." However, before they attack Russia the Germans must crush France, Germany's archenemy, because the French would never stand idly by and see Germany strengthen herself at the expense of Russia. To crush France and then wrest territory from Russia was, in Hitler's opinion, in accordance with the law of nature, for this is "a world of struggle where, in every part of it, one being feeds upon another and the death of the weaker is the life of the stronger." But the major war must not come until Germany is ready. To make victory certain she must not only rearm herself; she must also conclude alliances with Italy and Great Britain, one with Italy against France and another with Great Britain against Russia.



NAZI TECHNIQUE

During the period of prosperity from 1924 to 1929 the Nazi movement got nowhere, but with the onset of depression its opportunity came. The economic collapse, accompanied by a rapid rise in the number of unemployed, made Germany fertile for the Nazis. Although it is true that the cause probably would not have succeeded if the depression had not prepared the ground for it, one must not overlook the ability of the Nazis to make the most of the opportunity offered them. Essential factors in their success were their skill in yoking to their cause the forces let loose by the period of domestic disintegration and their mastery of the art of propaganda. They evolved a technique of mass propaganda and mass emotionalism which made the efforts of the other parties appear feeble and amateurish. The movement probably owes more to propaganda than did any similar movement preceding it. The Bolsheviks did not learn the uses of propaganda until they had taken over the reins of government, and the followers of Mussolini had to expose themselves to danger by fighting a real opposition; but the Nazis accomplished their rise to power largely by propaganda.

Of course the pivot about which the whole movement revolved

was Hitler himself. In guiding it he gave ample evidence of the talents he had developed during the years of his apprenticeship. The failure of the Beer-Hall Putsch in 1923 taught him that he could not gain political power by force; so he set himself to developing a technique which would win votes. He carefully studied the general theory of propaganda and, together with such associates as Dr. Goebbels, developed the specific methods employed by the party.⁸ Furthermore, the personality of Hitler was an important factor. Not only was he able to instill in his associates a fanatical devotion to the cause; he was able to convince millions that he was the man of destiny. His influence over the masses was to a large extent made possible by his gift of oratory. Political oratory was something new to the Germans; in fact, Hitler was almost the only great popular speaker in modern Germany. William II had made political speeches on occasion and so had Bismarck before him, but neither of them had possessed Hitler's ability to sway the crowds. He electrified his audiences not so much with what he said as with the way he said it. He played upon the emotions of the people as a musician plays upon an instrument. By the consummate skill of his demagoguery he created such an atmosphere of enthusiasm that impartial observers likened nazism to a religious revival. Certainly among party members the name of Hitler inspired all the fanatic reverence that Mohammed was accorded by his followers.

But Hitler himself was far from being the whole story of the Nazi success. The movement was worked up by an unceasing campaign in which all members participated and every possible means was employed to foster enthusiasm. Nothing that might appeal to the dramatic sense of the people was overlooked. Uniforms, flags, badges, and insignia of all kinds played their part. Banners were used to catch the eye, and patriotic music to stir the heart. Hundreds of orators were trained to carry the gospel of national regeneration into every village and hamlet. During the mass meetings, which were usually opened by a band playing stirring music, uniformed Nazis were stationed about the speaker's platform and among the crowd with instructions to punctuate the speeches with shouts of "Heil Hitler" or to applaud certain phrases. By such means the Nazis could whip up the emotions of their audiences almost at will and generate a fervor of such intensity that the imagination cannot picture it. This stagecraft was supplemented by other means of carrying the Nazi ideas to the masses. Vast quantities of printed propaganda were issued. Pamphlets by the millions were distributed

⁸ The real propaganda genius of the movement was, of course, Dr. Goebbels.

from door to door or showered upon town and country from airplanes. In addition the party published more than a hundred newspapers and periodicals, the principal organ being *Der Völkische Beobachter*.

In their books, pamphlets, newspapers, and speeches the Nazis skilfully exploited the discontents of the various classes and groups. This accounts for the contradictory nature of the Nazi literature. For example, they promised work to the unemployed, and economic salvation to the white collar workers who were being forced into the ranks of the proletariat by the depression. In the hearts of many dissatisfied ex-soldiers they roused memories of prewar greatness. To the peasants who were weighed down with mortgages, debts, and taxes and to the agricultural workers who complained of low wages they promised remedies for every grievance. By advocating the abolition of unearned incomes, the nationalization of the great trusts, and the communalization of the great department stores they stirred in many socialists the hope that the party would realize the objects the Marxists had failed to achieve. They succeeded in enlisting not only the moral but the financial support of the big industrialists by their promise to crush the communist influence in Germany and to curb the power of the trade unions. Above all, by their sentimental and patriotic appeals they captured the imagination of the younger generation which because of the economic depression and the abolition of military service was for the most part unable to find anything to do.

Although the Nazis tried to cater to the specific tastes of their different audiences, they always emphasized certain stock subjects no matter what the audience. One of the most effective weapons in their armory was the denunciation of the Treaty of Versailles, particularly of the "war-guilt" clause or, as they called it, the "war-guilt lie," the disarmament clauses, and the reparations clauses. Nazi orators did not tire of repeating that the treaty had riveted the shackles of slavery on the German people and that if they would be free they must strike off these shackles "by fair means or foul." The blame for the treaty and its evils they laid at the door of the Social Democrats, who had accepted it and who had brought about the establishment of the republic which the Nazis were trying to overthrow. Moral indignation was, in fact, directed against all the parties that had supported the Weimar constitution, but in no field of propaganda were they more energetic than in their denunciation of the Jews. The Jews were declared to be the originators of Marxism, more particularly of the Social Democratic Party in Germany and of Bolshevism in Rus-

sia. They were held responsible for the occupation of the Ruhr, the inflation—in short, for all the evils of state and society. Nazi propaganda endlessly repeated such absurdities as that of a supposed international Jewish conspiracy to bleed Germany to death financially. Thus anti-Semitism was deeply sown and furiously cultivated in the minds of millions.

How much all this appealed to the Germans can be seen from the fact as stated, that the Nazis increased their vote from 800,000 in 1928 to nearly 6.5 million in 1930 and the number of their deputies in the Reichstag from 12 to 107. This made them the second strongest party in the country. In July, 1932, they carried nearly 40 per cent of the electorate, and with 230 seats in the Reichstag they were the strongest party. When they lost nearly two million votes in the election of November, 1932, Hitler declared his readiness to head a coalition cabinet as chancellor. Joining forces with von Papen and with President Hindenburg's son, he was summoned on January 30, 1933, to form a cabinet. Thus was ushered in the Third Reich.⁴ Many historians doubt that senile President Hindenburg knew what he was doing.



THE NAZIS CONSOLIDATE THEIR POWER

When Hitler was appointed to the chancellorship the Nazis were not strong enough to control the state by themselves. The new cabinet was a coalition in which only three of eleven members were Nazis. The two others, beside Hitler, were Dr. Frick and Hermann Göring, the former being minister of the interior, the latter minister of aviation and Prussian minister of the interior. The vice-chancellor was Franz von Papen, who hoped that he and his Junker-Nationalists would be able to exercise a moderating influence over the Nazis. But the opposition underestimated the driving force of the Nazis, who were resolved to be satisfied with nothing less than complete control of the state. More particularly, the opposition failed to gauge Hitler's determination and political acumen. Up to January 30, 1933, he had been the leader of a political party, but having become chancellor he resolutely set himself to become the leader of the German people. The first step in this direction, as he saw it, was to increase his support in the Reichstag. His government could definitely count on only 247 deputies who, even with the support of other rightist deputies, lacked at least twenty-five

⁴ The First Reich was the Holy Roman Empire; the Second was the German Empire which was founded in 1871 and collapsed in 1918.

votes of a majority. Hoping to gain an absolute majority he had President Hindenburg dissolve the Reichstag on February 1 and set March 5 as the day for new elections.

From the first it was obvious that the Nazis were determined to carry the elections at all costs. No sooner had they been announced than the party went to work to curb the efforts of the opposition. The task was facilitated by the fact that Göring as Prussian minister of the interior had charge of the Prussian police. In other words, he controlled the police in three fifths of Germany. He at once proceeded to convert the police into a dependable ally by "purging" it of all those who were not in sympathy with the Nazis or Nationalists. Then he issued the order to strike remorselessly at "Marxism," the word used to designate the collective opposition to Nazism. The slightest pretext sufficed to suspend opposition newspapers or to break up opposition election meetings.

As the time for polling drew near, it became evident that despite the use of repressive measures the Nazis were not gaining enough votes to obtain the desired majority. Something more was required to influence the voters. The first move came on February 24 when the police raided the Karl Liebknechthaus, communist headquarters in Berlin, and then announced the finding of documents—never made public—which were said to contain plans for a concerted communist uprising throughout Germany. Although it was stated that the signal for this uprising was to be the burning of the Reichstag building, no extra guards were placed about it. Three days later, on February 27, a fire did break out in the Reichstag building, seriously damaging it. Not a vestige of evidence was ever presented to show that the Communist Party was in any way involved in the affair; nevertheless, the government at once issued a special edict "for the protection of the Reich against communist danger."⁵ It suspended all the articles of the constitution guaranteeing such fundamental liberties as freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and authorized house-searching and confiscation of property without compensation. In brief, it established dictatorial government. Communists and socialists were forbidden to hold election meetings or to employ any kind of election propaganda, communist and many socialist newspapers were suppressed, and all communist deputies that could be apprehended were placed under arrest. Storm Troopers, enrolled as auxiliary police to insure a "free" election, went

⁵ At the trial Torgler, leader of the Communist Party, and four foreign communists picked at random were acquitted. The best the Nazis could do was to convict van der Lubbe, a half-wit with a dubious communist past.

about in groups tearing down the placards of the opposition and beating up communists and socialists.

Even the "red scare," the overriding of all ordinary legality, and the open use of terrorism did not stampede the masses into voting for the Nazis. The communists, it is true, lost a million votes, but nearly five million still voted for the party. When the votes were counted, it was found that the Nazi Party had polled only 43.9 per cent of the total vote and had won only 288 out of the total of 647 seats. Thus the Nazis, although they were the largest party in Germany, were still a minority. Only in conjunction with the Nationalists, who got 8 per cent of the votes and fifty-two seats, did the government have a slender majority in the Reichstag. Realizing how precarious this majority was, the Nazis lost no time in strengthening their position. They decided that if the eighty-one communists were eliminated from the Reichstag, their own party would have a clear majority over all others combined. Such a step did not appear too difficult since most of the communist deputies were already in concentration camps, in hiding, or in exile. The object was achieved by simply not "inviting" the communist deputies to attend the meeting of the Reichstag which convened on March 21. In other words, the communists were outlawed from the Reichstag.

Two days later the Reichstag passed a bill, variously called the Act of Authorization or Enabling Act (*Ermächtigungsgesetz*), which covered the Nazi despotism with a mantle of legality. At first it seemed as if they would find it difficult to obtain the two thirds majority necessary to pass the Act, but by the use of threats, promises, and cajolery Hitler managed to get the support of the Catholic Center Party. When President Hindenburg signed the bill the next day, he gave the former Austrian house painter complete dictatorial powers. Although the Act did not abolish the ordinary legislative organs provided in the constitution, it did give the cabinet power to legislate without the Reichstag and the Reichsrat. In practice the cabinet became the sole legislator. Hitler as chancellor could now even dispense with the necessity of the President's consent to legislation. "The Reich laws enacted by the Reich cabinet," the Act stated, "are drawn up by the chancellor and published in the *Reichsgesetzblatt*. They come into effect, unless otherwise specified, on the day following their publication." As the government interpreted the Act, it put no limitations on the cabinet's power to legislate by decree. For all practical purposes the constitution was dead.

Armed with such powers Hitler and his associates proceeded at once to bring everything under their control. One of the first things

they did was to establish control over all the German states or, as they put it, to coordinate the states (*Gleichschaltung*). Prussia had been in Göring's hands since January 30, but in most other states the local administration was still free of Nazi control up to the election of March 5. Right after the election bands of Storm Troopers marched into a number of the state capitals, occupied the government buildings, evicted the legal governments, and installed Nazi commissioners. In other states the governments, taking warning from the fate of their sisters, resigned of their own accord and were similarly replaced. To support in theory that which had earlier been accomplished in fact, Hitler promulgated a law on April 7, 1933, which authorized him to name a regent or governor (*Statthalter*) for each of the seventeen states, with power to nominate and dismiss the members of the state cabinets and to control all officials. Thus the law disposed of the prerogatives of the separate states. Bismarck's old federal empire was gone. The new Germany was a completely unified and centralized state.

Next the Nazis in their drive for "totality of power" dissolved all political parties but their own. The goal, Dr. Goebbels announced in May, was a totalitarian state. Before the revolution was finished, he said, "People, Party, and State must become identified with the Third Reich." The Communist Party, as stated earlier, was outlawed when the Reichstag met toward the end of March. Some weeks later the Social Democratic Party was eliminated and its property confiscated. The outlawing of the "Marxist" parties was followed by the "voluntary" dissolution of the Catholic Center Party shortly afterward and at the end of June the Nationalist Party also announced its dissolution. All the remaining minor parties soon followed suit, leaving the National Socialists as the only political party in Germany. On July 14, 1933, a law was promulgated which declared the National Socialist Party to be the only legally constituted party in Germany. The creation of any new political parties was prohibited under penalty of severe prison terms and even death.

Meanwhile the Nazis had been taking steps toward achieving control of the economic as well as of the political life of Germany. The first step in this direction was to dissolve the trade unions, which had formed the backbone of the Weimar regime. Despite the fact that these unions endeavored to live in peace with the government, the Nazi leaders decided upon their dissolution. First, however, they lulled the workers into a false security by making May 1, the day the socialists and communists had set aside as a holiday on which to protest against the existing order, a national Labor Day. May 1,

1933, was celebrated with all the impressive stage settings characteristic of Nazi celebrations. On the Tempelhof parade ground near Berlin Hitler addressed over a million workers and employees from every factory and office in the city. Similar demonstrations were held in other large cities. But while labor was celebrating the holiday, gangs of Storm Troopers were making ready to "liquidate" the trade unions. On May 2, the very day after the pageantry of Hitler's first German Labor Day, the Storm Troopers invaded all the headquarters of the Social Democratic trade unions, took possession of the buildings, expelled the leaders or threw them into prisons and concentration camps, and seized the union funds. Upon learning of the fate of the larger unions, the smaller Catholic trade unions submitted unconditionally and the agricultural organizations and cooperatives followed suit. Later, by the law of January 20, 1934, all labor organizations were completely and finally dissolved. Thus was demolished the autonomous organization of German labor which had been built up over several decades. The successor was the Labor Front, an organ of the National Socialist Party. No other labor organization was tolerated.

Nor did the Nazis stop with the dissolution of the political parties and trade unions; they brought every phase of life under their control. Music, theatre, cinema, and press, all were bent to Nazi propaganda aims. "The theatre and the film," Dr. Goebbels, the minister of propaganda, said, "must adjust themselves to the new era. Film and theatrical producers cannot complain of lack of material; the government will, if necessary, put them on the right path. I hope to reach the goal where the whole nation will think unitedly and in which there will be only one public opinion." Higher as well as lower schools were purged of all who were not sympathetic to Nazi aims. Those who were not removed were warned that all who refused to speak or teach in harmony with the ideals of the new Germany would be treated as "insolent slaves, who must be beaten down with the whip." The function of the press, Goebbels stated, would be that of "a piano on which the government can play." The number of Nazi newspapers was increased from 120 to 379 and other newspapers were subjected to rigid control. Unfriendly or lukewarm or liberal or pacifist or "internationalist" proprietors, editors, and correspondents were expelled and Nazi commissars were put at the side of the journalists who remained. The slightest departure from the prescribed path was sufficient pretext for taking control of a newspaper. In April, 1933, for example, the *Dortmunder General Anzeiger*, the most prosperous provincial newspaper, was taken over

by a Nazi staff because it had published a portrait of Hitler which had given him "a distorted expression suggesting vulgarity." To escape such a fate most of the great "independent" newspapers hewed closely to the line marked out for them.

No sooner did the Nazis get control of the administration, the schools and universities, and the various cultural agencies than they eliminated all Jews and persons of Jewish descent from them. The Weimar constitution had, of course, granted equal protection to all, but the Enabling Act of March 24, 1933, empowered Hitler to override the constitution. Two weeks after this Act was passed (April 7, 1933) Hitler issued a statute which removed all non-Aryans from public office. "A person," the law stated, "shall be known as a non-Aryan who has non-Aryan, in particular Jewish, grandparents. It suffices if one parent or grandparent is a non-Aryan." At first exceptions were made for non-Aryan officials who had served in World War I or who had lost fathers or sons in the war, but gradually all non-Aryans without exception were debarred from public office. Schools and universities were "cleansed" in the same way. In the universities eminent professors of Jewish descent were dismissed either by the government or more often simply by order of student committees. In many instances Nazi student boycotts forced out Jewish professors for whom the government had made exceptions because of service at the front. Books written by non-Aryans as well as by writers who entertained liberal ideas were removed from the universities and from public libraries. Sometimes they were confiscated and burned in public. Sometimes Nazi student groups staged public burnings of books.

By midsummer of 1933 the totalitarian state had been achieved. As the Nazi Party was everywhere in control, Hitler declared the revolution to be at an end. He felt that any further changes might undermine the stability of the regime. But the anticapitalist left wing was far from satisfied. Many of its members had been attracted to Hitler's party by the hope that he would establish a socialist order, but nothing had come of their hopes. No spectacular modification of the economic structure had been made. Hitler, it seemed to them, had forgotten that the name of his party was National Socialist. Some even accused him of having betrayed the revolution. In general, a struggle between the more radical and the conservative elements was impending. The struggle for power came to a head when the Storm Troopers, who were commanded by left-wingers, demanded incorporation in the *Reichswehr*. Since the Storm Troopers were numerically superior to the army such a move would have given

the left wing control of the armed forces. Hitler at once opposed the move. On the pretense that a dangerous conspiracy was plotting the overthrow of the government, he instituted the purge of June 30, 1934. On this, the German St. Bartholomew's Day, many high-ranking leaders, including Ernst Röhm, the commander of the Storm Troopers, were summarily executed. Scores of actual or reputed enemies of the regime were murdered in cold blood. Among these were von Schleicher, an open enemy of Hitlerism, and Gregor Strasser, a former left-wing leader who had withdrawn from the party. It is estimated that on June 30 and the days following more than a thousand persons were put to death, most of them with little semblance of a trial.⁶ Conservatism had triumphed and for the time being the fears of big business were allayed.

A few days later, on August 2, 1934, President Hindenburg died at the age of eighty-six. Even before *der alte Herr*, as the Germans affectionately called him, had breathed his last, newspapers began to speculate on his successor. Such speculation, however, was silenced by Goebbels in his role as propaganda minister with the curt remark, "All that has been taken care of." As soon as the death of Hindenburg was announced, Hitler settled the question by convoking an emergency session of the cabinet which drew up a decree merging the offices of president and chancellor. Although Hitler did not assume the title of President, contenting himself with "Leader and Chancellor,"⁷ he did obtain the supreme command of the army (*Reichswehr*) and the navy. Before many days passed, all the members of the *Reichswehr* were compelled to take the following oath: "I swear before God this holy oath: that I will render unconditional obedience to the Leader of the German Reich and People, Adolf Hitler, commander in chief of the forces of defense, and that as a brave soldier I will be ready at all times to pledge my life for this oath." On August 14 Hitler asked the people to uphold in a plebiscite the action of the cabinet in making him Führer and chancellor. More than 38 million cast their votes for him. The man of dreams and visions—he who had failed at everything he had previously undertaken—was now the head of the state, the head of the government, the head of the army and navy. In short, he was the nation.



MAKING GERMANY STRONG

It is impossible to give an exhaustive description of National Socialism within the limits of space available, because the move-

⁶ See Loewenstein, *Hitler's Germany*, p. 24.

⁷ In June, 1939, Hitler reduced his title to "Der Führer."

ment was so extraordinarily all-embracing. Its activities touched every phase of national life. One of the first things the Nazis did to allay discontent was to launch a "work creation" policy. Just prior to Hitler's accession to power the number of unemployed had increased to a total of about six millions. While hundreds of thousands tramped the countryside asking for work at almost any price, other thousands resorted to begging. On the outskirts of the larger industrial cities tent and shanty towns grew up and many families who could not afford the smallest rent flocked to them. So many jobless hoping for casual employment would congregate to watch construction jobs that the police ordered building plots enclosed by wooden fences. Even a great number of those who were employed worked only part time.

The means employed to combat unemployment were not necessarily novel. Some had already been initiated by earlier governments. Vast sums were spent on public works, road construction, harbor improvement, and housing. Particularly noteworthy was the improvement of the road system, which up to that time had been markedly poor. Thousands of miles of *Autobahnen* (automobile roads) consisting of two twenty-five foot lanes divided by a center strip were constructed. Besides connecting the multitudinous industrial and trading centers, these roads were important military assets.⁸ Second, subsidies were given to home owners for the repair and modernization of their homes, and farm owners received subsidies to enable them to employ more farm hands. Third, tax incentives were used to produce jobs. Families, for example, who hired a new servant girl could regard her as a dependent for tax purposes. People who purchased automobiles and manufacturers who bought new machinery could deduct the amount of their purchases from their taxable incomes. Fourth, steps were taken to withdraw as many women as possible from industrial establishments. Women, the Nazis proclaimed, must busy themselves with *Kinder, Kirche, und Küche* (children, church, and kitchen). To facilitate the withdrawal of women from employment as well as to promote growth of population, marriage loans were made to women who got married, providing they gave up their jobs. Finally, the hours of work of those who were employed were reduced so as to make room for unemployed.

The net result of these measures was that the number of unemployed decreased to 2.6 millions by the end of 1936. But the problem was by no means solved. The stopgap measures, it is true, had greatly relieved the situation but they had achieved few if any long-term

⁸ As it turned out, these *Autobahnen* were important military assets to the Allied armies which invaded Germany during World War II.

benefits. By this time many of the unemployment projects were running down and the number of unemployed would soon have increased had it not been for the rearmament program which was launched on a really vast scale early in 1935. The manufacture of armaments and the withdrawal of a large number of men for military service not only reduced unemployment to a minimum but soon caused a shortage of skilled labor.

As a means of controlling labor and of enforcing labor unity the government created the Labor Front, a kind of superunion, in January, 1934. The Labor Front was not a governmental department but rather an organ of the National Socialist Party. Its executive director, Dr. Robert Ley, was appointed by Hitler as head of the party, and its financial management was put under the control of the party treasurer. Its membership included employers as well as employees. Although membership was theoretically not compulsory, few workers or employers could afford to remain outside. The result was that by 1937 the Labor Front could boast more than 25 million members. When one considers the size of the population it is obvious that almost all male workers were members. In its practical working it was much like the system of workers' councils in Russian factories. Councils were organized in every industrial establishment employing twelve workers or more. In general, the Labor Front supervised everything that concerned industrial relations, with special emphasis on the promotion of "peace in industry" and the building up of "a real unity of the people in life and work." Accordingly the settlement of differences between employers and employees was one of its most important functions. Whenever possible the differences were composed by the factory council, but if neither side gave way the question was referred to special courts established for the purpose. Strikes were of course out of question.

Another major function of the Labor Front was the organization of the workers' leisure in order to keep them in a satisfied frame of mind and to promote physical fitness. This phase of its activities, copied from the Italian *Dopolavoro*, was known as *Kraft durch Freude* (Strength through Joy). Among the things it provided for the masses were low-cost sports and sport festivals. During the years preceding World War II more than seven million workers annually participated in sports organized by Strength through Joy. It also provided music and theatrical entertainment. For example, it had its own symphony orchestra of ninety pieces that traveled all over the Reich. All the concerts and operas the workers attended, all the music they heard, and all the films and plays they saw were of course



AUTOMOBILE HIGHWAY NEAR BONN, GERMANY

carefully "coordinated" with the Nazi philosophy. Often musical and dramatic activities in which they themselves could participate were organized, but the most conspicuous achievement of the movement was its work of arranging low-cost vacations for members of the Labor Front. For this purpose it purchased summer resorts at which members could spend vacations at a fraction of the usual cost. More than this, it purchased or chartered a number of steamships which until the outbreak of World War II took workers and their families on cruises to the Mediterranean, the Azores, or points in the north. Finally, an important branch of Strength through Joy, called "Beauty of Work," devoted itself to the improvement of working conditions, including such questions as better ventilation and lighting in the factories, installation of rest rooms, and protection against the harmful effects of gases, dust, and noise.

The reason so much emphasis was put on pastimes and amusement for the masses was that the Nazis failed to provide a higher standard of living; in fact, under their rule the standard of living declined by 10 per cent and probably more. Because of longer hours the average total income of wage earners did, it is true, increase by about 15 per cent, but unit wages dropped. The hourly wage of skilled workers sank from 79.2 pfennig at the beginning of 1933 to 78.3 in February, 1937, and the wage of unskilled workers declined from 62.8 to 62.3 during the same period.⁹ Even the increased totals were more than offset by a rise of about 25 per cent in the cost of living. This rise, which greatly reduced the purchasing power of wages, was also accompanied by a drop in the quality of most products. Soaps, for example, contained less fat. Chocolate was adulterated with oat and acorn meal. Frequently the cheaper products were unavailable and the workers were compelled to buy more expensive products. A further shrinkage in the purchasing power of the wage earner resulted from the impounding of a considerable part of his wages by the state and party organizations. It is estimated that compulsory dues to the Labor Front and other party organizations and the "voluntary" contributions to the Winter Relief Fund and numerous collections claimed between 4.5 and 5 per cent of the workers' gross income. As compensation for all this and for the loss of political freedom, they had only the low-cost amusement provided by Strength through Joy.

Another preoccupation of the government was the question of population. The declining birth rate did not augur well for future strength. This decline was not peculiar to Germany. The annual

⁹ See *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 52 (1938), p. 116.

number of births per thousand fell from 34.3 in 1901 to 15.1 in 1932. Whereas 2,032,000 German babies had been born in 1901, the year 1932 saw the birth of only 993,000. In other words, the number of births decreased by more than 50 per cent between 1901 and 1932. The decrease was particularly rapid during the years after World War I because of the fact that approximately 1,775,000 Germans had been killed during the four years of war. Although the birth rate still exceeded the death rate in 1932, it was calculated that to maintain the population of 1932 Germany needed 1,400,000 births per year.

The decline in the birth rate caused the Nazis genuine alarm. Soon after taking over the reins of government they took energetic measures to stop the trend. They inaugurated a population policy which used all the varied resources of publicity to impress upon the people the fact that the birth rate was declining and to create a public opinion in favor of an increase in fertility. In addition bachelors were heavily taxed, thousands of small homesteads which could be paid for through small monthly rentals were constructed, and various economic inducements such as income tax reductions, rent allowances, and preference in public employment were offered to encourage large families. Probably the most effective measure was the provision of marriage loans. In August, 1933, a large sum derived from the tax on single persons was set aside for this purpose. The loans varied from a minimum of 300 to a maximum of 1000 marks and were given in coupons exchangeable at retail stores for household furnishings. No interest was asked on the loan, but it was to be repaid at the rate of 1 per cent per month over a period of eight and a half years. At the birth of each child during this period one fourth of the loan was canceled. Because unemployment was prevalent when the scheme was introduced, a loan was not granted unless the bride had been employed for at least nine months during the previous two years or unless she had been doing housework at home and was to be replaced by a domestic servant. From the time the scheme went into operation to December, 1937, loans were granted to no less than 900,000 couples.

The immediate results of the policy were substantial. Marriages increased almost at once. In 1933 the number rose 23.5 per cent over 1932, and in 1934 there was a further increase of 43.1 per cent. In 1935 a decline set in, although the rate still remained above normal until after the middle of 1936. The increase in marriages was followed in due course by an increase in births, the number rising from 971,000 in 1933 to 1,198,000 in 1934; to 1,264,000 in

1935; and to 1,279,000 in 1936. Writers pointed with pride to the fact that during the three years from 1934 to 1936 alone legitimate births were 900,000 more than they would have been if the birth rate of 1932 had remained constant.

Yet this increase cannot be entirely explained by the population policy of the Nazis. There were other influences also at work. Certainly the enormous reduction in unemployment and the resulting optimism are factors to be taken into account. However the rise of birth rate may be explained, too few babies were still being born to maintain the population at its existing level. Moreover, the rise, as has been shown, was merely temporary. Up to the outbreak of World War II the efforts of the Nazis to raise the birth rate succeeded only in postponing the numerical decline for about twenty years.¹⁰ Nevertheless, they were more successful in raising the birth rate than any other of the Western nations.

The Nazis did not stop at trying to increase the quantity of population; they also endeavored to improve its quality. They taught that it must be the highest aim of the *Völkischer Staat* (racial state) to maintain its best elements. Accordingly new legislation was enacted to make the issuance of marriage licenses difficult. Before a couple was granted a license, they had to submit to a careful investigation which included not only a medical examination but also a study of their physical measurements and racial characteristics and a search of their family history at least as far back as their grandparents. Besides endeavoring to keep persons afflicted with certain diseases and other disabilities from having children, they wished to eliminate "alien" blood by preventing the marriage of Aryans and non-Aryans. As stated earlier, the doctrine of racial purity was a fundamental article of the Nazi faith. If the true qualities of the Aryan race are cultivated in Germany, the Nazis said, the Germans will once more become strong and powerful. Although other "alien races" were included in the prohibition, the laws were aimed particularly at the Jews. The statutes regulating the marriage of Jews and "persons of German or similar blood" varied according to the proportion of Jewish blood in each partner. For example, a person with one "alien" grandparent could by special permission marry a partner entirely of German blood, but marriage between one who was half Jewish and one of German blood was forbidden.

¹⁰ The incorporation in the Reich of Austria and the Sudeten territories in 1938 added ten million to Germany's population. However, the birth rate in these territories was also declining. In Vienna, for example, there were 14,000 more deaths than births in 1937.

Everything possible was done to discourage the increase of the Jews. Crushing disabilities were imposed upon them in every sphere of national and social life and in every branch of cultural and economic activity. Mention has already been made of the law "for the reorganization of the civil service," promulgated in April, 1933, which retired some 12,000 Jewish officeholders. A new law of July, 1933, definitely barred all Jews and persons married to Jews from being appointed officials of the Reich, the states, municipalities, or any kind of public or legal corporation, institution, or endowment. At first exceptions were made in the case of Jewish war veterans and non-Aryans who had held office under the Hohenzollern, but later all Jewish officials were retired. Nor did the purge limit itself to the civil service; it extended to the liberal professions. Jews, with a few exceptions, were excluded from the legal profession, ousted from the practice of medicine and dentistry, and eliminated as professors in the universities. While Jewish students in the universities were limited to 1.5 per cent of the total enrollment, Jewish children, by a decree of September, 1935, were isolated in separate schools. Furthermore, Jews were forbidden to own land, were barred from the army, and denied membership in the Labor Front. Various steps were also taken to eliminate them from commerce and business. In short, Nazi legislation banned the Jew wherever it could. In September, 1935, even the last hope of the Jews was dimmed when the Reichstag decreed the so-called "Nuremberg Laws" which deprived all full-blooded Jews, even those of the Christian faith, of German citizenship.¹¹ It all added up to the exit of the Jew from German life. He had the choice of either migrating to another country or returning to the ghetto.



GERMANY PREPARES FOR WAR

After World War I, as stated earlier, the former imperial army was replaced by the *Reichswehr*, which was limited to 100,000 men serving twelve-year enlistments. The effective fighting power of this force was restricted by the prohibition of heavy arms and by the reduction to a minimum of lighter weapons. The air force surviving the treaty was completely obliterated, the *Reichswehr* being forbidden to possess any aircraft whatsoever. In addition heavy artillery and tank units were also outlawed. Although defeat at first caused many Germans to regard with repugnance that militarism

¹¹ On the other hand, these laws permitted persons of 25 and 50 per cent of "Jewish blood," formerly called "non-Aryans," to become citizens.

which had led them through four years of blood and hardships, it did not extinguish the spirit of militarism with which the people had been so deeply imbued by tradition and practice.

The military tradition was preserved in various ways. First of all, it was kept alive in the *Reichswehr*. Not only was it trained to be an army of leaders if the country should ever need to raise a large force, but the training became gradually more effective and up to date. Forbidden weapons were either imagined or represented by dummies. Outside the *Reichswehr* the military tradition was preserved in a number of ways. Associations of soldiers representing old regiments were encouraged; instruction in the "science of defense" was introduced in all the higher schools; and the glorification of former military triumphs was emphasized in elementary education. Civil aviation was developed in such a way that the transformation to military aviation could be carried out with the greatest rapidity. To promote the growth of air-mindedness and to create a reserve of potential war pilots, glider clubs were organized in many parts of the country. Equally important were the many rifle, riding, and hunting clubs which featured various forms of military drill, marching with packs, and rifle practice. In addition there were numerous sports clubs which stressed *Wehrsport*, that is, sports of direct military use. Among the associations which gave military or at least semimilitary training were the *Reichsbanner*, *Stahlhelm*, *Jungdeutscher Orden*, *Wehrwolf*, and the *Sturm Abteilung* of the Nazi Party. The combined membership of these associations in 1932, as announced by the German press, numbered more than a million.

The question of rearming in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles was openly discussed in Germany several years before the Nazis took over the reins of government. In 1931 General von Seeckt, head of the *Reichswehr*, made a speech at Magdeburg in which he advocated increasing the force to 200,000 effectives and reducing the term of service to six years. "Even before January 30, 1933," a military historian writes,¹² "many units had been motorized and some weapons forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles, such as tanks and antitank units, began to appear in the *Reichswehr*." Thus the soil was largely prepared for the Nazis, who regarded armed strength as the one lever by which Germany could elevate herself to a position of equality among the world powers. They were certain that rearmament through its psychological effect alone would bring about a revision of the treaty. The one thing that restrained them

¹² Rosinski, *The German Army*, p. 210.

was the fear that the powers would resent too bold a progress in rearmament. Hence their first steps were taken secretly. Two months after Hitler's accession, the *Reichswehr* began to enroll volunteers in excess of the 100,000 men permitted by the treaty. On April 1, 1934, volunteers were accepted for the first time since 1920 for a training period of one year only. To aid in the development of the new army, German officers were recalled from Russia, China, and other countries where they had gone as professional military leaders and advisers. Special attention was given to the development of an air force. While military airfields were being constructed in various parts of Germany, bombers disguised as commercial planes used the commercial airfields for training purposes.

The Versailles powers did not long remain unaware of these rearmament activities. Although the discovery caused considerable alarm, particularly in France and in the small countries bordering on Germany, the powers failed to agree on a program of action. Hence they did nothing beyond making a few protests and sending a few proposals which Hitler had no need to accept. The Führer answered all protests by disclaiming any aggressive designs and by insisting that a strongly fortified Germany would be a contribution to European peace. Some, particularly among the British, accepted his statements at face value. For example, Sir John Simon, the British foreign minister, said: "We welcome the assurances of Herr Hitler that Germany's desire is for peace and that she has no aggressive designs." The French, on the other hand, took alarm to the extent that they lengthened the term of universal military service from one to two years on March 6, 1935. This caused the Nazi leaders boldly to announce their rearmament program. On March 10 General Göring proclaimed that Germany had created an air force in defiance of the treaty, and less than a week later Hitler declared that, since the various powers that had secured the disarmament of Germany at Versailles in 1919 were not carrying out their pledges to disarm themselves, Germany must reintroduce conscription. The conscription law as decreed on May 21 of the same year prescribed a year's training for all able-bodied Aryan Germans between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, the active military service beginning generally at twenty. In this way the Nazis planned to raise an army of about 500,000. When the Versailles powers again did nothing beyond offering formal protests, the Nazis realized they had won the campaign for rearmament.

Thereafter rearmament proceeded at an ever-increasing pace, so that Germany was before long living on what amounted to a war-

time footing. "We are," Hitler declared in December, 1936, "already in a state of war, only the guns have not gone off." The production of airplanes was put on an assembly-line basis like that of motor cars; military reservations and airfields were constructed in many parts of Germany; and military pilots were trained as fast as the existing facilities permitted. This enabled Germany to begin the Second World War with an air fleet and a productive capacity larger than those of her opponents. Warships of all types kept the shipyards busy on twenty-four hour shifts. In 1936 the standing army was almost doubled by the extension of the training period to two years. During the succeeding years additional corps were created, so that by the end of 1938 the army had an estimated strength of about two million men. Technically it was the best equipped force in the world, with a striking power previously unknown. In all corners of Germany the people also were being trained for war. They were being drilled with gas masks and rehearsed in protection against possible air raids. In every public school the pupils were taught the use of masks and first aid against poison gas.

To the Nazis rearmament meant more than just building up the armed forces. They reasoned that if Germany was to wage a successful war it must also be ready in other respects. Above all, no efforts were spared to prepare the food supply to meet the supreme emergency of war and blockade. The leaders hoped to prevent a breakdown of food supplies like the one that had occurred during the First World War and which had been in large part responsible for the collapse in 1918. What they aimed at was "autarchy" (self-sufficiency). The idea was not their invention. Various measures designed to enhance the domestic production of food had been promulgated during the period of the Weimar Republic. It was only in 1934, however, that autarchy for military purposes became a definite goal. Although agricultural production had for some years shown a steady increase, it was not sufficient to meet the requirements. In favorable years agriculture was able to produce more than enough wheat and rye to meet domestic needs for human consumption, the surplus being used to feed livestock; and the production of potatoes, sugar, and in a large degree even of meat was sufficient for peacetime needs. But the production of other foodstuffs was less favorable. Germany produced only about 80 per cent of the cheese and eggs it consumed, and the home production of fruits and vegetables was much less. Regarding fats and oils less than half the quantity consumed was produced in Germany. Finally, the need for importing fodder protein, particularly oilseeds, was considerable.

The Four-Year Plan embraced a series of measures to render Germany independent of foreign supplies at least for the indispensable products. First of all, the government undertook a redistribution of cropping so that some of the land previously used to grow rye and potatoes would be given over to products that were being imported. Second, the government sought to extend the area of cultivation; through the draining of marshlands and the diking of lowlands along the coast no less than 1.3 million acres were added to the tillable area. Third, the new program sought to increase the yield of the poorer land by the use of fertilizers and mechanical equipment. As a result the use of artificial fertilizer increased 50 per cent from 1934 to 1937, and the number of tractors rose from 23,000 in 1933 to 57,000 by 1939. Almost 45 per cent more was spent for farm machinery in 1935 than in 1934 and the figures for the next year show a further increase of 33 per cent. Considerable effort was devoted to augmenting the yield of dairy products. Probably the most important measure to this end was the replacement of many German cows of inferior milk capacity with imported breeds of high-capacity cows.

In addition the government did a number of things to make the lot of the peasant and the farm laborer more attractive. It raised the tariffs on farm products, increased farm prices to a point far above world prices, and raised the wages of farm hands in an effort to keep them from migrating to the cities. To prevent the progressive parceling of the land and to give the peasant greater security of tenure the government issued the Farm Inheritance Act (September, 1933) which decreed that all farms up to 312 acres must pass undivided to the eldest male heir upon the owner's death, unless the heir was already the owner of such a farm (*Erbhof*). The privileged heir, who was officially designated as *Bauer* (peasant), was required to qualify for the inheritance by proving that he was a German citizen and that his ancestry was pure Aryan back to the year 1800. If he could not do this or did not wish to become the owner and operator of a farm, the next male heir received the land. An *Erbhof* could not be mortgaged, nor could it or necessary equipment be seized for debt, nor could it be sold except in very special circumstances. Since it could not be sold, mortgaged, or divided to satisfy their claims, the minor heirs were disinherited by the law. Their only claim against the heir who inherited the farm was for support until they became of age. One effect of the law was an increase in the number of landless younger sons. When many of these instead of remaining in the country as laborers drifted to the cities, a decree was published

(1934) forbidding the employment in industry of persons who within the preceding three years had been engaged in agriculture.

The government was temporarily successful in increasing agricultural production, particularly of vegetables, barley, oil-yielding plants, and forage crops. The number of livestock also increased. Furthermore, by the end of 1934 many thousands had either gone or been driven back to the soil. But in the next two years the trend reversed itself. After 1934 there was again a decline in the number of cattle, largely as a result of restrictions on the importation of fodder. When the rearmament program reached larger proportions, a larger area than had been added by the reclamation of marshes and lowlands was withdrawn from cultivation for the construction of air fields, military reservations, training camps, roads, and so on. As opportunities for employment in the armament industries increased, farm workers left the land in large numbers. The resulting scarcity of farm laborers caused the government in 1937 to lift the ban against foreign laborers during the harvest period. Storm Troopers were also sent to assist in the harvest and by an order of February, 1938, unmarried women under twenty-five were required to devote a year to agricultural labor service or to domestic service before they could take other jobs. Despite these measures agriculture continued to suffer from labor scarcity. In short, agricultural production was not substantially increased by the first Four-Year Plan. The number of hogs raised in 1938 was actually less than it had been in 1932, and a grave shortage of fats continued to exist.

Failure to attain self-sufficiency in food production was admitted by Hitler himself at the party congress of 1936. Later in the same year Göring said to a gathering at the Sport Palast in Berlin: "You know, my dear fellow Germans, and the Führer told you so at Nuremberg, that in spite of the increased security of our food supply, not all the victuals required by the population can be produced in Germany, notwithstanding all our efforts . . . My dear fellow Germans, consume the foodstuffs that our national production provides." In accordance with the last suggestion the government encouraged the people to eat more of the foodstuffs that were produced in sufficient quantities and would be available in wartime. Consequently the consumption of potatoes increased 7 per cent and that of bread 3 per cent, while the consumption of fats decreased 7 per cent and that of meat 16 per cent. Some months before the Second World War began, food rationing was instituted. A government decree issued in February, 1939, provided for the rationing of lard, butter, margarine, fish, and meat, and in August of the

same year other necessities, including clothing, were also rationed.

Realizing that Germany had been made almost as blockadeproof as possible in regard to food, the Nazis in 1936 shifted the emphasis to the achievement of self-sufficiency in raw materials needed for industrial purposes. The vast consumption of raw materials in the rearmament program was causing a growing scarcity and because of the shortage of gold it was not easy to obtain the required amounts from foreign countries. Unable to borrow from abroad, the government found it necessary to develop an intricate barter system which literally amounted to exchanging manufactured goods for raw materials. As Germany was concentrating on the manufacture of arms, it was often difficult to produce the things other countries wanted in exchange for their raw materials. Furthermore, the scarcity of raw materials recalled the experiences of World War I. Even before the blockade became effective during the First World War, Germany had suffered from a lack of supplies, a lack which, expert opinion insisted, had paralyzed the great drive on Paris in 1914. Later the blockade by causing an acute shortage of war materials had contributed greatly to defeat. To forestall a similar breakdown in another war the government decided to take energetic steps toward remedying the shortage. At the party congress in 1936 Hitler announced the plan, known as the Second Four-Year Plan, to make the Reich "within four years entirely independent of all such raw materials as can in any way be home produced by means of German ability or by means of her chemical and mechanical industries, as well as mining."

The second Four-Year Plan, as can be seen from Hitler's words, was not an absolute objective, but rather a policy of increasing the supply of home-produced materials as much as possible. Even so it was an ambitious undertaking in a country notoriously poor in most of the essential raw materials. Of the thirty-odd vital materials necessary for modern industry and modern warfare Germany had an abundance only of coal and potash. All others had to be imported entirely or in part. Thus more than 80 per cent of the mineral oil and practically all the rubber was imported. Except zinc, German mines produced only limited quantities of metal ores. German industry even had to rely to an overwhelming extent on foreign mines for iron and steel. In addition Germany had to depend on imports for practically all her nickel, chromium, mercury, and precious metals, almost all her molybdenum, about 71 per cent of her copper, and 56 per cent of her lead. As for textiles, practically all the cotton and silk and about 90 per cent of the wool came from abroad.

Finally, Germany produced only 40 per cent of the hides and skins, 15 per cent of the flax, and less than 1 per cent of the hemp, jute, and other fibers required by her industries.

In carrying out the plan Göring, who was given the title of Commissioner of the Four-Year Plan, endeavored first of all to increase the domestic production of the most necessary raw materials. Sheep-raising was energetically promoted to increase the production of both wool and meat; the cultivation of flax and hemp was extended; the mining of low grade ores, which private enterprise had found unprofitable, was undertaken by the government. Other phases of the program stressed greater economy in the use of metals and the development of substitutes. Manufacturers were not only urged to avoid unnecessary consumption of scarce materials but all scrap and waste were carefully collected. This collection did not stop with the gathering of industrial waste and empty tin cans; razor blades, bones, human hair, waste paper, garbage, sawdust, and even old coffee grounds were gathered up and put to various uses. Whenever possible a substitute (*Ersatz*) was developed for materials that had been imported. Breweries, for example, were required to use glass instead of copper pipes; water and steam pipes were made of porcelain; wires for electrical purposes were made of aluminum; and tin cigarette boxes were replaced with containers made of cardboard. Even the arms industry made cartridge cases of aluminum in order to save brass. Textile manufacturers were required to mix artificial with natural fibers. One of the first orders issued under the second Four-Year Plan was that men's clothing must contain 15 to 25 per cent of artificial wool. Later it was decreed that the various fabrics designed for civilian use must contain up to 50 per cent artificial fiber and even the fabrics of which military uniforms were made contained a considerable proportion of artificial wool.

The three most important achievements of the *Ersatz* program were cell wool, motor fuel, and rubber. As a means of meeting the shortage of wool the Nazis developed cell wool (*Zellwolle*), which is made from cellulose derived from wood and is not essentially different from rayon. In 1936 no less than 45,000 tons of this artificial wool were made in Germany, and the output for 1939 was estimated as having been four times greater. Although at first very inferior to wool, it was considerably improved by 1939. More critical than the shortage of wool was the shortage of motor fuel for the newly mechanized army. Experiments to supply motors with synthetic fuel had, in fact, been started before the First World War. During the years after the war two processes of making fuel from coal (hydro-

genation and liquefaction) were developed with such success that by 1935 Germany was producing more than a third of the motor fuel consumed in the country. Since synthetic fuel could be made of brown coal and Germany had large deposits of this coal, it was only a question of building more plants. Three new ones began producing in 1937 and ten others were being built. According to a number of estimates the production of synthetic fuel met about half the peacetime needs during the early months of 1939. Efforts to produce synthetic rubber were equally successful. The new product, called buna, was made by an electrical process from coal and lime. Although buna cost about four times as much as natural rubber, it was much more durable. The output for 1938 was estimated at 25,000 tons or about one third of the national requirements, and the next year saw production increase by at least 7 per cent.



EDUCATION AND CULTURE

Even before the Nazis achieved power it was clear that a political party pretending to be the bearer of a new philosophy would seek to control the thoughts and emotions of men. Such control, in fact, was necessary to the continued existence of the Nazi state. Hence they were not slow to pull down the banners of liberalism and to hoist the swastika in the domain of education and culture as well as in politics. They endeavored, above all, to mold the minds of the younger generation into the Nazi pattern of thinking. "Whosoever has the youth has the future," was one of Hitler's favorite slogans. "In the struggles that are to come," said a Nazi leader, "we will see to it that the youth of Germany belongs to National Socialism only, and to Adolf Hitler." And there was no better way of perpetuating National Socialism than through the educational system. From the kindergarten up the school system was converted into a vast enterprise for the indoctrination of children with the Nazi philosophy. The Nazis made no secret of their purpose. "The entire function of all education," Dr. Rust, Hitler's minister of education, stated, "is to create Nazis."

To make sure that the educational system would achieve the aim they set for it, the Nazis "purified" it from top to bottom. The first thing they did was to remove all teachers who were in any way opposed to them. The least they demanded from a teacher was outward conformity to the Nazi philosophy. Social committees examined the political records of all schools to question the teachers in front of their pupils. All who were found unsympathetic to the

Nazi cause were either summarily dismissed or retired on pensions. Before the end of 1936 one teacher out of every five was either dismissed or retired. Those who remained were required to take the oath of loyalty to Hitler and to promise in writing that they would obey the laws of the National Socialist state. Besides eliminating all teachers who were not sympathetic to their cause, the Nazis reorganized the curriculum to suit their purposes. Old subjects were carefully colored with the Nazi *Weltanschauung*, and new ones which glorified the National Socialist movement were added. Among the new studies were race study, genetics, race hygiene, and genealogy. A decree of September 13, 1933, ordered that these studies be given special emphasis "at the expense, if necessary, of mathematics and foreign languages." The purpose, of course, was to indoctrinate every child with the Nazi philosophy of race. Hitler himself decreed in 1935 that "no boy or girl may leave school without having been brought to full appreciation of the nature and necessity of racial purity." Not only were special textbooks prescribed for all schools but school libraries were also purged of all books by Jews, books that spoke well of Jews, and books that "failed to show the proper respect" for Aryans.

But the formal school was only one of the agencies for the furtherance of the Nazi cause. Even greater reliance for inculcating the spirit of National Socialism was put on the Hitler Youth organizations. For boys there were two divisions: the *Jungvolk*, taking boys from ten to fourteen years, and the Hitler Youth proper, from fourteen to eighteen years. Paralleling these groups were similar divisions for girls, the *Jungmädels* and *Bund Deutscher Mädchen*. At first membership in the Hitler Youth was voluntary, but by a decree of December 1, 1936, it was made obligatory for all. In these organizations special emphasis was placed upon physical training. Much time, for example, was devoted to *Wehrsport* (defense sport) and to drilling according to the rhythm of marching songs. At all times military order, military discipline, and military knowledge were stressed. Even the films which were shown to the youth dealt invariably with such subjects as *Wehrsport*, aviation, and war. This was in accordance with Hitler's declaration in *Mein Kampf* that "education in a general way is to be preparation for later army service." However, the indoctrination of youth with Nazi teachings on other subjects was not neglected. Hitler Youth groups were required to attend frequent lectures on race hygiene, "history," and the various political, economic, and ethical questions of National Socialism. No Aryan German was able to escape one of the most intensive schemes

of indoctrination ever devised. The general aim was stated in *Mein Kampf* when Hitler said of the German child: "His entire education and development has to be directed at giving him the conviction of being absolutely superior to the others. With this physical force and skill he has again to win the belief in the invincibility of his entire nationality."¹³

The control which the Nazis established over the universities was no less complete than their control over the lower schools. In Prussia the university professors had since 1852 been protected by law against political interference, and in other German states similar protection obtained either through law or custom. This protection, however, went by the board soon after the Nazi seizure of power. Not only academic tenure but also academic freedom, sound learning, and true scholarship became a thing of the past. As in the lower schools, non-Aryans and those who were suspected of being unsympathetic or even lukewarm to Nazi doctrines were retired on pensions, expelled without pensions, or driven into exile, the purpose being, according to the Rector of the University of Berlin, "to eliminate the dregs of a past liberal age." At first the government permitted a few non-Aryan professors to retain their positions, but this was distasteful to rabid Nazi students, who would either start riots in the classrooms of such professors or howl them down. In other cases the German Students Union, founded by the Nazis, would order the students not to attend the lectures of certain professors. Before the end of 1933 teachers' colleges were closed to students of non-Aryan descent, and in 1935 it was ordained that non-Aryans could no longer hold the title of professor. It is estimated that during the first three years of Nazi rule about 20 per cent of the university teachers were dismissed, retired, or forced into exile. Those professors who retained their positions were always under scrutiny by Nazi students or the police. Early in 1936 the minister of education declared that all professors must become Nazis and assist in the creation of a new type of National Socialist learning. To prevent "political undesirables" from becoming teachers in the universities, the administration of the universities was taken over by the government. The right of appointing the chief administrative officer of each university, whose title was "Führer" (originally Rector), and also the other university officials was vested in the minister of education. Upon the recommendation of the university officials he also appointed the teaching staff.

Equally complete was the Nazi control of the students. The Nazis decided not only who might attend a university but also what he

¹³ *Mein Kampf*, Reynal and Hitchcock ed., p. 618.

must study. Soon after taking office Hitler decreed that there were too many professional men in Germany and that the number of new students admitted annually should, therefore, be limited to 15,000, of whom not more than 10 per cent might be women. As a result the numbers fell from 116,154 in 1933 to 67,082 in 1937, a drop of about 42 per cent. Between 1937 and the outbreak of war in 1939 the number declined even further. The determining factor in the selection of a boy for university study was not so much his academic achievements as his record in the Hitler Youth and his zeal for Nazi ideas. Once in a university he had to join the German Students Union, a national organization under Nazi direction. In his studies he did not enjoy the freedom his predecessors had of choosing his courses. Besides being required to participate for at least three semesters in a series of compulsory sports, he had to spend a considerable part of the first two years studying such courses as eugenics, genetics, race biology, and race hygiene, the purpose of which was to indoctrinate him with Nazi racial ideas. In short, the function of guiding the intellectual life of the nation, formerly exercised by the universities, was taken over by the Nazis.

While the Nazis were applying the principle, "Whatever suits the party is right," to education, art, literature, and music, the theatre and the cinema were also bent to their aims. A work of art or a performance of any kind was good only so far as it supported their ideology. Anything that tended to diverge from the lines they laid down was styled *Kulturbolshevismus*, in other words, subversive and destructive to the state. They recognized no such thing as intellectual detachment. Whoever was not for National Socialism was against it. As Göring stated the issue, "I see only those who are for National Socialism and those who are against it, and I know how to deal with the latter."

But the fact that cultural production was subservient to Nazi interests was not enough. It was also prescribed that its creators must be Aryans. Regarding German culture as the highest expression of Aryanism, the Nazis thought it intolerable that non-Aryans should have any part in it. As early as September, 1933, a Reich Chamber of Culture was set up to supervise music, art, theatre, press, literature, radio, and the films. The statute instituting the chamber states specifically that "all creative forces in all spheres must be assembled under Reich leadership with a view to the uniform molding of the will." Membership in the chamber was compulsory for everyone active in the fields it supervised. At first the applications of non-Aryans and non-Nazis could be refused on the basis of a special

regulation which read: "Admission to a Chamber may be refused, and a member may be excluded if facts justify the presumption that the person in question does not inspire the confidence or possess the ability necessary for the carrying on of his activity." Later Jews were specifically excluded from all activities supervised by the chamber.

In the field of literature, for example, Dr. Goebbels justified the suppression of all communist, socialist, liberal, and pacifist writings by declaring that the authors were not Germans and were therefore out of touch with the true life of the German people. Such authors were labeled "corrupters of the German spirit and the German soul." In other words writers who disapproved of the Nazi system had the choice of leaving the country, remaining silent, or producing inoffensive escapist literature. Most of the distinguished writers of the Weimar period chose to leave. All this explains why the literature of the Nazi era has been so mediocre and even puny. While the "new drama" attempted to glorify history as interpreted by the Nazis, lyrical poetry took the form of marching and fighting songs. As for novels and short stories, they were shallow escapist literature or Nazi heroics. In short, German literature from 1933 to 1939 was the triumph of unprincipled mediocrity and dilettantism. To prevent the reading of "obnoxious" books published before 1933 the Nazis drew up a blacklist of volumes and ordered them removed from all bookshops and public libraries. At a number of places student groups committed the works of "heretical" writers to the flames. Goebbels himself attended such a burning in the Opernplatz in Berlin and exclaimed, "What a joy to be alive!" while students threw into the fire the works of Freud, Schnitzler, Marx, Einstein, Erich Maria Remarque, Heinrich and Thomas Mann, and Emil Ludwig.

Even the great German classics of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were judged in the light of Nazi doctrines. While the writings of Heine and other German-Jewish writers were scored as being un-German, the works of Lessing, pioneer of the Golden Age of German literature, were ignored because he was an advocate of toleration and the friend of Moses Mendelssohn. Certain works of Goethe, Schiller, and Kleist were issued in popular editions or presented on the stage, but everything in them which might possibly conflict with Nazi teachings was deleted. Thus, for example, in Schiller's *Don Carlos* the line, "Sir! Give us liberty of thought," one of the loftiest passages in German literature, was carefully eliminated. Although the Nazis hailed Gerhardt Hauptmann as the Grand Old

Man of German literature on at least one occasion, they disapproved of his drama, *Die Weber*, because it portrays the struggle of a class and not of the entire nation (*Volk*). Certain of the early nationalist writers were highly praised, including Fichte, author of the famous *Reden an die deutsche Nation*, and Ernst Moritz Arndt who in his poem, *Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland?* (What is the German's fatherland?), advocated that all those who speak German be included in the fatherland. Herder was lauded for his nationalism, but his cosmopolitanism was significantly overlooked. Finally, a number of minor poets who had uttered sentiments the Nazis found pleasant were resurrected. One of these was Wilhelm Raabe who had written: "If I forget you, Germany, mighty Fatherland, then I forfeit all my rights." He had also prophesied that the German oak would flourish mightily and gather all the German people under its shade.

The Balkans

THE PENINSULA OF UNREST

THE Balkan¹ Peninsula is one of three peninsulas that jut southward into the Mediterranean, the other two being the Iberian in the west and the Italian in the center. Political and linguistic unity have long been established in Italy, and the Iberian Peninsula is shared by the two related nations of Spain and Portugal. There has been little unity, however, in the Balkan Peninsula. For centuries it has been inhabited by discordant peoples whose interests and ambitions clash fiercely. On this account someone has aptly called it the Peninsula of Unrest. For convenience we shall consider as the Balkans the area occupied by the states of Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania. It is "a rough mountainous region, with fertile valleys tucked between boulder-strewn ridges and steep, wooded hills." Its mountainous nature has kept the inhabitants from any commercial development. The main occupation in all the countries has been agriculture.

There is a widespread tendency in the Western world to regard these states as insignificant. Many do not realize that from the physical viewpoint alone they are far from being so. As constituted after the First World War Rumania embraced an area of 113,889 square miles; in other words, it was only about 6000 square miles smaller than Italy. Yugoslavia, with an area of some 96,000 square miles, was nearly the size of Oregon. Greece, with about 50,000 square miles, was somewhat larger than New York. Bulgaria, with some 30,000 square miles, was about the size of Maine. Albania, the smallest of these states, encompassed an area of about 10,629 square

¹ The word "Balkan" derives from a Turkish word meaning "mountain."

miles, which is about the size of Maryland. According to the census of 1925 the total population of the five states was 42 million.

For many decades prior to the First World War the Balkan Peninsula had been the danger zone of Europe. It was the scene of plots and counterplots. Time and again upheavals in this region threatened to involve most of Europe in bloody conflict. For example, war almost broke out when Austria seized Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. From that time onward, students of European affairs predicted more emphatically than ever that if a great war came it would be precipitated in the Balkans.

Generally speaking, the reason for the perpetual turbulence was twofold. First, because the peninsula formed the main highway from Europe to Asia and from Russia to the Mediterranean, a number of great powers coveted control of it. This desire caused Russia and Austria to glare at one another across the chessboard of diplomacy throughout much of the nineteenth century. Toward the end of the century Germany also entered the competition. These three powers were ever ready to stir up unrest if they stood to gain thereby. In brief, live and let live was not the rule. Dealings between the nations were normally regulated in accordance with "the simple plan, that he shall take who has the power and he shall keep who can."

The second reason for the perpetual unrest was the desire for freedom and national union. Some of the nationalities in the peninsula were still subject peoples. Since freedom had been denied them so long, they put it above everything else and stopped at nothing in their efforts to attain it. On the other hand those who already had independent governments wished to include all the members of their respective nationality in one state.

The First World War, by destroying the Romanov and Habsburg empires, removed the most baleful outside influences from the lives of the Balkan peoples. But their main problem was only partially solved by the Paris Peace Conference, despite the fact that the peacemakers purported to base the settlement on such lofty principles as the right of self-determination, the right of nationality, and the right of political freedom. But the nationalities of the Balkans were so intermingled that with the best will in the world it would have been impossible for the Conference to make a clean-cut division on ethnographical lines. Even when allowance is made for this fact, the settlement did not approximate the best possible achievement under the circumstances. Other motives entered into the settlement. One of these was the doctrine of punishment; many

of the peacemakers were influenced by the idea that the lesser as well as the greater enemy states should pay a penalty. Then there was also the desire to block Germany's *Drang nach dem Südosten* (drive to the southeast) by strengthening the states that had been on the Allied side.

The result was a series of compromises which left much to be desired. Rumania, as one of the victors, received all of Transylvania and Bucovina, thereby more than doubling her population and becoming the largest of the Balkan states. The territory of Greece was nearly doubled. Serbia nearly quadrupled her population, Serbia and Montenegro being merged into the great commonwealth of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, Bulgaria, being on the losing side, was pared down very considerably. Once strong among her neighbors, she now became one of the smallest states in the Balkans.

The political position of these states was far from satisfactory. The victors were determined to preserve their gains, and Bulgaria was determined to recoup her losses at the first possible opportunity. The worst feature of this policy of "the spoils to the victor" was the incorporation of national minorities in states of other nationalities. Nearly 1.2 million Magyars and 600,000 Germans were, in grotesque disregard of self-determination, transferred to Rumania; nearly 300,000 Germans and a quarter million Magyars, to Yugoslavia; and about one quarter of the Bulgarians, to Greece and other states. The situation was aggravated by the fact that most of the nations did not pursue a liberal policy toward the minorities despite their promises to do so. This not only increased the discontent of the minorities but also strengthened the determination of the various national states to redeem these minorities.

During the months after the settlement of 1919 the Balkan equilibrium was so sensitive and there were so many border incidents that the word "peace" must in this connection be used only relatively. Quick to grasp the necessity of coordinating their political action, the governments of Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia formed a defensive alliance as a means of frustrating the designs of the vanquished states. This alliance, known as the Little Entente, was concluded by a series of treaties in 1920 and 1921. While the general purpose was the maintenance of the *status quo*, a more specific aim was the prevention of attempts to restore the Habsburgs to power either at Budapest or at Vienna. Such a restoration, it was feared, would lead to an attempt to regain the territories which were distributed to the victorious states upon the collapse of the

empire in 1918. The Little Entente, supplemented in 1929 by a tripartite treaty of arbitration, played a material role in the period between the two world wars.

But problems of territory and of national minorities were not the only ones confronting the Balkan states. In addition to the general upheaval caused by the war, the collapse of the Habsburg Empire and the creation of national states upon its ruins brought in their train such difficulties as the transfer of land to the peasantry, the advent to power of new classes, the creation of new bureaucracies, the revision of many fundamental institutions, the establishment of internal unity through the fusion of the old and the new elements in the population, and the restoration of commercial and financial stability. In most of the states, financial conditions were serious as a result of the disorganization produced by four years of war and the dislocation caused by the increase in the number of tariff walls.

There were also religious problems. Although most of the inhabitants of the peninsula were at least nominal members of the Eastern Orthodox Church, the number of Roman Catholics, particularly in Yugoslavia (Croatia), was considerable. Then there were the Mohammedans or Moslems, who were convinced of their duty to go on being loyal and consistent professors of their religion.

Another major problem was the conflict between radicalism and conservatism. Thus the difficulties facing the Balkan states were tremendous.

The discussion that follows will show briefly how the states succeeded or failed in their attempts to solve these problems, the fundamental character of which was much the same in each state. The problems included: (1) the establishment of administrative machinery, (2) the creation of commercial and financial stability, (3) the adjustment of social differences, (4) the reconciliation of racial minorities.



RUMANIA

Rumania became territorially the largest of the Balkan group as a result of the peace settlement. For fighting on the side of the Allies the peacemakers allotted to it the province of Bucovina, which had belonged to Austria; Transylvania, which had for centuries been attached to Hungary; and Bessarabia, which had been a part of the Russian Empire. In addition, the boundary between Rumania and Bulgaria was reestablished as it had been drawn in 1913, so

that Dobruja became a part of Greater Rumania. Thus the area of the country was more than doubled in size, from 53,000 square miles to 113,889 square miles. Its population, which had formerly been about eight million, was also more than doubled to around eighteen million. In other words, as one result of the settlement Rumania became the sixth largest country in Europe, with an area very nearly equal to that of Italy and a population almost three fourths that of Spain.

During the period between two wars Rumania was not only the largest state of the Balkan group but it was also economically the most important. It was particularly rich in natural resources—petroleum, coal, iron, gold, manganese, copper, salt, and natural gas. The gold mines were among the richest in Europe. More important was the wealth in petroleum, which was the country's second richest source of natural wealth. In 1929 Rumania ranked seventh among the nations of the world in petroleum production, with 2.4 per cent of the world's total output. Petroleum accounted for about 40 per cent of the exports. But the richest source of natural wealth was agriculture. Almost 80 per cent of the inhabitants derived their living from the soil. Fertile fields produced great harvests of maize and wheat. Next to Argentina, Rumania exported more maize than any other country in the world. It was rich in timber, about 17.5 million acres, or one fourth of the total area, being timberland. Manufacturing was still in its infancy. During the years immediately following the termination of World War I less than one million inhabitants were employed in manufacturing establishments, but after 1935 there was a mushroom growth of industry which was largely due to the rearmament program.

The government was technically a constitutional monarchy of the normal type with a bicameral legislature but in practice it was largely absolute. King Ferdinand, who ascended the throne in October, 1914, was little more than a figurehead. The real ruler was Ion Bratianu, who dominated the political situation from 1918 until his death in 1927.² Through his domination of the king, Bratianu controlled the royal power to nominate and recall ministers. Once he and his nominees were in power, they proceeded to form a majority in parliament by wholesale manipulation of elections. They did not hesitate to limit the freedom of the press, to infringe upon the right of free assembly, or to resort to martial law when crises arose.

² The name "Bratianu" was not new in Rumanian politics. For many decades it had been closely connected with important historical events. The father of Ion Bratianu had played a primary role in winning Rumanian independence (1878).

By such means, though he was not always premier, he ruled the country for almost a decade.

The end of World War I saw the Rumanian government confronted by many knotty problems which demanded a solution. Outstanding among them was repairing the damages of war. Two thirds of old Rumania had been occupied by the Germans and systematically exploited to the point of exhaustion. At the time of the German advance into Rumania in 1917 the Rumanians had destroyed many oil wells to keep the enemy from using them. For these wells new machinery had to be purchased so that they could again be made productive. Then it was also necessary to put the finances in order. The Germans had flooded the country with German marks, which rapidly fell in value and which the Germans refused to redeem at any rate. In addition, Rumania had at the time of the German advance sent its entire gold reserve to Russia, where the Bolsheviks used it to establish their revolution. Consequently there was little or no money available for repairing the war ravages, with the result that for a time mines and industries were at a standstill and farmers could not till the fields because of a lack of fertilizers, tools, and animals. The dislocation of agriculture was such that the people, though they were an agricultural nation, were obliged to purchase food abroad to keep from starving.

Not only food but the agrarian question generally posed a serious problem. Before the war Rumania had been a country of large estates. Peasant holdings were relatively few and most of these too small to be self-supporting. During the second half of the nineteenth century uprisings impelled by land hunger were by no means uncommon. At various times the parliament did take measures toward allotting more land to the peasants, but these reforms did not settle the agrarian question. The portions of land held by the peasants were still too small to maintain the owners. In 42 per cent of the cases the allotments averaged less than five acres, while 39 per cent had no more than twelve acres and 14 per cent under twenty-five acres. Many small holders in fact were forced to sell their land and become dependent again upon the landlord. When the Bolshevik Revolution broke out, King Ferdinand in order to avert the imminent danger of a similar revolution in Rumania promised the peasants that the great estates would be split up and handed to them. The expropriation began the next year. Up to the end of 1929 nine thousand estates had been allotted to the peasants and many of the remaining large estates were divided during the succeeding years. The terms were so arranged that the



THE BALKAN STATES AND THEIR NEIGHBORS

The "peninsula of unrest," the danger zone of Europe, has never attained the unity long ago established in the other two peninsulas that jut down into the Mediterranean.

peasants paid 65 per cent of the appropriation price in forty-five annual installments, the remaining 35 per cent being borne by the state. This division changed both the status and the outlook of the peasant and gave him an incentive to plan and look forward to his own betterment.

Most persistent throughout the period was the problem of minorities. The population before the First World War had been largely, though not wholly, homogeneous. As a result of the settlement the Rumanians made up only 74.4 per cent of the population, the rest being members of other nationalities. Thus 8.4 per cent were Hungarians, 5 per cent Jews, 4.3 per cent Germans, 3.3 per cent Russians (Ukrainians), 1.5 per cent Bulgarians, 1 per cent Turks, and the rest a collection from other nationalities. The actual joining of the unredeemed provinces to the mother country was easily achieved, but the tremendous task of readjustment to new conditions and of fitting together the different parts of Greater Rumania into a harmonious whole was a task of another nature. It was not only a question of unifying the various legal systems which had previously functioned in the new provinces, but of making Rumanian nationals of the 1,500,000 Hungarians, 750,000 Germans, 500,000 Ukrainians, and 250,000 Bulgarians who inhabited these provinces. Nor were the great numbers of Magyars, Germans, Russians, and Bulgarians disposed to welcome the change of sovereignty and the efforts of the government to destroy their cultural existence. The government, it is true, had signed the Minorities' Treaty in 1919 under pressure from the Allied powers, but the Bratianu regime made no attempt to enact its provisions. On the contrary, it pursued a relentless policy of denationalization.

If it made little progress toward solving the minorities problem, it did achieve some success in other respects. Besides being directly responsible for the introduction of peasant proprietorship, it was able by a process of rigid economy coupled with a systematic readjustment of taxation to put some semblance of order into the finances. But its popularity was short lived. As the party of big business it adopted a policy which evoked widespread opposition within and sharp criticism outside Rumania. The keynote of this policy was "Rumania for Rumanians." More specifically, it advocated control of industry by Rumanians and a high tariff to protect Rumanian products. Laws were enacted to achieve both aims. Particularly noteworthy was the mining law (June 30, 1924) which aimed to give Rumanians control of the oil industry in their country. It was estimated that previously only one company out of five

had been Rumanian owned and that of the capital invested no less than 80 per cent was foreign. The mining law decreed that thereafter only the state could grant oil concessions and that 55 per cent of the stock of all oil companies must be owned by Rumanian citizens. Corporations which already held concessions were given a specified time in which to sell a majority of their stock to Rumanians. Both the protective tariff and the nationalization of the subsoil aroused opposition. While the peasants contended that the tariff was prejudicial to their interests, the mining law provoked the wrath of foreign investors. When Bratianu attempted to organize Rumanian companies to develop the national resources, he could not command sufficient capital.

Meanwhile the political front had been undergoing a gradual change. Before the war there had been two important political parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals. The former represented the interests of the great landowners; the latter, the industrial and financial classes. The balance between these two was, however, upset through the introduction of universal manhood suffrage and peasant proprietorship. According to the new electoral law (1922) all male citizens, irrespective of wealth, became direct voters. Thus the landlords lost their former political privileges, which were based upon property. It was the political death warrant of the Conservative Party. While the party as such went to pieces, the former members joined the Liberal Party. Thenceforth the name "Liberal Party" was in reality a misnomer because it now became the party of the right. On the left a group of peasant parties had arisen, stimulated to life by the extension of direct suffrage to the peasants. They were the country's true liberals. In 1926 these various parties were fused into the National Peasant Party which thereafter increasingly contested the Liberal Party's control of the government. The platform of the Peasant Party was not communistic. Its basic plank was peasant prosperity through cooperatives for the marketing of agricultural produce and the buying of implements.

The downfall of the Liberal Party, which had been expected for some time, finally came in 1927. In addition to the economic decline, the death of the king and the question of the succession increased the difficulties of the ruling party and its leaders. When King Ferdinand died in July, 1927, he was not succeeded by his eldest son Carol but by Prince Michael, the son of Carol and his wife, Princess Helen of Greece. A series of youthful escapades culminating in a clash with his family and with the Bratianus caused Carol formally to renounce his right to the throne and to leave

Rumania to live in exile with his mistress, Magda Lupescu. Consequently upon Ferdinand's death, Michael, a boy of six, was declared king under a regency. Bratianu continued as the power behind the throne, but his days were numbered. Four months later he followed his royal friend to the grave. His brother, Vintila, who succeeded him as premier and as leader of the Liberal Party, sought to continue Ion's policies. He was unequal to the situation. After failing to obtain a foreign loan, the need for which had become imperative, he reached a point where he could not go on. The regency was forced to call Julius Maniu, the leader of the National Peasant Party, to the helm (1928).

The new government proceeded at once to inaugurate a program of domestic reform. It repealed the censorship of the press, eased the restrictions on racial minorities, curbed anti-Jewish demonstrations, modified the laws restricting foreign capital, reduced the tariff, lowered the cost of living, and introduced drastic economies into public administration. Nevertheless it did not produce the miraculous results the masses expected. The obstacles confronting it were too great: first, there was the inexperience of its supporters; second, the world-wide depression was making itself felt; third, the National Liberals, who still retained control of the banking institutions, bent every effort to undermine the work of the new government. When they felt the reins of government slipping through their fingers, the National Peasant leaders decided to play their last trump. They approved the return of Carol. Public opinion was not unfavorable to his return. Not only had the peasants always been fond of him, but he was also popular with the army. Hence it was not surprising that he was enthusiastically welcomed by the troops when he stepped from a military airplane at Bucharest on June 6, 1930. Two days later the two houses of parliament repealed by an almost unanimous vote the act which had excluded him from the throne and then proclaimed him king of the Rumanians. Thus the former playboy became King Carol II.

The new king was determined not to owe his crown to any party or to take orders from any group. His ambition was to eliminate factional strife and to form a national government in which all parties were represented. Personal and factional interests, he said, had ruled Rumanian politics too long and too much; henceforth national interests must be paramount. Instead of taking steps against the National Liberals who had opposed his return, he made it known that he would welcome their support. The result was that the party issued a manifesto declaring its adherence to the new ruler. With the

support of the two major parties Carol settled down with a new seriousness to the business of being king. "Rumania," he said, "has vast resources and we must make them productive, thus strengthening the country economically. The army must be reorganized. Restored to a normal regime and enjoying the advantages of stability, Rumania may aspire to a high place in Europe." Carol made the development of education and the welfare of the peasants his special care and was able to achieve much in both directions. He also sought to win the support of the minorities. By his direction a statute promulgated in 1938 permitted the minorities to organize themselves into communities for the defense of their cultural, economic, and social interests.

Carol's most formidable opposition centered in the Fascist movement. The main Fascist group was the Iron Guard founded by Corneliu Codreanu. This party did not, as is often stated, originate as an offshoot of the German Nazi Party; it was an indigenous, intensely nationalistic movement which, like the Nazi Party, had an economic basis in the land hunger of the peasants and the job hunger of the middle classes. The Iron Guardists shared the anti-Semitism of the Nazis and adopted the swastika as their symbol, and parts of their platform were a literal translation of the Nazi program. In foreign politics they urged a close alliance with Germany and Italy. When they found that Carol had no intention of allying himself with them, certain sections of the party resorted to terroristic methods and political murders which included the assassination of Premier Duca in 1933. The king responded by proscribing the party, but this only served to drive it under cover. Thenceforth the Iron Guard, continuing its activities under the new name of "All-for-Country," received encouragement and subsidies from the Nazis, who were vitally interested in the priceless oil reserves and the fertile fields of Rumania and who also coveted this passageway to the Ukraine.

The internal situation gradually reached a point where the king was compelled to take drastic steps in order to save his crown and the independence of his state. He met the totalitarian challenge by an experiment in authoritarian government. In 1930 he replaced the loosely democratic constitution of 1923 by a new constitution which made the ministers responsible only to the crown. In the same year he also dissolved the old political parties and replaced them by a single legitimate organization, the Front of National Rebirth. "In difficult times," Carol said, "the labor of those at the head of the country should be strengthened by the concentrated effort of all

the active and creative elements of the nation." Most of the Iron Guard leaders, including Codreanu, were sentenced to prison terms, and some two thousand members were banished to concentration camps. In November Codreanu and some of his followers were shot "while attempting to escape," as the government put it. For the time being Carol was the dictator of Rumania.

In the field of international politics events had taken a turn which augured ill for Rumania's future. Carol, whose sympathies were on the side of Great Britain and France, repeatedly refused Germany's offer to safeguard his territory because he knew that consent would mean the end of independence. He hoped the situation would develop in such a way as to make it possible for the Allied powers to come to his aid in case of necessity. By making minor revisions of the frontiers he could probably have built up a Balkan bloc that would have stood as a formidable barrier to Axis³ ambitions. But he was determined to cling to every inch of territory that Rumania had received in 1919, and in his stand he was supported by a majority of Rumanians. In the Munich crisis of 1938 he did declare that Rumania would stand behind its treaties. Representatives even began to devise means whereby a Russian army could pass through Rumania in going to the help of Czechoslovakia, which the Nazis were about to add to the Greater Reich. As it became clear that the British and French could give him no military support, Carol tried to make the best of both worlds. While he did not repudiate his former connections, he did comply to a considerable extent with Hitler's behests because he deemed this essential for security. At the outbreak of World War II Rumania formally declared its neutrality, and none hoped more fervently than Carol II that his country would be able to adhere to it. But Rumania was inexorably sucked into the maelstrom.



YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslavia was the second largest Balkan state, with a population of some fourteen million and an area of roughly 96,000 miles, which is over three quarters the size of the British Isles and three times that of prewar Serbia. The new kingdom began its formal existence in December, 1918, under the name, Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Not until 1929 did it officially receive the name of Yugoslavia. Its component parts were the independent kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro and the former Austro-Hun-

³Germany and Italy were the Axis powers.

garian provinces of Croatia, Slovenia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes constituted more than 80 per cent of the total population, Yugoslavia, like Rumania, had its German and Magyar minorities. Linguistically the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were closely related, but in most other respects they were far apart. Having lived apart for centuries, they had developed peculiar mental processes and psychological outlooks. They were, for example, in different stages of development, the Croats and Slovenes being much more advanced than the Serbians. Such differences made them distrustful of each other. In addition to the ethnic, historical, and economic differences, there were also religious differences which complicated the relations of the three groups. While the Serbs belonged to the Orthodox Church and wrote with Cyrillic characters, the Croats and Slovenes were Roman Catholics and, though they spoke the same tongue as their Serb kinsmen, wrote it with Latin characters. More specifically, 48 per cent of the nation were adherents of the Orthodox faith and 37 per cent were Roman Catholics. The Moslems numbered 11 per cent of the population.

In November, 1918, Prince Alexander, heir to the Serbian throne, was chosen as head of the new kingdom and on December 1 began his rule as constitutional monarch. His task was far from easy, for the internal condition of the new state was fraught with many difficulties. Croatia and Slovenia, it is true, had hardly been touched by the devastation of the preceding years, but Serbia had been carrying on war for more than six years and had been held by the enemy for four years, during which time it had been plundered of everything worth removing. Towns had been turned into rubble heaps, roads and railroads torn up, and mines and factories destroyed. Everything necessary for industry and agriculture had to be procured afresh. On top of this, the national credit was low and the rate of exchange unfavorable. Furthermore, the different provinces stood on different economic levels, had different legal systems, and also different land systems. More than half the population was illiterate and there was no tradition of democratic participation in the government.

The central problem was the establishment of a system of government which could put order into the existing chaos and, above all, command the cooperation and respect of the various groups composing the new state. The basic issue was between what may roughly be called "centralist" and "federalist" tendencies. Under the stress of an acute crisis in 1918 the principle of union was accepted

on all sides, but unhappily the fundamental lines on which the union was to be worked out were not specified. In the Constituent Assembly which met in 1920 the Serbian Radical Party under the leadership of Nicholas Pashitch (1845-1926) was the most powerful group. Pashitch, who had carried Serbia through the war years and fought its battles at the Peace Conference, worked tirelessly for a highly centralized state. In other words, he wished to create a "Great Serbia," regardless of the national, cultural, and political aspirations of non-Serb peoples within the new state. Accordingly the constitution adopted at his urging was along extreme centralist lines, one which supplanted the provincial diets by one central legislative body and otherwise sought to centralize authority in Belgrade.

This constitution, promulgated in 1921, was not to the liking of the Croats, who cherished everything that marked them as distinct from other peoples. Having enjoyed a certain autonomy in the old Austro-Hungarian state they resented the attempt to shape them into the Serbian mold. They were willing to admit that the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes must live together, but insisted that the bonds joining them must be as shadowy as possible, that each province must have the right to go its own way politically, commercially, and culturally. The chief protagonists of Croat particularism were the members of the Croat Peasant Party whose leader was Stefan Raditch, a Zagreb bookseller. The representatives of this party either refused to participate in the proceedings of the Belgrade chamber or when they were present voted against the government. Consequently there were recurrent political crises, and no cabinet was able to retain a parliamentary majority for long. Urgent legislation was far in arrears and the economic organization of the country was sadly neglected. Worst of all, the misunderstanding between Serbia and Croatia was becoming more serious. In 1928 the political strife was intensified to a point where the Croat leader, Stefan Raditch, was assassinated at a session of the Belgrade parliament.

When the Croat deputies withdrew as a result of the assassination and the very existence of the state was threatened, the demand became more and more insistent that the king take the initiative. Alexander responded by suspending parliament and abolishing the constitution of 1921 (January 6, 1929). Thereafter, with the support of the army, he carried on the government entirely on autocratic lines. The goal he set for his dictatorship was to weld the three ethnic groups into one nationality. To this end he deliberately broke with historic tradition and abolished the old names of Croatia, Bosnia, Dalmatia, etc., replacing these districts with new divisions.

He further decreed (July, 1930) the dissolution of all associations and institutions which might help preserve tribal sentiments. These measures, however, only created further grievances. Finally, in September, 1931, to allay internal discontent and to assuage foreign opinion, Alexander issued a new constitution which defined the state as a constitutional monarchy. But it restored the constitutional monarchy in appearance rather than in reality. While it contained clauses which guaranteed political liberties, inviolability of person, the right of free assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and a free press, it unfortunately nullified the rights in each instance by the addition of such phrases as "except in cases provided by the law" or "within the limits of the law," for all the laws of the dictatorship remained in force under the new constitution. There was once more a parliament, but the crown retained the right to nominate and dismiss the prime minister and all the members of the cabinet, and was able to manipulate the elections in such a way as to insure itself a majority of supporters.

King Alexander had failed to solve the basic problems of Yugoslav unity. He had merely established a police regime which, instead of breaking the passive resistance of the Croats, had made them more determined in their opposition. Everywhere there was profound discontent. In October, 1931, a turning point came as the result of the assassination of King Alexander by a Macedonian kinsman. Alexander's young son ascended the throne with the title of Peter II, but the government was carried on by a triple regency in which Prince Paul, Alexander's cousin, played the leading role. A much milder ruler than Alexander had been, Paul pursued a more conciliatory policy toward the Croats. He was still unwilling, however, to modify the constitution to the extent of granting them local autonomy. After the German designs on Czechoslovakia became patent, he changed his mind. He feared that the Nazis might make the most of the internal dissension to render the country an easy prey to Nazi domination. Thus after many years of struggle the Croat strivings for autonomy came to fruition in 1939. It was agreed that Croatia, with its 4.5 million inhabitants, should form a distinct unit under a Ban or governor, after the pattern of Croatia's previous status in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In addition to a Ban, appointed by the crown, Croatia was to have a local diet, meeting in Zagreb, and a separate budget. On the other hand, the central government retained control of foreign affairs, the army, foreign trade, transportation, religion, mining, weights and measures, and the broad lines of educational policy.



Wide World Photo

A PEASANT DANCE IN YUGOSLAVIA

Under the regency of Prince Paul a change also became apparent in Yugoslavia's foreign policy. Until 1936 this was based on friendship with Great Britain and France and on adherence to the Little Entente. But in 1936 Yugoslavia began to gravitate toward the orbit of Germany and Italy, Prince Paul endeavoring at the same time to remain on good terms with Great Britain and France. The drift toward the Axis came as a result of advances made by Germany and Italy, who eagerly sought the economic resources of Yugoslavia. The regency defended its new policy by stating that it had no other choice since it could place little reliance on the guarantees of the Western democracies. It further stated that trade with Germany was more beneficial than economic relations with Great Britain and France. Finally, it also argued that Yugoslavia was only making new friends while retaining the old ones. The masses did not, however, share the opinion of the regency. Bitterly hostile to Germany and to Italy, they sharply denounced the friendship with the Axis powers.



GREECE

Greece emerged from the Balkan Wars and World War I with large acquisitions of territory. By the peace that was signed after the Balkan Wars it acquired territory in Epirus, Macedonia, Crete, and the Aegean Islands, so that it was practically doubled in size and population. When the First World War broke out, Venizelos, who had been premier most of the time since 1910, was wholeheartedly in favor of joining the Allies; but King Constantine, who was married to the sister of Kaiser William of Germany, had other ideas. Convinced of Teutonic invincibility, he tried to avoid becoming involved in the war. In 1917, after the entry of the United States, France and Great Britain put pressure on the king, who responded by abdicating in favor of Alexander, the younger of his sons (June 11, 1917). Several weeks later Venizelos formally declared war on Germany, Turkey, and Bulgaria.

The opening of the Peace Conference saw Venizelos in Paris. As the representative of Greece, he proved himself a consummate master of diplomatic technique. It is reported that at his first meeting with President Wilson the latter, wishing to end the conversation after several minutes of generalities, assured Venizelos that he would keep the Hellenic aspirations in mind. "I am grateful, Mr. President," the Greek premier responded. "What really interests me now is not Greece but your great idea of the League of Nations. To work, in

the measure of my capacities, toward the realization of this great idea is my deepest desire. Consider me, please, as a soldier at your order for this task." Happy at finding a supporter of his cause, the President continued the conversation for more than an hour. Venizelos, upon returning to his hotel, said to his friends, "I think we have Smyrna." Unfortunately the Treaty of Sèvres did give the Greeks permission to occupy the Smyrna district of Asia Minor besides assigning them the greater part of Thrace. The occupation of Smyrna meant the forcible ejection of the Turks from that territory. Thus the Greeks were called upon to make a fresh military effort. But the enterprise was doomed to failure: not only was their army poorly equipped, but it was also singularly lacking in leadership. At first they made appreciable progress in their advance into Asia Minor, but with the stiffening of Turkish resistance they were gradually compelled to evacuate the district. The differences between the Greeks and Turks were composed in the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923).⁴

The new treaty left Greece with an area of about 50,000 square miles—about the size of the state of New York—and a population of about 6.5 million. Like the other Balkan nations, Greece was pre-eminently an agricultural state. More than 60 per cent of the population derived a living from farming. Although the land was on the whole less fertile, the momentary yield per acre was greater than in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, or Albania.⁵ While cereals made up the greater part of the crops, considerable quantities of fruit, particularly grapes, figs, and olives, were raised. Stock raising was also an important source of income.

Commerce and industry were, however, by no means neglected. The Greeks had long been noted traders and fishermen. Nor was the industrial development as backward as in some of the other Balkan countries. Ten years after World War I Greece boasted almost 4000 large factories, and this despite a serious lack of capital and coal. Besides wines, raisins, tobacco, brandy, soap, and olive oil, the exports included yarns, carpets, and chemical fertilizers.

The political history of Greece during the period between the two great wars is the story of an almost unbroken series of political revolutions, most of which were bloodless. The changes were generally the work of resolute minorities, the public as such being completely indifferent most of the time. On October 5, 1920, King Alex-

⁴ See page 302.

⁵ See J. S. Roucek, "The Economic Geography of Greece," in *Economic Geography*, vol. II, pp. 91-101.

ander who had occupied the throne only a few years died of blood poisoning from the bite of a pet monkey. His death made the restoration of Constantine a real issue. Despite Venizelos' opposition, the people, who longed for a real peace and believed that Constantine would give it to them, voted overwhelmingly for his restoration. But his popularity was shortlived. When the Smyrna expedition turned out so disastrously, a large part of the defeated army held him responsible. Although there were loyal troops ready to fight for him, he abdicated to avoid civil war (September 27, 1922). The Crown Prince ascended the throne as George II, but occupied it only a few troubled months. The republicans cut short his reign by proclaiming a republic and then proceeded to secure ratification of their action in a plebiscite (April, 1924).

But the new form of government brought no more political stability than the old had. There was violent political strife, with cabinets rising and falling in rapid succession. For a considerable time there was even an actual dictatorship. In 1928 Venizelos, after an absence from political life of more than four years, returned to an active role in the government. Even his four-year rule failed to end the discord. After his retirement in 1932 the vitality of the republic gradually ebbed. Three years later (October, 1935) a group of scheming generals staged a military *coup d'état* which proclaimed Greece a monarchy. A plebiscite was staged to approve the return of George II. The exiled king announced that he would be "king of all the Greeks," not of the royalists alone. However, the political parties showed little inclination to sink their differences and to pull together for the benefit of the country as a whole. So uncompromising was the rivalry that no stable ministry could be formed. The threat of anarchy opened the way for dictatorship, and the man who seized the opportunity was General Metaxas.

Metaxas, who had the support of the army, obtained King George's signature (August 4, 1936) to decrees which suspended the articles of the constitution guaranteeing personal liberty. He then proceeded to declare martial law. Thereafter until his death (January, 1941) he ruled as dictator. Upon assuming power he at once set about reorganizing the country according to the example set by Hitler and Mussolini. In harmony with both he defined liberty as a "nineteenth-century illusion" and acted accordingly. Thus, for example, the press was muzzled and many opponents were subjected to the "castor oil treatment." But there were also reforms; among others, a minimum wage was established, an eight-hour day was declared, some of the debts of the small landowners were canceled,

and workers were given health protection. Nevertheless, the Metaxas government gained little popular support until the Italian occupation of Albania (April, 1939). Fearing that Greece might be next on the schedule, the people rallied behind Metaxas, who tried to maintain a strict neutrality when World War II broke out. It was all to no avail, for the Italians coveted the Greek harbors which were important strategic points. In 1940 Mussolini's government tried to pick a quarrel with Greece. When this maneuver failed, Italy presented a crude ultimatum and then launched an unprovoked invasion of Greek territory.



BULGARIA

While Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Greece gained territory as a result of the settlement in 1919, Bulgaria was reduced to a population of something less than five million and an area of some 39,000 square miles. In other words, it was a third larger than the state of Maine and its population seven times as large. From the time of its liberation from Turkish rule in 1878 until 1913 Bulgaria had become more successful and important. But a turning point came in the second Balkan War. In the first Balkan War the Serbs, Greeks, and Bulgarians had been allies against Turkey, but no sooner was it over than the Serbs and Greeks (subsequently joined by the Rumanians) attacked Bulgaria in a war over the division of the spoils. In the settlement Bulgaria lost most of Macedonia and Dobruja. When the First World War broke out, most of the Bulgarians wished to remain neutral; but as it progressed, neutrality became increasingly difficult. In the spring of 1915, after the Dardanelles failure, King Ferdinand decided that the Central Powers must win and he therefore cast Bulgaria's lot with them. Thus the end of the war found Bulgaria on the losing side. At Paris the Bulgarian nation was reduced from a position of importance to one of comparative insignificance. Besides having its boundaries further reduced in favor of Yugoslavia and Greece, it lost its access to the Aegean. Furthermore, its finances were dealt a fatal blow by the imposition of an indemnity of 2.25 billion francs in gold. In 1923, it is true, the amount of the indemnity was reduced to 550 million gold francs which were to be paid over a period of sixty years, but the burden was still a crushing one for the impoverished nation.

The feeling of resentment over the war, the defeat, and the dismemberment which cut off a million Bulgarians from their home-

land was so strong that those who had been instrumental in taking the country into the war fell out of favor with the masses. King Ferdinand fled the country in the autumn of 1918 and was succeeded by his son, Boris III. With the departure of Ferdinand the atmosphere of the court became less autocratic. The young sovereign made no attempt to control the government, which in form was a constitutional monarchy. His position was, however, no sinecure. Post-war restlessness produced class hatreds and strife which at times assumed the dimensions of civil war.

The feeling was especially tense between the townspeople on the one hand and the peasants on the other. The word "Bulgarian" derives from "Bolalagar," meaning plowman or peasant. The name was appropriate since more than four fifths of the population were peasants. Only 10 per cent were employed in industry, commerce, and transportation. The contrast between town and country was very sharp. Sofia, the capital, was well equipped with hospitals, a municipal water system, electric lights, street cars, and taxis. There were also other towns and cities with up-to-date conveniences. But the inhabitants of the villages had only the barest necessities. The average holding, which had been twenty-five acres in 1900, decreased to only fifteen in 1926. The methods of agriculture employed by most of the peasants were still primitive. As late as 1936 there were almost twice as many wooden plows as iron plows. Consequently crop yield was decidedly lower than in many European countries.

During the period preceding the First World War the administration had been in the hands of the townspeople, but early in the twentieth century a reaction against bourgeois domination began to take form. An Agrarian League was organized and gradually grew stronger until by 1919 it was the most powerful party. When it obtained a majority of the seats in the National Assembly as a result of the elections of 1919, King Boris entrusted the government to Alexander Stambolisky, the leader of the party. The son of poor parents and a man of Herculean stature and a forceful eloquence, Stambolisky was deeply venerated by the peasants. With their support he began to crush the opposition and to inaugurate sweeping agrarian reforms. For example, he expropriated large tracts of church, government, and private land which he then broke up into small farms and gave to landless peasants. In his foreign policy he bowed to the wishes of the victorious powers, accepting the Treaty of Neuilly and endeavoring to carry out its provisions.

Stambolisky's policies soon aroused bitter resentment among the

urban, military, and professional classes. While his iron rule which favored the peasants created ill feeling among the townspeople generally, the military and nationalist leaders opposed his policy of friendship with the other Balkan states. Furthermore, his subordinates brought discredit upon the administration by frequently falling short in the performance of their duties. All this caused a combination of army officers, intellectuals, and the chieftains of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization⁶ to stage a *coup d'état*. In June, 1923, Stambolisky was murdered and a bourgeois government was established. For the next eleven years coalitions, most of which represented only a small minority of the people, ruled the country. In May, 1934, the parliamentary form of government was terminated completely by a Fascist group supported by the Officers' League. The new government abolished all political parties, dissolved the Macedonian terrorist organization, and entered into collaboration with the Agrarians. They made a serious mistake, however, in restricting the role of King Boris. Boris, by patient planning and guileful manipulation, succeeded in causing division within the group that had staged the coup. Having weakened the power of this group, the king proclaimed a royal dictatorship in April, 1935. After two years of personal rule he decided to recreate parliament. The new parliament, elected in March, 1938, had no actual power. In general, the royal dictatorship was no more successful than preceding governments in solving the social and economic crisis of Bulgaria.

Throughout this period the Treaty of Neuilly and its results were a major problem. Although the government continued to fulfill its treaty obligations, the fact that about a million Bulgarians were under Greek, Yugoslav, and Rumanian rule engendered a keen sense of injustice. As in Germany and Hungary the injustice of the peace provided fuel for a revisionist movement. After Hitler reorganized the German army, many discontented intellectuals openly advocated close ties with Germany in the hope that Bulgaria might with its help regain the territories lost in 1918. The king also seemed to favor such cooperation but in general there was no love lost between the Bulgarians and the Germans. On the other hand, Bulgaria's trade was largely dependent on the Axis. In 1938-1939, for example, 63.4 per cent of the exports went to Greater Germany and 57.8 per cent of its imports came from Greater Germany. This

⁶ An organization which by means of terrorist methods waged a ceaseless fight to set up Macedonia, which had been apportioned to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Greece, as an autonomous state.

foreign trade, supported by intensified Nazi propaganda, gradually drew Bulgaria into the orbit of Axis influence.



ALBANIA

Albania was the smallest of the Balkan states, with a population of less than a million and an area of 10,629 square miles, which is about the size of the state of Maryland. This tiny land of rugged mountains, fertile valleys, and swampy coastal plains had been under Turkish rule for five centuries. It was only in 1913, at the close of the Balkan Wars, that its independence was recognized. During the First World War the fighting front cut Albania almost in two, the Central Powers holding the north and the Allied forces the south. At the Paris Conference there was much discussion as to what should be done with Albania. While the representatives of Greece, Yugoslavia, and Italy contended that the country was incapable of self-government, others wished to preserve it as an independent state. Italy, in particular, had long been interested in Albania, which lies at the bottleneck entrance to the Adriatic Sea and is only forty-seven miles from the Italian coast at the nearest point. At this point there is the Bay of Valona from which a hostile fleet might control the entrance to the Adriatic and seriously threaten Italy's exposed eastern coastline. On the other hand, possession of Valona would have given the Italians complete control of the gateway to the Adriatic. During World War I the Italians had, in fact, used Valona as a naval and air base. While the fate of Albania was being discussed in Paris, the Albanians took matters into their own hands. After organizing their own government, they rose against the Italians, drove them into Valona, and besieged them until they agreed to withdraw (August, 1920). In December, 1920, Albania was admitted into the League of Nations.

Albania was not only the smallest but also the most backward of the Balkan states. The Albanian proverb, "If God came to visit Albania, He would find it just as he made it," contains a considerable element of truth, for conditions in the country were still very primitive. During the centuries of Turkish rule instruction in the Albanian language was prohibited. The few Albanian children who attended the Moslem schools benefited only to the extent of learning some verses of the Koran. Consequently most of the Albanians remained grossly ignorant. Most of the inhabitants had also found it expedient to renounce Christianity. It was only in the more isolated mountain regions which the Turks were never able to administer

that Christianity survived.⁷ As a whole the Albanians were a sturdy race of mountaineers who carried on little or no industry, growing only enough food to exist upon and spinning enough wool to clothe themselves. They did, however, raise many cattle on the mountains, this being the country's most important industry. There were also considerable deposits of coal, iron, copper, oil, and asphalt. Near Valona there is one of the best asphalt deposits in the world. But probably the greatest asset was water power.

In 1925, after a period during which the functions of sovereignty were exercised by a council of four regents, a Constituent Assembly proclaimed a republic and elected Ahmed Zogu to the post of president. Three years later the government was changed to a monarchy, and Ahmed Zogu became Zog I, King of the Albanians. Whatever his weaknesses, Zog was a man of action who immediately bent his energies to the task of organizing and developing his country. Tremendous odds notwithstanding, he made considerable progress towards stability and civilization. For example, a law of June, 1928, made primary education obligatory for both sexes between the ages of six and thirteen. Although the law could not be strictly enforced because of the lack of schools, teachers, and textbooks, the number of children attending school increased rapidly. Zog also endeavored to improve the means of communication and travel and to develop natural resources. For this task he needed financial aid from the outside. Unable to obtain it from any other country, he accepted a loan of 50 million lire from Italy, pledging the customs receipts as a guarantee. The Italian government founded the Albanian National Bank, sent technicians to build roads and bridges, and established advisers in the various state departments.

King Zog tried on a number of occasions to limit the gradual Italian penetration. In 1933, for instance, he rejected a customs union with Italy. In the same year the Italian schools in Albania were closed. The next year he endeavored to limit the increasing Italian control over his government, but an Italian naval demonstration forced him to give way. For the next few years the relations between the two governments appeared outwardly friendly. Then, in April, 1939, in total disregard of all his pledges, Mussolini sent troops, supported by airplanes and warships, to seize control of the country. The Albanians were able to offer but little resistance. In two days the Italians occupied all the important points with a loss of only twenty-one lives. King Zog, who had vainly hoped to rally the

⁷ About two thirds of the Albanians were Mohammedans and the remaining third were adherents of the Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic faiths.

country and to obtain outside help, was forced to flee to Greece with his queen and their two-day-old son. A new government was constituted to rule under an Italian Governor-General. In Italy the *Giornale d'Italia* announced that "Italy by her intervention has restored to Albania peace and order and the liberty of civil workers which was being seriously compromised."

Spain and Portugal

DISCONTENT AMONG THE WORKING CLASSES

SPAIN was one of the few European countries which did not become involved in World War I. While opinion within Spain was divided, the government remained neutral. But the war did have a tremendous influence on the country. When the naval blockade shut off the foreign supply of manufactured goods, Spaniards began to establish industries to supply the home market. This tendency toward industrialization received a further impetus from the demands of the belligerents for both foodstuffs and manufactured products. Before long the peninsula was literally humming with industry. Certain districts were industrialized almost overnight. The report of the British Overseas Trade Department for 1920 commented on the development of industry during the war years as follows: "The textile industry was so strongly established as to be in a position even to export to South America and compete with Manchester goods there. Electrical goods of quality were being made at Zaragoza. Much progress was achieved in the manufacture of glass and china ware. Shipbuilding improved. The national coal and iron industries were developed to a notable degree." Not only did France and England purchase heavily in the Spanish market during the war years but the exports to Italy also more than doubled. As a result Spain experienced a period of prosperity. Gold flowed into the country faster than at any time since the days when the Spanish galleons brought in the treasure of the Incas and the Aztecs. From being a debtor nation Spain became a creditor nation which made considerable loans to other nations.

The wave of prosperity, instead of bringing contentment, only increased the dissatisfaction of the masses. Since the prosperity rarely

extended below the middle class, the peasants and industrial workers saw little improvement in their lot. Conditions among those engaged in agriculture—and Spain was predominantly agricultural with only a small percentage of the population employed in industrial establishments—were generally bad. The general situation might be summed up briefly in the words: too few landowners, too numerous and too poor tenants and agricultural laborers. About 50,000 landlords who constituted about one five-hundredth of the population owned more than half of the land. The actual management of the land was most often left to agents and middlemen whose one interest was to make the largest profit. Actual cultivation was done either by tenants who leased part of an estate or by hired laborers. Both were ruthlessly exploited. In Catalonia, for example, many winegrowers were required to give their landlords as much as two thirds of the crop. As most tenants were too poor to introduce machinery and better methods of cultivation, the yield was very low. France produced almost twice the wine from an area of about the same size. As for wheat, eleven bushels to the acre was the average yield. Agricultural laborers were paid wages barely sufficient to maintain a miserable undernourished existence. No wonder that the nationalization of land in Russia made a deep impression on the Spanish masses. In certain districts one phrase was on many lips—distribution of the land.

The industrial workers were equally dissatisfied. Although the cost of living rose sharply after 1914, most industrial workers succeeded in wringing higher wages from their employers only during the last years of the war. With the return of peace Spain found herself confronted by a decreasing demand for her goods. Exports fell off considerably and foreign manufactures again invaded the market. As a result thousands of workers were thrown out of employment and the wages of those who kept their jobs dropped, bringing acute distress to many. In short, a general depression made itself felt. One observer described the situation as follows: "There cannot be any other civilized country in the world where the laboring classes have as much to complain of their lot in life, and to rebel against it by every means in their power, as they have in Spain."¹ Workers staged repeated strikes in an attempt to restore the former scale of wages; in fact, the early postwar period was but a succession of strikes. More than this, discontented workers became easy converts to socialism and revolutionary anarchism, more to the latter than to the former. Although there was a small Socialist Labor Party,

¹ Deakin, *Spain Today* (1924), p. 11.

anarchism was a much stronger movement, particularly in Barcelona where about one third of Spain's industries were located. The anarcho-syndicalists did not hesitate to use violence in their attempt to change existing conditions.


There was among the masses a widespread dissatisfaction not only with economic conditions but also with a government that was utterly indifferent to chaos. For many decades Spain had been struggling to build a government along constitutional lines. The reigning king, Alfonso XIII, who had come to the throne in 1902, had been more successful than his predecessors, but the government was still inefficient. According to law Spain was a constitutional monarchy, with a constitution that dated from 1876. This guaranteed freedom from arbitrary arrest and provided that no tax be imposed and no law passed without the consent of the Cortes, a parliament of two chambers. But in practice the constitution was largely circumvented. The real government was known in the political slang of the country as *El Caciquismo* or the rule of the *caciques*.² The rule of the *caciques* was the same whether the dominant party was conservative or liberal in name. It was, in brief, a political machine. The supreme *cacique* was the prime minister and directly under him there were a dozen leading politicians each of whom had his own district over which he ruled as master. The rule of the provincial *cacique* was exercised in every town and village through local *caciques* without whose consent nothing could be done and whose allegiance was due only the higher *cacique* whom they served. Most often the local *caciques* were employers of labor or money lenders to whom the working population of the district looked for employment or in whose debt they were. Thus the *caciques* had the majority of the constituency under their collective thumb.



THE DICTATORSHIP OF PRIMO DE RIVERA

At the opening of 1923 two serious situations faced the government. On the one hand, there was the separatist movement in Catalonia and, on the other, the Riff uprising in Morocco. In Catalonia a group of separatists had formed a movement which wished to separate Catalonia entirely from the rest of Spain and to establish it as an independent nation. Not regarded too seriously by the government at first, Catalan separatism had grown to the point where it constituted a grave menace to Spanish unity. But it was the

² The word *cacique* was introduced into the language by the early explorers, it being the name of the despots they found among the tribes of the New World.



THE IBERIAN PENINSULA

The separatist movement in Catalonia and the Riff rebellion in Morocco precipitated the chain of events that led to the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, the abdication of Alfonso XIII, the establishment of the Spanish Republic, the civil war, and the dictatorship of Franco.

Moroccan situation—more specifically, the series of disastrous defeats sustained by the army in attempting to quell an uprising of Riff tribesmen—which precipitated a change in the government. The struggle between the tribesmen and the Spaniards started as far back as 1909 when the former attacked Spanish soldiers and workers who were building a railroad in Morocco. From that time onward various attempts had been made to solve “the problem of Morocco” but without success. The summer of 1921 saw another such attempt. General Silvestre, a court favorite, marching against the Riff chieftain, Abd-el-Krim, with a force of about 20,000, suffered a disastrous defeat at Annual in Morocco. Attacked by a very inferior force, the Spaniards broke and ran. In the rout more than 10,000 were massacred and large stores of artillery and ammunition were lost. It was the worst defeat for the Spanish forces since the Spanish-American War.

At home the news gave rise to an energetic demand from one end of the country to the other for an inquiry to assign the responsibility for what had taken place. This demand finally became so insistent that the Cortes appointed a Committee of Inquiry. The evidence revealed widespread disobedience, disorder, and corruption in the army, including wholesale graft in the purchase of supplies, illicit trafficking in arms, and the pocketing of payrolls by officers while soldiers were starving and in rags. Among those implicated by the report were not only high military and government officials but Alfonso XIII himself. The report was to have been made public on September 20, 1923; but a group of officers, seeing the position of the army in jeopardy, decided to take over the government itself before the findings could reach the people. The leader was General Primo de Rivera. He carefully laid plans for a *coup d'état*, which was executed on September 13 without the firing of a shot. Whether or not the king personally helped to plan the coup, is still a moot question. With many writers Rivera's emphatic assurances that the king was not privy to the plans have carried great weight. On the other hand, Alfonso did nothing to prevent their execution. When the Marquis de Albuemas, who was prime minister at the time, realized what was going on, he proposed the immediate arrest of the rebellious generals, but the king replied that such a grave proposal required reflection. Thereupon the prime minister resigned. Within twenty-four hours General de Rivera was ruling the country at the head of a military cabinet called the Directory.

Although he was officially only the president of the Directory, he was actually the absolute ruler of Spain. He was, it is true, subject

to the king in theory and had to have his decrees countersigned by the latter before they could become law, but Alfonso could hardly refuse his signature since the very existence of the monarchy was at stake. Soon after the coup the Cortes was dissolved. When the constitutional period of three months passed without new elections, it was realized that the constitution was for all practical purposes dead. Anyone who tried to lift a finger in its behalf was at once suppressed. Martial law became the law of the country. Free speech and assembly were suspended, the press was subjected to a strict censorship, and meetings for the discussion of political matters were forbidden. In order to escape imprisonment many critics of the government became refugees in foreign lands, among them the popular novelist, Blasco Ibáñez. One move which brought joy to many who had suffered at the hands of the petty tyrants in town and country was the uprooting of the *caciques*. Proclaiming that "boss rule must be torn up by the roots," military governors took over the power previously exercised by the *caciques*. Nor did the destruction stop there. The municipal councils were also unceremoniously dissolved and their functions taken over by the military authorities. The new government further struck harshly at the separatist movement in Catalonia. The Catalan language was put under the ban, newspapers published in Catalan being obliged to appear in Castilian; Catalan festivals were prohibited; and even the typical dress of the region was ordered modified. But in spite of the official notes stating that the separatist movement had been crushed, it had only been forced underground.

Upon assuming the dictatorship General de Rivera announced that his tenure of power was purely a temporary expedient. He would, he stated, soon take steps toward re-establishing constitutional government and then retire. He did not, however, translate his words into action. In December, 1925, the military directory, it is true, was replaced by a civil directory, composed largely of civilians; but Rivera retained his powers. His dictatorship was to last more than six years. During this time he did accomplish a number of things. Pushing the war against the Riffs more vigorously, he compelled Abd-el-Krim to surrender to a combined force of Spanish and French troops in 1926. He also worked hard to promote the material well-being of the people. To stimulate the development of industry he raised the tariffs on imported manufactures and subsidized new industries. Companies from which foreigners derived profits were either confiscated or turned over to Spanish ownership. He improved transportation by fusing existing railway companies, constructing new lines, and electrifying some old ones. In the field of agrarian

reform he issued legislation which created a special fund from which tenants of estates could borrow if they wished to purchase the land they were working. In general, economic conditions did improve during the first years of his rule. But the world economic crisis of 1929 undid much of his work.

After the first three or four years the pendulum of public opinion began to swing more and more against him. The liberals completely lost faith in his promises to establish constitutional government and the monarchists began to accuse him of seeking to make his dictatorship permanent. Meanwhile his efforts to found a party like that of Mussolini in Italy met with no real success. When the depression came in 1929, the regime lost its popularity even with the bankers, merchants, and industrialists. His only support came from certain sections of the army and from the old conservative Roman Catholics. Perceiving that even the king was alarmed and on the point of deserting him, Rivera resigned in January, 1930, and retired to France, where he died a few weeks later.

Alfonso, in a last effort to save his throne, entrusted the government in succession to two other dictators whose policies were somewhat more liberal. But popular feeling against the continued suppression of personal liberties and the refusal to restore the Cortes was by this time thoroughly aroused. When the government held municipal elections on April 12, 1931, thereby giving the people the first opportunity in eight years to express their feelings, the vote was overwhelmingly republican. The Spanish people did not want the monarchy, and in particular they did not want the king. The cabinet read the handwriting on the wall and resigned at once, leaving the king the choice of either ruling by force or abdicating. He chose the latter. On April 14 Alfonso XIII fled the country and republican leaders set up a provisional government with Señor Alcalá Zamora as president. Thus the abolition of the monarchy was achieved without bloodshed.



REPUBLICAN REFORM AND CONSERVATIVE REACTION

The proclamation of the republic was received with widespread rejoicing. The people felt that freedom had arrived at last, and the fiesta spirit reigned throughout the land. In the cities the streets were filled with singing and dancing throngs, and in the cafés repeated toasts were drunk to the republic. One of the first tasks of the provisional government was to arrange for the election of a constitutional Cortes. When the election returns came in, it was found

that the socialists and republicans together had won a majority of the deputies. The right opposition gained only sixty deputies of a total of 470. The Cortes met in July, 1931, and turned at once to its assigned task. As finally adopted, the constitution was a document of progressive democratic government. "Spain," Article I stated, "is a democratic republic of workers of all classes, united under a regime of liberty and justice. The powers of all its organs derive from the people." All Spaniards were declared equal before the law, and the rights of freedom of speech, press, and assemblage were guaranteed. The framework of the government, as prescribed by the constitution, was simple. It was to consist of a one-chamber parliament or Cortes, elected by vote of all citizens, regardless of sex, who had reached the age of twenty-three. There was also to be a president, elected for six years by the Cortes in joint session with an equal number of popularly elected delegates. The president, in turn, was given the right to choose the prime minister and the cabinet, but the men chosen had to have the confidence of the Cortes. The constitution was proclaimed on December 10, 1931, with Alcalá Zamora as the first president.

Besides establishing a democratic government, the new constitution broke sharply with the past in various other respects. Particularly noteworthy are the provisions for the complete separation of church and state. The relation between the two had probably been closer in Spain than in any other nation of modern Europe. It was indeed so close that to many Spaniards they were practically identical. Not only had the state taken strong steps to safeguard the privileges of the Spanish Catholic Church but all secular priests had received a stipend from the government. Moreover, only the Catholic Church had been recognized by the state. But according to the new constitution, "the Spanish state has no official religion." All religious sects were placed on the same footing. "A special law," the constitution stated, "shall provide for the total extinction, within a period not exceeding two years, of state grants to the church." Education, which had been largely in the hands of the church, was secularized. Divorce by mutual consent or by either party, upon the presentation of due cause, was permitted. Furthermore, as stated in Article 26, "those religious orders the rule of which requires in addition to the three canonical vows a special vow of obedience to an authority other than that of the state are declared dissolved. Their property shall be nationalized and used for charitable and educational purposes." This Article was, of course, aimed at the Jesuits. The other orders were to be put under rigid governmental control

and were forbidden to teach or to engage in commerce and industry. There was little new in this, for either repression of the religious orders or at least restriction in numbers had been one of the planks of the revolutionary program of liberal and radical parties for more than a century.

After the new constitution went into force, the government with a coalition ministry of socialists and republicans headed by premier Azaña proceeded to carry out the changes. Among the first were those regarding religious orders, church property, marriage, and divorce. In January, 1932, the Cortes passed a law dissolving the Jesuit order and confiscating its property. A few weeks later a law recognizing divorce was passed, and in June of the same year another law decreed that thenceforth the state would recognize only civil marriage. Later in the same year the Cortes enacted another bill, corresponding to the French anticlerical law of 1902, which gave the government the right to veto appointments of heads of religious associations and declared that all heads of religious associations must be Spaniards. In March, 1933, a bill was approved which provided for the "nationalization," i.e., seizure by the state, of "churches of all classes, episcopal palaces, rectories, seminaries, and other buildings of the Catholic cult." Finally, in June, 1933, a law prescribed that religious orders cease all primary teaching by December 31, 1933, and all other nonreligious instruction by October, 1933.

By its anticlerical decrees the government sought to placate the extremists and put an end to the attacks on church property. On May 11, 1931, soon after the republic had been declared, revolutionary elements in Madrid, Malaga, and other important centers had burned a large number of churches and convents. In Malaga twenty-two of the twenty-five churches had been destroyed. Sporadic burnings continued until the bill nationalizing church property was passed. When the burning of a monastery at Antequara during Holy Week of 1932 was characterized as an act of "extreme cruelty" before the Cortes, a socialist Deputy retorted that "the populace there is 85 per cent illiterate, although there are twenty rich monasteries in the vicinity. While I regret the incident, the feeling among such people is understandable."³

Nor were the changes introduced by the Cortes limited to the sphere of religion. A far-reaching reorganization of the army was carried out. The officer personnel was drastically reduced, the equipment was modernized, and a law was passed which based promotion to the rank of commissioned officer on rigid examinations and upon

³ Cited in *Current History*, vol. 36 (1932), p. 236.

study at the military academy. As a result the efficiency of the army increased to a point theretofore unknown in Spain. In the field of social legislation the Cortes drew up a code which gave the worker social insurance benefits and guaranteed the right of collective bargaining. Furthermore, in 1932 the Cortes approved a bill which settled the Catalan question for the time being by granting Catalonia a substantial measure of autonomy. The Catalans were given permission to use their own flag, national anthem, and language, Catalan and Castilian being made the official languages. In addition to all this the government took measures to wipe out illiteracy. Although Alfonso's government had done much to improve educational facilities, schools were still insufficient in number and the training they offered was superficial. At the time the republic was established, about half the people were still unable to read and write. It was estimated that at least 27,000 new schools would have to be opened if all children were to have the opportunity to attend school. The government took a long step toward meeting this deficiency by establishing some nine thousand schools during the first years of its existence. It further raised the pay of most teachers, made provisions to give them better training, and established almost 1500 libraries to encourage reading and education outside the schools. But the lack of money somewhat limited the initial impulse. In April, 1934, no less than 1.7 million Spanish children were still unable to attend because of an insufficient number of schools.

Probably the most important problem confronting the government was the improvement of the extremely low economic and social condition of the peasants and farm laborers. But because of the powerful opposition of the landed interests the Cortes failed to enact remedial legislation until a year and a half after the republic was established. In September, 1932, it passed the Land Reform Bill, which gave the government the right to expropriate large estates.⁴ All owners, except those of feudal estates, were to be compensated on the basis of the values declared for taxation. The task of distributing the land to landless agricultural workers and to peasants having only small plots was delegated to the Institute of Agrarian Reform, created by the same bill. Ownership of the land, however, was vested in the state. Provisions were also made to finance the purchase of seed, fertilizer, and tools, and the construction of farm buildings. This Land Reform Bill, if it had been carried out, would have started the peasant on the way to greater independence and prosperity. Up to the end of 1933, however, only about five thousand

⁴ At first only in the districts around Madrid; later in all of Spain.

peasants and agricultural workers had benefited from it. The rest, estimated at 2.5 million, remained land hungry, with the result that many were being converted to extremism.

The reconstruction of the semifeudal conditions of Spanish life proved to be no easy task. Changes were carried out only by overcoming the bitter opposition of both the left and the right. On the one hand, the anarcho-syndicalists and communists took an irreconcilable position because the reforms were not radical enough; workers of the leftist persuasion waged unceasing war against the government through strikes, riots, and disorders; and on a number of occasions the more radical elements made serious attempts to overthrow the republic. On the other hand, the groups on the right felt that the reforms had gone too far. These groups included the monarchists, who were naturally opposed to the republic; a newly formed Fascist movement organized by José Primo de Rivera, son of the former dictator; merchants, manufacturers, and landlords who were antagonized by the government's pro-labor policies; and reactionary army officers.

But the most determined opposition on the right came from the Roman Catholics. The anticlerical laws angered a great body of them, including many who were genuine republicans. Some even interpreted the measures of the government and the burning of churches and convents by revolutionary mobs as a persecution of Christianity. From many sides came a demand for repeal of the anti-clerical laws, a demand which was vigorously supported by the officials of the church. When the law was passed which excluded the religious orders from all except religious education, the bishops issued a pastoral letter forbidding parents to send their children to the state schools. Pope Pius XI himself condemned the legislation in an encyclical addressed to the clergy and the people, urging the Spaniards to stand up for the faith.

The first indication of the rising tide of opposition to the republican-socialist alliance was the municipal elections held in April, 1933. Despite all its efforts the cabinet secured only about 5000 seats in the municipal councils as against more than 10,000 for the opposition. Various cabinet changes took place during the succeeding months. In September Manuel Azaña finally resigned his premiership, and the republican-socialist coalition came to an end.

The general elections, held in November and December, resulted in a sweeping victory for the right and right center. Of the 472 seats in the Cortes, the right captured 212 and the center 162, leaving the left only 98. The new cabinet, consisting largely of repre-

sentatives of the right and right center, showed a decided swing in the direction of conservatism. Early in 1934 it announced a program designed to modify some of the laws the earlier Cortes had passed. It called for a revision of the agrarian law of 1932, state aid to rural priests left without a means of livelihood by the anticlerical legislation, and general amnesty for political offenders. It also stated that there would be no more closing of schools conducted by religious orders.

This program did not go far enough to please the right and it excited the bitter hostility of the left. The socialists, in fact, went so far as to announce that any attempt of the right to wreck the republic would be met by armed force. When it was announced that three more members of the right would be added to the cabinet, the parties of the left on October 5 issued a call for a general strike. This was immediately followed by uprisings in the northern and central parts of the country. Desperate street fighting took place in Madrid and many other cities. For days the fate of the government hung in the balance, but because the army had remained loyal the government was finally able to crush the revolts. The issue was, however, by no means settled.

During the period that followed, as the parties of the left saw the conservative government gradually nullify the economic and social reforms that had been enacted during the first years of the republic, they became more bitter and relentless in their opposition. Nor was the discontent limited to the left parties as such. When the Agrarian Reform was amended in 1935, large numbers of peasants began to fear the return of the "old slavery." There was also widespread discontent among the workers because wages had fallen considerably. What is more, the leaders of the left parties began to realize that in unity there is strength. When the government drafted proposals for amending the constitution so that the church schools could be reopened, the Jesuits could return, and Roman Catholicism could again be made the state religion, many leftists decided that it was time to terminate the hair-splitting over political questions and to form a united front against the reactionaries. But the union was not achieved until a month before the general elections of 1936 when the so-called Popular Front comprising the left republicans, socialists, communists, and anarcho-syndicalists was organized. On the other side, the right and center formed an anti-Marxist alliance. Both now girded for the showdown. It came in the general elections of February and March, 1936, elections in which the communists and syndicalists for the first time put aside their opposition to the use

of the ballot. When the votes were tabulated it was found that the Popular Front was victorious. Although the left totaled only a plurality of the votes, it managed to return a majority of its candidates to the Cortes. In the new Cortes, as it was finally constituted, the Popular Front held 266 seats as against 217 for the right and center.



CIVIL WAR

As soon as the results of the election became known, the cabinet resigned and Manuel Azaña, the leader of the Popular Front, formed a new ministry. It is noteworthy that this cabinet was composed entirely of middle class representatives, the socialists and the more radical groups remaining outside the government. The cabinet began at once to carry out the program the parties of the Popular Front had adopted. Political prisoners held in confinement since the uprising of October, 1934, were released, and workers whose political sympathies had cost them their jobs were reinstated. But the extremists among the masses were impatient. Feeling that the hour had struck, many became dangerously active. Every day there were acts of violence. Churches and convents were burned, the political headquarters and newspaper offices of the Fascists and monarchists were pillaged, and in the country districts impatient peasants seized large estates. Such activities by leftist groups called forth retaliation by rightist groups, with the result that murder, arson, and anarchy reigned virtually uncontrolled. Except in a few instances the government seemed unable to assert itself. President Zamora, who had been trying to steer a middle course, called down upon himself the denunciation of both parties and was expelled from the presidency by a vote of the Cortes. On May 10, 1936, Manuel Azaña, leader of the Popular Front, was elected president. Nevertheless the violence and unrest continued.

Meanwhile the members of a secret society of military officers, the Union Militar Española, fearing that the army would lose its privileges and power, had laid plans for a military uprising. A number of garrisons were to stage simultaneous insurrections and then march on Madrid. On March 15, 1936, the army chiefs even warned the government that they would act if order were not restored. The government answered by either dismissing or transferring to other posts a number of high-ranking officers suspected of reactionary sympathies. Among those transferred was General Francisco Franco, who for a time had been chief of staff and had also commanded the

Foreign Legion in Morocco. The place to which he was transferred was the Canary Islands. But he did not remain there long. He escaped to Spanish Morocco and raised the standard of revolt on July 17. Supported by the Foreign Legion, Moorish contingents, and regiments of the regular army, he quickly succeeded in making himself master of Spanish Morocco. The next day the rebellion spread to Spain itself. One after another, garrisons of various cities revolted. It is estimated that about 90 per cent of the officers and two thirds of the enlisted men joined the rebels. In other words, the Insurgents controlled most of the trained land forces. But in two of the country's defense divisions they found only small support. Most of the air force and the navy remained loyal to the government. Certain naval officers did endeavor to turn their vessels over to the Insurgents, but the attempt was frustrated by the *coup d'état*, as they had expected. The uprising developed into a prolonged civil war lasting until March, 1939.

The Spanish civil war has often been referred to as a war of Fascism against communism and vice versa. Such an explanation is, however, too simple to fit the facts. The avowed supporters of the two ideologies formed only a minority on both sides. The ranks of the Insurgents were filled with members of all the right groups, including monarchists, antimonarchical falangists, adherents of the Roman Catholic Church, and members of the class of large land-owners and of the propertied classes generally. The composition of the other side was equally heterogeneous. Drawing its support largely from the laboring masses, the Loyalist side included not only socialists, syndicalists, and communists but also moderate republicans and liberals of all shades. Nor did the radical element prevail. When the rebellion began, there was among those in power not a single communist or even an extreme socialist. In addition to the various reformist groups, the Loyalist cause had the support of the Catalonian and Basque separatists, actuated by motives of independence. Among them were many who were strongly Catholic. The supporters of each side were drawn together not so much by a common ideal as by a common fear. While the Insurgents feared a "Marxist revolution," the Loyalists feared the re-establishment of the old order which would again reduce them to virtual slavery. Only in the external, non-Spanish sense did it become a battle between Fascism and communism, with the Insurgents getting support from the Fascist nations and the Loyalists from communist Russia.

The Insurgents had planned for a quick victory, but their hopes were soon blasted. Although the government had few trained troops,

it hastily organized a volunteer militia which succeeded in quelling the insurrection in eastern and central Spain. In Barcelona the uprising was suppressed after three days of severe fighting; and in Madrid, the capital, the revolution was also abortive. When several garrisons in Madrid and vicinity mutinied, the militia, the civil guards, and the police captured the barracks after a sharp struggle and suppressed the mutiny. The Insurgents now began to march on Madrid from the north and from the south. In the north General Mola collected an army of about 10,000 at Burgos, but his advance was checked in the Guadarama mountains northwest of Madrid. Meanwhile General Franco had crossed from Morocco to Spain to assume the direction of the movement against the government. Because the Loyalists had naval control of the Straits of Gibraltar, he was compelled to transport his troops largely by airplane. The force he finally collected at Seville numbered only about 15,000 effective troops but was well trained. Working his way northward with this army, Franco took Badajoz on August 11 and then marched up the valley of the Tagus, arriving in the vicinity of Madrid early in November. On September 30 General Mola had set up a directory under the name of Junta de Defensa Nacional at Burgos and had proclaimed General Franco "Chief of the Government of the Spanish State." After the establishment of this government the Insurgents gradually became known as the Nationalists.

During the civil war hostilities were conducted with extreme ruthlessness. Both sides neither asked nor gave any quarter, with the result that Spain was truly a land drenched in blood. Both sides frequently executed prisoners of war, particularly if they were not members of the regularly trained army. As one Nationalist general put it: "I take no prisoners. Anybody other than uniformed soldiers of the Spanish army caught by me carrying arms finds the death he deserves." Both sides also revived the old practice of holding hostages and of slaughtering them in retaliation for raids or attacks by the other side. Above all, each side ruthlessly exterminated in the territory it held all those who sympathized with the other side. Thus in the territory under Loyalist control thousands of landowners, priests, and others were shot either without trial or after what amounted to a mock trial. In many districts self-organized bands took it upon themselves to "cleanse" the population of all whose sympathies were on the Nationalist side. The Nationalists likewise carried out wholesale executions of Loyalists and their sympathizers. All Loyalist leaders were summarily executed as soon as the Nationalist forces captured a town or village; later all sym-



Acme

HITLER AND FRANCO SHAKE HANDS; 1940

pathizers were systematically rounded up and often shot in batches of twenty or more. It is estimated that up to the end of 1936 about 500,000 persons lost their lives in the sanguinary struggle, most of them being massacred or executed behind the line of battle.

In November of 1936 the Nationalist forces attacked Madrid. They had the advantage in modern machines of warfare, including tanks, artillery, and airplanes, many of which had been sent in by the Italian and German governments. The defense of Madrid, on the other hand, was at first largely in the hands of unorganized masses. For some time President Azaña had resisted the demands of those who advocated distribution of arms to the people but had finally acceded when he saw the seriousness of the struggle. While some of the defenders had rifles and revolvers obtained from government arsenals, others had only knives, paving stones, or their bare hands. At the end of October the Loyalist cause was strengthened by the arrival of supplies, including machine guns and some planes and tanks, from Russia and of volunteers from a number of countries. When the Nationalists launched their attack against Madrid, they were met by a most determined, if not a well-armed, resistance. After bitter fighting they were able to gain a precarious foothold in University City on the outskirts of the capital, but they failed to take Madrid itself. By beating off the first assaults, the defenders gained time to organize. Military leaders soon molded the hodgepodge of men into companies and modern battalions, defense works were constructed, and most noncombatants were evacuated from the city, President Azaña and the cabinet withdrawing to Valencia. Madrid, which could have been captured rather easily at first, soon became a strong fortress. Hence the opening of 1937 saw the rival forces tightly deadlocked before the city. On the other fronts the war also appeared to be approaching a stalemate, but foreign intervention was gradually to change the picture.

The civil war in Spain had been a matter of great concern to all the great powers right from the start. While some governments were apprehensive that the struggle might involve all of Europe, others saw in it an opportunity to advance their respective ambitions and ideologies. Prominent among the latter were Portugal, Italy, and Germany. Not long after the war broke out it became clear that Franco's forces were receiving both men and supplies from Italy and Germany; in fact, Franco probably had the promise of aid before he raised the standard of revolt. In France and Great Britain statesmen feared that if this aid and intervention continued, the conflagration might spread until it engulfed the entire continent. To

offset this danger the two governments at the beginning of August proposed a general nonintervention agreement and invited all the other states to adhere. The Fascist states were anything but enthusiastic over the proposal. Although they did finally subscribe, this did not stop them from continuing to extend clandestine aid to the Nationalists. In October, 1936, the Soviet government not only charged Italy, Germany, and Portugal with "systematic violation" of the agreement, but used the violation of the agreement as an excuse to send aid to the Loyalists. When France and Great Britain established a joint naval patrol of Spanish waters, the Loyalist government complained that the blockade was operating "to the exclusive advantage of the Insurgents" since a steady stream of supplies was reaching them by way of Portugal, the air, and Franco-controlled ports.

By the beginning of 1937 the sending of men and supplies by Italy and Germany had become more or less open. In March, the Loyalist government protested that four regular divisions of the Italian army were being used by the Nationalists in the Guadalajara offensive. Shortly thereafter the Italian government went so far as to give notice that not a single Italian "volunteer" would be withdrawn until the victory of General Franco was assured. Further proposals were made by France and Great Britain and further pacts were even signed but, on the whole, little headway was made toward nonintervention. In September, 1938, Loyalist prime minister Negrín announced the "immediate and complete withdrawal of all non-Spanish combatants taking part in the struggle in Spain on the government side." This caused the Italians to make a gesture at withdrawing some of their troops, but not long thereafter fresh Italian troops arrived to take the places of those that had been withdrawn. Thus what had at the outbreak been purely a civil war was soon converted into a clash of rival ideologies of the great European powers. The war, in fact, became so largely an international affair that the Spaniards, as it were, served only as auxiliaries.

Early in 1937 the Nationalists launched a fierce drive aimed at cutting the highway communications between Madrid and Barcelona, but the Loyalists, who expected the move, repulsed it after severe fighting. Next Franco turned to the Basque provinces. Although the Loyalists offered a stiff resistance, he blasted his way through to Bilbao (June 19), then pushed on to take Santander (August 25), and finally Gijón (October 21), the last Loyalist stronghold in that region. Thus all of northwest Spain was added to the territory held by the Nationalists.

Having completed the conquest of the northwest, Franco returned to his plan of driving a wedge between Madrid and Barcelona. This time he succeeded. After capturing Teruel (February, 1938) he pressed on down the Ebro valley and reached the Mediterranean by the middle of April. With the Loyalist territory split into two parts and over two thirds of the country in his hands, he announced that the war was over. The Loyalists, however, were far from ready to give up. When he realized this, he prepared a campaign directed at the conquest of Catalonia. For this purpose he collected a powerful force of more than 200,000, including six Italian army corps, fully equipped with the most modern instruments of war. The Loyalists had more men, but better fighting equipment gave Franco's forces an overwhelming superiority. German and Italian artillery, tanks, and airplanes enabled them to take town after town until the road to Barcelona was open. It was clear that the city was doomed unless substantial foreign help came quickly. No foreign help arrived and on January 26, 1939, the Nationalists occupied Barcelona. Within a fortnight the demoralized Loyalist army was driven from the rest of Catalonia, the soldiers either crossing into France or surrendering. All the territory that now remained under Loyalist control was central Spain with the two important cities of Madrid and Valencia.

The cause of the Loyalists was becoming more and more desperate. Their last hopes were blasted when France and Great Britain granted Franco's government recognition toward the end of February. Seeing that further resistance was useless, President Azaña and some of his cabinet were ready to make peace, but prime minister Negrín was determined to carry on to the bitter end. The result was that President Azaña resigned and went to France, leaving the government in the hands of Negrín. On March 5 a group of generals who favored making peace on the best possible terms ousted the prime minister and established a National Defense Council. The change, however, provoked a series of communist uprisings which were put down only with machine guns, tanks, artillery, and bombing planes. It is estimated that this civil war within a civil war brought 9000 casualties. Having quelled the uprisings, the Council opened negotiations with Franco. The latter stood fast on his demand for unconditional surrender. With the supply of munitions low and the population of Madrid on the point of starvation, the National Defense Council had no alternative but to accept the terms and surrender the city. Valencia had previously capitulated and all other armed resistance collapsed within the next few weeks. The war,

which besides costing a million lives and doing untold damage in Spain had threatened to engulf Europe, was over (March 29, 1939).



THE DICTATORSHIP OF GENERAL FRANCO

Throughout the war Franco had been laying the foundations for a totalitarian state on Italian and German models. "The regime I shall establish," he had said, "will be based on a corporative system analogous to that of Italy and Germany but safeguarding the characteristics of Spanish traditionalism." In an effort to end the bitter rivalry on the Nationalist side he had in April, 1937, merged all political groups in one party called *Falange Española Tradicionalista* (Spanish Traditionalist Phalanx).⁵ This Falange, recognized as the only legal party in Spain, became the basis of the new government. Like the National Socialist Party in Germany and the Fascist Party in Italy it directed the affairs of the nation. But the keystone of the whole political structure was Franco himself. He was the head of the state, the Caudillo (leader or chief), analogous to Duce or Führer. He assumed authority to issue laws without consulting his ministers; he claimed the right to appoint his successor; and he was also the Generalissimo of the army. As a means of strengthening his dictatorship he incorporated the army in the Falange. Having achieved virtually absolute power, he declared himself to be "responsible only to God and to history." Certain powers, it is true, were delegated to a National Falangist Council composed of seventy-five representatives of the various political interests in the Falange, and to a political junta of nineteen members, but both were made directly responsible to Franco and charged with unquestioning obedience.

Following the collapse of Loyalist resistance, Franco inaugurated a systematic purge of all who had been either actively hostile or passively indifferent to his cause. Even before the war ended, the Nationalists had drawn up a list of more than two million persons who were to be punished. The Law of Political Responsibilities, promulgated in February, 1939, was couched in such elastic terms that anyone who had not been active on the Nationalist side could be brought up for trial. Those who had either participated in or abetted executions of Nationalists and their sympathizers or who had attacked churches, priests, or nuns were subject to the death penalty. Those guilty of lesser "crimes" were given long prison sentences. Hundreds of thousands of others who had been sympathetic

⁵ Before the civil war the *Falange* had been a small but enthusiastic Fascist party.

to the Loyalist cause were imprisoned, exiled, or had their property confiscated. To make sure that no republican sympathizers escaped, the government instituted house to house searches, and the daily press urged citizens to denounce one another. No accurate list of those executed or imprisoned has been made public. A dispatch from Vatican City early in 1940 estimated the number of those held in prison at half a million.⁶ But most journalists and observers who had visited Spain placed the total much higher, usually exceeding a million, and many placed it between two and three millions. The men and women in the prisons and concentration camps were subjected to a process of "regeneration" in which enforced fasting and the club were employed to exorcise "the baleful effects of 'red' sorcery."

Meanwhile Franco's government was also undoing many changes that had been made under the republic. Particularly noteworthy in this respect is the restoration to the Catholic Church of many privileges it had lost. Catholicism was re-established as the official state religion; religious instruction was reintroduced into every public school, college, and university; and civil marriage and divorce were prohibited. Furthermore, the property which the republic had taken from the Jesuits was restored; the reconstruction of all cathedrals, churches, and religious monuments that had been destroyed or damaged was ordered; and the annual payment of 62 million pesetas (\$6.2 million) to the clergy, as stipulated in the concordat of 1851, was resumed. Franco insisted that the concordat be carried out in other respects also. First of all, he sought re-enactment of the provisions which gave the ruler the right to appoint and control the bishops of the Spanish church. Second, he wished to enforce the provisions which stated that all religious disputes were to be settled by a Spanish court of the Rota rather than by the Vatican tribunal in Rome. The Pope's reply to these claims was that the concordat of 1851 was abrogated with the fall of the monarchy. Another change which the government introduced was the termination of the autonomy exercised by Catalonia and the Basque provinces under the republic. In addition Catalonians and Basques were forbidden to speak their regional languages.

The real job of Franco's regime was to repair the damages of war and to raise the living standard of an impoverished nation. When the war ended, much of Spain lay in ruins, some by gunfire and bombs, some by deliberate wreckage. The devastation was so nearly universal that hardly a city or town had escaped. In Madrid

⁶ *New York Times*, January 26, 1940.

about a third of the city had been destroyed and another third damaged by gunfire. Barcelona had suffered less damage to its buildings, but its port had been completely destroyed. The greatest damage had been done to means of transportation. Roads were in disrepair, many bridges had been destroyed, and railroads and harbors needed new equipment. Of the 3000 locomotives which Spain possessed in 1936 only about 1000 were actually usable when the war ended. Industry was in a sad state of disorganization. Many of the factories had been completely destroyed or the machinery in them had been replaced by machinery for the manufacture of war materials. Hunger was the dominant feature of the whole scene. After a visit to Spain in the summer of 1939 Professor Samuel Eliot Morison wrote: "The state of Spain is pitiable. No eggs, milk, meat, or oil is available. In Seville, once the mart of the New World, there is no coffee and sugar. Whenever the *Capitana*⁷ lay alongside a dock, a breadline of hungry children waited for our leavings."

Soon after the end of the war the new government announced a great program of public works, including the re-equipment of harbors, the replacement of rolling stock on the railways, the building of new roads, the repair of old roads, and the construction of irrigation works. The slogan, as stated by Franco, was "Produce, produce, produce!" To hasten the work the government employed the men and women in the concentration camps on many of its projects. As a result some progress was made with towns, buildings, and roads, and also in increasing the output of certain mines and industries. The production of iron and steel in the Basque country, for example, was greatly expanded. The improvement, however, was limited to specific industries. Small progress was made during 1939 and 1940 toward the reconstruction of Spanish economy as a whole. Industrial recovery was retarded by a lack of raw materials and machinery, by inadequate inland transportation, and by a shortage of skilled workers. Since a large percentage of technicians and trained workers had during the war sided with the Loyalists, they were either in prison or unable to obtain employment because they were politically suspect. Foreign trade was also in a bad way. The war having dissipated Spain's gold reserves and undermined its foreign credit, the new regime could purchase goods abroad only on a barter basis. This was made difficult by the fact that goods formerly produced for export were hardly adequate for home requirements.

The condition of agriculture was equally bad at the end of 1940.

⁷ The 140-foot ketch in which Professor Morison retraced the voyage of Columbus.

Before the war Spain had been self-sufficient in the principal food-stuffs and had even exported large quantities. But in 1940 shortages of farm equipment and fertilizers, scarcity and poor quality of seeds, and adverse weather conditions all contributed to a disappointing yield. The wheat crop was about half the average of the years 1931 to 1935; supplementary foods such as barley, rye, and oats were also short; and harvests of lentils, beans, and peas were very small. Olive oil, an essential ingredient of Spanish cooking, was so scarce as to become a luxury. Even the price of potatoes was three times that of the prewar period. Meanwhile wages had not risen and in many industries had been cut. The declining purchasing power of income combined with the shortage of necessary foodstuffs caused widespread undernourishment, and in some sections there were cases of actual starvation.

Nor was the Franco government successful in winning the favor or confidence of the people and in preserving unity within its own ranks. The various component groups had merged their interests during the war, but the merger did not produce an ideological fusion. No sooner did the war end than political intrigues were resumed, with each group striving for increased power. The monarchists and clergy, for example, regained a share of their former prestige but not the extensive powers they had anticipated. More than this, neither group desired the imposition of the economic and political structure of Fascism. The landlords and certain Catholic groups were seeking the restoration of the semifeudal regime, and businessmen were irritated by the endless restrictions placed upon them by the government. Many members of the military clique were jealous of the influence wielded by the civilians in the government. Thus the claims that a compromise had been reached among the monarchists, Fascists, traditionalists, and other components of the Falange were mere pretense. General Franco may have placed the lid on the Spanish cauldron but its contents were still seething.



DICTATORSHIP IN PORTUGAL

Portugal, the westernmost of the European states, comprised an area of some 35,000 square miles with a population of about six and a half millions when World War I broke out in 1914. Despite its small size it ranked fourth among colonial powers, with colonies scattered over three continents and many seas. Its island possessions in the Atlantic included the Azores and the Madeira, Cape Verde, and Principe Islands. Its colonies on the continent of Africa included

Portuguese Guinea, São Thomé, Angola, and Mozambique. In addition it had extensive possessions in the East, including Diu, Damão, and Goa in India, Macao in China, and Timor in Oceania.

Down to 1910 Portugal was a monarchy which was nominally constitutional but absolute in practice. In that year a revolution drove King Manuel II of the house of Braganza into exile, and a republic was proclaimed. Not that there was a strong demand for a republic; the fall of the monarchy was due to the conviction in the minds of the more influential citizens that the political system was so corrupt that the only remedy lay in a complete change to popular control. A new constitution, adopted the following year, vested the executive power in a president elected by the legislature for four years and the legislative power in two chambers of which the lower was elected by direct suffrage and the upper was chosen by the municipal councils.

Although the great majority of Portuguese were Roman Catholic, the republican government reduced the power of the Catholic Church by decreeing the separation of church and state. Thus Roman Catholicism ceased to be the official religion of the state and all creeds were given equal recognition. The teaching of religion in the primary schools was forbidden and many religious orders were expelled from the country. But the republican government did little to improve the economic condition of the peasants and workers or to promote education, despite the fact that more than 60 per cent of persons ten years of age and over were unable to read and write.

In general, the sixteen years of the republic's existence were characterized by extreme political instability. Right from the beginning it had to fight for its existence against monarchist attempts to overthrow it. During the subsequent years presidents and ministries followed each other in rapid succession. Hardly a year passed without a revolution and in some years there were more than one. Political conditions were unstable because not one among the half dozen parties possessed an absolute majority. Unable to rise to power through the ballot, certain groups had recourse to violence. The record was no less than a score of revolutions and forty-three new cabinets. World War I, it is true, brought some degree of internal peace to the harassed country. On August 7, 1914, the parliament proclaimed that Portugal would remain loyal to the British alliance concluded as far back as the fourteenth century, and on November 23 it formally committed Portugal to participate in military operations. Most of the factions, burying their differences for the

time being, joined in prosecuting the war. As a result there was only one serious revolution during the war years. But once the war was over, the old rivalries flared up anew. More than this, they were intensified by economic conditions. Owing to the war expenditures and the financial disturbances of the postwar period, the budget deficit, which had been chronic for many decades, became serious. At the same time the currency became greatly depreciated. The escudo, which had had a par value of \$1.08, fell to three cents. All this brought disillusionment to those who had greeted the advent of the republic with a Messianic faith. The most active opposition came from the working classes who, desperate from poverty, saw in a revolution like that which had taken place in Russia the only remedy for their misfortunes.

Early in 1926 the various heads of the army and navy agreed on a program to establish a military dictatorship. After practically all the military elements had aligned themselves with the movement, troops were concentrated near Lisbon. On June 6 they marched into the city and took charge of the government offices. Parliament was disbanded, the press was muzzled, all political and trade union organizations were dissolved, and those who raised their voices in protest were imprisoned, banished, or deported to the colonies. General Carmona, elected president without opposition, ruled as dictator. Some semblance of constitutional government was established in 1933 when a new constitution was framed providing for a legislative assembly of one chamber, half of whose members were elected by "educated heads of families" and half appointed by economic bodies. But the president still had the power to select and dismiss the cabinet, which was not responsible to the legislature.

With the country rapidly drifting toward economic ruin, General Carmona soon after his election began to search for a financial savior. In 1928 he summoned to Lisbon Dr. Oliveira Salazar, professor of economics at the University of Coimbra. The new minister of finance attacked his problems with determination. He increased the taxes, overhauled the machinery for the collection of taxes, eliminated much of the graft, and within a year succeeded in achieving a budget surplus. The last previous year which had seen a surplus was 1914. Gradually Dr. Salazar became the leading spirit of the dictatorship. In 1932 he assumed the additional portfolio of premier and later also became minister of war and foreign affairs. In other words, he became the dictator, even though General Carmona remained president.⁸ His dictatorship, however, was not based on the

⁸ General Carmona was re-elected in 1935 and in 1942.

ambition and self-glorification which characterized Mussolini and Hitler. He seldom appeared in public and when he did his appearances were not dramatic. Nor did he play on the emotions of the masses. In the words of one writer: "His style is terse and bare, and his appeal intellectual rather than sentimental. . . . He has no desire for power, nor could he derive pleasure from domination of the masses. . . . Salazar's rise to power was purely circumstantial and did not follow any direct action on his part. To quote his own words, he accepted the responsibilities, the dangers, and the crushing work that go with absolute power 'because it was an experiment necessary to try for the good of the country.' " ⁹

⁹ E. A. C. Ballard, "Salazar of Portugal," *Contemporary Review*, vol. 158 (1940), p. 321.



CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Small States of Europe

DILEMMA OF THE SMALL STATES

THROUGHOUT history small states have sought means of remaining outside the quarrels among the great powers. In 1815, for example, Switzerland endeavored to set up a new defense by declaring herself “eternally neutral.” Such a neutrality was possible at the time of flintlocks and when the largest cannon had a range of less than a mile. But the technique of modern warfare reduced the possibility of this kind of national defense to a mere illusion. Belgium, declared “eternally neutral” in 1831, became an active participant in World War I when the Germans decided that the route through that country was the shortest way to Paris. President Wilson, who realized that in a world capable of hurling millions of men with giant armaments into battle there was little protection for weak nations, heralded the League of Nations as “the first serious and systematic attempt made in the world to put nations on a footing of equality with each other.” The smaller nations did not, however, share Wilson’s faith in the League. While some sought protection in clinging to the skirts of great powers and in constructing networks of treaties in the form of neutrality, nonaggression, mutual assistance, and friendship pacts, others either resorted to rearmament or merely hoped they could avoid involvement in the next conflict. All such devices were largely futile. When World War II broke out, most of the smaller nations were inexorably sucked into the maelstrom. As in World War I, the Germans did not hesitate to violate the neutrality of the smaller nations if it suited their purpose.



BELGIUM

Belgium is a small rectangle of 11,755 square miles on the North Sea, wedged in between Germany and Luxemburg on the east, France on the south, and Holland on the north. Its population of about eight million during the period between the two World Wars was about a million larger than that of New York City. The ratio of about seven hundred persons per square mile made it the most densely populated country in the world.

As one of the most progressive of the smaller European states, it exerts a greater influence than its size would indicate. After the revolution of 1830, which ended in separation from Holland, it experienced a rapid economic expansion. Steam and, later, electrical machinery was introduced into its industries with the result that it ranked fifth among the great trading nations of the world in 1914. Agriculture, although insufficient because of limited acreage to produce enough food for the Belgians, led all other European countries in the yield of crops per acre.

In addition to its European possessions Belgium has extensive colonial possessions in Central Africa, comprising the Ruanda-Urundi provinces, taken from Germany at the end of World War I, and the Congo Free State. The latter alone has an area of almost a million square miles and a population of some ten million.

Belgium emerged from the war with the same government it had in 1914. The Constitution of 1831 described it as "a constitutional, representative, and hereditary monarchy." The king could appoint the burgomasters of the communes, initiate legislation, and dissolve parliament under certain circumstances. Beyond this he exercised executive power through a ministry responsible to parliament. Parliament consisted of a Senate and a Chamber of Representatives, the members of the former elected in part by direct suffrage and in part by the provincial councils, the representatives elected by universal male suffrage.¹ The three great political parties were the Catholic, Liberal, and Socialist. After the German retreat in the fall of 1918, King Albert re-entered Brussels on November 22 to take up the work of restoring the devastated regions and re-establishing normal life. In February, 1934, Albert accidentally lost his life in a fall while climbing a mountain peak near Namur. He was succeeded by his son, who was crowned as Leopold III.

Situated in the most exposed corner of Europe, Belgium has been

¹ The right of suffrage was extended to include women during subsequent years.

a battleground through the centuries. On no less than nine occasions since the Germanic migrations of the fourth century has the country been ravaged. In consequence the Belgians have developed extraordinary powers of recuperation. These powers were never more in evidence than after World War I. So far as man power was concerned, Belgian losses were proportionately not so great as those of France, the ratio being 4.6 per cent of the French population in 1913 and 2.6 per cent for Belgium. The number of Belgian soldiers and civilians who lost their lives was about 46,000 and about 50,000 had been invalided. As the scene of much of the fighting, Belgium suffered great material losses. Means of communication were damaged so badly that there seemed little prospect of the resumption of normal trade in the near future. Nearly 2500 miles of tracks were demolished, many railway bridges were wrecked, and much equipment destroyed or removed. There were only 81 out of 3470 locomotives left. Furthermore, canals were blocked with the wreckage of bridges and discarded implements of warfare. Destruction in the area through which the Germans passed necessitated the rebuilding of about 100,000 houses and 1200 public buildings. Much of the land had been rendered unfit for cultivation. Before it could be used for agricultural purposes the shell craters had to be filled in, the barbed-wire entanglements removed, and the unexploded shells collected. But it was Belgian industry which suffered most. Not one factory in the war area had been left untouched. Much of the machinery had been removed to Germany and the buildings wantonly destroyed by the retreating armies.

The rapidity with which the Belgians succeeded in obliterating the traces of war was remarkable. By the beginning of 1921 the roads had been rebuilt, most of the bridges had been replaced, all canals had been cleared, and some of them had even been widened. The railway system had been re-established so that it was functioning with an activity equal to that of prewar days. More than this, industrial production had reached an average of 86 per cent of the production of prewar days, while the yield of the mines was 98 per cent. Above all, towns like Ypres, Dixmude, and Nieuport, which had been razed to the ground and which were believed blotted out forever, rose from their ruins as if by magic. The rebuilding of towns, in general, proceeded so rapidly that by the end of 1923 normal conditions seemed again to prevail with but few exceptions. Agriculture, aided by the importation of agricultural machinery, recovered so speedily that in 1921 all but a small part of the devastated land was under cultivation. This reconstruction, however, was an enor-

mous drain on the country's treasury. The national budget increased from 830 million francs in 1914 to 2310 million in 1921, raising the public debt to nearly 40 billion francs. As the sums received as reparation from Germany did not wipe out the deficit, it became necessary to increase taxes. By 1924 they were six or seven times higher than before the war. Despite the high taxes the government did not succeed in balancing the budget until 1927.

The Versailles settlement allotted to Belgium the small districts of Eupen and Malmédy on condition that the inhabitants approve the transfer. But the desire of most of the 65,000 inhabitants to remain under German rule was so obvious that the Belgians, supported by the French, were afraid to risk a plebiscite. Finally by permission of the League of Nations the plebiscite was curtailed into the right of dissenters to register a protest. Despite all this the district was not a tremendous asset. Several times the Germans attempted to purchase the ceded territory and the Belgians did not seem unwilling to sell. In 1926, in fact, the Belgians, who were badly in need of financial help, had virtually come to terms with the Germans; but French diplomats brought pressure to bear on the government, insisting that the sale would be a breach not only of the Treaty of Versailles but also of the Locarno agreements which guaranteed the *status quo* established by the Versailles treaty. "It is very disappointing," the *Kölnische Zeitung* stated, "to think that the opportunity has been frustrated to remove an injustice inserted in the Treaty of Versailles only for the purpose of continually spoiling the relations between two countries. Of these two countries it is undoubtedly Belgium that will suffer most. The impossibility of taking advantage of the financial help which was offered to it by Germany will be felt by the whole Belgian people during a period of financial and economic difficulties."

Among the more vexing problems with which the government had to deal during the period between the two wars was that of language. There is, of course, no such thing as a Belgian language. The southern half of the population, adjoining France, speak French; the northern half, bordering on Holland, speak Flemish, which is closely related to Dutch. The men who had initiated and conducted the revolution of 1830 which severed the ties joining Belgium and Holland had been French speaking and had achieved success with the help of French bayonets. It was therefore natural that they would favor French as the official language for all administrative, religious, and educational activities. Gradually, however, a movement took form in support of the Flemish language

and culture. Up to 1914 the leaders of this movement had made only mild demands, but after the war the demands became more robust. During the four years the Germans occupied Belgium they attempted to exploit the latent discontent for their own ends. They promised the Flemings cultural autonomy, made the University of Ghent exclusively Flemish, and tried in every way to persuade the Flemings that they belonged to the German race and ought to separate from the Walloons, as the French-speaking Belgians are known. But all attempts to win over the Flemings as a body proved unsuccessful.

Although King Albert, upon his triumphal return to Brussels in November, 1918, promised the Flemings equality of language and the creation of a Flemish University of Ghent, little was done during the years immediately following toward fulfilling the promise; in fact, a step backward was taken when the university was returned to its former linguistic status. The result was a widespread agitation on the part of the Flemings. Finally in the summer of 1921 a law was passed dividing Belgium into two parts in each of which all administrative matters were to be conducted in a single language, Flemish in the northern part and French in the southern. This law still left the Flemish unsatisfied. After that the question of a Flemish university became a special point of dissension. In 1922 a law was carried through parliament by a margin of only twelve votes decreeing that Flemish should be the official language of the University of Ghent but that certain courses should still be given in French. This settlement satisfied neither side. While the Walloons boycotted the university, the Flemings continued their agitation to make the university completely Flemish. The latter ultimately achieved their goal in 1930 when a new law was passed stipulating that beginning with the academic year 1930-1931 instruction in the University of Ghent was to be in Flemish only. During the decade of the thirties other laws removed other grievances. Thus, for example, in 1938 a Flemish Scientific Academy was created and two councils were established, one to foster the advancement of Flemish culture, another for French culture.

In 1930 the world depression made itself felt in Belgium. In one year foreign trade was cut in half, and during the years 1930-1935 unemployment rose steadily. As in other countries, the depression gave rise to Fascist movements, the supporters of which believed that only an authoritarian government could pull the country out of the slough. One of these movements was the Flemish Fascist movement, organized in 1931 upon the Nazi pattern and reputedly sub-

sidized by the Nazis. But the party which achieved the greatest temporary strength was the Rexists, led by Leon Degrelle, a mystic who took the name of his party from Christus Rex. In the elections of 1936 this party succeeded in obtaining twenty-one seats in the Chamber of Representatives. However, the party's tactics of parliamentary obstruction alienated so many of its followers that the Rexists lost all but four seats in the elections of 1939.

For many years after the First World War fear and hatred of the Germans remained a strong feature of Belgium's foreign policy. The Belgians could not forget how much they had suffered at the hands of the invaders. As the policy of neutrality had not prevented the Germans from marching through the country, the Belgians were faced with the duty of finding a new basis of security. This time they turned to collective security. They sincerely hoped to reach a military agreement with Britain, but the British were in no mood to enter into any alliance whatsoever. A military agreement was, however, signed with France in 1921, the details of which were not revealed. This was fortified by a further agreement in 1926. In addition the Belgians relied on the protection of the League of Nations.

But they gradually came to the conclusion that their commitments did not afford them security. They saw the Germans defy the Versailles treaty by rearming and by scrapping the Locarno Pacts which guaranteed the postwar frontiers and the demilitarization of the Rhineland. They saw, in general, that the European powers instead of disarming were abandoning the ideals of Geneva and building up mighty war machines. Moreover, the agreement with France had become distasteful to many. While the Flemings, opposed as they were to French influence in Belgian life, denounced the agreement as likely to commit the country to an unnecessary war, the bourgeois Belgians disliked the growth of the French Communist Party, and the powerful Catholic Party resented the anticlerical attitude of the Popular Front government.

Opposition to the defensive alliance with France soon grew so strong that the government decided to sever the ties between the two nations. On October 14, 1936, King Leopold III summoned his ministers to a cabinet council and announced that Belgium had decided to abandon its military obligations and was reverting to its prewar status of neutrality. "Any bilateral policy," the king stated, "weakens our position abroad . . . excites division at home. . . . An alliance even if it is purely defensive does not achieve its purpose, because however prompt might be the aid from our ally it

would come only after an onslaught by an invading army which would be devastating." In the war of 1914, he said, "our moral position would have been much weaker if the invader had been able to advance as an argument an alliance between Belgium and one of its neighbors." Belgium must henceforth, the monarch declared, take care of its own defense. "Our geographical position enjoins us to maintain a military establishment . . . to dissuade . . . neighbors from borrowing our territory for use in attacking another state." In short, it was the king's aim to avert the danger of war. As a means of better defense the throne had previously approved the strengthening of the border fortifications, the extension of compulsory military service, and the creation of a motorized army. As Europe moved rapidly toward war, Leopold bent every effort to keeping his country out of the holocaust. But his efforts availed him nothing. Belgium was to become a victim of German aggression for the second time in a quarter of a century.



THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

The Kingdom of the Netherlands, so called because of the depressed geographical position of the territories embraced by this state, is a small but densely populated country situated at the mouths of the Rhine, Maas, and Scheldt Rivers. In the area of a little over 12,000 square miles, which is one third larger than the state of Maryland, nearly eight million Dutchmen lived in 1920. Much of the land along the seashore had been wrested from the sea through the building of dikes, an achievement that is proudly expressed in the saying, "Deus mare, Batavus litora fecit (God made the sea, the Dutchman made the shore)."

The situation of the Netherlands at an important crossing of some of the principal highways of international commerce has for centuries made this country a natural center of trade to which merchants of the north and south have brought their wares for sale or exchange. Although at the beginning of the twentieth century the little state no longer occupied the prominent place among the nations that it held in the seventeenth, it did not live merely on the memories of a glorious past. Its merchant marine was one of the largest in the world; its industry was flourishing; and its agriculture and horticulture, raised to a high pitch of efficiency, produced a large surplus for export.

Furthermore, the Dutch managed to retain the great empire they had won in the seventeenth century. They controlled the third larg-

est colonial empire of the world, less extensive and important only than the empires of Britain and France. It included Dutch Guiana on the continent of South America, the island of Curaçao in the West Indies, and a cluster of islands in the Pacific with a population of about fifty millions belonging to nearly forty races and tribes with different languages and varying degrees of civilization and culture. Among these islands were Sumatra, Java, the Celebes, the Moluccas, Borneo, and New Guinea. From them came a great variety of products which figured conspicuously in the world markets—sugar, spices, cinchona, copra, coffee, tea, rubber, petroleum, palm oil, tobacco, dyes, tin, gold, silver, and other metals in addition to an enormous list of minor commodities.

The government of the Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy based on the constitution of 1814 which has been revised from time to time. While the executive power of the state is vested exclusively in the sovereign, the legislative authority is exercised jointly by the sovereign and by a parliament (States-General) composed of two chambers, the Upper or First Chamber of fifty members elected by direct vote for a period of six years and a Lower Chamber of one hundred deputies elected by direct vote for a period of four years. Although appointed by the sovereign the cabinet is accountable to and dependent upon the support of the States-General. The prime minister, as in Britain, can continue in office only as long as he commands a parliamentary majority.

The ruler of the Netherlands during the period between the two World Wars was Queen Wilhelmina. Born in 1880 she succeeded to the throne at the death of her father, King William II, when she was only ten. Her mother, Queen Emma, acted as regent during her minority. Upon reaching the age of eighteen Wilhelmina was crowned in Amsterdam. It is reported that happy Hollanders celebrated the occasion by braiding the tails of their cows with gay ribbons in honor of the "lily among the tulips," as the plump girl was called by a contemporary phrasemaker. The next year she offered her palace at The Hague to the diplomats of the world for a disarmament conference known as the First Hague Conference. Thereafter the Dutch queen could be found in the vanguard of every movement making for world peace. As she was the last of her line, the question of her marriage and the birth of an heir was an urgent necessity of state. In 1901 she married Henry, Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, who received the title of Prince of the Netherlands. Eight years later Princess Juliana was born of this union. Wilhelmina, who combined tact with firmness, took her posi-



National Film Board Photo

QUEEN WILHELMINA OF THE NETHERLANDS; MADAME CHIANG KAI-SHEK; PRINCESS JULIANA

tion as queen seriously from the start, working hard to understand her people and their needs. Save for contact with her ministers and a few old friends, she led a quiet life. Once a year she would appear before the people on her ride to open the session of the States-General. Her courts, held only infrequently, were stiff and formal affairs. At such functions the queen indulged her one weakness, the display of costly jewels.

When the First World War broke out, she stood by the dikes, like the Dutch boy in the familiar story, holding back the waves of propaganda that would have swept her people into the conflict. Nevertheless the Netherlands, although they were spared the devastation of war, suffered economic losses in all directions. Of all the neutral states, the Netherlands probably suffered most through the dislocation of trade and industry. As a result of the blockades set up by Germany and Britain, the shipping trade dwindled to less than a tenth of its former proportions. Many factories were forced to close because of the lack of raw materials and coal. Unemployment prevailed among the working classes. The shortage of some kinds of food and the faulty distribution of the existing supply resulted in widespread undernourishment. Moreover, the necessity of having the army in a state of readiness for more than four years to defend the borders against aggression drained the Dutch coffers and made high taxes necessary. At the end of the war unemployment was rife and the country was hungry and discontented. It seemed as if the stage were set for revolution. For the first time groups of workers did demonstrate against the queen. The leader of the Socialist Party even went so far as to make a formal demand that "a republic be instituted." The queen's ministers, who feared for her safety, cautioned her not to leave her guarded palace. But Wilhelmina was not one to be frightened. Summoning her open carriage, she drove through the crowded streets of The Hague almost unattended. Her fearlessness won her instant acclaim. The crowd surged about her and cheered their *Landsmoeder* (Mother of the Land). The younger men even unhitched the horses so they might pull the coach themselves.

During the succeeding years the Dutch recovered their former prosperity. The period from 1924 to 1929 was, in fact, one of unusual economic activity. After that Dutch trade, industry, and agriculture began to wither under the blighting winds of world depression. Exports to Britain and Germany, which were by far the best customers, fell off alarmingly. Exports to Britain, for example, declined from £36 million in 1928 to £10 million in 1933, and ex-

ports to Germany from £38.5 million in 1928 to £13 million in 1933. Translated into the realities of everyday life these figures mean that by 1933 a large portion of the merchant marine was lying idle, that farmers were in distress, and that unemployment was increasing by leaps and bounds. The year 1934 saw serious riots break out in the working-class quarter of Amsterdam over the reduction of unemployment benefits. Public offices were stoned, barricades erected in the streets, and a number of lives were lost before police and soldiers could restore order. At the beginning of 1936 the country had the largest percentage of unemployed in western Europe, with more than 400,000 families being supported by the state or local communities. Economic recovery began only in the autumn of 1936 after the government, which for five years had struggled to maintain the gold standard, decided to devalue the guilder. This devaluation, added to the revival of business all over the world, stimulated renewed activity in industry, trade, and agriculture.

By this time the government had other troubles that were giving it great concern. After Hitler's accession to power in 1933 the dark cloud of nazism spread its first shadow over the Netherlands. A Nazi party was organized and was reported to be receiving financial aid from Germany. It adopted a program that incorporated many ideas borrowed from the German Nazis, including anti-Semitism. For a time the movement spread quickly. Before many months passed, the Dutch Nazis achieved sufficient importance to cause the Roman Catholic clergy to deny the sacraments of the church to all members of the party. In the 1935 elections for the First Chamber they managed to obtain representation for the first time by gaining two seats, and in the provincial elections they polled the unexpected number of 300,000 votes or 8 per cent of the total. In imitation of the Nazi tactics in Germany before 1933 the Dutch Nazis staged street brawls against their opponents, until the government in 1936 passed a law forbidding the formation of private armies and the wearing of party uniforms. But in 1937 they saw their following reduced by half as compared with 1935, although they did obtain four of the fifty seats in the First Chamber. It was, of course, Hitler's plan to draw the Netherlands into the orbit of the Axis powers. When in 1937 the Princess Juliana married Count Bernhard zu Lippe-Biesterfeld, member of a family of minor German nobility, Hitler interpreted this step to mean closer cooperation between the two countries. But Queen Wilhelmina, known for her directness, disillusioned him with the following statement: "This is the marriage of my daughter to the man whom she loves and whom I found worthy of her love; it is not the marriage of Holland to Germany."

Since the Netherlands refused to be dominated by Germany, it was feared that Hitler might use force to achieve his ends. Hence the rearming of Germany caused great apprehension among the Dutch. As early as 1935 the government took up in earnest the problem of defending both the mother country and the overseas territories. The necessity for this was so obvious that even the extreme leftists voted for the establishment of a defense fund for antiaircraft batteries, modern airplanes, mechanized equipment for the army, new fighting ships, frontier fortifications, and coastal defense equipment. Relations with Germany grew more tense after a series of unauthorized flights of German aircraft over Dutch territory in 1937 and 1938. The Munich triumph caused the German press to assume a more menacing tone toward the Netherlands. It went so far as to suggest that it would be wise for the Dutch to cooperate with Germany in both economic and political affairs. Instead of complying with these demands they took further steps to strengthen their defenses against invasion by calling up more men and lengthening the period of their training. As the war clouds gathered, the foreign minister reaffirmed the policy of armed neutrality in case of war but added that his government would resist any army that attempted to enter Dutch territory.

As the decade of the thirties progressed, there were rumblings of trouble in the colonial possessions as well as in the mother country. The black and the brown races alike were beginning to feel conscious of their position. Although the relations between the Dutch and their subject peoples were on the whole friendly, this did not prevent the latter from demanding independence. This dissatisfaction made it necessary for the Dutch to supervise their colonies more closely and that was a strain on the national budget. At one time the government had derived a handsome surplus through the sale of products from government-owned industries in the colonies, but after the withdrawal of the government from business, this income had ceased; yet the government had to continue to defray the cost of public works in the colonies, of educating the natives, and of keeping order among them. In other words, colonial administration was becoming a financial burden to the mother country. By maintaining the policy of the open door in their colonies the Dutch had facilitated the exploitation of the natives by other nations. In 1928 the Dutch had, for example, supplied 26 per cent of the textiles purchased by the natives of the Dutch East Indies, but during the succeeding years the Japanese had seized the lion's share of the market (76 per cent), while the share of the mother country had been reduced to 6 per cent. In general, Japan's share of imports into the Dutch

East Indies increased from 10 per cent in 1928 to 31 per cent in 1935, but that of the Netherlands slumped from 20 to 12 per cent.

This decline was accompanied by a drop in tax receipts which caused the Dutch to curtail the expense of government in an effort to balance the budget. The first thing that suffered was the higher schools for the natives. This caused the natives to go to Japan for their education. And the Japanese were not slow to make the most of the opportunity to inculcate in the minds of the Indonesians a hatred for European rule. Soon the slogan "Indonesia for Indonesians" was heard far and wide in the Dutch East Indies.

The eve of World War II saw doughty Queen Wilhelmina still ruling the Netherlands in her characteristic manner. By this time all those who were occupying thrones at the time of her accession had departed from the scene. In Britain, Queen Victoria's fourth successor was wearing the crown. In the Netherlands, communists went so far as to heckle Wilhelmina during her addresses to the States-General and the Nazis infuriated her in the streets by giving the Nazi salute. But the average burgher and his wife still regarded their queen with typical Dutch affection.



THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, the three countries which make up Scandinavia, are in many respects closely related. Most of the inhabitants are of the same anthropological type and the languages they speak are so similar that members of one can understand the two others without an interpreter. In addition, the peoples have many tastes and customs in common. Nevertheless one must not take Scandinavian unity for granted; a closer examination will reveal many dissimilarities. There are differences in economic interests no less than in geographical positions. Each country possesses a somewhat different political and social organization. Each insists on particularism in language and culture: the vocabulary and, above all, the pronunciation of each language is different. Swedes insist on being Swedes no less than Danes and Norwegians are proud of their nationality. In each country strong nationalist tendencies had made their appearance before World War I and had grown stronger in the years that followed.

During the Middle Ages and far into the modern period the Scandinavians had been an adventurous, warlike people. For centuries the Vikings had harried the coasts of France and Britain, and long before Columbus touched the shores of America the Vikings

had been here. Later the Swedes produced the great military leader, Gustavus Adolphus (d. 1632), and some decades later Charles XII (d. 1718). But during more recent centuries these countries turned their backs firmly upon war and the quest of martial glory. "And we Norwegians of today," the distinguished author, Sigrid Undset, wrote, "are proud, not that our forefathers were Vikings, but that these same forefathers outgrew the Viking mentality so rapidly, so that less than two hundred years after the battle of Stiklestad we were already in many ways far ahead of many older nations on the road that ultimately has led to present-day ideas about humaneness, justice, respect of the rights of personal freedom, and just treatment of individuals, poor and rich."² When World War I broke out, all three countries remained neutral. During the war years they experienced a certain prosperity despite the blockade and the restrictions on their domestic activities as well as on their foreign trade. They did not, however, entirely escape the destruction of war. Mines and German submarines took a large toll of their shipping. Norway, which was hardest hit, lost 1162 seamen and half of her prewar merchant marine, which had boasted a tonnage exceeding three million.

Scandinavian philosophy may be summed up in the words "peace," "freedom," "democracy," and "progress." In all these countries suffrage during the period between the two wars was probably as free as anywhere in the world, with women enjoying full political rights with men. A writer on Scandinavia says, "Here democracy is full of vitality; it acts instead of merely talking and criticizing; it is constructive, cautious, and in the widest sense of the word conservatively progressive. Furthermore, in this respect Sweden is not alone; in Denmark the position is almost identical, and Norway seems to be gravitating to a similar state of affairs. In fact, the development and consolidation of democracy in Scandinavian countries is striking and undeniable. And it is essential to realize that the bearers of democratic ideas are no longer the bourgeois liberals, or a radical intelligentsia, but primarily workmen, peasants, and the lower middle classes. This makes it particularly interesting and original."³

Denmark, with an area of 16,571 square miles is about one third the size of New York state and had a population of about three millions in 1918. Of this number nearly a third lived in Copenhagen, the one really large city. According to the constitution the legislative power is vested jointly in the king and the Diet (*Rigsdag*).

² *Free World*, vol. 5 (1943), p. 211.

³ *Contemporary Review*, vol. 147 (1935), p. 46.

The king during the period between the two wars was Christian X (1870-1947), whose character and statesmanship made him popular with his subjects. On his daily horseback rides through Copenhagen, the tall monarch (he was six feet, six inches tall) would salute the ladies, nod to groups, chat with small boys or truck drivers, and carefully obey the traffic lights. Everywhere he was regarded with love and respect. During World War I the government had mobilized an emergency army of 70,000 but quickly demobilized them at the time of the armistice. Although a nonparticipant in the fighting, Denmark gained Northern Schleswig which had been annexed by Germany in 1864. There was a movement to return all of Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark, but Christian X, eager to eliminate the possibility of future international complications, firmly stated that he wished "to see Denmark go only as far south in Schleswig as Danish hearts beat." As a result of the plebiscite stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles Denmark was given possession of a strip of land where the inhabitants even under German rule had remained Danish in language, customs, and culture. Thus was added to Denmark an area of 1507 square miles with a population of nearly 200,000. The return of North Schleswig after fifty-four years under the German flag was an occasion for great jubilation. Many hailed it as the greatest event in a century of Danish history.

Although Copenhagen is a port and shipbuilding center of the first importance, with the largest ice-free harbor in northern Europe, the Danish people are largely devoted to agriculture. Denmark is, in a sense, a country of farmers in which most of the agencies of the state and also a vast number of cooperative enterprises are consciously devoted to the promotion of the well-being of the farmers. About 250,000 farmers are members of some 4000 cooperative societies which control the machinery for buying all the farmer produces beyond his own needs. The cooperative movement began with dairying early in the eighties and proved so successful that it was soon extended to pork packing, the export of butter, and other phases of economic activity. By the thirties more than 90 per cent of all Danish farmers were members of a cooperative dairy. The secret of the success of the movement in Denmark is that it has

THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES. *Note the boundaries of Sweden, Finland, Russia, and Germany, and the position of such cities as Leningrad, Danzig, Berlin, and Hamburg.*

enabled the small farmer to place his output as advantageously as the large-scale farmer. Besides insuring to the individual producer the best prices for his products, the movement has made for progress and efficiency. To promote agriculture and stock-raising, the co-operative societies employ agricultural advisers, arrange agricultural shows, and conduct experiments of many kinds. The farmers also have cooperative associations for buying fertilizers, feeds, and supplies. The cooperatives even charter ships to carry away the exports and to bring back the imports, such as cottonseed from the United States and soy beans from the East.

It is estimated that Danish agriculture is able to feed some twelve million people in addition to the inhabitants of Denmark. The country supplies others with great quantities of butter, eggs, bacon, and hams. No less than 50 per cent of the butter, 53 per cent of the ham, 64 per cent of the bacon, and 75 per cent of the eggs were sold abroad during the decade of the thirties. One of the best customers was England, and Germany was another. During World War I Denmark lost the British market to the United States and Canada. Nevertheless, Denmark, as one writer put it, was "the one European country that during the war literally flowed with milk and honey. It alone had an ample supply of food." Prices were so high that huge fortunes were made. But as prices fell off, the fortunes melted away. Bankruptcies and foreclosure sales became everyday affairs. Gradually, however, conditions improved. British markets were again open and Germany also consumed large quantities of Danish products.

When Hitler rose to power, the Nazis made no issue of the Schleswig territory that had been returned to Denmark. They even seemed satisfied with the treatment of the German minority in that country. Nevertheless, the long shadow of Nazi Germany fell ominously upon Denmark, whose only land frontier bordered the Reich and was unfortified. It was feared that the productive capacity of Danish agriculture might tempt a country that could not raise enough food to supply its needs. In May, 1939, Hitler sought to allay these fears by concluding with Denmark a nonaggression treaty in which both promised that they would "in no circumstances resort to war or any other form of violence against each other." But this promise was no more sacred to Hitler than any other. Before World War II was a year old, Nazi legions overran King Christian's country.

Norway, which forms the northern and western part of the Scandinavian Peninsula, has an extreme length of 1100 miles and an extreme width of 250 miles, with an estimated area of 124,555 square miles, which is about five times the combined areas of New Hamp-

shire, Vermont, and Massachusetts. In 1918 it had an estimated population of 2,632,010. The government during the period between the two wars was a constitutional and hereditary monarchy, and the ruler was King Haakon VII, second son of Frederick VIII of Denmark, who had been elected when Norway severed its connection with Sweden in 1905. The constitution vested the legislative power in the Storting, elected by universal suffrage without distinction of sex. The king was accorded a veto, but the constitution provides that a bill becomes law without his assent if it is passed by three Stortings formed by separate and subsequent elections.

Norway is on the whole a barren and mountainous country. In 1919 it was estimated that 71 per cent was unproductive from the agricultural standpoint. Almost a quarter of the total area is covered with forest, and only 3.7 per cent is under cultivation. Nevertheless, agriculture is one of the foremost industries. The other two are fisheries and shipping, as one would expect from the fact that the coastline is more than a thousand miles long. No other country has proportionately so much tonnage in ships or so many seamen. It has been calculated that during the decade of the thirties every twenty-fifth ship on the seas of the world was Norwegian and 17 per cent of the adult male population followed the sea for a livelihood. In 1935 the foreign trade per inhabitant was five times that of the United States. Fishing has been an important industry since the earliest days of recorded history. During the period between the wars Norwegian fish products were sold in many countries. Besides cod and herring fisheries, whaling has occupied an important place in the economic life of Norway. As an industry whaling is so important that a jest states, "The whale is one of Norway's domestic animals." The other important domestic animal is the silver fox. In 1935 there were nearly 20,000 fox farms, and a large number of pelts were being exported. Another important source of natural wealth is the forests. During the two decades after 1919 woodpulp and wood products formed about 25 per cent of the total exports. Industry as a whole is based on raw materials from the forests and fisheries.

During the years of World War I the shipowners and exporters of Norway enjoyed a high degree of prosperity, but this was followed by a slump in the early twenties accompanied by a thoroughgoing deflation. As a result a number of banks went bankrupt and unemployment reached high figures. By 1928 Norway had to a large extent overcome the effects of the slump and was looking forward to a period of economic growth and prosperity. About the middle of 1930, however, the effects of the world depression began to make

themselves felt. There followed a period of falling prices, reduced exports, and growing unemployment. But thanks to the deflation of the early years of the decade depression was not so severe as in other countries. In 1935 production reached 111 per cent of the production of 1928, while that of the United States was only 72 per cent. Moreover, whereas Norway had ranked eighth among the seafaring nations in 1923, the outbreak of World War II saw her in fourth place.

When in 1814 Norway was separated from Denmark and put under Swedish rule, the population preserved Danish as the literary language. The great Norwegian writer, Henrik Ibsen (1828–1906), wrote his works in Danish. After a few decades a movement was started to advance Norway's claim for a literary language by using Norwegian words for all things and ideas characteristic of Norwegian life, but most of the vocabulary of abstract words remained Danish. Two Norwegian writers of the period between the two wars whose works were and still are read in many countries are Knut Hamsun (1859–) and Sigrid Undset (1882–). The former's *Growth of the Soil* is often referred to as "the great Norwegian prose epic." Published in 1917, it won instantancous success in Norway and during the subsequent years was translated into nearly every major language, winning the Nobel prize for its author in 1920. Mrs. Undset's great work of the period was *Kristin Lavransdatter* (1920–1922), a trilogy composed of *The Bridal Wreath*, *The Mistress of Husaby*, and *The Cross*. This great historical novel, the scene of which is laid in fourteenth-century Norway, is an ambitious attempt to sum up the meaning of life from the viewpoint of religious experience.

The voice of Norway in music was Edvard Grieg, who died in 1904 but whose music was popular during the decades of the twenties and thirties. More than any other composer Grieg embodied in his music the national spirit and folklore of Norway and the voices of the Norwegian forest.

Sweden with an area of 158,450 square miles is the largest of the Scandinavian states. The population at the beginning of 1919 was 5,813,850. The government, like those of Denmark and Norway, is a constitutional monarchy. Executive power is vested in the king, who acts with the advice of the council of state. The legislative power is exercised by an elected Diet of two chambers.

The king during the period between the two wars was Gustav V (1858–), great-grandson of Marshal Bernadotte, the founder of the Royal House of Sweden. King Gustav, affectionately known

to his subjects as "Papa Gustav," ascended the throne in 1907. Aside from his democratic tastes and fine gifts of statesmanship, this tall ruler possesses considerable athletic ability. He is an uncommonly good horseman, an excellent marksman, an agile oarsman, and a skillful tennis player. Besides popularizing tennis in his own country, he also entered the Riviera tennis tournaments in France under the name of "Mr. G." It was King Gustav who in 1914 invited the sovereigns of Denmark and Norway to meet with him at Malmö, where it was agreed that the Scandinavian countries would try to stay out of the war. At the end of the war a contest arose between Sweden and Finland for the possession of the Åland Islands, which were regarded by the Swedes as the naval key to Stockholm. Although Finland exercised sovereignty over the islands after the fall of the Russian imperial government, the inhabitants demanded annexation to Sweden in the name of self-determination. It was finally agreed to accept the intervention of the League of Nations for the settlement of the dispute. The League adjudicated the islands to Finland.

Although Sweden had few manufactures in the middle of the nineteenth century, succeeding decades saw the development of a number of industries, particularly during the early years of the present century. Once industrialization had begun, it became clear that the nation possessed a certain talent for technical matters. The things the Swedes invented or discovered range from dynamite to steam turbines. Above all, their high-grade iron and steel enjoy an international reputation. The other pillar of their industry is wood. Notable among the exports during the period between the two wars were ball bearings, electrical machinery, calculating machines, measuring instruments, refrigerators, matches, paper, and pulp and wood products of many kinds. With the largest timber resources in western Europe, Sweden became one of the world's largest exporters of woodpulp and newsprint paper. Despite rapid industrialization, agriculture still remained the most important branch of activity. In 1935 two thirds of the population lived in the country, and as far as foodstuffs were concerned there was more than enough for the inhabitants. Many of those who pursued agriculture also devoted a great deal of time to handicrafts. Some of the textiles, toys, and woodwork made by the villagers enjoyed a world-wide reputation.

Like the other Scandinavian countries Sweden had her economic life violently dislocated by the war and its aftermath. A period of prosperity with rising prices was followed by deflation; in fact, the dislocation was probably more violent than in any other nonbel-

ligerent country. In June, 1920, the wholesale price index stood at 366 compared with 100 for the year preceding the outbreak of the war. In September, 1920, prices began to decline, and a year later the index had fallen to 182. This drop within a brief space of time put a severe strain on the economic structure. The sale of goods declined both at home and abroad, and unemployment became extensive. But conditions gradually improved during the succeeding years. In 1929 the volume of production was more than double that of 1921.

Sweden did not feel the force of the world depression of 1929 until 1931, but its consequences for a country so dependent on foreign trade were serious. In 1932, which saw a deepening of the depression, the volume of production fell to 79 per cent of the 1929 level, and the proportion of unemployed trade-union members reached 31 per cent. From the second quarter of 1934 the recovery was rapid. As far as manufactures are concerned, the situation in 1935 was more favorable than that of other industrialized countries. While the United States in 1935 was still about 26 per cent below the peak-year production of 1929, Sweden was 10 per cent above it. Unemployment at the end of 1935 was less than 1 per cent. An important factor in this recovery was a strong home market. Furthermore, the Swedish government had succeeded in keeping the krona both stable and low abroad, thus making money cheap and plentiful at home. This enabled private industry to expand and to re-employ thousands of workers.

The Nazi triumph in Germany gave a strong stimulus to the anti-democratic forces in Sweden. Three Nazi groups sprang into existence and made a spectacular bid for support. If a dominating personality had arisen to unite these groups, Sweden might have been confronted with a major political crisis. As it was, the oldest party, after a rapid rise, discredited itself by an organized attempt on the life of one of its members in an effort to create a Swedish Horst Wessel. Moreover, the improvement of economic conditions in 1934 robbed the Nazis of much of their ammunition and also contributed a great deal toward reviving the faith of the masses in democratic institutions. In any case, Hitler's bloody purge of July, 1934, dealt the final blow to the Nazi menace in Sweden.

The European arms race which began soon after Hitler's accession to power turned the eyes of Europe toward Sweden by creating an unprecedented demand for iron and steel. In northern Lapland Sweden possessed more than two billion tons of high-grade ore, much of which could simply be stripped from the mountain sides. Thus

Sweden,⁴ was in a position to aid any country in the development of an arms program. For many years Sweden shipped about 75 per cent of her total iron ore exports to Germany, the rest going to Britain, Belgium, and the United States. Although Germany's share decreased somewhat during the years immediately preceding World War II, Swedish iron still remained the very backbone of Germany's armament industries because of its high grade. Nor did Sweden's part in the armaments race stop with the export of ore. The Bofors plant ranked as one of the foremost munitions factories in the world. Bofors antiaircraft guns were considered equal if not indeed superior to any. Other nations were ready to buy antiaircraft guns and artillery generally as fast as Bofors could make them. Orders in 1937 amounted to \$37.5 million with capacity production contracted for three years in advance.

The names of many distinguished persons of Swedish birth are familiar to educated persons the world over. In the field of literature the culture of Sweden has reached us chiefly in the writings of Strindberg and in the stories and novels of Selma Lagerlöf. There was hardly a phase of Swedish literature that Strindberg (1849–1912) did not dominate, including the drama, the novel, and the short story. His poetry was among the most beautiful in the language. Selma Lagerlöf (1858–1940) wrote with such simple charm that her works have lost little in translation. Some of her writings have been translated into thirty-five languages. Among the better known are *The Wonderful Adventures of Nils*, *The Legend of the Bird's Nest*, *The General's Ring*, and *Charlotte Lowensköld*. The acknowledged dean of Swedish poetry is Verner von Heidenstam (1859–1940), whose prose works are also of outstanding importance. His patriotic poetry is most passionate, as exemplified by the following:

We love thee so that, if thou wert dead,
Our love to life could awake thee.
Though the bed is hard, though the midnight lowers,
We'll be true while the tempest rages,
Thou people, thou land, thou speech that is ours,
Thou voice of our souls to the ages.

Although he did not write books or even poetry, Alfred Nobel (1833–1896) is one of the most widely known persons of Swedish birth. As the son of an inventor, Alfred Nobel spent most of his life pursuing some invention or other. Among the subjects that par-

⁴ Only France surpassed Sweden in the quantity of iron ore exports.

ticularly occupied his attention was nitroglycerin, which had been discovered by the Italian Sobrero in 1846. It was Nobel's purpose to devise means whereby nitroglycerin could be employed without extreme danger. In 1862 he and his father erected a plant where it was manufactured on a commercial scale. After several appalling accidents, one of which claimed the life of his brother, he discovered that when nitroglycerin is absorbed in silica it loses many of its dangerous qualities. He called the new product, which was patented in 1867, "dynamite." Soon a number of plants were opened for the manufacture of it, including one in San Francisco. In 1876 he further improved it by combining nitroglycerin with guncotton. Thus was inaugurated the "Age of Dynamite" which produced new instruments of warfare, instruments which were terrible in their destructive powers. For the inventor it meant a large income from his more than twenty factories.

Alfred Nobel had a horror of war. He hoped that his product would outlaw war by making its consequences too terrible to contemplate. "Munition factories," he wrote to a friend who was an advocate of peace congresses, "will perhaps bring war to an end sooner than your conferences; on the day when two army corps are able to destroy each other in the twinkling of an eye, civilized nations will recoil with horror from a conflict and send their armies home." For years he toyed with the idea of using at least a part of his fortune to promote the cause of peace. "I should like to set a part of my property aside for a special prize," he wrote in 1892, "to be distributed every five years. The prize would be bestowed on him or her through whose efforts Europe would have been brought farthest along the way to peace." Several years later he made a will which ordained that his whole fortune be applied to the foundation of the five world prizes which now perpetuate his name. These are awarded to the person who shall have made the most important discovery or invention (1) in the domain of physics, (2) in chemistry, (3) in physiology or medicine, (4) to the person who shall have written the most distinguished work of an idealistic nature in the field of literature, (5) to the person who shall have done most to advance the cause of universal peace. While the first four are awarded by various academies and one institute in Sweden, the last is awarded by the Norwegian Storting. Among the many prize winners were Selma Lagerlöf (1909) and Verner von Heidenstam (1916).



FINLAND

For centuries Finland was a buffer state between Russia and the West. Politically it was a part of Sweden but in 1809 it was added to the Russian Empire by Tsar Alexander I who took the title of Grand Duke of Finland. Although under Russian domination, the Finns enjoyed complete internal autonomy. The Diet pioneered in progressive legislation and as early as 1907 granted the right of suffrage to women. Nevertheless, the Finns were not happy under the rule of the tsars; they wanted nothing short of complete independence. When World War I broke out, the tsar deprived the Diet of most of its powers, in an effort to Russify the country. Since Finland had no army to fight for her deliverance, she could only pray.

A new era was inaugurated with the collapse of Russia in 1917. The provisional government under Kerensky hastened at once to restore autonomy. When the Bolshevik revolution made an end to the provisional government in November, 1917, the Finns embraced the opportunity to declare their independence (December 6, 1917). The first government to recognize their independence was Soviet Russia, followed by the three Scandinavian states, Germany, France, and a number of other nations. Yet Finland was not to be spared the evils and bloodshed of a revolution. A group of "Reds" identified their cause with that of the Russian revolutionists and, supplied with Russian arms, attempted to draw the country into the Bolshevik whirlpool. The Reds occupied the southern and southwestern part of Finland including the capital city of Helsinki and Finland's most prosperous port, Viipuri. In the circumstances the government found it necessary to apply to Germany for armed assistance. A sanguinary struggle followed in which the Reds were driven across the Russian frontier with heavy casualties. For a time the Finns chafed under the German rule, but the collapse of Germany in November, 1918, restored their liberty. On October 14, 1920, after many months of negotiation, a definitive treaty between Finland and Soviet Russia recognized Finnish independence.

The new republic of Finland embraced an area of 149,903 square miles, which is about the size of Montana. The population was about 3.4 million. Finnish and Swedish were adopted as the official languages, corresponding to the main elements of the population. In 1921 about 87 per cent spoke Finnish and about 12 per cent Swedish. The constitution, which was ratified in June, 1919, established a truly democratic government. "The governmental power," the con-

stitution states, "belongs to the people, represented by the assembled Parliament." It granted free speech and free assembly under all normal conditions and guaranteed the linguistic, religious, and minority rights of all citizens. The executive power was vested in a president, elected for a term of six years; the legislative power was entrusted jointly to the president and an elected parliament.

Although it is often called the "Land of a Thousand Lakes," Finland is actually pockmarked by more than four thousand. These lakes provide fish in enormous quantities and make fishing one of the country's great industries. But the greatest industry during the period between the two wars was lumbering. More than half of Finland is covered by forest, of which about 40 per cent belongs to the state. In addition to the natural wealth in timber, Finland also has aluminum mines. There is no coal, but the system of lakes and rivers offers unlimited opportunities for the development of waterpower. Dairying and agriculture both produce exportable wealth of no mean importance. During the twentieth century industry experienced a rapid development. On the eve of World War II the linen, tobacco, and leather factories were among the most important in northern Europe. As in the Scandinavian countries, the cooperative movement has been very successful.

Finland's most distinguished world citizen during the period between the two wars was the composer Jan Sibelius (1865-). His popularity with his compatriots was such that they lovingly referred to him as "the uncrowned king of Finland." After studying in Helsinki and Berlin, young Sibelius in 1890 found Vienna, the home of Johann Strauss and the city that is filled with memories of Schubert, Beethoven, and Mozart. "At last," he wrote, "I have found a place that was made for me." Although enchanted by the gay city on the Danube, he followed the dictates of his own mind and instincts in his compositions. He returned to Finland in 1892 and quickly gained recognition from his countrymen. Early in his career the Diet voted him a pension so that he could devote himself exclusively to composition without being harassed by financial problems. In 1899 his *First Symphony* was received with tremendous enthusiasm; then came his *Song of the Athenians* and *Finlandia*. The latter was an expression of the surging Finnish nationalism of the time. A nationalist by temperament, he wrote a number of his early works, including *Kullerovo* and the *Karelia Suite* as patriotic tributes; in fact, his music contributed much toward gaining independence for Finland. In Germany his *Finlandia* was called *Vaterland* and in Paris *La Patrie*. In Russia, so long as Finland was a

part of the Russian Empire, it could not be played under any name that suggested its patriotic character.



SWITZERLAND

Switzerland, homeland of the legendary William Tell, is a small country in the very heart of Europe. The Swiss are heterogeneous not only in their religious faith, one part being Protestant and the other Catholic, but also in ethnic origin, in speech, and in culture. In 1930 the population, numbering about four million, was divided linguistically as follows: 71 per cent German, 21 per cent French, and 6 per cent Italian. The three official languages were German, French, and Italian. None of the different ethnic or language groups could, however, claim any superiority over the others; all were definitely on the same plane. Switzerland is basically not one state, but a union of twenty-two cantons or small states, each having its local rights, customs, and government. These cantons were gradually drawn together in a voluntary union by common interests and a love of freedom. At first the bonds that held them together were loose, but as centralization became more and more necessary, unification was extended to national defense, currency, law, foreign policy, and certain phases of education and police administration.

The government is a liberal democracy established in 1848, a time when the general environment was neither liberal nor democratic. The constitution, modeled to a certain extent upon that of the United States, transformed Switzerland into a federal government. Since it was first promulgated in 1848 the constitution has been changed a number of times. All changes have been in the direction of greater participation of the people in the process of legislation. Sovereignty was vested in the people, who exercise it alike in national and cantonal affairs by means of the veto, the initiative, and, in some instances, the recall. The legislative power was vested in a Federal Assembly consisting of a House of Representatives representing the people⁵ and a Council of State which, like the United States Senate, represents the cantons or states. The right to initiate legislation was accorded equally to both houses. Provisions were made for the exercise of the executive power by a Federal Council composed of seven members elected by the Assembly. The presidency is held for twelve months only, virtually in rotation, by members of the Federal Council and has no political or adminis-

⁵ Representatives, according to the act of 1930, are elected by manhood suffrage on the basis of one member for every 22,000 people.

trative significance. The president merely serves as chairman of the Federal Council.

During the early decades of the nineteenth century the population of Switzerland was made up almost entirely of peasants, but toward the end of the century and particularly in the present century manufactures developed rapidly. In 1934 nearly 46 per cent of the population was engaged in manufacturing. The country is not, however, rich in natural resources; hence it was necessary to import raw materials. To pay for such imports the Swiss had to develop export industries. Swiss watches, textiles, electrical apparatus, machinery, and chemical products were soon known in many parts of the world. During the decade of the thirties the per capita value of the foreign trade exceeded that of both Great Britain and the United States. Another important source of income during the period between the two wars was the tourist traffic. Originally isolated by high mountains, Switzerland became, with the development of modern means of transportation, a land of tourists. International expresses roared through the railway tunnels day and night. In general, the economic and social wellbeing of the Swiss was such as to evoke the envy of foreigners. The depression of 1929 naturally curtailed exports, but conditions gradually improved during the thirties.

Despite their language and cultural differences the Swiss have for centuries lived in relative peace and mutual concord while their neighbors have waged wars over the very issues which failed to disrupt the national unity of Switzerland. The Swiss demonstrated, in the words of Woodrow Wilson, "how Germans, Frenchmen, and Italians, if only they respect each other's liberties as they would have their own respected, may by mutual helpfulness and forbearance build up a union at once stable and free."

This spirit of peace and cooperation has also been characteristic of foreign policy. For more than a century Switzerland has succeeded in remaining aloof from the wars of Europe, thereby earning for herself the appellation of "Isle of Peace." During World War I her neutrality was respected by her neighbors, but during the succeeding period the effervescence of nationalism in France, of Fascism in Italy, and of National Socialism in Germany caused considerable uneasiness among the Swiss. It was, above all, the Nazis that the Swiss feared. After Hitler's accession to power Nazi newspapers, printed in Switzerland, repeatedly stated that the Swiss were "racial comrades" and even invited them to "come home to Mother Germania." A German Nazi Party was organized in Switzerland with more than forty branches, all working toward the establishment of an authori-

tarian state. After Germany's reoccupation of the Rhineland, the Swiss fears deepened. The Swiss believed that in case of war against France the Nazis would march through Switzerland as a means of outflanking the Maginot Line. This fear caused the minister of war to make a moving appeal to the nation to be ready "to defend its liberty by force of arms." "The moment a foreign soldier crosses our border," one of the Swiss statesmen said, "we will fight, and you may rest assured that we will fight to the last man."



CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Revolt of the East against Western Imperialism

AWAKENING OF THE ORIENT

THE contest for colonial possessions has been one of the outstanding features of European history since the time when the crusades saw the founding of the great Venetian maritime empire. During the centuries that followed, most European nations strove unceasingly to extend their influence. The object of this early imperialism was not so much possession of the territories as of the markets the territories afforded. European traders wanted to buy and sell goods at a profit in distant lands. Of special importance was the trade in precious metals, spices, and various kinds of luxuries.

With the invention of power machinery in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries a new stage of imperialism began. Power machinery meant, above all, large-scale production of the necessities of life rather than the luxuries. There was every incentive, after the domestic market had been supplied, to establish political control of overseas territories as a means of monopolizing their markets. Furthermore, to keep the wheels of the machinery turning, the industrial states of Europe needed vast quantities of raw materials, many of which the backward countries of Asia and Africa could supply. More than this, profits were so large that industrialists were seeking new spheres of remunerative investment. In short, political control of backward countries to a greater or lesser extent for purposes of economic exploitation constitutes the essence of modern imperialism, however much imperialists may have tried to disguise their motives in a humanitarian garb. In addition to the seamy side there is, of course, a constructive side. Many of the benefits of Western civilization were conferred upon the backward peo-

ples: harbors and ports were constructed in their countries, railroads were built, and steps were taken to develop natural resources.

The same general methods were employed by all imperialist powers. They simply occupied the territory whose products or markets they desired. The discoveries of science and their application to economic processes gave the Occident command of weapons that made it possible to occupy weak and backward countries with relatively small effort. In this way more than two thirds of the population of the globe became more or less subject to a few aggressive Western powers. Great Britain established political control over India and Burma; France, over Indo-China; the Netherlands, over an insular empire; and Spain, over the Philippine Islands.¹ At the outbreak of World War I Japan alone of the Asiatic nations could call herself wholly independent.

For a long time Asia was passive, even indifferent, and it seemed as if its peoples would always play a subordinate part in the political and economic development of the human race. But superiority of arms did not give the Western nations a final and lasting supremacy over the Eastern peoples. In the twentieth century the East flared into revolt and asserted its right to self-government. Many factors contributed to produce this independence movement, among them the rise of a nationalist spirit, a desire for social equality, a longing for political independence, resentment against economic exploitation by the imperialist nations, and hostility to the imposition of Western religion and culture.

The movement to free the East from European domination began to develop in the nineteenth century among those who had either been educated by teachers from the Occident or who had studied in Europe or the United States of America. Many of them had been deeply imbued with democratic ideas, and others were eager to replace the foreigners in the rule of their country. These men grasped the vision of fighting the West with its own weapons, both material and spiritual. Before the twentieth century was many years old, the victory of the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War "sent tremors of surprise down the spine of Asia." The Orient, which had stood in awe of the white man with his engines of death, realized that he was not invincible. Lilliputian Japan, a recent convert to the ways of the West, had sent the Russian giant reeling. It generated in the hearts of the Asiatic peoples a new hope of emancipation.

¹ The United States entered the ranks of the imperialist powers when after the Spanish-American War it took over the Spanish colonial possessions.

During the next decade the Western powers were still engaged in empire making or at least in consolidating their empires. They still believed that permanent domination of the Eastern peoples was possible. Then came the First World War. During the war, it is true, the Oriental dominions of the Allies were actively loyal to the extent that Asiatic and African troops fought side by side with the English and French. However, if the war delayed the independence movement, it also served to strengthen it. While Europe was locked in bloody combat, a steady awakening was taking place among the vast populations inhabiting the territories from Egypt to the Straits of Singapore. During the war years the feeling of nationalism, which had previously been restricted to the small group of the intelligentsia, began to penetrate the masses. Not the least among the influences that awakened them from their age-old lethargy were such phrases as "self-determination" and "the rights of small nations" which were spread about the globe during and after the war. The creation of national states in eastern and central Europe at the end of the war gave point to the phrases and further whetted the appetites of the Oriental peoples for independence. Another factor which engendered discontent was the influence of Bolshevik propaganda. If the Bolsheviks did not light the fires of Eastern unrest, they did pour oil on the flames by spreading abroad the doctrines of militant proletarianism and by accusing the "imperialist powers" of "crass exploitation." The masses who had long cherished a deep hatred of the foreigner quickly absorbed these ideas.

All this strengthened the determination of the subject peoples to terminate the rule the Europeans exercised over them. Although each of the various revolts differed from the others in detail, all were formed in the same mold, all pointed toward self-government. The supporters of independence did not stop to ask whether the abolition of European political governance would throw the internal affairs of their respective countries into a state of confusion and anarchy. Their motto was: "Bad home rule is better than good foreign rule." They were determined to fight on until they were complete masters in their own house. It was the same psychology and procedure that existed in the American colonies when they were reaching out toward independence and nationhood. In the case of the Oriental peoples the aspirations for independence were reinforced by hatred of European religion and culture. The belief that theirs is a better way of life was deeply ingrained in their minds. Not that they were unwilling to accept Western science and Western technique. What they were profoundly sceptical about was Western values. Thus Rabindranath Tagore, the East Indian poet, was moved

to state that "the power by which the West thrives is an evil power." "Christianity," said the Chinese Ku Hung-Ming, "aims to secure the moral perfection of the individual, but Confucianism not only makes excellent men, it makes good citizens." Hence the desire for a combination of Western technique and Eastern values. This combination, the leaders felt, could be achieved only if the entire governmental machinery were in native hands.

During the years after World War I the independence movements vented themselves in organized revolts, sporadic outbreaks, mass demonstrations, and widespread disaffections. In 1927 a native of Asia wrote: "It has dawned upon even the dumbest witted person in North America and Europe that a change has come over the people of Asia—that they have ceased to be putty in the hands of Occidentals—that everywhere they are challenging the right of the Caucasians to rule and exploit them, and in some places are not hesitating to use force to dislodge the dominant races from their entrenched positions in the Orient."² The result was that Western ascendancy was shaken to its very foundations. In Egypt, whose civilization was Asiatic rather than African, the demand for independence was so insistent that Great Britain was forced to make important concessions. Egypt was proclaimed independent with the provision that British troops remain in Egypt to protect the Suez Canal. There were formidable risings against the French in Syria, and both Persia and Afghanistan insisted upon freedom from interference in their internal affairs. A liberation movement was also on foot in Burma, which was one of Great Britain's richest possessions, and in the Dutch East Indies. During the same period the Philippines asserted their right to independence in no uncertain voice. India, which had been fairly quiet during the war, was swept by a nationalist agitation; China, though torn by revolution, demanded restoration of its sovereignty and territorial integrity; and Japan, the one Far Eastern country that escaped exploitation, joined the European powers in the game of imperialism after deliberately westernizing itself under the leadership of its feudal aristocracy. The story of the last three nations will be told in greater detail in the following pages.



INDIA'S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

In 1919 the term "India" was a geographical expression implying the area under British rule from the eastern frontier of Persia to

² *Southern Workman*, vol. 56 (1927), p. 420.

the western frontier of the Chinese province of Yünnan. This vast territory, over twelve times the size of Great Britain, had no political unity beyond the fact that it was administered by the British sovereign as Emperor of India, through the Viceroy. Two thirds of the area was divided into provinces ruled by British governors and British councils; the remaining third consisted of Indian states, many of which were ruled by hereditary princes but all of which were under the indirect control of Britain. The population, greater than that of the two Americas, numbered more than 335 million or about one fifth of the human race. About 90 per cent were engaged in cultivating the soil. In general, it was a poverty-stricken people: about 60 per cent was either definitely undernourished or at least badly nourished. Periodic famines took a large toll in human lives.

Beyond the fact that most of the inhabitants derived their living from the soil there was little homogeneity of any kind in India. The people are in fact a most heterogeneous collection, divided by appearance, dress, ceremonial, and language. They speak no less than twelve distinct languages and over two hundred minor dialects. Moreover, they are divided by religious faiths: living side by side in different parts of the peninsula are about 240 million Hindus and about 75 million Mohammedans. So sharp are the mutual feelings that clashes between the two have been chronic. The situation is further complicated by the fact that there is little unity among the Hindus; in fact they are sharply divided into castes, of which there are between two and three thousand. Every Hindu is born into a caste and can never leave it or even marry outside it. He can eat only with members of his caste, and the food he eats is regulated by the scruples of his caste. At the top of the system stand the Brahmins or priests, who are held in reverence and commonly addressed as "Maharaj" (Your Highness). At the bottom are the so-called "untouchables," who numbered about sixty million in 1919. The name of this depressed class derives from the fact that Hindus of the higher castes believe that the touch of the members of this class pollutes food and water and that even their shadow is polluting. As outcasts, the untouchables may not draw water from the village wells, enter the temples, or live in the same section of the village as the higher castes.

This teeming continent with its conflicting religions and customs was "the brightest jewel in the British crown." Having originally entered India for trade alone, the British succeeded in establishing their sovereignty in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. After the development of power machinery it became Britain's

greatest overseas market. More than this, it was a highly important source of products, particularly raw materials, for which Britain had a special need. The function of the British, according to Indian patriots, was primarily economic exploitation. The British in turn pointed to the fact that they had given the people many of the blessings of Western civilization, including roads, railroads, schools, better sanitation, and methods for the prevention of disease; that they had diminished child marriages and had abolished such customs as that by which widows permitted themselves to be burned alive on the funeral pyres of their husbands. Actually the British contributed but little toward raising the standard of living and not much more toward wiping out illiteracy. According to the census of 1921 only 7 per cent of the population was literate in the vernaculars and only 1 per cent was literate in English. In spite of criticism the British were determined to hold India. In 1922 Lloyd George said in the House of Commons: "One thing we must make clear, that Great Britain will in no circumstances relinquish her responsibility to India. We owe this not only to the people of this country, though they have made great sacrifices for India, but we owe it to the people of India as a whole. . . . If Great Britain withdrew her strong hand, nothing would ensue except division, strife, conflict, and anarchy." To this speech a moderate member of the Delhi Legislative Assembly replied in part: "His statement that the British came here with a view to draw Indians out of the state of anarchy is incorrect. The less said about the methods of the acquisition of India by Great Britain, the better."

Under the aegis of the British a number of steps had been taken in the direction of constitutionalism but there was no popular participation in the government. Meanwhile a sentiment of common nationality had been growing up among the members of the educated class, a class that was increasing in both numbers and influence. As early as 1885 some of their representatives had organized the Indian National Congress which stood for increasing participation of the people in the government. At first the demands of the Congress were amazingly moderate, but as a result of World War I they became more pointed and inclusive. As their part of the war effort British India and the Indian States provided a million and a half men for military service and contributed large sums toward defraying the expenses of the war which was fought "to make the world safe for democracy." This slogan, together with the Allied cry that subject nations must be free, could not fail to kindle aspirations for liberty and self-government. "Attention is repeatedly being

called to the fact," the secretary of state for India reported, "that in Europe Britain is fighting on the side of liberty, and it is urged that Britain cannot deny to the people of India that for which she is herself fighting in Europe and in the fight for which she has been helped by Indian blood and treasure." In 1916 the Indian National Congress and the All-India Moslem League held a combined meeting at which the demand for home rule was proclaimed. Thus at a critical moment Great Britain was suddenly confronted by nationalist demands which threatened to interfere with the prosecution of the war. To save the situation Mr. Montagu, the secretary of state for India, formally declared in 1917 that the basic aim of British policy in India would be "the development of self-governing institutions with a view to progressive realization of responsible government."

When the war ended, the people of India believed that the time had come for them to have *Swaraj* (home rule) in fulfillment of the proclamation of 1917. This desire for home rule was strengthened by Indian soldiers returning from the front to the remotest villages with ideas of liberty and self-determination. Everywhere the educated class and the masses too were stirred by new hopes as never before. But when the months passed and nothing was done to fulfill their hopes and desires, signs of unrest began to multiply. Realizing the increasing difficulty of ruling India without support of popular opinion, the British in 1919 sought to placate Indian sentiment with the so-called Government of India Act which gave the people an increased share in the government. First of all, certain matters, including agriculture, education, public health, and public works were put under the control of Provincial Councils. On the other hand, control of finance and the police remained in the hands of the British governor of each province, thus effectually preventing the inauguration of widespread reforms. This system of divided rule was known as "dyarchy." In the second place, the Act provided for an Indian legislative assembly with power to debate but not to legislate; but the central power remained with the British. The entire scheme was designed only for British India, the Indian States remaining under the despotic rule of the native princes.

The British were certain that the Act would satisfy the people of India, but such cheerful expectations were rudely disappointed. Stirred to the depths, the Indians refused to be satisfied with anything short of complete home rule. There were some few, it is true, who urged that the reforms be accepted, but the majority in the National Congress denounced them as inadequate. It was pointed

out that while native Indians were permitted to exercise minor powers of administration in the provinces, the control of all important functions of government still remained with the British. In certain parts of India disappointment was so great that it caused minor uprisings. To prevent further outbreaks the British passed the so-called Rowlatt Bill, which empowered the police to arrest and imprison without formal trial any person suspected of antigovernment activities. This law, in addition to filling the jails with thousands of Nationalists, appeared to give the lie to Mr. Montagu's proclamation of 1917. In protest the Congress called for cessation of all work for a day. This demonstration, intended to be entirely in the nature of a peaceful protest, took the form of rioting in some towns. When a large crowd which had gathered in the public square at Amritsar in the Punjab refused to disperse, General Reginald Dyer, British brigade commander, ordered his soldiers to fire on the crowd. Estimates of the number of dead and wounded vary, the more moderate being about 400 killed and 1200 wounded. Nor did General Dyer stop at this. He also issued the "crawling order" which required all Indians to pass the scene of the shooting on their hands and knees. This was deliberately devised to humiliate a proud and sensitive people.

The "Amritsar massacre" had widespread repercussions, but perhaps the most far-reaching result for the future of India was that it made a confirmed Nationalist of that strange personality, Mohandas K. Gandhi, who had previously been a loyal British subject. "In as much as one man in the Punjab was made to crawl on his belly," he stated, "the whole of India crawled on her belly, and if we are worthy sons and daughters of India we should be pledged to remove these wrongs." Born in India in 1869 as the son of a Hindu, though not of the priestly class, he went to London in 1888 to study law and while he was there spent much time studying Christianity and Western civilization. Upon his return to India in 1893 he left almost immediately for South Africa, where he worked for twenty-one years to ameliorate the conditions under which his countrymen were living in that country. When the Boer War broke out in 1899, he organized the Indian Ambulance Corps which by its service sought to demonstrate to the British the loyalty of the Indian community. He was no less active during World War I. His pacifist inclinations notwithstanding, he went so far as to participate in a recruiting campaign for the Allied cause. It was his fervent hope that the British would recognize the Indians' loyalty during the war and their very material sacrifices of men and money. But the severity with which

expressions of native aspirations were repressed, caused him to cast his lot with the Nationalists. The man who had said in 1915, "The British Empire has certain ideals with which I have fallen in love," stated in 1921: "Experience has made me wiser. . . . I consider the existing system of government to be wholly bad and requiring special effort to end or amend it."

National aspirations found in Mr. Gandhi a powerful if somewhat singular champion. The austere simplicity of his life—for he lived largely on goat's milk—and his utter sincerity caused him to be revered as deity and earned for him the title of Mahatma or Great Soul. The means he advocated for attaining liberty and independence were a curious blend of religious idealism and political expediency. He would break British power in India and achieve *Swaraj* (home rule), not by force but by nonviolent means. His prescription was "passive noncooperation." In other words, what he preached with the zeal of a convert was "a peaceful general strike of the whole people." In this way, he said, "you can gain *Swaraj* in the course of a year." He cautioned, however, that the movement could be successful only if all violence and bitterness were eschewed. First of all, laborers were to refuse to work for foreign employers. British courts were to be boycotted by both lawyers and litigants. Students were to leave all schools and colleges that were owned, aided, or controlled by the British government. All honors and titles that had been conferred by the British were to be renounced. What was more important, merchants, traders, and consumers were asked to join in a boycott of British goods, particularly of cotton cloth. In place of the cotton cloth from England *khaddar* or homespun was to be used. Wearing foreign cloth was denounced as a sin, and homespun was declared the only possible dress for patriots. So that sufficient homespun would be available Gandhi sought to revive the art of spinning and weaving at home which had once been nearly universal in India. During the second year of the struggle, increased emphasis was put upon the boycott of British goods. Gandhi was convinced that if the people could make the rule of India unprofitable for the British, the latter would withdraw. Finally, he urged his followers not to pay taxes or obey the laws.

At first noncooperation was confined to only a few but it was soon adopted by the Indian National Congress as a national movement. Thereafter it spread beyond all expectations. By advocating the removal of "untouchability" Gandhi gained the support of the sixty million untouchables. He went so far as to state that India would not deserve freedom until untouchability was abolished. He

even succeeded for the time being in gaining the support of the Moslems for his movement. The Moslems at first favored a resort to force but were finally persuaded to try the nonviolent method. Thus the movement became an affair of the masses rather than of a few thousand intellectuals and they responded in a manner that threw the authorities into panic. Sir Michael O'Dwyer, British governor of Bombay, said, "Our margin of safety in India was never very large and in these days . . . it has been reduced almost to the vanishing point."

As the months passed, however, the movement began to lose its nonviolent character. In some of the outlying districts various local disorders and uprisings took place. These were followed in November, 1921, by riots in Bombay in which fifty-three persons were killed and four hundred wounded. Gandhi was horrified. When other riots followed with resulting bloodshed, he denounced the violence and sought to expiate it by fasting and prayer. This apparent rift in the movement caused the British to strike hard. In March, 1922, Gandhi was arrested and sentenced to six years' imprisonment for "creating disaffection." Without the driving power of Gandhi, the movement gradually lost its force and was finally abandoned.³

During the succeeding years the resentment against the British continued to gain strength. In an effort to improve relations a commission, called the Simon Commission after its chairman, Sir John Simon, was appointed in 1927 to inquire into a revision of the Indian constitution. In choosing the members of the commission the British committed the blunder of not including an Indian, and this served to fan the embers of discontent to a white heat. In 1928 at the meeting of the All-Indian Congress the nationalist feeling vented itself in a demand for full Dominion status. Sweeping concessions on the part of the British might have eased the strain, but they were not ready to take such a step. At this point Gandhi, who after his release had seemingly vanished from politics, once more became the leader of his people. He introduced a resolution demanding full independence at the meeting of the All-India Congress during the last days of 1929. The Congress not only ratified his resolution but also decided to support it with an elaborate plan of "civil disobedience."

This campaign was actively launched in April of 1930 when Gandhi violated the British salt monopoly by taking salt water from the sea to his bungalow, after which he stated that workers

³ On the advent to power of the Labor government and prime minister Ramsay MacDonald in 1924 Mahatma Gandhi, who became seriously ill in prison, was released.

should everywhere manufacture salt and boycott British goods, particularly cotton cloth. Thousands of members of the All-India Congress joined at once. As a result British imports to India declined sharply, with cotton goods registering an especially heavy drop. Gandhi had again admonished his followers that they should not resort to violence; but nevertheless there were scores of outbreaks in widely separated regions, involving heavy destruction of property and the loss of many lives.

The government responded by arresting all those who were inciting others to participate in the campaign of civil disobedience. Soon the prisons were filled to capacity. Among those arrested were two sons of the Mahatma and also Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the president of the All-India Congress. Finally Gandhi himself was arrested. After this the "civil disobedience" movement gradually ebbed. First of all, it lacked the cohesive strength of the earlier noncooperation movement. This time the Moslems did not give their support. Second, many of the Hindus gradually dissociated themselves from the movement for various reasons. Third, Gandhi's enthusiasm for "civil disobedience" cooled when the All-India Congress failed to support his demand that every member spin a specified amount of cotton yarn each year.

Finally in 1935 the British parliament passed the India Act, which was intended to give India political freedom. The new constitution contained two major provisions. The first granted a considerable measure of popular rule to the eleven provinces into which British India was divided; the franchise was thus extended to approximately forty million adults, including five million women. The other major part provided for the establishment of a federal or national legislature of two houses, the membership of both to be drawn from the provinces of British India and from the native states. While the British argued that the constitution represented a long step toward independence, the Nationalists regarded it as "an unwelcome British-made constitution." Jawaharlal Nehru stated that it was the primary purpose of the constitution "to keep British imperialism in India intact." On the whole, the Nationalists claimed that such concessions as the British had made were only in trivial matters. In support of this contention they pointed to the fact that such phases of government as the police and the civil service, foreign affairs, railways and defense, currency and exchange, and banking and tariffs were still in British hands. When the constitution was put in effect in 1938, the All-India Congress announced that it would have nothing to do with it. Only after much urging on the

part of Gandhi did the Congress agree to accept the measures dealing with self-government of the provinces.

When World War II broke out, the All-India Congress issued a declaration which stated that "while India's sympathy is entirely on the side of democracy and freedom, she is not able to associate herself with the present war when freedom is denied her." The Congress did, however, agree to defer final decision "to allow full elucidation of the issues on the present and future position of India." It was a golden opportunity for the British to win the support of India's millions in the war effort by making concessions to nationalist feeling. The Labor and Liberal press, in fact, urged the government to declare its aims with regard to India. For years before the war the most scathing denunciations of Nazi aggression had come from India, and it would have been easy to gain her wholehearted support. But Lord Linlithgow, the Governor-General, merely reiterated previous statements that the goal of British policy was that "India may attain due place among the Dominions." Even more blunt was the Marquess of Zetland, secretary of state for India, when he declared that greater independence was not in the best interests of the people and urged them to achieve agreement among themselves before asking for full independence. Later pronouncements of the British failed to impress the Nationalists.



STRIFE-RENT CHINA

China is a geographical term which embraces a land mass of some four million square miles, an area considerably larger than Europe. Besides China proper (the eighteen provinces south of the Great Wall) it includes Manchuria, Mongolia, Sin-kiang, and Tibet. There is no accurate census of the population for the period between World War I and World War II. Competent authorities have accepted the round figure of 400 million for the years immediately following World War I. In 1929 the Chinese Maritime Customs estimated the population, including Manchuria, at 438,933,373. The fact that the Chinese form so large a part of the human race has given rise to the expression, "Of every five persons in the world one is a Chinese."

The history of China during more than half a century before World War I is largely a story of exploitation by the Western powers and Japan. From the early years of the nineteenth century when its commercial possibilities became apparent to Western traders, the governments of Europe vied with one another in entrenching themselves so that they could ruthlessly exploit the unwieldy colossus of



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the Orient. The method of establishing themselves on Chinese soil was to extract under various pretexts special rights and privileges from the Chinese government. This was possible because China's army was weak, the control of the government over the vast domain was loose, and the country was torn by internal dissension. Every special right or privilege which foreign governments succeeded in acquiring further limited the authority and power of the Chinese government. More than this, every concession wrung from China by one of the powers was shared by the others. Among the rights obtained by Europeans—and shared in part by citizens of the United States—were: (1) the right of extraterritoriality, i.e., of entire freedom from Chinese law; (2) the right of living in special areas reserved for foreign residents and administered by their own municipal or consular officers; (3) the right to regulate the customs duties of China and thus favor their imports into China; (4) the right to administer certain parts of China, usually lands and ports situated at strategic points along the coast, under the guise of "leasing" them; (5) the right of holding a practical monopoly of trade and the natural wealth in certain districts known as "spheres of interest" or "spheres of influence."

Until the decade of the nineties, when Japan and Germany began to extend their influence, the leaders in the acquisition of special privileges were Great Britain, France, and Russia. Britain was the first to recognize in China a vast field of opportunity for its merchants. One of the principal items in its profitable trade was Indian opium. When the Chinese emperor, alarmed at the ravages caused by the drug, tried to stop the trade about 1840, he precipitated the first Opium War,⁴ which ended in the treaty of Nanking (1842) whereby the island of Hong Kong became a British Crown Colony and five Chinese ports were opened to foreign trade. In 1843 Great Britain imposed on China the General Regulations of Trade which gave the British the privilege of extraterritoriality.

Other nations were not slow to take advantage of the opportunity. In 1844 the United States and France concluded treaties with

⁴ A later attempt of the Chinese to restrict the sale of opium brought on the second Opium War in 1857.

JAPANESE EXPANSION ON THE CONTINENT OF ASIA. *The map covers the period from the clash of Chinese and Japanese troops near Peiping on July 7, 1937, until the summer of 1942.*

China which conceded the right of their nationals to be tried before their own consuls. During the period from 1850 to 1864 various disturbances gave the powers a pretext for taking over the administration of the tariff system, thus further curtailing China's sovereignty. This was to be a temporary measure but it was continued indefinitely. The British collected the duties and, after the interest due on loans was deducted, turned the remainder over to the Chinese government.

Between 1860 and 1895 China was continually being forced by war or by the threat of war to surrender larger or smaller districts to the powers, who saw in their possession opportunities for trade expansion or political aggrandizement. In 1860 Russia demanded and received a strip of territory running southward toward Korea on which it built the seaport of Vladivostok, later to become the terminus of the trans-Siberian railway. In 1862 the Chinese were persuaded to renounce their rights in Burma, and it was annexed by the British in 1866. Shortly before the end of the century came the Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895), after which China was compelled to acknowledge the independence of Korea and to cede to Japan the island of Formosa. Soon afterward the scramble began to "lease" ports and strategic points along the coast. In 1898 Germany "leased" Kiaochow Bay after the murder of two German missionaries; and Great Britain, France, and Russia also managed to "lease" strategic points. Not content with the concessions they had gained, the powers began to exert pressure on the Chinese as a means of acquiring "spheres of influence," which often involved large areas with millions of inhabitants. That the acquisition of such "spheres" was highly detrimental to China's economic development, keeping it in a state of chronic insolvency, was of little concern to the imperialist powers; in fact, they derived further advantages from making loans to the government. In order to obtain the loans, China had to pledge its forests, mines, and other sources of natural wealth. This intrusion helped bring on the Boxer uprising of 1899-1900, which caused the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Russia, and Japan to send troops to China. It was another opportunity to exact further concessions.

Thus, at the opening of the twentieth century, the Chinese found themselves with their best ports "leased" to or controlled by foreigners, their coastal and inland trade dominated by foreigners, their customs duties and other revenues pledged to foreigners. Almost two thirds of their country had been marked out in "spheres of influence," and in fourteen of the principal ports foreign settlements

had been established that were not subject to Chinese law. Under extraterritoriality foreigners could conduct themselves as they pleased without any recourse on the part of the Chinese government. In short, the history of China's foreign relations from 1842 to 1900 is a story of gradual loss of independence and the establishment of an increasing control over many phases of activity.

China's humiliation in the war of 1894-1895 convinced many of the educated Chinese that reform was imperative if the nation were to survive at all. The leader of the reform movement was Dr. Sun Yat-sen who earned for himself the title of "Father of the Chinese Revolution." A reformer from youth, he had when hardly more than a boy protested against child-selling, infanticide, concubinage, foot-binding, idol-worship, and other practices. Later when he realized that thorough-going reform was impossible under the Manchu dynasty, he became a revolutionary. Leaving a promising career as a surgeon, he carried on revolutionary propaganda among students and soldiers. In many parts of China he organized secret groups who worked for the overthrow of the Manchu rulers. "The Chinese have no real government," he said in *The Solution of the Chinese Question*, published in 1904; "a new government, an enlightened and progressive government, must be substituted for the old one." The result of his activities was that in 1911 antidynastic riots broke out which soon grew to the magnitude of revolution. Early in 1912 the dynasty fell and China was proclaimed a republic.⁵ Chosen as first president, Dr. Sun in the interests of peace and unity yielded the presidency to Yuan Shih-kai, a well-known general who had strong forces at his disposal but who was a reactionary in politics. In 1913 Yuan Shih-kai, declaring that the people were not ready for republican government, dissolved the Assembly. For the next three years he ruled as virtual dictator until his death in 1916. During the following decade the military governors whom he had appointed administered the provinces as independent lords while affairs as a whole were in a state of chaos.

In 1917 China, upon invitation of the Allies, joined in the war against the Central Powers. Internal conditions were such that China could take no active part in the struggle, but a work force of about 175,000 was recruited for service behind the lines in France. At the end of the war delegations representing both the Peking and the Canton governments laid their grievances before the Peace Conference at Paris and asked for the abolition of extraterritoriality,

⁵ In 1912 Sun Yat-sen's party adopted the name of Kuomintang or National People's Party.

cancellation of "spheres of influence," postal and tariff autonomy, and the restoration of all "leased" territories. The conference gave the delegates but little satisfaction. After permitting Japan to retain the province of Shantung, it ruled that the other questions did not fall within its jurisdiction. So great was the disappointment of the Chinese representatives that they refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles. China, did, however, succeed in making some gains. In the separate treaty between China and Germany it was specified that the German extraterritorial privileges were canceled. Further progress was made at the Washington Arms Conference (1921), at which Japan was induced to restore Shantung. It was also agreed that on January 1, 1923, foreign postal agencies in China were to be abolished. Finally, nine powers signed a treaty pledging themselves to respect the political, administrative, and territorial sovereignty of China.

Meanwhile Dr. Sun Yat-sen was not inactive. Having achieved the overthrow of the Manchus he worked for reform and the end of imperialism. Time and again he reiterated his determination to have all unequal treaties abolished. It was a bitter disappointment to him that the Peace Conference had not taken steps in this direction. "After the war," he said, "England, France, and Italy recognized that Wilson's proposals for the liberation of peoples were too much at variance with the designs of imperialism, so when it came to the time for discussing peace they used all kinds of methods to sidetrack Wilson's proposals." Far from discouraging him, however, the disappointment served to steel his will and fortify his courage. In 1918 he had founded at Canton what was to become the Nationalist government, built around the Kuomintang. He had hoped to receive the support of such western democracies as Great Britain and the United States in laying the foundations for a democratic state. When this was not forthcoming, he turned to Soviet Russia, which was regarded with favor in China because it was ready to surrender its special privileges. The Russians were delighted at having the opportunity of cooperating with China against the "imperialist nations." Early in 1923 emissaries conferred with Sun Yat-sen and in the following year a treaty was signed whereby in return for the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights Russia obtained diplomatic recognition and a renewal of trade relations. Sun Yat-sen then opened the ranks of the Kuomintang to the communists upon the promise of the Russians not to introduce the Russian brand of communism into China. The following year the Cantonese government established a military academy, staffed by Russian officers, as the first move in the build-

ing of a large Chinese army. In March, 1925, Sun Yat-sen died of cancer.

During his lifetime Dr. Sun Yat-sen had had considerable difficulty in keeping the eyes of his followers upon the goal of freedom and independence and had often found questions of practical administration very trying. But after his death men forgot his unpracticability and concentrated on his ideas and idealism. A patriotic cult, akin to a religion, grew up about his memory. He became the idealized and idolized symbol of China's freedom, his writings became the Bible of the nationalist movement, and his birthday and deathday were made patriotic holidays.

The leadership in the struggle for freedom and independence was assumed by one of his disciples, General Chiang Kai-shek. In 1926, after organizing a formidable army of soldiers and propagandists at Canton, he began a military campaign to bring all China under the control of the Kuomintang. Month after month the powerful revolutionary army marched northward, overwhelming all opposition. As the force neared the Great Wall, a rift developed in the Kuomintang between the right and the left over the role of the Russian advisers. The right, and particularly the bankers who were financing the expedition, objected to the growing influence of the communists. Chiang, who needed the support of the bankers, decided to take the middle-class road to national salvation. Halting the northern advance, he purged the Kuomintang of the radical elements and set up a conservative government at Nanking.

Once again the Chinese were split into factions. This time it was the communists against the nationalists. The communist leaders sponsored the ideals of Bolshevism but probably received no support from Russia. The seeds they sowed found fertile soil among the peasants, most of whom were staggering under a heavy burden of taxation. In some districts communist teachings provoked what was in essence a peasants' revolt, with peasant mobs terrifying the landlords and dealing summarily with some. Mounting industrial unrest also prepared the ground for the growth of communist ideas among the working classes. To both the industrial workers and the peasants the communists held out hope of a better life. Where they were weak they were regarded as "Red bandits"; but where they were strong they made a clean sweep of the old order and set up a sovietized regime backed by a Red army. Their hold on the masses increased until by 1934 it extended over about one sixth of the country, including some of the richest parts of central China. Thus the communists existed as a state within a state. Although the mili-

tary equipment of the nationalist government was vastly superior to that of the proletarian bands, the latter offered stubborn resistance. Compelled to retreat in 1934 and 1935, they made a fresh stand in the mountains of the northwest.

Despite the fact that the period from 1928 to 1937 was one of civil war and internal dissension, considerable progress was made toward the establishment of a more stable regime. The central figure in this development was Chiang Kai-shek. He and his armies were the chief buttress of the nationalist government. He was variously commander in chief of the armed forces, chairman of the executive committee of the Kuomintang, and president of the government, and at times filled several cabinet posts concurrently. But whatever positions he held, he was always the dominant personality. His government was the focus around which the antipodal forces of China found some degree of stabilization. As early as 1927 he strengthened his hold on the Kuomintang by marrying Soong Mei Ling, a sister of Madame Sun Yat-sen and member of the influential Soong family. Having been educated at Wellesley College in the United States, she shared her husband's interest in Western civilization. On their wedding day Chiang declared: "From now on we two are determined to exert our utmost for the cause of the Chinese Revolution." During the succeeding years Madame Chiang did help her husband bear the tremendous responsibility of the revolution.

Such success as the nationalist government enjoyed gave its representatives courage at various international conferences to demand the abrogation of all special privileges and grants in China. The result was that China had made some progress toward emancipation by 1929. In that year the Belgians consented to the cancellation of the Tientsin concession, and the British returned their Chinkiang concession to Chinese administration and the next year surrendered Amoy. Having obtained the formal assent of most powers to the establishment of tariff autonomy, the government issued its own schedule of duties in 1929. It also took a definite step toward the abolition of extraterritoriality by issuing the following edict: "For the purpose of restoring her jurisdictional sovereignty, it is hereby decided and declared that on and after January 1, 1930, all foreign nationals in the territory of China who are now enjoying extraterritorial privileges shall abide by the laws, ordinances, and regulations duly promulgated by the central and local governments in China." For a time it appeared as if a serious crisis would develop at the opening of the year 1930, but the British Foreign Office came forward with an acceptable suggestion. In place of an immediate change

they proposed a period of experimentation to find the proper substitute for the extraterritorial courts which were theoretically abolished. During the provisional period the courts were to function as before. Thus the crisis was avoided but the problem remained unsolved.

The principal aims of the government were to extend its control over larger areas, to achieve uniformity of administrative structure, and to modernize the country. The last offered unlimited opportunities. Although it is easy to exaggerate the progress that was made, there were advances in many fields. One of the more important was the improvement of transportation and communication. The government began to build railroads into the hinterland for both strategic and economic purposes. Besides increasing trade these railroads were to become important factors in resistance to Japanese invasion. At the same time, the government was instrumental in expanding both heavy and light industry.

The government also gave technical instruction to farmers for the purpose of raising the productivity of the soil, special care being given to the promotion of the cotton and silk industries. A painstaking investigation of the school situation was also made in the interests of better education, with the result that more schools were opened and those that existed were given better equipment. Some idea of the spread of primary and secondary education may be gained from the fact that the number of children attending school increased from three million in 1921 to eleven million in 1934. The government, too, did much to promote better health and sanitation. Schools of modern medicine were organized and country-wide campaigns were inaugurated for the control of disease. In short, the government greatly changed the face of China. On the other hand, there were complaints about the arbitrary methods of the government. Some writers also painted a picture of widespread graft and corruption in certain circles.

Unfortunately much that the enterprise of the government constructed was subsequently ruined by the invading hordes of Japanese. The Japanese imperialists and militarists, having long planned to dominate China, were not pleased to see her making strides in the direction of unification and modernization. They realized that if China ever attained the status of a strong, well knit nation possessing an army and navy commensurate with the size of its population and territorial greatness, Japan would have to release its hold on the continent of Asia. In 1931 the Japanese invaded Manchuria to prevent this area from being absorbed by the nationalist government.

China's stubborn resistance provoked the Japanese into acts of wanton destruction. Callously they swept aside all international rules of warfare and in their endeavor to spread terror pillaged the cities, devastated large areas of land, and deliberately slaughtered their prisoners of war. Generalissimo Chiang's appeal to the League of Nations evoked sympathy for China's sad plight but did not impel the European powers to send organized help. China had to stand alone against the barbarous aggressor. As the war rolled along its blood-drenched path, the Japanese armies captured large areas but they could not crush the indomitable spirit of the Chinese. Not until after the attack on Pearl Harbor drew the United States into World War II did China receive substantial aid. Then arms and equipment began to flow into China for the struggle against Japan.



IMPERIALIST JAPAN

In 1914 the Japanese Empire consisted, first of all, of Japan proper, a long chain of islands extending from northeast to southwest along the eastern coast of the continent of Asia. In this chain there are four main islands and hundreds of smaller ones. The total area of Japan proper is 147,707 square miles, somewhat less than that of California. In addition there were Korea, Formosa, the Pescadores, Japanese Sakhalin (Karafuto), and the leased Liaotung Peninsula. That Japan proper is not rich in natural resources is indicated by the fact that 55 per cent of the imports were raw materials. For instance, all the raw cotton, aluminum, wool, and rubber, and almost all the lead, zinc, iron ore, petroleum, and tin used in Japanese industry was brought in from the outside. Since the country is largely mountainous, only about 17 per cent of the land was being cultivated. The population per square mile of tillable land in 1930 was 2774 compared with 2170 in Great Britain, 806 in Germany, and 229 in the United States. Moreover, the Japanese were a prolific people, the population having increased from thirty-three million in 1872 to over sixty-four million in 1930. Though there was some emigration, the number of emigrants was not large. The proletarian found the customs and climate of his home islands so congenial that he had little desire to settle abroad.

In form the government during the period between the two Great Wars was a constitutional monarchy. The constitution, promulgated by the emperor in 1889, provided for a parliament or Imperial Diet consisting of two houses, a House of Peers and a House of Representatives. The former included, among others, the

princes of the blood, marquises, counts, viscounts, and barons, persons nominated by the emperor for meritorious services to the state, and four members of the Imperial Academy of Sciences. The members of the House of Representatives were elected by a suffrage based on the payment of taxes, but in May, 1925, a law was passed which provided for general manhood suffrage.⁶ In the constitution the legislative prerogatives of the Diet were carefully outlined. While the emperor convoked, opened, closed, and prorogued the Diet, his ordinances could not "alter any of the existing laws." Moreover, imperial ordinances issued by the emperor at a time when the Diet was not in session were subject to approval by it. The emperor occupied a unique position in the system. He was the head of the state in an absolutely unconditional sense. Much is made by Japanese writers of the fact that the constitution was not forced upon him but was a gift to his people. "The adoption of the constitutional system," one Japanese writer stated,⁷ "should not be associated with any idea of restricting the Tennō's (emperor's) sovereignty, nor be understood as accepting the principle of limited monarchy as in the West . . . the Tennō constitutes the immovable central authority and fountainhead of all matters, political, military, economic, religious, festival, moral, etc."

Thus the emperor stood over and above the constitution as heaven is above the earth and from him all authority emanated. He did not, however, participate actively in politics. Hence Japan was ruled, not by the emperor but in the name of the emperor. His unique position derived in large part from the myths of his divine origin. These myths stated that he is descended from the sun goddess, Amaterasu-o-mikami. The first emperor was her grandson Jimmu, who is supposed to have reigned about 660 B.C. and from whom the recent emperors were said to have descended in unbroken succession. Accordingly the Japanese called their emperor "Tennō" which means "the heavenly king." Article III of the constitution declared him to be "sacred and inviolable," but the classical statement is that of Prince Ito who wrote in his *Commentaries*: "The emperor is heaven-descended, divine and sacred." This doctrine, repeated again and again in official statements, was inculcated in the minds of Japanese youth from elementary school to university. Philosophers and writers preached it as a religion, and radio, cinema, and the theater broadcast it to the people. How firmly the tradition took hold of popular imagination was demonstrated by the

⁶ The law of 1925 fixed the number of representatives at 466.

⁷ *Cultural Nippon*, vol. 6 (1938), p. 41.

prohibition against looking upon him from an elevated position and the refusal to permit his picture to be printed on postage stamps where ordinary fingers could pollute the divine profile.⁸ The myth was also circulated that one must not look at his face lest one be blinded.

The principal religions of Japan are Shintoism and Buddhism. Christianity made steady progress during the nineteenth century, but baptized Christians of all denominations do not total 1 per cent of the population. It is Shintoism, which exists in two forms, secular and theological, that has the largest number of followers; in fact, all Japanese patriots are believers in secular Shintoism, though they are Buddhists or even Christians. Secular Shintoism was encouraged by the state as a means of cultivating patriotism through ancestor worship and the veneration of national heroes. As a cult of patriotism it emphasizes particularly the paying of homage to the former emperors of Japan and their "divine ancestress," Amaterasu. It also inculcates reverence for all soldiers killed in battle. These were periodically deified by the emperor in special ceremonies. The number of these "gods" in the Japanese pantheon was about eighty million. Since ancestor worship has a place in Buddhism, secular Shinto is a feasible arrangement for Buddhists, but for Christians it was more difficult. Nevertheless, Christians did practice it. The Reverend Shigeichi Miyazaki, former secretary of the Japan Council of Christian Churches, stated: "If Jesus, who made the pilgrimage to the Jewish temple at Jerusalem every year, had happened to live in Japan, He would have made the yearly pilgrimage to the Grand Shrine of Ise as His Heavenly Father's abode."⁹ It was at Ise that Amaterasu was enshrined.

Before a United States naval squadron commanded by Commodore Perry opened the country to foreign intercourse in 1853, Japan had for more than two centuries been cut off from contact with other nations. It did not possess even the beginnings of Western science. Soon afterward the government embarked on a policy of Westernization. The decision to remake the country after the Western pattern was not adopted by the people but by a small number of statesmen who saw in this step the only means of preserving Japanese sovereignty. Almost at once after Japan was "opened," there were demands for concessions and extraterritorial rights. Recognizing that

⁸ Some Japanese writers went so far as to state that the people themselves, as the descendants of Amaterasu, partook of this divinity. "From the fact of the divine descent of the Japanese people," the Japanese scholar Hirata stated, "proceeds their immeasurable superiority to the natives of other countries in courage and intelligence."

⁹ *New Republic*, vol. 93 (1937), p. 39.

military and naval strength was the only evidence that would demonstrate Japan's equality with Western nations the government proceeded to build an army and a navy on the Western model. Three decades later the country possessed a powerful fleet manned by expert seamen, and a large military force equipped with the best modern weapons. In addition, it had a constitution and an administration organized on Western patterns, a postal system that reached the remotest village, a network of railway and telegraph lines, and industries and mines in which the latest Western techniques were used. Furthermore, Japan had competent representatives at foreign courts, a large merchant marine on the world's oceans, and an extensive system of education at home. Even Western styles of clothing had become the vogue in court circles. All this was achieved without violation of national feeling.

Having copied Europe in other ways, the Japanese also began to dream grandiose dreams of empire. The natural and logical outlet for their imperialist ambitions was China. Since the European powers had enriched themselves at China's expense, why should Japan not do the same thing? Moreover, the Korean Peninsula, with an area of 80,000 square miles, stretched invitingly toward Japan. It was not difficult for the Japanese to pick a quarrel with China over Korea. When the Sino-Japanese war broke out in 1894, everyone outside Japan believed that China would find little difficulty in defeating so small an antagonist. But the reverse happened. China went down like a row of ninepins, giving Japan a commanding position among the imperialist powers. In the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895) China recognized the full and complete independence of Korea, a euphemism for surrendering it to Japanese hegemony.¹⁰ China further ceded the island of Formosa with its rich mineral deposits, and the Liaotung Peninsula with Port Arthur. But Japan was unable to retain this substantial footing on the mainland. Her imperialist and military surge alarmed Russia, France, and Germany and caused them to appear as the champions of China's integrity. The pressure which the three European nations exerted forced Japan to relinquish the Liaotung Peninsula. Not long thereafter the Russians, who had been seeking an ice-free port, obtained a lease of Port Arthur for twenty-five years (1898), together with a concession to build a railway through the peninsula.

The check upon Japanese ambitions, however, was only temporary. Russia's acquisition of the very territory the three powers had denied to Japan embittered the Japanese and spurred them on


¹⁰ Korea was annexed outright by Japan in 1910.

to greater activity in the development of military and naval power. Nor did they overlook diplomacy. In 1902 they concluded an alliance with Britain which, though not specifically directed at Russia, provided for British neutrality in the event of conflict. When the Japanese were ready, it was easy to find a cause for war. This time the world took them more seriously, but the general opinion still was that an Asiatic people would stand little chance of victory in the fight against the tsarist military forces. Japanese speed and strategy, combined with Russian weakness, gave the Asiatics a quick victory. By the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905) Russia agreed to transfer to Japan "with the consent of China," the lease on the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur. This consent was obtained the same year in a treaty between China and Japan. The Treaty of Portsmouth also gave Japan all the island of Sakhalin south of the 50th parallel, a land area of about 14,000 square miles. The acquisition of these large areas still did not satisfy the Japanese appetite. In 1910 the government openly annexed Korea, thus putting an end to China's hopes in that quarter.

From the time of the Russo-Japanese War the development of Japan followed an unbroken upward curve. She steadily strengthened herself not only in land and sea armaments but also by the vigor of her commercial enterprise. Although the country remained essentially agricultural, the government promoted the development of manufacturing industries, first as a means of defense against the Western nations and later as the most promising solution of the problem presented by a rapidly growing population. Such towns as Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Kobe, and Nagoya became great industrial centers which by virtue of the plentiful supply of cheap labor enabled Japan to enter into the competition for certain world markets.

When the First World War opened, Japan quickly seized the opportunity to strengthen her position in the Far East. Casting her lot with Britain and France, she proceeded to drive the Germans out of Shantung and to occupy the leased territory, taking over Germany's railroads, mines, etc. against the protests of the Chinese. In 1915 she presented the famous Twenty-one Demands that would virtually have converted China into a Japanese colony. Since the Peking government was in no condition to offer resistance and the Western powers were too busy with their own affairs to give China any support, General Yuan Shih-kai was compelled to accept the demands in large part.

In general, the period of the First World War was one of growing



JAPAN'S AMBITIONS IN EAST ASIA

On August 1, 1940, Prince Konoye officially expressed Japan's purpose as "building Greater East Asia"; the establishment of the "co-prosperity sphere" was to go forward in three successive stages as indicated on the map.

strength. In addition to gaining territory and a preferential position in China, Japan also garnered large profits from the Asiatic trade while the European nations were locked in bloody combat. By the end of the war her prestige had increased to such an extent that she occupied a place among the Big Five who drew up the peace treaties. The Japanese delegates, however, confined their attention chiefly to securing their interests in the Far East. The result was that Japan received a considerable share of the spoils. Besides retaining possession of Shantung, she received the mandate over the Pacific islands formerly owned by the Germans comprising the Marianne, Caroline, and Marshall groups.¹¹ In the words of a Japanese writer: "Japan emerged from the war practically unharmed and relatively stronger. She is now the only nation in the East, Far or Near, that enjoys complete independence. She is the indisputable leader nation of the Orient. The world war offered her the opportunity of 'ten thousand' years and Japan will see to it that she will have her place in the sun. Japan will see to it that the Western nations shall not meddle in the affairs of the Far East without Japan's consent. Japan considers it her obligation to redeem the unnumbered millions of Asiatics from what might be the world's greatest tragedy—of being reduced to a perpetual servitude to the white races."¹²

Beginning with the Washington Conference (1922) Japan assumed a more peaceful and conciliatory policy. The government not only agreed to return the Shantung properties to China but during the subsequent years it showed remarkable restraint on a number of occasions when force could have been employed to the advantage of the Japanese. In 1928 Japan even became one of the original signers of the Pact of Paris for "the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy." The building of both land and sea armaments did not, of course, cease. During the decade of the twenties the annual expenditures for armament purposes consumed from 27 to 47 per cent of the national budget. Nor was Japanese interest in China less keen. To strengthen its hold on Manchuria the government built railways, opened new industrial plants, and encouraged colonists to settle there. But the Japanese did insist that their primary interests in Manchuria were economic, not political. Soon, however, Japan's economic life was to suffer a severe blow. The crash on the New York stock exchange in the autumn of 1929 had a very serious effect

¹¹ The strategic value of the islands lay in their position athwart the direct sea route from the United States to the Philippines.

¹² Setsuo Uenoda, "Japan's Right to Empire," *Asia*, vol. 19 (1919), p. 1217.

because the United States had previously purchased nearly all the silk exported by Japan. During 1930 the price of raw silk dropped 50 per cent, bringing acute distress to the peasants. Export of other products also fell off sharply because of the increase of Indian, Australian, and American tariffs. As a result the export of cotton goods declined in 1930 by 34 per cent in value and 12 per cent in quantity. As a whole, export trade in 1930 was 27 per cent less than that of the preceding year.

The remedy which the Japanese adopted was a vigorous policy of imperialism. Their leaders turned to China in their search for raw materials, markets, and food supplies. The convictions of leading industrialists had been summarized some years before in the following words: "It must be remembered that Japan's material well-being is dependent upon the resources of China. Japan has no resources essential for modern industry, and China has everything that Japan needs. Japan can be a great commercial nation only by co-operation with China. Japan's commercial expansion in China, therefore, is a virtual necessity for her national existence." Consequently Manchuria took on a new importance. A land of fertile soil and excellent climate, it held out the promise of supplying Japan, among other things, with soy beans, grain, and meat. Moreover, it could furnish various raw materials, notably iron ore, coal, and petroleum, all of which were badly needed in Japan. It was also hoped that Manchuria would offer a wider market for Japanese exports. Not that the leaders had not known this earlier. What galvanized them into action was the threat to their interests in Manchuria. The rising tide of Chinese nationalism was seeking to restrict, even terminate, Japanese activities in this area. To the great annoyance of the Japanese the Nationalist government was making an effort to extend its influence in Manchuria. It was even attempting to build a railway that would compete with the Japanese railroads.

To insure an adequate supply of raw materials, to increase the export trade, to divert the attention of the hungry masses from their plight, and to prevent Manchuria from being drawn into the Chinese Nationalist orbit the government decided to send a military expedition to Manchuria. A pretext was soon established. On September 18, 1931, a small bomb exploded on or near the tracks of the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway near Mukden. The damage was so small that a train passed over the spot a few hours later; but on the pretext of dealing with organized groups of Chinese bandits the Japanese army began its occupation of the country. Superiority of equipment and organization made the scattered units

of Chinese soldiers easy prey. Within a few days most of the cities were in Japanese hands. Early in 1932 the Japanese set up the puppet state of Manchukuo and proclaimed its independence from China. The Chinese, though unable to offer effective military resistance, did have a defensive weapon in a boycott of Japanese goods. For a time it caused a substantial reduction in Japan's trade with China, but it was gradually abandoned. When a truce, signed near Tientsin on May 31, 1933, ended the fighting, Japan had extended its control over an area more than three times as great as that of Japan proper. The new territory, which included Manchuria with Jehol, part of Inner Mongolia, and the so-called Demilitarized Zone within the Great Wall, had a population of about thirty-three million, of which less than 3 per cent was Japanese.

It soon became evident that the occupation of Manchuria was only one stage in a larger operation. The next would be the establishment of Japanese control over all of China. During the years after 1932 the Japanese Foreign Office announced in no uncertain terms that Japan had "special interests" in China, warning all other nations to keep hands off. Mr. Saito, the ambassador in Washington, explained this to mean that "Japan must act and decide alone what is good for China." But these ambitions were not restricted to China. Their ultimate aim was the hegemony of the Far East. The sponsors of this aim were the Japanese military and naval officers. In the summer of 1932 Sadao Araki, who was then minister of war, stated in the columns of *Kaikosha*, the organ of the military association: "The spirit of Japan must spread over the seven seas and the five continents. Everything that opposes its expansion must be overwhelmed, if necessary by force. The countries of eastern Asia have been oppressed by the white people. Japan will not tolerate this condition any longer."¹³ This determination to assume supremacy in the Far East is visible in every major decision of Japanese policy during this period. It can be seen in the hostile reaction to any suggestion of aid to China, it accounts for Japan's official withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1935, and it explains the declaration of the Japanese government that after the end of 1936 it would no longer be bound by the naval limitations it had accepted in 1922.¹⁴

Plans were gradually maturing for a military expedition which would establish Japanese predominance in China so completely as to drive out all foreign competition and turn the country into a

¹³ *Living Age*, vol. 346 (1934), p. 310.

¹⁴ At the Washington Conference it was agreed to fix the ratio between the navies of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan at 5-5-3.

Japanese province. In the summer of 1937 large-scale military operations were launched, accompanied by extensive use of air bombing. The fact that war was not officially declared did not make the fighting less destructive or bloody. Judging on the basis of their previous experience, the Japanese did not expect to meet much resistance. They were convinced that the whole thing would be a minor episode in which China would receive a quick thrashing and would then see the wisdom of Japanese rule. The armies, it is true, did succeed in taking most of the chief cities, including Peiping, Nanking, Shanghai, Hankow, and Canton, but they were unable to subdue the country. When the Chinese failed to lay down their arms the Japanese, determined to break the will to resist, resorted to methods of warfare that shocked the world. But such methods served only to draw the Chinese together in their stubborn resistance. Even the fact that China was losing three men to every Japanese soldier failed to discourage the Chinese. The Nationalist government continued to place fresh armies in the field to replace those that had been destroyed. "If we can keep this up," a Chinese general stated, "China can exterminate the male population of Japan while losing 105 million men; and we will still have over 300 million left." Not only did organized troops offer resistance but guerilla bands continued to harass Japanese lines of communication and to waylay small enemy detachments. Thus the fighting continued month after month with the Japanese unable to deal the final blow.

The year 1940 still saw the Japanese seeking a solution which would free their hands for the next stage in the establishment of hegemony in the Far East. Supplies from the outside were beginning to flow into China in increasing quantities, causing the Tokyo military cliques to consider the possibility of eventual defeat. Retreat was ruled out not only because it would have damaged national pride but also because of the repercussions it would have had at home. Nor was there any possibility of negotiating a satisfactory peace. Peace on terms that would have saved Japan's face was precluded by China's determination to resist until the last invader had been driven from her soil. Seeing their power and prestige in jeopardy, the army and navy cliques proposed war against the United States as a solution of the puzzle. Special point was given to this proposal because the United States, in addition to bolstering Chinese resistance, was exerting economic pressure to block Japanese expansion toward the south, particularly in Malaya, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies. About a year after the outbreak of World War II Japan became a partner of Germany

and Italy (Tripartite Pact of September, 1940), thereby merging the Far Eastern and European issues. The Japanese were certain that the Axis would win the war and they would then share in the distribution of the booty. During the year that followed, Hitler's agents pressed for action against the United States, while within Japan the military cliques were assiduously cultivating the war fever. The result was the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941.

World War II

The Background of World War II

EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT PEACE

MILLIONS of people the world over hailed the end of the war in 1918 as the beginning of a new age, an age that was to be better in every way. Many of the nations that had participated in the long struggle emerged from it in a state of exhaustion. They had sacrificed the flower of their youth, dissipated their national wealth, and suffered social and moral injuries. But for all this many people had one consolation. They believed that the triumph of freedom was final, that the "war to end war" had really ended war. They were certain that the years of suffering had convinced mankind of the necessity not only of internal political, economic, and social reforms but also of making a settlement that would eliminate war. Such a settlement was regarded as easy of achievement. Whereas in 1914 the power had been rather evenly distributed between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, in 1919 Germany and her allies were defeated, Russia was in the throes of a civil war, and the new states which had been founded were struggling to establish themselves. It was patent to even the most casual observer that the victorious Allies dominated the scene. Thus they had practically a free hand to establish a durable peace by removing the conditions that had made for war. And their representatives appear to have been convinced that the settlement they reached would, despite its weaknesses and imperfections, provide a more or less permanent settlement. When the main lines had been drawn up, a delegate to the Paris Peace Conference congratulated one of the principal authors of the treaty in the following words: "I congratulate you upon having concluded a treaty of peace founded on a just and durable basis."

But the "new order" which had been instituted at the Paris Conference was neither new nor just nor durable. Instead of ushering in a new order, it confirmed the worst excesses of the old. More than this, no sooner had the "new order" been instituted than it began to disintegrate. If the settlement was to survive, it was necessary for the victorious powers to join in upholding it. But the unity and co-operation which had been so important in winning the war disappeared on the morrow of the peace negotiations. The enthusiasm of victory having spent itself, each turned to its own interests. Thereafter all efforts to perpetuate the alliance were of no avail. Once the war was over the people of the United States were impatient to demobilize their armies and return to "normalcy." After the Senate refused to ratify the Versailles treaty, the people of the United States eagerly embraced an isolationist policy. Upon their withdrawal the British refused to assume the obligations an Anglo-French alliance would have imposed on them. Feeling somewhat secure in their insular position, they were eager to restore their shattered commercial and financial supremacy and to return to their imperial interests. So far as they were concerned, security had been attained and a new war lay in too remote a future to be of immediate concern. They were not even opposed to the restoration of a considerable part of Germany's power as a counterbalance to French hegemony in Europe. Differences also developed between Britain and France in the affairs of the Near East, and their foreign policies began to diverge.

The French felt abandoned and almost betrayed. The guarantee they had hoped to secure was a permanent superiority of force on the part of the Allies, a superiority so great that it would be impossible for the defeated powers to attempt to overthrow the settlement. With both the United States and Britain refusing to support such an alliance, France was left facing Germany alone, a Germany with a much larger population and a much greater industrial power. Consequently the fear of a new war obsessed the French. What they sought above all was security, which, they believed, could be attained only by upholding the *status quo*, more particularly, by insisting upon the complete and lasting disarmament of Germany. Nor was France the only country to hold this opinion. A number of others had benefited territorially or otherwise as a result of the war and therefore naturally wished to maintain the *status quo*. Among these were Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Gradually those who were interested in upholding the Paris settlement drew together. On the other hand, not one of the de-

feated powers really accepted the settlement as either just or permanent. It may have been necessary for them to execute the terms but all were animated by the hope that a revision would soon be inaugurated. Thus not many years after "the war to end war" Europe was again divided into two camps.

By 1924, however, the bitterness which had followed the war began to subside. On the one hand, the Allies recognized that the return of Germany as a respectable member to the European family of nations was a prerequisite to the establishment of a more stable and tranquil order; on the other, the Germans, under the leadership of Stresemann, were ready to shelve the idea of revenge at least temporarily for a policy of reconciliation and peaceful readjustment. The general revival of trade and industry stimulated by the flow of wealth from the United States made life more pleasant for most Germans and inclined them to overlook the grievances which had caused so much hate and bitterness in the immediate postwar years. The result of this change of attitude was the Locarno treaties of 1925 in which the French, Germans, and Belgians promised to settle all differences by peaceful means instead of resorting to war.¹

Three years later a group of American publicists led by Frank B. Kellogg, then secretary of state, joined with Briand in the initiation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the Renunciation of War. In this treaty most of the nations of the world, including Germany, Italy, and Japan, renounced war altogether as an instrument of national policy and agreed that the settlement of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature among them should never be sought except by pacific means. Had this policy been carried out, it would have ushered in the millennium. But a large loophole was left for escape from its provisions. In a letter attached to the treaty, and expressly mentioned in most notes of acceptance, it was explained that the treaty neither "restricts nor impairs the right of self-defense" which is held to be "an inalienable right" of every sovereign state. What wars may not be justified on the grounds of self-defense?

In many circles it was believed that the Locarno treaties and the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact would usher in a new era of international understanding. But before many months it became clear that this was a delusion. Actually there was no real reconciliation

¹ This did not mean, however, that the Germans had abandoned all hope of obtaining a revision of the Versailles settlement. In a memorandum which Stresemann wrote to the former German Crown Prince on September 7, 1925, on the eve of his departure for Locarno, he laid down as primary aims of German policy "the rectification of our eastern frontiers: the recovery of Danzig, of the Polish corridor, and a revision of the boundary in Upper Silesia."

between Germany and France because the Locarno treaties did not remove such basic causes of friction as the war-debt problem. Neither did they lead to a reduction of tariffs or to a reconsideration of the most objectionable features of the Versailles settlement. Nor did they cause the French to turn their spears into pruning hooks and their swords into plowshares. The old fear of Germany remained undisputed. Despite the Locarno treaties and the Kellogg Pact, France and her allies still preserved the military alliances against Germany. By the time the ratification of the pact was announced (July 24, 1929) the spirit that had led to the signing of the treaties had died.

After 1930 international relations in Europe, and in the world generally, deteriorated and the system of collective security was gradually undermined. Before long it became clear that the nations were again drifting toward war. Why then, it may be asked, did the efforts to establish collective security fail? What brought about the deterioration of the international system? What were the factors that gave momentum to the movement toward war? Many people would answer these questions by saying that the war was caused by the insane ambitions and wanton aggression of Hitler and the Nazis. In one sense this is true. Hitler did set off the conflagration by his invasion of Poland. He did make the crucial decision regarding war or peace. But if we would know why things happened as they did we must study not only personalities but the economic, social, political, and moral forces that produced Hitler, made possible his rise, and permitted him to do the things he did. These same forces were also responsible for the dictatorships in Italy, Japan, and other countries. In the words of a British writer: "If you want to know why things happened or why they did not happen, you must investigate not only the individuals but the forces which jerked their arms and their legs and minds in one way or another."



THE BASIC CAUSES OF WORLD WAR II

The basic causes of World War II are no less complex than those which brought about the First World War; in fact, most of the causes that had been active in producing the one helped generate the other. Among the factors which undermined the spirit of internationalism and caused Europe to move toward war were: (1) economic conflicts and grievances; (2) the League's inability to meet the heavy tasks laid upon it; (3) the unwillingness of the nations to

disarm; (4) the problem of national minorities; (5) the failure of the powers to revise the Versailles settlement; (6) the revival of nationalist spirit. The last was to a greater or less extent the motive force in all the factors. As in all great political changes, some are in part cause and in part effect of the movement away from internationalism. Some caused more friction than others but all contributed to the stream of events which was gradually carrying the nations of the world toward the abyss.

(1) *Economic conflicts and grievances.* Of all the causes making for war these were certainly among the most important. The struggle for markets, raw materials, and colonies, which had been one of the major causes of World War I, did not abate during the subsequent period; it became more acute. The two countries which on the eve of World War I were struggling hardest to acquire colonies as sources of raw materials, and markets for manufactured goods were Italy and Germany. Neither was less dissatisfied after the war. Whereas the Italians felt that they should have received a larger share of the spoils, the Germans were disappointed because they had been deprived of the few colonies they had managed to acquire. The third member of the so-called "have-not" group was Japan which, like the others, was nursing imperialist ambitions. These three countries, in relation to the extent of their industrialization and rate of increase of their population, were poorest in natural resources. The bulk of the earth's surface, wealth, and population was embraced by the empires of Britain, France, the United States, Belgium, Portugal, and the Netherlands. Britain alone controlled nearly a quarter of the world's territory and population and more than a quarter of its wealth. Out of twenty-five essential raw materials and minerals there were in the British Empire adequate supplies of eighteen, while Germany had adequate supplies of only four. Italy was in a worse plight, having virtually no coal, little oil, and only small iron resources. The situation was equally bad in Japan, which had limited quantities of coal and iron, no resources in oil, and so small an area of arable land that it was difficult to supply the needs of her growing population.

During the era of prosperity the "have-not" nations found ready markets for their manufactured products and were thus able to purchase the raw materials they needed. But with the coming of the economic depression in 1930 the situation changed. Everywhere the attempt was made to reserve the home markets for home products. This aim gave rise to the "Buy-at-Home" movement. Slogans were

coined to stop the purchasing of foreign goods. The British opened the drive with the cry, "Buy British,"² but were soon imitated by other nations. In Germany the slogan was "*Kauft Deutsch!* Buy German goods and give work and bread to your fellow citizens!" Gradually most of the countries adopted such slogans as "Invest in France," "Buy American," and "Buy Japanese." Nor did the efforts stop with slogans. Most nations also resorted to tariff barriers as a means of protecting the home markets. Before 1914 most states had showed a tendency to restrict the free exchange of goods by tariffs. After the war the obstacles to international trade were made more numerous and more complicated than they had been in any previous period of human history. All the new states erected barriers high enough to compel their nationals to purchase goods manufactured within their own boundaries. The world depression caused a further increase in tariffs. In 1932 even Great Britain, which had long been the citadel of free trade, turned to protectionism. More than this, the Ottawa agreements of the same year erected around the British Commonwealth of Nations a Maginot Line bristling with tariffs. France, Italy, and Germany had even higher tariffs. Nor were these the final weapon in most countries. Various other devices such as quotas and embargoes were resorted to as a means of excluding imports. A country would inform other countries that they might send so much and no more or an embargo would be imposed on certain products.

Instead of solving economic difficulties, the erection of high tariff walls and the adoption of quotas and embargoes caused widespread distress, particularly in the countries which did not possess the raw materials that were vital to their industries. With their goods barred from foreign markets they lacked the credit to purchase raw materials. The inability to procure raw materials and to sell manufactured products caused a sense of economic suffocation. Imperialists in these nations began to ask such questions as: "Why is it that a few states should possess so large a share of the riches of the earth and the rest have so little? Why should such small countries as Hol-

² A British writer stated: "At the moment the appeal to 'Buy British' is posted everywhere to catch the Briton's eye. He is adjured to 'live British,' that is, to spend his spare money, if he has any, at home, wintering on the Cornish Riviera rather than pour more gold into already gold-filled France. Is this, it may be asked, an altruistic injunction? Is it not rather a supreme example of national selfishness? . . . we have to justify our position by asserting and maintaining that, for the time being and in the midst of a world of tariff walls, such a position is not merely justified, but is necessary if we are to live. No matter how clearly we may see that it would be greatly better for the economic welfare of mankind that all those walls should be razed to the ground, we still have to realise that practical politics require us to face the world as it is, and not as we should wish it to be."—*Quarterly Review*, vol. 258 (1932), 6-7.



International News

A LONDON MERCHANT URGES, "BUY BRITISH!"

land, Belgium, and Portugal possess such large colonial empires? Why should a single empire control a quarter of the earth's surface?" Over and over again publicists and agitators in the "have-not" nations insisted that their respective countries were entitled to a fair share of the earth's natural wealth or, at the very least, access to the materials needed for their industries. When nothing was done to effect a more equitable distribution, the three "have-not" countries decided to get their share by force. Accordingly the Japanese marched into Manchuria, the Italians took Albania and Ethiopia, and Hitler launched Germany on a career of expansion. Such military expeditions were part of the undeclared war which preceded the major struggle.

(2) *The failure of the League of Nations.* Following the holocaust of World War I the minds of men were fascinated by the hope held out by the League that nations might live peaceably together and settle their differences at the common conference table. In other words, the League was to organize a federation of mankind in which national policies were to be voluntarily subordinated to international order. This federation would safeguard the interests of both the small and the great powers with equal zeal. There was little doubt in the minds of its proponents that it could actually achieve this. When in January, 1920, a group of seven men representing Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Brazil, and Spain met in Paris to set up the Council of the League, the chairman, M. Leon Bourgeois, described the meeting as "the birth of a new world." While the United States denied the League at its birth and left it on Europe's doorstep, Germany and the other defeated nations were at first excluded from it. Consequently it was inevitable that in German eyes the League should appear as a committee of conquerors whose prime purpose it was to uphold the Paris settlement.

The first years of the League's existence were largely occupied in building up the machinery of international administration. Problems referred to it in these early years dealt largely with the delimitation of frontiers. Some of these problems were solved with considerable success. Other items on the credit side of the ledger were in the field of reconstruction and relief work. During this early period the delegates watched one another with doubt and distrust. In Lord Cecil's words, "At first things moved stickily." But in 1924 the spirit of the League changed. For the first time the offer of a seat to Germany was discussed, and in the next year Germany was admitted and the Locarno treaties were adopted. The next three years were the most flourishing period in the League's history. Not only

did Britain, France, and Germany discuss international affairs on a basis of equality but the assemblies, which had previously been poorly attended, now attracted the prime ministers and foreign ministers of the whole Continent. In 1927 membership numbered no less than fifty-six nations. The future looked so promising that Lord Robert Cecil said: "The truth is that the League of Nations has become, instead of a frail experiment, an indispensable organ of cooperation for the great part of the governments of the world."³

But after 1929 it became increasingly apparent that the League could not cope successfully with the burdens laid upon it, that a workable system to preserve peace did not exist. It has frequently been stated that the withdrawal of the United States doomed the League from the start. As a matter of fact it did lose much of its prestige and authority as a result of the voluntary withdrawal of the United States. It meant that the one strong power which might have spoken most freely in the Council was absent, an absence which shattered the hope of a universal league. More than this it made membership somewhat more optional and encouraged various nations to use threats of resignation as a means of achieving their aims. However disastrous the effect of American abstention was, it is not easy to prove that our adherence would have made the League strong enough to enforce collective security. It had still greater weaknesses. What was lacking was the will to succeed. If the members had given the existing machinery for the peaceful settlement of international difficulties the proper support, they could have achieved a common purpose. They may have sincerely desired peace, but they were not willing to pay the price to obtain it. While some were not ready to assume the responsibility which whole-hearted support involved, others were not ready to submit to the limitation of their sovereignty which the idea of internationalism implied.

When economic difficulties became grave and the general temper more warlike, the League was unable to arrest the drift toward war. The dictator nations flouted it at will. "The history of the League of Nations between World War I and World War II," Gaetano Salvemini wrote, "was the history of the devices, ruses, deceptions, frauds, tricks, and trappings by means of which the very diplomats who were pledged to operate the Covenant of the League managed to circumvent and stultify it. They were its most effective foes, since they were undermining it from within, while nationalists, militarists, and Fascists were attacking it openly from without in all lands."

³ *Living Age*, vol. 337 (October, 1929), p. 202.

The Nazis particularly ridiculed it, calling it "a joint-stock company for the preservation of the booty won in the war." The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, which was a breach of the Covenant, dealt a staggering blow to the League's prestige. Japan was scolded but little else was done to stop its imperialist venture. When Mussolini's designs on Abyssinia became potent, the latter appealed to the League to preserve her territorial integrity and existing political independence. Half-hearted sanctions were imposed, but oil, without which Italy could not have conquered, continued to flow freely. Thus the impotence of the League was ruthlessly exposed. In 1936 Lord Queenborough wrote: "The League is dead." In 1938 prime minister Neville Chamberlain said: "If I am right, as I am confident I am, in saying that the League as constituted today is unable to provide collective security for anybody, then I say we must not try to delude small weak nations into thinking that they will be protected by the League against aggression and acting accordingly, when we know that nothing of this kind can be expected."⁴

(3) *The League's greatest failure was its inability to achieve real progress toward disarmament.* The Treaty of Versailles contained the following clause regarding this point: "In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval, and air clauses which follow." In disarming Germany the victorious nations pledged themselves eventually to apply the same measure to themselves and the Germans believed that they would do so. Thus the German delegation to Paris (May 29, 1919) stated: "The German government is willing to consent to the abolition of compulsory military service on the condition that this will be the initiation of a general limitation of armaments of all nations." In reply Clemenceau told the delegation, "The acceptance by Germany of the conditions fixed for her disarmament will facilitate and hasten the realization of a general reduction of armaments, and it is their intention to open negotiations immediately with a view to the adoption eventually of a scheme of general reduction."

During the next twelve years there was a plethora of conversations, conferences, and agreements, but no substantial reduction emerged from the babel of talk and the mass of papers. Nothing really effective was accomplished because the nations did not want to disarm. The feeling of security was lacking. The French, with the threat of Germany on their frontier, were in no mood to disarm

⁴ *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 17 (1938), p. 200.

themselves; nor were the British inclined to scrap their navy or to reduce it to a level similar to that of their defeated foes. At the invitation of the United States the powers did assemble for a Disarmament Conference at Washington in 1921. There the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, in order to forestall another race like that preceding World War I, accepted a ratio of 5:5:3 respectively for the construction of capital ships but reached no agreement on reducing the number of smaller combat ships. Moreover, although the use of poison gas was prohibited, no decision was reached regarding the size of land forces. This was the most successful of the disarmament conferences between the two wars. During this period the various German governments time and again called upon the victorious powers to apply to themselves the same measure of disarmament that had been imposed on Germany. The Germans were not ready to remain permanently the one disarmed nation in a system of armed nationalism. They pointed to the paradox of a League whose members had sworn never to go to war but were all relying on huge armaments to protect their interests. Still the great powers refused to agree. In 1927 Lloyd George himself stated that the nations which had pledged themselves to disarmament had not reduced their armaments "by a single division, flight of aeroplanes, or battery of guns."

When at last a disarmament conference, called by the League, met at Geneva in 1932, there was little disposition on the part of anyone to disarm. The Brüning government explicitly stated that Germany was willing to remain on the armament level prescribed by the Treaty of Versailles and even to accept a further reduction if the other powers were willing to reduce their forces to the same level. A conditional promise of equality was given in January, 1933, but Hitler's advent to power in the same month terrified the French. Consequently the British and French representatives announced that no practical steps in the direction of equality to Germany could be taken for four more years. This statement was interpreted by the Germans as conclusive proof that the League was completely dominated by the victors of World War I. So they withdrew from the conference and started to rearm, at first by stealth and then openly.

The refusal of the great powers became grist for the Nazi propaganda mill in Germany. It facilitated Hitler's efforts to convince the people that rearmament was the road to power and national achievement. Before the end of 1931 General von Seeckt had already made plans for a huge army, but it remained for Hitler to carry out

the plans. Meanwhile Italy and Japan were busy building up their armaments. Japan had already set the precedent in the invasion of Manchuria and soon Germany and Italy were to join her in adopting force and the threat of force as a means of achieving their aims. To equal the threat, the other nations frantically turned to the building of armaments. In short, a state of affairs developed which was reminiscent of that prior to World War I when every great power strived at arming itself to the point at which it was stronger than its neighbors. Once more the pre-World War I faith in arms began to prevail.

(4) *The problem of national minorities.* Another fertile cause of friction and antagonism between nations was the question of minorities. The peacemakers at Paris had tried to settle such problems once and for all by adopting the Wilsonian principle of "self-determination." But they did not apply this principle in the strict sense of the word. Its application was conditioned by such factors as economic necessity, military defense, religious and political traditions, and punishment of the defeated nations. Moreover, in many areas of central Europe they were unable to apply the principles fully because the national minorities were intermixed in such a way that the drawing of clear-cut frontiers was out of question. Consequently, members of one nationality were included within the boundaries of states in which they constituted minorities. In the Soviet Union the plan of giving cultural freedom and equality to the many minorities ruled out the conflicts between the various language groups, but conditions were different in central Europe. There the national groups became hotbeds of ferment. Encouraged by propaganda from their "homeland" they demanded reunion with the "mother state" or full autonomy within the framework of the state to which they had been assigned by the peace treaties.

A number of states sought to exploit the principle of self-determination but it was the Nazis who made the most of it. At the Peace Conference in 1919 Lloyd George had warned against the inclusion of large numbers of Germans in foreign states. "I am," he said, "strongly adverse to transferring more Germans from German rule to the rule of some other nation than can possibly be helped. I cannot conceive any greater cause of future wars than that the German people . . . should be surrounded by a number of small states . . . each of them containing large masses of Germans clamoring for reunion with their native land." His warnings were not heeded. The Nazis seized upon this violation of the principle of self-determination almost at once. If it is true, they asked, that World

War I was fought for the self-determination of nationalities, why was Austria forbidden to unite with Germany and why were a large number of Germans put under foreign rule? Claiming that this wrong must be righted, the Nazis aimed, in the words of their party program, at the "unity of all Germans in a Greater Germany." They used every conceivable means to create dissatisfaction among the Germans under foreign rule. They even went so far, in their efforts to convince the world that these minorities should be incorporated into Germany, as to make extravagant claims about the mistreatment their fellow nationals were suffering. In other words, the principle of self-determination furnished them with a convenient pretext for annexing Austria and the country of the Sudeten. More than this, in 1939 they employed it as a pretext for the invasion of Poland, which kindled the fires of World War II.

(5) *Resentment against the Versailles treaty.* Even the severest critics will confess that the settlement made at Paris in 1919 removed many old injustices; but it is equally true that it also caused others. From this point of view it is regrettable that so little of President Wilson's healing message of international justice and cooperation found its way into the peace terms. While the treaty would undoubtedly have been worse, except for the efforts of the British and American delegations, it still violated the whole spirit and intention of the Fourteen Points. In depriving Germany of every scrap of colonial empire, in creating the Polish Corridor which severed East Prussia from the rest of the Reich, and in cutting Danzig away from Germany the settlement created a burning sense of injustice. More than this, in including the "war-guilt" clause (Article 231) whereby Germany accepted full responsibility for the war, the peacemakers inflicted a bitter humiliation upon the German people. Signor Nitti, who was prime minister of Italy at the time the treaty was signed, said in 1922: "It will remain forever a terrible precedent in modern history that against all pledges, all precedents, and all traditions the representatives of Germany were never even heard."

The German people, although they felt duped, had no choice but to accept the treaty. But a feeling of injustice and humiliation rankled in their hearts. President Wilson had proved himself a good prophet when just before the United States entered the war he had called for "a peace without victory," saying that "victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation under duress at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory, upon which the terms of peace would rest."

The German people did not regard the settlement of its frontiers with Poland as anything more than provisional. Like President Wilson they insisted that the basis of durable peace must be justice, and for them justice was lacking so long as the treaties remained unrevised. Although Article Nineteen of the League Covenant provided for the reconsideration of treaties which had become unfair and for the adjustment of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world, the League members never made use of this Article. The French, in fact, never ceased to declare that not a jot or tittle of the treaty could be either expunged or altered. On the other hand, there were many in Germany who regarded it as the chief cause of Germany's postwar difficulties.

It was the economic depression that again turned the attention of the Germans to the settlement and inclined them to listen to the Nazi blandishments. Economic suffering, combined with a revived consciousness of humiliation, raised their emotions to the point of explosion. Convinced that anything would be better than nothing, they called on their leaders to do something toward lifting them out of the slough of depression and despondency. This gave Hitler his long-awaited opportunity. During the years from 1930 to 1933 the Allies might still have robbed his sails of much wind by revising the treaty. But nothing was done. No sooner was he in power than he began his preparations to demolish the settlement. He did not share Stresemann's hope that the treaties might be revised by international negotiation. He was convinced that "only force counts." This is the basic idea of *Mein Kampf*. Thus he wrote: "The reconquest of lost territories cannot be achieved by solemn appeals to Almighty God or pious hopes in a League of Nations, but only by armed force."

(6) *Resurgence of the nationalist spirit.* The one factor operative in all the forces which were undermining collective security and paving the way toward war was the nationalist spirit, the same spirit which had been one of the basic causes of World War I. During the decades immediately preceding 1914 the nationalist psychology dominated every department of human life. School, press, churches, literature, art, and other influences had combined to cultivate it. But during the war it lost much of its glamor. The soldiers in the mud of Flanders as well as the civilians, under the desire to prevent another war, became lukewarm converts to international psychology. All realized that if war was to be outlawed, conflicting national ambitions would have to give way to a system of international control. This attitude was reinforced by the speeches of President Wilson

and others who advocated a pacific internationalism based upon cooperation and the promotion of common interests. But when the war ended, the spirit of nationalism dictated the peace settlement in large part, with the result that the framework of the "New Europe" was reconstructed on strictly national lines. Then the League was created as an antidote, as a focus of internationalism and international organization. In many fields, including commerce, industry, finance, the post, telegraph, and railways, a vast system of cooperation had quietly grown up during the nineteenth century. What was lacking, however, was a psychology in which the common interests of nations would be regarded as infinitely more important than the interests of any one nation. The cultivation of this psychology was to be one of the primary tasks of the League.

During the twenties important progress was made in fostering the international mind. To many it appeared as if this spirit would gradually prevail. But after 1929 a reaction set in. New emphasis was put on the things that divide nation from nation. The outstanding cause was the economic depression. So long as prosperity continued, the international spirit flourished in certain circles; but the coming of the depression led to a recrudescence of economic nationalism which, in turn, stimulated nationalism in other forms. As in the period prior to World War I nationalism became the all-pervading influence, with nations again seeking security in armaments and hostile alliances. "At a time when the need for mutual understanding is most imperative," the League of Nations World Economic Survey states,⁵ "countries persist in acting as if the narrowest form of economic nationalism and the strictest isolation were the only roads to salvation." The revived nationalism was, in some of its manifestations, even more intolerant than the earlier had been. In Italy and Germany, where the spirit allied itself with Fascism and nazism, its votaries worshiped the state as an end in itself while internationalism was ridiculed as being "sickly and wishy-washy." In a number of other countries, too, dictators rode to power on a wave of popular nationalist enthusiasm. To retain their power they found it necessary to sustain this enthusiasm; and in order to do this, they resorted to aggressive measures against other nations. Thus they converted the nationalist spirit into a juggernaut of destruction.

⁵ *Proceedings of the Institute of World Affairs*, vol. 10 (1932), p. 171.



THE ROAD TO WAR

From 1920 to 1932 peace rested precariously on French military predominance supplemented by the uncertain support of Great Britain. A new chapter began with the rise of Adolf Hitler to power in Germany in January, 1933. Up to that time the Germans and the peoples of Europe generally had been thinking of the problems and settlements of World War I; thereafter they thought more and more in terms of the next war. In the spring of 1933 when Hitler asked the Reichstag to give him four years to carry out the political, social, and economic reorganization of Germany, the Nazis did not divulge exactly what their plan was. But those who shared the secrets of the policymakers knew that one of its basic purposes was military. The details were worked out in a series of conferences attended by Hitler and the military and political chiefs of the National Socialist Party in consultation with the general staff.

The fact that Germany would rearm as rapidly as possible was, of course, no secret to the other European countries. Inasmuch as denunciation of the Versailles treaty was one of the cardinal doctrines of National Socialism, it was believed that the new government would challenge what remained of this treaty as soon as it had made the necessary preparations. Of all the neighbors of Germany the Poles were the most nervous. They believed that Hitler's first blow for territorial revision would be aimed at Danzig and the Corridor. This fear had impelled the Poles to sign a three-year nonaggression pact with Russia in 1932, some months before Hitler became chancellor. Russia, against whom much of *Mein Kampf* was aimed, had equal reason to distrust Nazi ambitions. Hence after Hitler's accession to power the treaty between Russia and Poland was strengthened by various additions. This pact aroused widespread fears in Nazi circles that these two countries might unite with France to crush Germany before she could rearm. As a means of preventing what the Nazis regarded as a premature war, the leaders asked party members to sound a more accommodating note; above all, to cease making references to the annexation of Danzig or the taking of the Corridor. Hitler himself tried to calm the misgivings Nazi ambitions had aroused in other countries with such statements as: "Germany will tread no other path than that laid down by the treaties. The German government will discuss all political and economic questions only within the framework of, and through, the treaties."

The Nazi strategy was successful in allaying Polish fears. Not only did tension subside but the two nations surprised the world by issuing a joint declaration of nonaggression in November, 1933. Later, in January, 1934, this declaration was supplemented by a formal treaty whereby the two nations pledged each other not to resort to war to settle differences that might arise between them. In commenting on this pact before the Reichstag Hitler said: "The attempt to settle the differences between our two countries by war would in its calamitous consequences be out of proportion to any possible gain." But if he endeavored to avoid serious embroilment until Germany was ready to fight, he did permit himself manifestations of bravado with the evident object of seeing just how far he could go. Such a step was the withdrawal of Germany from the League in October, 1933. Having taken it he immediately resorted to honeyed words of peace. "The history of the last 150 years," he said, "should, in its changing course, have taught France and Germany that essential and enduring changes are no longer to be gained by the sacrifice of blood. . . . No one could demand that millions of men in the flower of youth be annihilated for the sake of a readjustment of our frontier." Several weeks later (November 10, 1933) he again sounded the trumpet of peace. "I am not crazy enough to want a war," he said; "the German people have but one wish—to be happy in their own way and to be left in peace." More than this, in his discussions with foreign diplomats and correspondents the word "peace" was always on his lips. But his actions in frantically rearming Germany gave the lie to his statements; in fact, what he was trying to do in the first place was to deceive his prospective enemies until he was strong enough to assert himself. Later he boasted repeatedly of having secretly armed Germany to the teeth while other countries were asleep.

Hitler himself dispelled all doubts about rearmament in March, 1935, by openly restoring universal military service, a move which was contrary to the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. Europe had a choice of two policies: either to take up arms in defense of the treaty or acquiesce quietly in its violation and revision. It chose the latter course. Nothing was done to stop Hitler from building up his army in preparation for "the day" when he would carry out his designs. Only three months later Britain openly recognized the abolition of the disarmament clauses by concluding a naval agreement with Germany. This agreement, while ostensibly limiting German naval strength to 35 per cent of the British strength, made Germany a present of naval supremacy in the Baltic and


furthermore permitted her to build submarines up to 100 per cent of British strength.

All this time while Hitler was rearming Germany, the British did little or nothing to bolster their land, sea, and air forces. When information reached them regarding the alarming lengths to which German rearmament was going, it was belittled, ridiculed, or ignored. A number of leading organs of the press derided the idea that German armaments could imply any threat to the security of western Europe. There were, however, some who were alarmed, and among them Winston Churchill. In 1934 he told the British people of "the tremendous covert armaments which are proceeding" in Germany, warning them that "wars come suddenly." He told the House of Commons that "though little is said about it in public, Germany has already a powerful, well equipped army, with an excellent artillery and an immense reserve of armed, trained men. The German munitions factories are working practically under war conditions, and war material is flowing out from them, and has been for the last twelve months in an ever broadening flow."⁶ Churchill also sounded other warnings during the subsequent months. For his pains he was dubbed an alarmist or his fears were characterized as "Churchillian nightmares." One writer went so far as to state that "nothing is left but to exclaim in Gilbertian phrase:

Tale tremendous, Heaven defend us.
What a tale of Cock and Bull."

However, not long after Hitler announced the reintroduction of conscription, a number of things happened which caused widespread alarm. Hitler's act was shortly followed by Mussolini's announcement that the 1911 class of reservists would be called up and would raise the number of men under arms to about 800,000. In Britain a real anxiety was generated by the discovery that the figures which prime minister Baldwin had given the House of Commons regarding the relative air strength of Germany and Britain were erroneous. It was found that by November of that year (1935) the German air force would be three or four times as strong as that of Britain. Moreover, the German machines were faster and of later design. The immediate result of this disclosure was that the three major parties in the House joined in supporting the policy of raising the air force to a level with that of Germany as quickly as possible. But hope of forestalling an armament race was not abandoned. Plans were made to resume negotiations for a limitation in the near future.

⁶ Churchill, *While England Slept* (1938), pp. 141-142.



THE EXPANSION OF GERMANY BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Meanwhile Hitler was endeavoring to lull Europe into a sense of security with such statements as: "We want to be a peace-loving element among the nations. We cannot repeat that often enough." (January 30, 1936.) A few weeks later he made his next open move. On March 7, 1936, the German army reoccupied the Rhineland and denounced the Locarno treaties. Again Hitler tried to allay the fears of Germany's neighbors with such words as (March 7, 1936): "We have no territorial demands to make in Europe," and a week later he stated (March 15, 1936): "The German people do not wish to continue waging war to readjust frontiers. Each readjustment is bought by sacrifices out of proportion to what is gained." The Germans themselves were surprised when nothing happened. They had expected opposition to the occupation of the Rhineland. As a colonel put it, "The French can't stand provocations like that." General von Fritsch, the commander in chief, had at first opposed the march into the Rhineland because he felt that the Reichswehr was not ready for war. But Hitler assured him that there would be no war. As a guarantee he gave his generals the order to evacuate the Rhineland without firing a shot if the French should mobilize and cross the frontier. In France there was a strong desire to offer resistance because the demilitarized zone was the one remaining element of the compromise France had been induced to accept at the Paris Peace Conference in lieu of the complete separation of the Rhineland from Germany. But General Gamelin, chief of the French staff, stated that he would require 400,000 men to occupy the Rhineland. So nothing was done and Hitler again had his way.

In 1936 Hitlerite Germany took a long step toward escaping from her isolated position by drawing closer to Italy. The way for a rapprochement between Hitler and Mussolini was really opened when the former realized that he could hope for no readjustment of the territorial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and when Il Duce became irked because sanctions were invoked against him in the Ethiopian conflict. Thereafter the dictators discovered that they had much in common, which was evident from the similarity of their methods and political ideals. When Spain's civil war flared up in July, 1936, they made that peninsula the battleground for the

THE EXPANSION OF GERMANY BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR. *Here the student can trace the steps by which Germany flouted the Treaty of Versailles from the remilitarization of the Rhine to the invasion of Poland.*

struggle of dictatorship against the "red menace." It gave both the opportunity to try out new tactics and new weapons in preparation for the great struggle that was in the offing.

To the states of central Europe the failure of Britain and France to stop Germany was incomprehensible. Germany's occupation of the Rhineland, Mussolini's defiance of the League in the Ethiopian question, the rapprochement between Germany and Italy raised the stock of both countries among the Balkan peoples and caused them to grow cool toward France and Britain. Hungary and Bulgaria were of course already in the Italian bag but, encouraged by the growing might of Germany and Italy, they drew closer to the Axis powers. When nothing was done to stop Germany, the rulers of Yugoslavia became convinced that the British and French had lost their supremacy on the Continent. Furthermore, it convinced them that they could expect no help from Britain and France. Hence, early in 1937 the Yugoslav government signed pacts with both Bulgaria and Italy. The attitude of the Western powers discouraged the Greek and Turkish governments to the extent that they took a more conciliatory attitude toward Germany. Only Czechoslovakia and Rumania adhered to the old political line. Even they endeavored to show France and Britain the danger of permitting European affairs to continue in the course in which they were moving. It was to no avail.

On January 30, 1937, at the Reichstag session commemorating four years of Nazi rule Hitler formally served notice to the world that he would no longer be bound by the Treaty of Versailles. Again nothing happened. The Führer then decided that the time had come to test the inertia of the European states by a series of territorial aggrandizements. He felt that Germany for internal reasons required an ideological success. As usual he sought to mislead the European states with such statements as: "The genuineness of Germany's desire for peace and international understanding is demonstrated by her large-scale building schemes." Meanwhile he was laying plans for the incorporation of Austria in a Greater Germany. Union with Austria was a cardinal doctrine of the Nazi creed. In *Mein Kampf* Hitler had stated that it was "a life task to be achieved by any and every means." Accordingly early in 1938 he announced that Germany would no longer tolerate the persecution of ten million brethren living in "two neighboring states." Dr. Goebbels' propaganda machine had been let loose in Austria earlier but despite its apparent success Nazis were barred from the cabinet. In February Hitler forced Dr. Schuschnigg, the Austrian chancellor, under threat


of invasion to admit two Nazis to his cabinet, in return for which he promised to reaffirm Austrian independence.

A few weeks later Hitler was ready to move German troops into Austria. When General von Fritsch objected, Hitler dismissed him summarily. The invasion began on the morning of March 12 and the next day Austria was formally annexed to the Reich. Less than three years earlier he had said emphatically (May 21, 1935): "Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to conclude an *Anschluss*." Upon his arrival in Austria after the *Anschluss*, Hitler said: "I believe it was God's will to send this Austrian boy to the Reich and permit him to return to unite the German people. . . . Everything that has happened must have been preordained by divine will. . . . I have proved that I can do more than the dwarfs who were running the country into the ground. . . . My name will stand forever!" Thus Hitler achieved the conquest without opposition from the other European states. The possession of Austria gave him the desired pincers against Czechoslovakia, whose military position became practically untenable.



THE RAPE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The annexation of Austria brought under Hitler's rule two thirds of the ten million Germans to whom he had referred in his speech of February 20. The other third were the Sudeten Germans living in Czechoslovakia. At the time of the seizure of Austria he stated that he had no designs on Czechoslovakia, but Europe did not have to wait long before his actions belied his statements. In Czechoslovakia the *Anschluss* had caused a surge of pro-Nazi sentiment among the Sudeten Germans which resulted in a rush to join Henlein's party. Hitler did not lose any time in giving the latter stronger backing and in loosing a flood of imprecations against Czech "violence." In annexing Austria he had added the state as a whole, but to "bring the Sudeten Germans home" involved the dismemberment of one of the most enlightened states of Europe. This did not deter him. On May 19 reports began to circulate regarding the concentration of troops near the borders of Czechoslovakia. Inquiries by the British elicited the reply that the troop movements were merely "routine." But a frontier incident and Henlein's refusal to continue negotiations convinced the Czechoslovak government that an invasion was imminent. After manning their frontier fortifications, they appealed to France and Britain for aid. Urging



THE DISMEMBERMENT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

the Czechs to make further concessions, the French government promised to fulfill its pledge to come to Czechoslovakia's assistance and Britain agreed to support France. This caused Hitler to realize that his aims could not be attained except by war or a serious threat of war. Hence he put an end to the crisis by denying that he had any design on Czechoslovakia.

Even though the tension had eased for the time being, the question was by no means settled. During the succeeding months Nazi aggressiveness increased despite the fact that the Czech government was making more and more concessions to the Sudetens. In September the British prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, decided to take the matter in hand. Believing that Europe was rushing headlong into war, he devoted all the energy and resources at his command to prevent it if possible; if not, to play for time in which Britain could rearm. On September 14, 1938, he sent Hitler the following telegram: "In view of the increasingly critical situation I propose to come over at once to see you with a view to trying to find a peaceful solution." Upon receiving the answer that the Führer would be glad to see him, Chamberlain boarded a plane for Berchtesgaden on September 15. During the three-hour discussion that followed, the British prime minister realized that the situation was fraught with great danger. Hitler did not mince words in stating that he was determined to incorporate the Sudeten districts into the Reich and demanded their outright surrender. To this Chamberlain replied that he would have to consult his colleagues about the matter.

When he made a report of his conversation with Hitler to the members of the British cabinet, they were anything but enthusiastic about the details. On September 18 premier Daladier of France, accompanied by foreign minister Bonnet, arrived in London for a consultation. After a long discussion the representatives of the two governments accepted Hitler's demand that the principle of self-determination be applied to the Sudeten Germans. The next day Britain and France presented a note at Prague in which the Czech government was bluntly informed that the preservation of European peace necessitated the transfer to Germany of "the districts mainly inhabited by Sudeten Germans." As Chamberlain wished to resume

THE DISMEMBERMENT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. *The year 1938 saw the extinction of the Czechoslovak Republic. Poland and Hungary were given small pieces but Germany appropriated the major portion.*

his conversations with Hitler, a reply was requested "at the earliest possible moment." The Czech cabinet after much discussion refused the demand, styling it "the basest betrayal in history." But this was not the final answer. When British and French authorities told the cabinet that it could not expect military aid from them if it persisted in its refusal, the Czechs decided they could do nothing but yield.

The morning of September 22 saw Chamberlain in a plane bound for Germany where he met the German dictator in the town of Godesberg on the Rhine and informed him of Czechoslovakia's agreement to cede all territories with 50 per cent or more Sudeten. The prime minister, who still labored under the delusion that Hitler like himself was working for "an orderly settlement rather than a settlement by the use of force," was convinced that his report would settle the matter in a friendly fashion. But much to his surprise he discovered that Hitler was determined to occupy the Sudeten territory with German army units no later than October 1 instead of working out the details of the transfer in a peaceful and orderly manner. When he protested, the Führer flew into one of his famous rages and stated that the situation in Czechoslovakia was becoming more and more unbearable and must be terminated. This time Chamberlain refused to capitulate. He stood firmly on the principle, "We will negotiate, but we won't bow to force!" Upon his return to England the Czechs were told that Britain and France no longer advised them not to mobilize. Mobilization followed immediately. At the same time the British began to mobilize their fleet and the French called more men to the colors. On September 28, when war seemed imminent, Hitler backed down and accepted Chamberlain's suggestion for a conference that was to include representatives of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Czechoslovakia. For the first time one of Hitler's lightning coups had failed to come off, but he became more determined than ever to achieve his purpose.

The conference took place at Munich on September 29. Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, and Mussolini were present, but the Germans saw to it that the Czechs were not represented. This time both the French and the British yielded to pressure. An American correspondent, who was present when the conference closed early the next morning and who saw the four men emerge from the conference room, wrote: "The first of the four statesmen to come out of that hall was the French premier, Edouard Daladier. If ever I have seen a man sunk in the depths of despair, I saw one that night



Acme

PRIME MINISTER NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN RETURNS FROM GERMANY,
SEPTEMBER 30, 1938

in Daladier. . . . The British prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, is known to the correspondents as 'Poker Face.' He kept his feelings to himself, that night as always. But that was not true of the two dictators, as they came out of the conference hall almost arm in arm. Signor Mussolini wore the broad smile of a man who had just put his bank roll on the right horse. And Herr Hitler seemed to be no longer of this earth. All my life I have heard the expression 'walking on air,' but never quite realized it could have literal meaning until I saw Herr Hitler that night in Munich."⁷

Hitler had reason to feel as if he were walking on air, for Chamberlain and Daladier, who went to Munich to "try what reason and good will and discussion would do," had accepted the substance of what had been rejected at Godesberg. Hitler, it is true, had agreed to occupy the territory in five stages. Moreover, the line of occupation was to be fixed by an international committee. Essentially, however, he was given just what he said he would take.

Back in London, Chamberlain received a wild ovation. He told the people who cheered him that he had brought back "peace with honor." "I believe," he said, "it is peace for our time." The English could now put away their gas masks and enjoy the blessings of peace. In France there was similar evidence of relief that the world had been saved from war. Rues de la Paix were renamed Boulevards Neville Chamberlain in honor of the great "man of peace." In Rome and Berlin there was great enthusiasm over what was interpreted as a victory for the dictators. Only in Czechoslovakia was there an atmosphere of sadness and despair. Without giving the Czech representatives an opportunity to state their case, the four powers had partitioned the country. The Czechs had no recourse but to yield. In announcing the catastrophe to his people over the radio premier Syrový said, "Superior force has compelled me to accept."

On Saturday, October 1, the day Hitler had originally designated, German troops marched into Zone 1, while panic-stricken groups of Czechs, Jews, and non-Nazi Germans fled in the utmost confusion. The work of the so-called international commission was farcical for it merely put a rubber stamp on the German decisions. Only where the Germans could see no military or economic advantage in departing from it did they follow the ethnical or language line. It was, indeed, a mockery to call the procedure self-determination.

⁷ *Saturday Evening Post*, vol. 211 (December 3, 1938), p. 6.



THE EVE OF HOSTILITIES

At the beginning of 1939 a noted English historian wrote: "Looking round at our distressed continent at the opening of 1939 we seem to see the scales of war and peace hanging level in the air. Such a perilous balance is easily upset. The chief factor making for war is the land hunger of Germany, Italy, and Japan."⁸ Although the Italians and Japanese had conquered territories occupied by peoples of different nationalities, Hitler up to this time seemed only to be endeavoring to unite all Germans in a greater Germany. The peaceful conclusion of the Sudetenland question at Munich led the British, French, and others to hope that his ambitions were fulfilled. He himself had stimulated this hope by saying (September 26, 1938): "The Sudetenland is the last territorial claim I have to make in Europe. . . . I have assured Mr. Chamberlain, and I emphasize it now, that when this problem is solved, Germany has no more territorial problems in Europe." On a later occasion he said: "I shall not be interested in the Czechs any more, and I can guarantee it. We don't want any more Czechs."

But the addition of territory inhabited by ten million Germans only served to whet his appetite. He now turned from the idea of nationality and self-determination to *Lebensraum* (living space) and economic autarchy. During the first part of 1939 his propaganda machine placed less emphasis on racial doctrine and more on the "mission" of the German people. In short, the concept of nationality made way for a doctrine of naked imperialism. As usual he sought to mislead his neighbors with such statements as (January 1, 1939): "In general we have but one wish—that in the coming year we may be able to make our contribution to the general pacification of the world." A few weeks later he said (January 30, 1939): "Only the warmongers think there will be a war. I think there will be a long period of peace." Meanwhile he was rearming feverishly and looking about for the next victim for his aggressions. The policy of appeasement which the British and French had adopted caused him to hold them in contempt. He was convinced that unless they were attacked Britain and France would not fight. Hence he felt he could do almost whatever he liked.

During the early weeks of 1939 Hitler was merely waiting for a favorable opportunity to deal the *coup de grâce* to the Czechoslovakian state which since the dismemberment of the previous year

⁸ G. P. Gooch in *Contemporary Review*, vol. 155 (1939), p. 136.

had been struggling with inextricable internal difficulties. After summoning President Hacha, the successor of President Beneš, to Berlin and forcing him by a threat of aerial bombardment of Prague to surrender his country, German troops crossed the frontiers from the Sudetenland and annexed Bohemia and Moravia. Next, after recognizing the independence of Slovakia, he took it under his protection and made it virtually a part of the Third Reich. This left only the province of Ruthenia of the former Czechoslovakian state and that was overrun by Hungarian troops. Thus the Czechoslovakian republic after twenty years of freedom passed once more under alien dominance.

Still Hitler did not stop. One week after the destruction of Czechoslovakia, he demanded of Lithuania its chief city and only seaport, Memel, which prior to World War I had been a part of Germany. The Lithuanians had no choice but to surrender it. On March 23 German troops marched into the area, adding a Baltic harbor area of more than a thousand square miles to the Reich. The next move was made not by Germany but by Italy. While Hitler was adding vast territories and populations, Mussolini had succeeded only in conquering Abyssinia, a possession of doubtful value. He now felt that it was time to make further additions to the Italian Empire. On April 7 troops landed at three points on the Albanian coast and overran the country. It seemed as if the dictators were pretty much having their way about everything.

The absorption of Bohemia and Moravia convinced the British and French that Hitler's wallings about mistreated minorities were simply a smoke screen to cover expansion eastward. They realized that no small country could thenceforth consider itself safe from Nazi seizure or domination. Believing that the Nazi juggernaut would roll on toward the east, they began to consult with the countries that would be in the path of aggression. On March 31 Chamberlain stated that "in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power." In April Britain extended her guarantee of assistance to Greece and Rumania if their independence should be threatened. The French Government immediately stepped to Britain's side with a similar declaration.

The problem of sending help to the small countries of central Europe was not easy, particularly in the case of Poland. The only way any real help could be brought to Poland was by enlisting Soviet

Russia on the side of Britain and France. There appeared to be many reasons why the Bolsheviks should join the "stop-Hitler front." Not only was much of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* aimed at Russia but the Führer had since his accession to power continued his denunciation of the Russians. Thus on January 30, 1937, he said: "We look upon Bolshevism as upon an intolerable danger to the world. . . . Any treaty links between Germany and present-day Bolshevik Russia would be without any value whatsoever." Negotiations for an alliance between the British and the French on the one hand and the Russians on the other were started, but they dragged on without producing anything definite.

Meanwhile Hitler made no secret of his intentions. Before the end of March he presented a number of proposals to the Polish government. The first demanded the return of Danzig to German control. Others proposed the cession to Germany of a route through the Polish Corridor to connect West and East Prussia with a railway line and extraterritorial status. Upon hearing of the Anglo-Polish mutual assistance agreement he chose to interpret it as an attempt to encircle Germany⁹ and used it (April 28, 1939) as an excuse for tearing up the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935 and for denouncing the nonaggression pact he had made with Poland in 1934. Less than three months earlier (January 30, 1939) he had said in a speech to the Reichstag: "We have just celebrated the fifth anniversary of the conclusion of our nonaggression pact with Poland. There can be scarcely any difference of opinion today among the true friends of peace with regard to the value of this agreement." Not long afterward he moved closer to Italy. On May 22 an Italo-German military alliance was signed providing for consultation of the two parties if the interests of either were threatened and arranging definitely for cooperation and collaboration in the event of war. Not long after this the German press and radio launched a campaign of abuse against Poland, reminiscent of the campaign that had been conducted against Czechoslovakia. The Poles were accused of mercilessly and systematically persecuting the German minority and of perpetrating against the Germans barbarian acts of every description. It all had a very familiar ring.

During the time the German propaganda machine was grinding out Polish atrocity stories, the French and British continued their

⁹ In answer to Hitler's claim that Germany was being "encircled" Lord Halifax said in a speech to the House of Lords: "Germany is isolating herself and doing it most successfully and most completely. Our people were not backward in recognizing some of the mistakes of the Versailles treaty that required remedying, but each time during these last years that there seemed a chance of making progress in understanding, the German government has taken action which has made that progress impossible."

negotiations with Soviet Russia without reaching an agreement. While the Russians could not forget that the British and French had largely ignored them during the previous years, the British still harbored much of their old distrust of Bolshevism. Just when it appeared as if negotiations were moving toward a successful conclusion, the world was startled by the announcement from Berlin on August 19 that Germany and the Soviet Union had agreed to conclude a pact of nonaggression. Four days later the pact was signed. It pledged the two contracting parties to refrain for ten years from acts of aggression against one another and from supporting either actively or by association any other power hostile to either of the parties. Subsequently it was revealed that negotiations had been going on for months. What it all meant no one really knew. The one thing certain was that the bottom had fallen out of the Franco-British negotiations with Russia. But the Soviet-German pact did not cause the British and French to retreat. Chamberlain stated emphatically that "whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet agreement, it cannot alter Great Britain's obligations," and France stood equally firm. While the French called up fresh reserves, Chamberlain reaffirmed Britain's guarantee to Poland.

After the conclusion of the pact Hitler became bolder in his demands. On the very day on which it was signed, he told Sir Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador to Germany, that he "did not desire war but would not shrink from it if it was necessary." At their next meeting the Führer informed the ambassador that he "preferred war now to when he would be fifty-five or sixty." During the last days of August appeals for peace were made by a number of leading figures, among them President Roosevelt, the pope, the queen of Holland, and the king of Belgium, the latter speaking in the name of the ruling heads of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Finland. But Hitler adhered to his determination to take over Danzig and the Polish Corridor. On August 25 he summoned Sir Nevile Henderson and asked him to fly to London to offer the British government his friendship, once the Polish question was solved. If he expected another capitulation like that of Munich, he was sadly mistaken. The British ambassador told him at once that his government insisted upon settling the Polish question by free and peaceful negotiation and would keep her pledge to the Polish nation.¹⁰ On August 28 the British government replied to Hitler's offer by suggesting direct discussion between the German and the Polish governments. The reply stated that if such direct

¹⁰ On the same day the Anglo-Polish declaration of the previous May was converted into a five-year Assistance Agreement.

discussion led to a German-Polish agreement "the way would be open to the wider and more complete understanding between Great Britain and Germany which both countries desire." When Henderson delivered the answer, the German dictator said that he had to satisfy the demands of his people, his army was ready and eager for battle, his people were united behind him.

On the evening of August 29 Hitler informed the British ambassador that the German government was ready to accept the British proposal for German-Polish negotiations and would expect the arrival of a Polish plenipotentiary the next day. The British answer suggested that Hitler hand the proposals to the Polish ambassador in Berlin and explained that it was impossible to send a Polish emissary on such short notice. But the Führer continued to demand a plenipotentiary. On August 31 the Polish ambassador endeavored to obtain an interview with von Ribbentrop, the Germany foreign minister, but he was not received until evening. Then von Ribbentrop informed him that the offer to arbitrate had expired and that the refusal to send a plenipotentiary was tantamount to a rejection of the German demands. The terms were then broadcast, but the orders had already been given to the German army and air force to advance. At dawn the next day German troops crossed the frontier, and the German air force began to bomb towns and to kill civilians who did not even know war had begun. While this was taking place, Hitler said in a speech in Berlin: "I will not war against women and children. I have ordered my air force to restrict itself to attacks on military objectives."

Hitler invaded Poland believing that the democracies, unprepared and hating war, would not stand by their pledges. In this he was mistaken. On September 1 a warning was handed to von Ribbentrop that Britain and France would fulfill their pledges of support to Poland if Germany did not cease her aggression and withdraw her forces. Hitler made no reply. Early on September 3 the British ambassador delivered an ultimatum, to expire at 11 A.M., asking that Germany suspend the fighting in Poland. When the reply at 11:20 A.M. proved to be unsatisfactory, Britain issued a declaration of war. On the same day France presented a similar ultimatum, to expire at 5 P.M., after which time the French government also declared France to be at war with Germany. It was Britain as the head of an empire rather than Britain as an island state that declared war on September 3. During the first weeks of September all the Dominions also declared war. On September 2 Mussolini had declared his "neutrality"; hence Germany stood alone for the time being.



CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

The Period of Axis Predominance

FROM BLITZKRIEG TO
SITZKRIEG

THE German armies that moved against Poland on the morning of September 1 were in a technical sense the best equipped force in the world. Its equipment included speedy reconnaissance and fighter planes, dive bombers, tanks of various sizes, antitank guns, antiaircraft artillery, and other modern inventions of military science. It also had facilities for moving faster than any armies ever moved in history. In other words, the marching power of the *Reichswehr* was measured in motors instead of legs.

Their object was to overwhelm Poland before the French and British could launch a major offensive in the West. The Germans were no less eager than they had been at the outbreak of World War I to prevent a two-front war. In the First World War they had failed to destroy the French armies before the Russians became dangerous. This time they had taken the precaution to conclude a non-aggression treaty with Russia. The Nazi leaders had hoped that the announcement of the Soviet-German treaty would result in the abandonment of Poland by the British and French; when it did not, they were again faced with the possibility of waging war on two fronts. To avoid being bogged down in Poland for any length of time, Hitler concentrated an absolutely overwhelming force against Poland, leaving only a minimum holding force in the West.

The German general staff had carefully laid the invasion plans and rehearsed them in maneuvers of the preceding summer. The attack was to be launched simultaneously by two main groups, a northern group and a southern group. Upon entering Poland both were to converge toward Warsaw. The general direction which the attack would take was not unknown to the Polish general staff. In order to

prevent the Polish forces from being enveloped by the converging attack it decided that they were to fall back in a series of delaying actions to the line formed by the rivers Narew, Bug, Vistula, and San. There, reinforced by the arrival of reserves from eastern Poland, they hoped to hold out until the rainy season would make operations difficult and France and Britain could launch an attack in the West. On paper the plan of defense seemed excellent, but the general staff had failed to take into account the new German strategy known as *Blitzkrieg* (lightning war). This strategy involved the coordination of air and mechanized forces in a swift thrust to overwhelm the enemy. The formula of the *Blitzkrieg* as evolved by the Nazis included: destruction of the enemy air force in a surprise attack; bombing of all means of communication and transportation used for mobilization; dive-bombing and machine-gunning of enemy troop concentrations to open the way for the *Blitzkrieg* troops; speedy advance of the ground forces composed of motorcycle infantry, armored cars, light tanks, and light artillery carried in trucks, supported by fighter and bomber planes; subsequent advance of medium-sized tanks, antitank, and antiaircraft artillery, and motorized infantry; advance of the regular infantry and heavy artillery.

This strategy was carried out with great precision and speed. In the early hours of September 1 many hundreds of German planes swooped down on various objectives. Among the first targets were the stations of the Polish air force. So successful was this stroke that almost the whole force was destroyed before it could leave the ground. On September 2 the Germans claimed its virtual elimination. Thereafter they were the undisputed masters of the air and could at leisure bomb almost any target they pleased. While some planes were attacking the airfields, others were dropping bombs on railway junctions and stations, barracks, depots, freight trains, and motor convoys—in short, on all facilities used by an army for mobilization. Special targets were the junctions of the three main north-south railways. The Poles had little defense of any kind against these attacks. Antiaircraft guns were so scarce that many antiaircraft units were equipped only with machine guns. The result was that in a few hours the railway systems practically ceased functioning. This was particularly serious because the absence of good roads forced the Polish army to depend on railroads for mobilization and troop movements. To avoid provocation the government had postponed a general mobilization until the last possible moment; in fact, the order had not been issued until August 31. Hence the attack found the Poles unready and unable to mobilize their forces.

The situation also favored the Germans in other respects. Both the terrain and the weather were "made to order" for the attack. The absence of any natural obstacles in the western part of Poland permitted the German mechanized forces to move with great speed. As the weather was dry, the advance could be made cross-country with little regard for roads. Even the rivers, which were at low level, did not stop them long. Preparedness was so thorough that engineer units arrived with pontoon bridges already cut to the measure of the destroyed bridges. In short, the Germans were able to strike with a maximum force according to a well-chosen plan under excellent weather conditions and over a terrain that was ideal for mechanized warfare.

The result was catastrophic for the Poles. Before their armies could begin either to resist or to retreat the whole political and military organization of the country was in hopeless confusion. The troops that had been mobilized were broken up into uncoordinated groups by air attacks. These groups lacked such basic equipment as antitank guns which were necessary if they were to offer effective resistance to the German mechanized forces. Consequently the advance was so rapid that in a few days the entire industrial and mining region, situated in the southern part of the country, was at the mercy of the Germans. On September 8 the world was startled by the announcement from Berlin that the Germans had entered Warsaw. A spearhead, it is true, had entered the outskirts of the city but was compelled to retreat because it had outdistanced its supporting units. However, on the 15th the Germans did arrive before the city in force and on the next day the area was practically surrounded.

The last forlorn hope of the Poles that an effective resistance could be organized in eastern Poland was blasted on September 17 when the Russians marched in along the whole length of the undefended eastern frontier. The purpose, as announced by the Russians, was "to protect their own frontiers." Meeting with but little resistance they crossed nearly half of Poland in two days, cutting Hitler off from the rich oil fields of Galicia and blocking his direct road to Rumania. By September 20 resistance was over except for Warsaw and a few other "pockets." In Warsaw the Poles continued their resistance under intensive air attacks but were forced to capitulate on September 27 after, according to the official record, "all possibilities for further resistance had been exhausted because of lack of ammunition, the disruption of the sewer and water supply systems, and the failure of the food supply." Two days later the German foreign office announced the signing of a treaty with Russia

which divided Poland between the two countries. The line of division, drawn roughly north and south through Warsaw, gave Russia substantially more than half the total area. This territory consisted largely of farms, forests, and marshlands, while Germany got the industrialized western part of the country. In the central part of southern Poland a Polish state was set up under German protection, but it was small and hopelessly landlocked. Thus in a little over a month¹ Poland had been beaten into submission in one of the fastest moving campaigns of military history. The collapse had been so rapid that Britain and France did not find time to give any aid. But the victory had not been gained without a price, for German casualties numbered more than 91,000 killed and 98,000 wounded in addition to heavy losses of equipment. The Polish losses in killed, wounded, and missing were, of course, very high. But this did not prevent the Poles from continuing their fight for liberation. While the underground continued to be active within Poland, those who managed to escape were organized under General Sikorski. In May, 1940, the Polish army in France numbered over 70,000. Later Polish airmen were to render invaluable service in the battle of Britain.

The Russians did not stop after annexing the eastern half of Poland. Foreseeing eventual war with Germany, they decided to improve their strategic position further in the West. On September 29 they signed a treaty with Estonia which yielded rights of military garrison and naval and air bases on Estonian soil. During the succeeding weeks similar treaties were concluded with Latvia and Lithuania. As the acquisition of bases and strategic territories had up to that point not been too difficult, the Soviet government decided to forge an iron belt around the eastern end of the Baltic. To this end it demanded from Finland, among other things, the leasing of a section of territory near the mouth of the Gulf of Finland and the exchange of a strip of territory north of Leningrad for a section of Soviet Karelia. The government was adamant in its refusal, believing that fulfillment of the demands would gravely jeopardize Finnish independence. When the Finns refused to yield, the communist press inside and outside the Soviet Union launched a campaign of abuse against them. Notwithstanding the fact that the Russians enjoyed a potential superiority in man power of almost 50 to 1, Soviet newspapers proclaimed in screaming headlines that the Finns were preparing to attack Russia. Such statements caused many a wry smile around the world.

To those who had observed Nazi technique it was patent that

¹ The last battle on a major scale was fought on October 5 near Lublin.

A BLOCKHOUSE ON THE MAGINOT LINE



a Russian invasion of Finland was imminent. *Pravda*, the official organ of the Communist Party in Russia, had in fact hinted that Finland might meet the fate of Poland. On November 28 the Soviet government denounced its nonaggression treaty with Finland and two days later Red troops invaded the country at five points. It appeared as if the task of overwhelming the Finns would be easy. Much to the surprise of Moscow and of the world, the Finns, entrenched behind their Mannerheim Line, offered a very effective resistance. The Soviet forces, it is true, enjoyed a certain initial success but at the end of 1939 not one of their five separate drives had achieved success. During the next two months the Finns, under able leadership, continued to stand firmly, meanwhile exacting a high toll in Russian lives. It was only when Russia moved in her best troops and equipment at the end of February that the Finnish troops were forced to give way through sheer weight of numbers. Peace discussions began on March 6 and a week later a peace treaty was signed. The terms were more severe than Russia's earlier demands had been. They included the cession of the entire Karelian isthmus with Viborg (Viipuri), the second largest city of Finland; the western and northern shores of Lake Ladoga with its cities; a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland; and several other strips of territory. Furthermore, the Finns consented to the leasing of the peninsula of Hangö and gave the Russians the right to construct a railroad across Finland to Sweden. In short, Finland was placed militarily at the mercy of Russia. The Finns had no other choice than to accept the terms.

Meanwhile there was little activity on the western front. During the early days of September the French army had, after completing its mobilization, undertaken a series of minor operations which carried them a few miles into the no man's land between the Maginot and Siegfried Lines. When the main German forces returned to the West after the conclusion of the war against Poland, the French evacuated the narrow strip of territory they held and retired to prepared positions along their frontier. While these operations were in progress the first instalment of the British Expeditionary Force under General Lord Gort crossed the Channel and moved up to its allotted position on the French front. Then began that unparalleled interlude variously known as *Sitzkrieg*, Bore War, Phony War, or "War of Words." While the British camped on the frozen fields of Flanders, the French sat in the ponderous fortifications of the Maginot Line. The Germans, for their part, having almost completed their own fortified line called the Siegfried Line or

West Wall, also appeared to be watching and waiting. They seemed to have little desire to hurl themselves against the formidable Maginot Line, while the French and British were just as reluctant to charge the Siegfried Line. About all the news correspondents had to report was: "All quiet on the western front." Thus the situation remained for more than five months. All over the world many people were asking such questions as: "Will the coming spring bring a great offensive on the western front?" Others were convinced that the military situation was a stalemate. One British newspaper even suggested that a suitable new marching song for the Allied forces would be: "All dressed up and nowhere to go." As the weeks and months passed, the Nazi menace began to appear more and more remote. On April 4, 1940, Chamberlain declared that "now after seven months of war I feel ten times as confident of victory as I did at the beginning." He felt that Hitler had missed his great opportunity in not overwhelming France and Britain before they had mobilized and strengthened their forces. "One thing is certain," the British prime minister said, "he [Hitler] missed the bus."



THE WAR AT SEA

If the months after the fall of Poland were a period of inactivity on land, at sea where no fortified lines immobilized action there was considerable activity. The comparative naval strength of the belligerents was about as follows:

	<i>Great Britain</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>Germany</i>
Battleships	12	5	3
Battlecruisers	3	2	2
Cruisers	62	19	4
Aircraft Carriers	7	2	—
Destroyers	178	69	21
Escort Vessels	35	—	—
Submarines	56	75	55

The number of German capital ships was, of course, much too low to permit them to challenge the British fleet. The navy Hitler had inherited from the Weimar Republic was inconsequential in comparison with the navies of France and Britain. Because of the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles only five cruisers, three destroyers, and three pocket battleships of 10,000 tons² had been built during the period from World War I to 1933. Of submarines,

² The construction of pocket battleships was a method employed by the Germans to circumvent the provisions of the treaty.

the weapon that had nearly won the First World War for Germany, there were none at all when Hitler took the reins of government. During the subsequent years, however, the Germans worked almost frantically to build a fleet of submarines.

Since the German fleet was not powerful enough to challenge the British, to say nothing of the combined fleets of Britain and France, the object of sea warfare became one of blockade. While the British sought to prevent the shipping of essential war materials to Germany, the Germans attempted to "starve out" the British, as they had done in 1917. When war was declared, the British navy at once took charge of the sea and within a few days German merchant ships were largely driven off the ocean as they had been in 1914. The Germans, because of the inferiority of their war fleet in surface ships, were compelled to strike below the surface or from the air. Accordingly they began the sea war methodically with a broad scale submarine campaign. U-boats, already posted at their stations in the Atlantic along the routes usually followed by British merchant shipping, set to work immediately. The war was only nine hours old when the *Athenia*, a 13,581 ton British liner carrying 1400 passengers bound from London to Montreal, was torpedoed without any warning some two hundred miles due west of the Hebrides with the loss of ninety-three lives.

During the first week of the war no less than eleven British merchantmen were sent to their doom. British losses of the first two months were 54 ships representing a total of 236,532 tons, while the losses of British allies and neutrals totaled 91 ships or 356,273 tons. An outstanding feat of the campaign was the sinking on September 18 of the *Courageous*, a battleship of 22,500 tons that had been converted into an aircraft carrier. Even more striking was the exploit of a submarine which penetrated the harbor defenses of Scapa Flow, the British naval base in the north of Scotland, and sank the *Royal Oak*, a 29,150 ton battleship, with a loss of more than eight hundred lives. In sinking this battleship the Germans, so to speak, paid off an old score, for the eight 15-inch guns of the *Royal Oak* had sunk four German battleships at the battle of Jutland during the First World War.

The number of sinkings by submarines decreased sharply, however, after the British organized the convoy system which had been so effective in World War I. Then, too, with the development of improved methods of detection and pursuit, German losses increased. It is estimated that about twenty of the original German sea-going fleet of U-boats were sunk, captured, or badly damaged during the

first two months of war. Moreover, the cruising radius of the U-boats was limited. Outside this radius British commerce moved without interference. To support the campaign the German Admiralty revived the raider activity which had taken such a large toll of Allied shipping in World War I, the *Emden* alone having sent 74,000 tons of Allied shipping to the bottom. This time, instead of using merchant cruisers, they used pocket battleships. While the *Graf Spee* pursued Allied shipping in the South Atlantic, the *Deutschland* operated in the North Atlantic. But the success of the two ships was not as spectacular as had been expected. In all the *Graf Spee* sank 50,139 tons before it was cornered by three British cruisers off the coast of Uruguay on December 13. After giving battle, she took refuge in Montevideo harbor. For some hours there was conjecture as to whether she would submit to internment or go out and do desperate battle with Allied warships. But the commander settled the issue by scuttling the ship. The *Deutschland* in the ten weeks she was at sea sank only one British steamer and an auxiliary cruiser. The reason for the comparatively poor results was that most British ships were protected by convoys.


But the Germans did not stop at sending out U-boats and pocket battleships. When the loss of British merchantmen decreased in October, the German Admiralty began to lay mine fields off the coast of Britain. The losses of British and neutral shipping were still not very high until after the middle of November when the Germans began to scatter magnetic mines in the narrow channels of the Thames estuary. These mines, filled with TNT, were detonated when a passing iron hull induced and completed an electrical circuit within the mine. They were either laid by submarine mine layers or dropped from seaplanes. In itself the magnetic mine was not new. The British had used several varieties in World War I, but the Germans had greatly improved their effectiveness. In just one week in November, twenty-four ships of all countries were sunk. The antidote developed by the British was to send out fishing trawlers, which were made of wood and could therefore pass over the mines without detonating them, to sweep the Thames estuary clean of mines at least once a day. Despite German attempts to scare off the trawlers by machine gunning and bombing them from the air, the British fleets continued to do yeoman service in clearing the inshore waters. Instead of "starving out" the British, the Germans succeeded up to the middle of March, 1940, in sinking only about 3 per cent of their shipping. Meanwhile Germany had lost 7.5 per cent of her tonnage by sinking, capture, or scuttling. The rest of her merchant fleet was

lying idle with the exception of a small number of ships that moved in the Baltic or within neutral Scandinavian waters.

While the struggle was being waged on and under the sea, there was some activity in the air, but aerial warfare did not move into high gear during the early months. Both sides conducted extensive reconnaissance flights over land and sea. When such patrols met the enemy, there were occasional clashes but beyond this there was little fighting. For the bombers there was more activity. On the 4th of September the first British air attack was made by twelve bombers on Wilhelmshaven, one of the principal German naval bases. The Germans retaliated with a number of bombing attacks on Scapa Flow and Scotland's famous Firth of Forth, but they were all attacks in small force. One of the great surprises was the comparative ineffectiveness of air attacks on convoys of merchantmen and on battleships. Bombs dropped from the air did, it is true, cause considerable loss of mercantile shipping but not so much as had been expected. Against battleships planes were much less effective. The German *Luftwaffe* did not fulfill Hitler's prediction that his bombers would obliterate the British fleet. On October 9, 1939, for example, a flock of German bombers engaged a British force of cruisers which had gone into the open sea in pursuit of German battleships. The result of a five-hour battle was that one of the cruisers was damaged. According to the Nazi leaders the worst was yet to come. On November 15 Marshal Göring declared that Nazi bombing planes had not yet begun to "show the British what it means to be at war with Germany."

THE NAZI JUGGERNAUT CRUSHES FIVE NATIONS

The military inactivity of the winter of 1939-1940 came to an abrupt end on April 9. For months Hitler had been collecting ships and troops in the Baltic ports with a view to seizing both Denmark and Norway. Control of the Scandinavian Peninsula, the Nazi leaders hoped, would give Germany bases for air attacks against Britain and harbors from which her naval units could operate in the North Atlantic. Moreover, such control would mean an additional source of food supplies for Germany and less food for Britain. The Nazis further realized that control of Norway would make it difficult for Britain to interfere with their access to Swedish iron ore which was so vital to the war effort. Plans for the occupation of the two countries had been worked out to the smallest detail. But before the Nazis moved northward both verbal and actual feints were made in the



THE INVASION OF DENMARK AND NORWAY

direction of the western front. After an announcement by Marshal Göring that "a decisive blow must be struck in the West," troops were concentrated along the western front and the Swiss border. But the attack did not materialize. Early on the morning of April 9 German troops crossed the Danish border. Before many hours passed they reached Copenhagen, where the guard at the royal palace offered some resistance. But resistance was so hopeless that King Christian asked his people to accept the situation.

While Denmark was being overrun, German forces were also invading Norway, the conquest of which was more difficult than that of Denmark. For months German propaganda had been working on certain susceptible elements with the result that a group of "fifth columnists," some of them holding high positions, were waiting to aid the invaders. On April 7 naval forces were sent out to decoy the British fleet away from the coast of Norway. The next day a formidable expedition left the German Baltic ports, steamed up the Kattegat into the Skagerrak, and at dawn the next morning entered Oslo Fiord. Previously at 1:30 A.M. the commander of three warships at the naval station on the west coast of the fiord had received a telegram ostensibly from Dr. Koht, foreign minister of Norway, ordering him not to fire on the German warships that would come up the fiord. He obeyed the order unquestioningly. The conspirators did, however, overlook the mine layer *Olaf Tryggvason* which was anchored in the fiord. When the German ships arrived at 4:30 A.M., the mine layer promptly attacked them, crippling the cruiser *Blucher* so badly that it later sank. At 5 A.M. the German minister in Oslo demanded of Dr. Koht that Norway submit to German occupation immediately. He refused. At 9 A.M. bombers swooped down on Fornebo Field, Oslo's principal airport, and battered its defenders into submission. Soon thereafter a swarm of transport planes roared into sight, bringing German troops, light guns, ammunition, and other equipment. Between the troopships and battleships, threats to bomb the city, air transports pouring men and guns onto Fornebo Field, and the activity of the fifth column, Oslo was in full surrender by 4. P.M.

THE INVASION OF DENMARK AND NORWAY. *On April 9, 1940, the Germans invaded Denmark and Norway and obtained the surrender of both countries within a few hours.*

Simultaneously German troops landed at Christiansand, Arendal, Egersund, and Stavanger in the south, at Bergen and Trondheim in the central section, and at Narvik in the north. In all these places sheer surprise coupled in varying degrees with treachery and incompetence prevented any effective resistance. Consequently within a few hours every important harbor, all airfields, and five of the six divisional headquarters were in German hands. King Haakon and his ministers managed to escape to England, where they established a government in exile to continue the fight. In Norway the Germans set up a puppet government under a certain Major Quisling, who had previously organized a local Nazi party. As a result the name Quisling quickly became an international synonym for traitor. To strengthen their hold on the country the Germans poured a steady stream of reinforcements into Norway, so that they had a firm grip on it by the time the Allies were ready to act. On April 14 and the succeeding days two small Franco-British expeditionary forces were landed in central Norway, one northeast of Trondheim and the other southwest of the same port. But the difficulties in their path proved insuperable. From the time of their landing they were bombed almost ceaselessly by German planes. Since they had no airfield, they could not send fighter craft up to drive the bombers away. As they pushed forward, the expeditionary forces were threatened with envelopment by mechanized detachments. The situation became so hopeless that the forces re-embarked, the last troops leaving on May 2.³

In Paris and London Hitler's occupation of Norway and Denmark brought political crises in its wake. The French overthrew premier Daladier and replaced him with Paul Reynaud. In Britain, too, dissatisfaction with the government came into the open. Even many of Chamberlain's supporters joined with those who demanded that his government be replaced by one that was truly national in that it would include representatives of the opposition parties. In the House of Commons the attacks were particularly vehement. One member declared: "We are fighting today for our life, for our liberty, for our all; we cannot go on being led as we are." He closed his attack with Cromwell's words to the Long Parliament: "You have sat too long here for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go." Chamberlain was faced with the alternative of either forming a government which would include representatives of all parties or of stepping aside so

³ An Allied force which had been successful in taking Narvik did not leave Norway at this time but found it necessary to evacuate the town after the fall of France.

that someone else could. He tried the former but found that the opposition would not join a government of which he was the head. Bowing to the inevitable he resigned on May 10. Winston Churchill succeeded him as prime minister. His government was a three-party coalition. One of its first achievements was to set up a Ministry of Air Production to speed the output of aircraft. In an eloquent speech before the House of Commons on May 13 Churchill did not depict the war situation in terms of an easy victory. He stated that he had nothing to offer the country but "blood and toil and tears and sweat." But his driving zeal and inspired oratory were a stimulus to his countrymen.

After the fall of Denmark and Norway the other small countries began to speculate as to which would be the next victim. They did not have to wait long to find out. On May 10 Hitler again unleashed his forces for a third lightning campaign that was to dwarf the preceding ones. This time his objectives were Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands. Possession of these three states, the Germans believed, would not only add the industrial resources of Belgium to Germany's war effort and replenish the German food supplies, but would also afford them advanced bases for an attack on France and England. Above all, possession of Belgium would enable them to outflank the Maginot Line and invade France across the unfortified Belgian frontier. Although both the Belgians and the Dutch were conversant with Hitler's record, they still relied upon neutrality to keep them out of the war. Hitler had of course repeatedly stated that he would not violate the neutrality of the three countries. The pledge was repeated as late as the evening of May 9.

At dawn the next morning his forces swarmed into the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg. The last state, having no army, was occupied without resistance. The other two resisted with every means at their command. For the third time the Germans adjusted the *Blitzkrieg* methods to fit a particular situation. While the ground forces advanced against the vital points, the *Luftwaffe* launched a devastating attack upon all rearward communications of France as well as of the invaded countries, particularly upon airfields and nodal railway junctions. A novel feature of the attack was the use of parachute troops to capture airfields and to disrupt mobilization facilities.

It was the Dutch who received the brunt of the opening blow. Having neither the planes nor the tanks necessary for effective resistance, they knew they would be overwhelmed if help did not arrive quickly from France and Britain. They therefore planned to



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slow down the advance until this help should arrive. Part of their plan called for the flooding of wide areas to a depth which would interfere with the progress of tanks but would not permit the use of barges. In addition they mined the important bridges, constructed pillboxes at strategic points, and made provisions to block the roads. But the German mechanized forces moved with such speed that the Dutch had no time to translate their plans into action. The invaders crossed many of the mined bridges before they could be blown up and used shallow-draft rubber boats to cross the flooded areas. As early as May 13 Queen Wilhelmina and some of her ministers found it necessary to flee to England. The next day the Dutch army was compelled to surrender. Capitulation was expedited by the bombing of Rotterdam. Flying low over the city, German planes reduced more than two square miles in the heart of the city to rubble, with a great loss of life; then the Germans threatened to repeat the procedure in other cities if the Dutch did not surrender at once. By such methods the Dutch were overwhelmed in five days.

Belgium lasted two weeks longer. No sooner had the Germans crossed the border than King Leopold asked the Allies for aid. French and British troops moved forward at once, but the German air force disrupted communications so completely that it was difficult to set up an effective defense. Meanwhile mechanized forces, including about 5000 tanks, advanced with astounding speed. This force, added to the dive bombers, parachute troops, and fifth columnists, succeeded in badly disorganizing the position of the Allies, who had neither tanks nor antitank guns that could stop the advance of the panzer units. The consequence was that the Allies had to fall back toward the Scheldt as early as May 16. By May 18 the Germans had occupied Brussels, Louvain, Malines, and Antwerp. Before another week passed, the cabinet was urging the king to leave the country. But Leopold remained with his army. The Belgian position soon became hopeless. To prevent further bloodshed the king ordered his troops to lay down their arms in unconditional surrender on May 28. Leopold himself was confined to his castle on the outskirts of Brussels.

During the campaign in Belgium a German force had driven

THE GERMAN INVASION OF THE LOW COUNTRIES. *Note the extent of the Maginot Line and the German strategy in breaking through the weaker fortifications along the Belgian border.*

rapidly across southeastern Belgium and had then turned toward Abbeville on the French channel coast. This drive had isolated the Allied forces and left them only the single port of Dunkirk as a means of escape. On the day after the Belgian surrender the official German communiqué announced that the fate of the French and British armies was sealed. By every canon of military strategy they were doomed. But they refused to accept the dictum as final. While some of them sold their lives dearly in rearguard actions which slowed up the forces that were closing in on Dunkirk, the Allies began to evacuate their troops from the bomb-shattered port. At first British and French destroyers ran directly into the canal-like docks to take aboard battalion after battalion. But within a few hours German bombers had reduced the facilities to such a shambles that this method had to be abandoned. Soon one of history's strangest armadas appeared off the beaches. It included merchantmen, passenger steamers, ferries, motor launches, private yachts, fishing smacks, and even tugs with strings of barges. While an outside ring of British and French cruisers and destroyers covered the sky with flaming curtains of antiaircraft fire and the Royal Air Force was using every available plane to drive off German bombers, British and French troops scrambled into the transports to be ferried to Britain. The evacuation continued for six days. London admitted the loss of six British and seven French destroyers, three auxiliary naval vessels, and twenty-four smaller craft out of 1500 vessels employed in the evacuation (May 30-June 4). In addition most of the military equipment the British forces had taken to the Continent was lost. But the armada did succeed in evacuating more than 330,000 soldiers. It was, as Winston Churchill said, "a miracle of deliverance." Britain had suffered a military disaster in France but the rescue of so many troops made it appear almost a victory.



THE FALL OF FRANCE

Hardly had Belgium been knocked out when Hitler launched another campaign. Speaking in the House of Commons on June 4, Winston Churchill said: "What has happened in France and Belgium is a colossal military disaster. The French army is weakened. Belgium is lost. The whole of the Channel ports are in Hitler's hands. We must expect another blow struck almost immediately at us or the French." After twenty-six days of continuous fighting in which considerable casualties were incurred, especially among aircraft and tanks, it was generally believed that the German forces


would need some time to reorganize and overhaul their equipment. But they still had a number of armored divisions in reserve. These were quickly pressed into service and on the day after Churchill made his speech they opened the battle of France. The first phase of the drive began on the lower Somme and had as its aim the capture of the French ports. A further drive was launched for the purpose of taking the Maginot Line from the rear. For the first three days the French stood their ground. Several weeks previously General Gamelin had been replaced as chief of the Allied land forces by General Maxime Weygand, who at once set to work to establish a defense in depth. But the time was too short to achieve much. After the third day the superiority of the German mechanized forces began to show. On June 8 there was an ominous retirement of the French left that gave the Germans room for envelopment.

They were not slow in making the most of their opportunity. On June 9 they sent into the battle every plane and every tank they could assemble. The next day advance troops were across the lower Seine west of Paris. When another spearhead crossed the Marne at Château-Thierry on June 12, it became clear that General Weygand had lost control of the situation. The French also realized that Paris was doomed. To save the city from destruction by bombers and artillery, the Allied command decided to surrender it. The government withdrew to Tours and on June 14 the Nazi legions rolled into the city. Many Frenchmen, believing further resistance hopeless, were ready to sue for peace. Premier Reynaud had other ideas. On June 13 he had announced at Tours that France would go on fighting "even if it were in one province only; even if it were in North Africa only." But on the 16th he was forced out of office. President Lebrun at once called upon Marshal Pétain, who was a man of eighty-four, to form a government. He formed a ministry composed largely of representatives of the right, the chief figure being Pierre Laval, a friend of the Germans. The next day Pétain told the people in a broadcast that he had assumed the direction of the government and that he regarded a continuation of the struggle "against an enemy superior in numbers and in arms" as futile. He continued: "It is with a heavy heart I say we must cease the fight. I have applied to our opponent to ask him if he is ready to sign with us, as between soldiers after the fight and in honor, means to put an end to hostilities." The aged marshal imagined that Hitler would talk to him like one soldier to another; hence he surrendered before he had even inquired what the terms of an armistice would be.

In the meantime Germany had gained an ally. On June 10 dur-

ing the darkest hour in nine months of fighting against Germany Mussolini entered the war. It was generally expected that he would enter the minute German victory seemed certain so that he could claim a share of the spoils. When the Germans began to move toward Paris, he decided that the right moment had arrived. On the afternoon of June 10 he appeared on the balcony of the Palazzo di Venezia in Rome and announced to a cheering crowd that Italy was going to war with France and Great Britain. In announcing Italy's entry into the war Il Duce declared that he had "done all that was humanly possible to halt the war, but it was useless"; hence Italy would fight "to safeguard her honor, her interests, and her future." Italy, he said, was entering the conflict against "the plutocratic, reactionary democracies of the West which at all times have opposed the march of events and often plotted against the very existence of the Italian people." "Italian people," he said, "rush to arms and show your tenacity, your courage, and your valor." That same evening President Roosevelt expressed the opinion of many when he said: "The hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor." Italy brought against the Allies a navy of more than 700,000 tons, some 4000 planes, and an army of about a million. The army attacked France at once, but the attack had little effect on the general situation. Later Italy's participation did cause the fighting to spread to the Mediterranean, Suez, and Africa.

Upon receiving Pétain's request for an armistice, Hitler did not reply for three days. Finally he received three French envoys on June 21 and handed them the German terms. The next day the terms were accepted. With his flair for the dramatic Hitler decided that the armistice be signed at Compiègne in the same railway coach in which General Foch had handed the German representatives the armistice terms on November 11, 1918. The terms included: (1) cessation of hostilities six hours after the signing of the Italian armistice, this being the same time limit as in 1918; (2) the occupation of more than half of France, giving the Germans control of the Atlantic coast from the North Cape to the Pyrenees; (3) France was required to pay the costs of the occupation; (4) demobilization of the French army and surrender of its arms and of all war materials including artillery, tanks, planes, and coast defenses at German discretion; (5) the French navy, excepting such part of it as was necessary to protect French colonial possessions, was to be turned over to Germany and Italy for demobilization and internment, the Germans promising not to use the ships for their own war purposes. On



OCCUPIED AND UNOCCUPIED FRANCE

The speed of the German invasion can be seen in the position of the battle line on June 5, on June 17, and on June 25; more than half the country was overrun in less than three weeks.

June 24 the French delegates accepted Italy's armistice terms, and the fighting ceased.⁴

The deeper causes of the French collapse were many and complex. Among the more noteworthy was, first, internal dissension. Constant labor unrest, political corruption and intrigue, and factionalism of various kinds had divided France against herself. While in Germany all the forces of the nation had been working frantically to rearm the country, in France mutual hostility was poisoning the relations between workmen and employers so that production was greatly impeded. In 1936 "sit-down strikes in the factories, lack of energy on the part of the government, the red tape of bureaucracy, and the unreasonable demands of the committees on procurement reduced French production almost to zero. During the year 1937 the number of airplanes produced each month by French factories fell to the almost unbelievable figure of thirty-eight—at a time when the monthly production in Germany was exceeding a thousand planes."⁵

Second, the heart of the French people was not in the struggle. When the war broke out, there was little enthusiasm for it; in fact, considerable sections of public opinion were definitely opposed to it. In general, the French were a tired and sated nation, asking only to be left alone. Right from the start defeatism hung over the country like a thick pall. When the Germans began to invade France, many sections of the population became completely demoralized.

Third, the doctrine of defense which was advocated by many French military leaders was an important factor in bringing about the debacle. Not only had stories of the impregnability of the Maginot Line been hammered into the people day after day by a press in the service of the Daladier government, but the legend was also accepted by many high-ranking officers of the army. It was assumed that the Germans, if they ever attacked France, would batter millions of men to death against the Maginot Line. Hence the general staff prepared only for a defensive war, forgetting that successful decisions are attained by offensive action. The Maginot Line was good so far as it went, but it went only half way along the frontier. It had not been extended to protect the frontier between France and Belgium. When the Germans decided to outflank the Line, as most military experts outside France expected them to do, the French

⁴ Italy's gains were limited to the few miles of French territory they had won before the armistice. These concessions by the Germans were so minor that many interpreted them as a gesture of contempt for Italy.

⁵ André Maurois, *Why France Fell* (1941), p. 13.

were totally unprepared to defend themselves against mechanized forces in a war of movement. They did not have enough planes or enough tanks or enough antiaircraft guns. The air force, which after World War I had been one of the best in the world, had been permitted to deteriorate during the thirties. The British were, of course, in no position to furnish necessary matériel. Nor does it appear that the French general staff had learned anything from the German conquest of Poland. There is no evidence to show that they used the nine months after that event to devise methods to meet such tactics. Hence the troops, though they fought with a dogged courage, were no match for the armies of the Third Reich where an efficient militarism was reinforced and inflamed by the spirit of Nazi revolutionism.

When it became clear that the French would surrender, the thought that raced through the minds of the British people was: "What will become of the French fleet? Will Hitler use it to invade Britain?" Even after the signing of the armistice terms in which Hitler stated that he would not use the fleet, the British continued to be uneasy. Experience had taught them not to put faith in his promises. The addition of the fleet to the German and Italian navies would have given the Axis sea power of such proportions that they could have challenged British control of the sea. Fortunately for the British a large number of French warships happened to be in British ports and could therefore be brought under British control without difficulty. But in North Africa, at Oran and neighboring ports, the French naval commanders could not bring themselves to hand over their ships to the British. On July 3 the British sent a note to the French commander at Oran informing him that the British in the interests of self-defense could not permit the French ships to fall into German hands. The commander was asked either to join the British in the war or to demilitarize his ships for the duration or to scuttle them. When the commander did not reply within a given time, the British fleet opened fire and in a fierce but short naval action destroyed most of the ships. In time the British gained control of most of the French navy, excepting such ships as were scuttled, destroyed, or disabled.

In about ninety days of actual fighting the Nazi steam roller had crushed six countries, two of them with armies considered among the best in Europe. No other great power in modern history had fallen so quickly and so catastrophically as France. In 1870-1871 French resistance was stubborn and persistent compared with that of 1940. When the fall of France was announced to the German

people, they staged scenes of wild rejoicing. The great triumphs which their forces had achieved strengthened their belief in the invincibility of their armed forces. Nor were they alone in this belief. Throughout the world there were many who shared it. Of all the countries attacked not one had been able to offer effective resistance. It appeared as if nothing could prevent the Nazis from dominating Europe. Only Britain stood between them and complete victory. "You have just one more battle to win," propaganda minister Goebbels told the German soldiers; "then the bells of peace will ring." The promise seemed reasonable. According to Hitler's timetable he was to dictate peace to Britain in London on August 15.



THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Once the Germans had occupied the northern coast of France, an invasion of Britain became a serious possibility. On June 17, the day on which the French government decided to sue for peace, Winston Churchill said in a broadcast speech: "What has happened in France makes no difference to British faith and purpose. We have become the sole champions now in arms to defend the world cause. . . . We shall defend our island and, with the British Empire around us, we shall fight on unconquerable until the curse of Hitler is lifted from the brows of men. We are sure that in the end all will be well." The next day he told the House of Commons that "the battle of Britain is about to begin." By every calculation the moment was propitious for invasion. Britain was ill prepared for resistance. Right after Dunkirk there was but a single fully equipped division available for defense. The others did not have tanks, artillery, and machine guns. They had abandoned all their heavy equipment at Dunkirk, in some cases even their rifles. There were no coastal or road defenses against invasion, such as began to appear over the whole country later.

Why, then, did not Hitler order the invasion at once? Even before the surrender of France the Nazis had proclaimed this as their intention. A number of things caused Hitler to hesitate. First, there was the desire to lay the foundations of the new Europe while the time was ripe. Peasant unrest had been growing in eastern Europe and he feared that Russia might step in before he had established Nazi influence. Second, military considerations prevented him from undertaking the invasion at once. The German forces were disorganized in the sense that they had outrun themselves. Hitler himself was as surprised as anyone over the speedy victory in France.

The battle of France ended so quickly that he and the Nazi leaders did not have a detailed strategy worked out. Nor did they have the specialized weapons that were necessary for a seaborne invasion. Above all, the evacuation at Dunkirk had proved conclusively that a landing in Britain would be possible only if the Germans could win superiority in the air and find some way of neutralizing the opposition of the British navy. Rather than risk an invasion Hitler hoped that he could propagandize Britain into peace. He believed that the people were convinced of the futility of continuing the war; therefore in a "last appeal" he called upon them to submit or be destroyed. Instead of surrendering, they worked harder than ever to produce planes and tanks and guns. The coastal defenses were also made ready, so far as that was possible.

The rejection of his appeal by the British, who were determined to carry on the fight in the face of tremendous odds, infuriated Hitler as few things had. He would show them that they had made a great mistake in deciding to continue the struggle. He would annihilate them. The German radio went into action with a series of broadcasts designed to scare the British out of their wits. London was pictured as suffering the same fate as Warsaw, and the British were told that they would soon be reduced to eating cats as the Parisians did in 1871. When the Nazis proceeded to the attack, their first aim seems to have been to establish supremacy in the air by sweeping the Royal Air Force from the skies, bombing its airfields out of existence, and blasting the plane factories to bits. Thus Hitler would open the way for an easy invasion. But he and his associates grossly underestimated the RAF. Although the *Luftwaffe* had many more planes, the British planes and pilots were better.⁶ The anti-aircraft gunners, too, quickly improved their marksmanship with practice. Methods of detecting enemy planes improved rapidly. When the visibility was good, the British Air Command would receive reports before the German planes reached the English coast, and at times warning of an impending air raid was given as soon as the Nazis took off from the airfields in France, Holland, or Belgium.

At first the German bombers came to Britain on their forays in mass formations of from fifty to one hundred, largely without fighter plane protection. Each group was usually preceded by dive bombers. During the first weeks the raids were generally conducted during the daylight hours, because the Nazis believed that daylight bombing was more effective. Upon being notified of the approach of enemy

⁶ The numerical inferiority was gradually wiped out by increased production in Britain and the arrival of planes from the United States.

planes the RAF pursuit planes would rise and the antiaircraft guns would spray the skies with lead. This double attack often wrought havoc upon the enemy, much to the surprise of the Nazis who had not expected such efficiency. On August 15 the Germans sent a veritable armada—estimated at nearly a thousand planes—of Stuka dive bombers, heavy bombers, and fighters for an attack on southern England. The Spitfires and Hurricanes of the RAF handled them roughly. On that day alone the British shot down 180 planes. During the week ending August 17 the RAF and the antiaircraft batteries shot down no less than 492 while losing only 115 of their own, thereby dashing the Führer's hopes of a quick knockout by the *Luftwaffe*. On August 20 prime minister Churchill paid tribute to the RAF before the House of Commons in the following words: "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few."

Early in September the Germans began to concentrate hundreds of self-propelled barges, speedboats, and other light craft along the coasts of Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and northern France. While invasion troops were being trained to embark and disembark quickly, the German radio warned the British of an invasion. The RAF replied by repeatedly dropping bombs on the concentrations of light craft. During the period of full moon Allied sympathizers were on tenterhooks wondering whether the Germans would launch their invasion before the moon waned. But October came without an attempt. With the onset of bad weather observers concluded that the battle of Britain had settled down for the winter to an air-and-sea war.

Meanwhile the *Luftwaffe* was continuing its attacks. On September 15 a second mass attack was made on southern England. This one fared even worse than that of a month earlier. Definitely confirmed losses of German aircraft on that day amounted to 185. This attack must have wrecked Marshal Göring's hopes of dealing the death blow to the RAF. But the attacks did not cease. Instead of sending large group formations of bombers, the German Air Command now sent them in small flights of from three to twelve directed at widely distributed targets. Bombs were aimed not only at London docks, power plants, gas works, railroad stations, and telephone exchanges, but also at facilities in other British ports, at industrial cities in the Midlands and north country, and even at isolated plants in the open countryside. Much destruction was, of course, wrought by these attacks, but they failed to achieve their purpose of bringing Britain to her knees. Moreover, the *Luftwaffe* paid dearly in

the number of planes it lost. Between August 8 and October 31 no less than 2375 were shot down in daylight.

As daylight raiding was not achieving its object, the *Luftwaffe* turned to night bombing. This was a tacit confession of their inability to penetrate the British defenses by day. In making the forays at night the Air Command hoped both to lower the morale of the people by disturbing their sleep and to reduce plane losses. Defense against bombing attacks in darkness was more difficult than during the day.

For the Germans night bombing was facilitated by the use of radio beams to direct their pilots. This obviated the necessity of sighting the target and enabled planes to remain at high altitudes without sacrificing accuracy. Thus a bomber might "ride in" on a radio beam from northern France and when it reached the intersection of this beam with one sent out from some point in the Netherlands the bombardier would drop his bombs knowing that he was directly over his target. In the vicinity of London the principal targets were the dock areas, key points in the water supply system, and important railway junctions. But, while the bombing of London created the biggest headlines, it was not necessarily the most destructive. Intensified attacks were also launched against the great ship-building centers of western Britain, the textile centers of the Midlands, and the factories where Spitfire and Hurricane planes were made. Other targets were the seaports of Cardiff, Bristol, Portsmouth, Harwich, Hull, Ramsgate, Dover, and Southampton.

Besides dropping explosive bombs the Germans used incendiaries. The first large-scale incendiary raid was made on London, December 29, 1940. Before fire fighters could rush to the scene, large fires were blazing on every side. Many historic landmarks of old London suffered complete or partial destruction. During the succeeding days civilian spotters and fire fighters were organized to take charge of the situation. Thereafter most of such fires were quickly extinguished. Month after month the bombing attacks continued. From September, 1940, to May, 1941, the British suffered an intensity of air attacks then without precedent. It has been calculated that 43,667 civilians were killed and 50,387 seriously injured before the end of 1941. But the attacks failed to achieve their purpose. British docks and factories, it is true, were destroyed in addition to hundreds of thousands of civilian homes. Whatever loss in production the bombings caused was more than made up by the importation of planes, ammunition, and other military supplies from the United States and Canada. Nor did the Germans succeed in breaking British

morale. The bombings made the people more determined than ever to defeat the Nazis. A British girl, living in a much bombed city, wrote in 1940: "It is nothing but Dante's Inferno, but it's marvelous what one can get used to—even bombs. We will beat them and give them their own medicine back."⁷ Such statements were typical.

All this time the British did not simply remain targets of the Germans; they were striking back vigorously with their own bombers. Between the time of Hitler's invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands and the opening of the battle of Britain the RAF staged many raids on the Reich. Most of these were in small force. Germany was not exactly an unknown country to the RAF pilots. During the months of the *Sitzkrieg*, the RAF, while making reconnaissance flights, had carefully mapped future targets. Their first objective was the Ruhr Valley which with its mines, foundries, steel mills, and important railway lines was the industrial heart of Germany. Night after night bombs fell on steel works, munitions factories, power stations, oil refineries, synthetic oil plants, and railway junctions. Repeatedly such place names as Düsseldorf, Dortmund, Duisberg, Essen, Cologne, and Gelsenkirchen appeared in British air communiques. After hundreds of bomb clusters had been dropped into the Ruhr, the Germans began to shift much of their war production to remote places. Other favorite targets were plane factories. For a time the air raid sirens screamed almost nightly at the Dornier, Heinkel, Junkers, Messerschmitt, and Focke-Wulf factories. Unremitting attacks were also made on the naval dockyards and ports of Hamburg, Bremen, Wilhelmshaven, Kiel, and Cuxhaven. German airfields in Belgium, the Netherlands, and France were also subjected to heavy bombings. The RAF even ranged as far afield as the great Skoda armament works at Pilsen in Czechoslovakia and various motor, magneto, and aircraft factories in Italy.

Perhaps the most publicized raids were those which dropped bombs on military targets in the Berlin area. While the British were expecting the Germans to attack London, the Berliners lived under the illusion that Berlin would remain unscathed. Marshal Göring had on a number of occasions assured them that their defenses were impregnable, that the *Luftwaffe* and the anti-aircraft guns would tear to bits any Britisher who would dare to challenge the Reich's might. Nevertheless, the rain of bombs did come. Berliners learned about air-raid casualties, sleepless nights, and haggard mornings after. It was the first time German civilians had felt the impact of war since Napoleon's day. In the wars of the nineteenth

⁷ *Round Table*, vol. 31 (1940), p. 428

century and in the First World War German territory had been immune because the armies had carried the war into the surrounding countries. This time the old strategy had failed. War had come home to the Germans. One American newspaper correspondent reported that the Germans living in the bombed towns were "nervous wrecks from constant raids."

Far more important for the ultimate outcome than the bombing activities was a diplomatic victory won by the British. In March, 1941, the Congress of the United States acted upon prime minister Churchill's statement that Britain "hasn't a chance" unless it could count on unlimited war supplies from America. It passed the so-called Lend-Lease Act which, in effect, was a pledge that the industry of the United States would make up the difference between Britain's limited output of war materials and the growing output of Germany resulting from increased utilization of factories, raw materials, and labor in occupied Europe. In other words, American business entered the war on the side of Britain. From that time on, the menacing shadow of rapidly increasing production lay across Germany's path. The ink on the Act was hardly dry when the President asked the Congress for \$7 billion to start the program of building and lending materials to Britain. Previously fifty of the older United States destroyers had been transferred to Britain, which needed them for convoy duty to reduce the growing losses of ships.

But all the war matériel the United States could produce was worthless unless it could be delivered, and the problem of transportation was not simple. Before President Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease bill the so-called battle of the Atlantic had increased in fury. This time the Germans were determined to make the blockade so effective through the use of submarines, mines, and airplanes that Britain would soon be brought to her knees.

After heavy initial losses, sinkings of British ships had declined as the convoy system was perfected, and for some months it seemed as if the Royal Navy had the situation well in hand. But in the summer of 1940 there was a sharp increase in losses of merchant ships. The fundamental cause of this change was the use by the Germans of the harbors and bases along the coastline from Norway to the Pyrenees. This made the situation of Britain much more difficult and complicated than it had been during World War I when German sea power had largely been bottled up in the Baltic. After June, 1940, the Germans had easy and direct access to the trade lanes of the Atlantic. It was no longer necessary for their submarines to run the gauntlet of minefields and patrols before reaching their

hunting grounds. Moreover, Italy's entrance into the war had forced Britain to send into the Mediterranean a considerable number of warships, all of which were vitally needed for antisubmarine and convoy duty in the Atlantic. Then, too, the inability of the British to make use of the bases in western Ireland, which had proved so useful in 1917 and 1918, complicated the problem of escorting merchant ships. Finally, in World War II the Germans had long-range bombers which not only bombed ships at sea but also served as scouts to locate British convoys and to notify the submarines of their course by radio. Thus the Germans could strike more quickly and effectively than ever before.

Until October, 1940, the British had been able to replace their ship losses by purchase, capture, or construction, but after this time the steady toll of sinkings was gradually whittling away the margin of safety. On the very day on which President Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease bill the British Admiralty announced that during the week ending March 2, German submarines, bombers, and raiders had sunk twenty-nine British and Allied ships totaling 148,038 tons. It was the fourth worst week of the war for British shipping. During the two weeks after the signing of the bill the losses were 240,000 tons.

The heavy losses moved Colonel Knox, the United States secretary of the navy, to declare that the British were losing ships at the rate of three times their capacity to replace them. It is important to realize that even before the war there had existed a world-wide shipping shortage. During the decade after 1929 British tonnage had declined by two million tons and that of the United States by three million. Hence the problem of supplying Britain with the necessary materials at home and on the fighting fronts would have been a major one even if the Nazis had not sunk a single ship. As it was, Britain was doomed to fall steadily behind in the struggle to keep its commerce going unless the United States could ease the crisis by supplying ships. "In no sphere of our war efforts," prime minister Churchill stated, "is the help which the United States government can give us under lease-lend legislation more urgent than that of shipping." In short, the menace of the Nazi blockade was for Britain the most critical aspect of the war.

The construction of a merchant fleet which could assure a constantly greater flow of materials to Britain posed a grave problem for the United States, which was scheduled to produce only one million tons of merchant shipping in 1941. The first move toward keeping open the supply lines was taken by President Roosevelt late



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THE WITHDRAWAL FROM DUNKIRK, 1940; A PAINTING BY RICHARD EURICH

in May when he made known a scheme to collect two million tons of existing shipping for transfer to Britain, including the vessels of Axis or Axis-controlled nations tied up in American harbors. While coast guardsmen were boarding the thirty Axis and fifty-four foreign ships to prevent the crews from scuttling them, Congress passed a bill empowering the government to take over foreign shipping immobilized in American ports by the war. Many naval experts felt, however, that aid in the form of ships was only a partial solution of the problem. They were convinced that American convoys would be the minimum of effective aid, but public opinion in general was not ready for this step. The United States neutrality patrol, which operated as far as a thousand miles off America's shores, did, however, give some aid by warning all shipping of the presence of U-boats and raiders in these waters. More than this, the fifty destroyers which the Congress permitted President Roosevelt to turn over to the British, enabled them to give their convoys better protection and to increase the toll of German submarines.



WAR IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA

During the first year of the war the Mediterranean basin rarely figured in the news. Although the three exits—the Straits of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, and the Dardanelles—were of vital importance to both belligerents and neutrals, there was no major struggle for their control. But the picture changed somewhat after Italy entered the war. Mussolini was hungry for conquest. He decided after the Franco-Italian armistice to conquer for himself a great Mediterranean empire at the expense of Britain. In Fascist circles it was generally believed that the battle of Britain would necessitate the recall of the bulk of the British fleet for home duty. With France out of the war, Mussolini was certain he would have his own way in dealing with the British colonies in Africa. A desert *Blitzkrieg*, it seemed to him, would account for Egypt and the Suez Canal. One army would move northward from Italian East Africa, while the other was moving into Egypt from Libya. Gradually the two armies would draw together and finally crush the British in the vise, thus forcing them out of North Africa.

For a time it appeared as if his plans might succeed. In Italian East Africa he collected an army of about 70,000, composed largely of native troops under the command of the Duke of Aosta, a member of the Italian royal family. On August 5, 1940, this army advanced in three columns against British Somaliland, situated at the southern

entrance to the Red Sea. Since the prewar plans for the defense of Somaliland had been based on the joint resources of France and Britain, the small British garrison of 7000 was greatly outnumbered. In the face of such odds it had no choice but to withdraw. The occupation of British Somaliland gave Mussolini the opportunity to swagger and boast of "a great conquest." With much fanfare the drive from Libya into Egypt was launched on September 14 by a second Italian army of about 250,000 white and native troops under the command of Marshal Graziani. Its aim was to strike across northern Egypt to the Suez Canal. Moving from its bases at Bardia and Fort Capuzzo, Graziani's forces captured Solum and Sidi Barrani, while the British retired to Mersa Matruh, the railhead of the line to Alexandria. At Sidi Barrani the invading army halted to gather supplies and reinforcements for a drive on Alexandria. But difficulty in obtaining mechanized equipment delayed the advance so long that General Wavell, who commanded the British army in Egypt, was able to train and strengthen his forces for a counterattack.

If the British were unable to spare men for the African battlefield, they did station a considerable part of their fleet in the Mediterranean. During the months Graziani was waiting for supplies, they made a sweep of the eastern Mediterranean looking for the Italians. A number of brief engagements took place, with the Italians invariably seeking safety in their bases. The Fascist high command was apparently trying to keep its fleet intact to defend the long coastline of Italy in case of invasion. The British, on the other hand, were trying to entice them into a decisive contest. Throughout this time the main portion of the Italian fleet continued to hug the harbor of Taranto, on the heel of the Italian boot. Finally on the evening of November 11-12 the British fleet took position off Taranto, and during the night torpedo planes from their aircraft carriers dealt the Italian ships a crippling blow. Three battleships and two cruisers were severely damaged by torpedoes; this meant temporary loss of half the Italian line of six battleships. As the rest of the fleet was no longer safe from attack at Taranto, it sought shelter on the western coast. This gave the British absolute naval supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean.

Meanwhile the Axis powers were taking action to eliminate British influence from the lands on the northern shores of the Mediterranean. It was a phase both of Hitler's attempt to establish his "new European order" in the Balkans and of the imperial tradition of *Drang nach Osten* (Drive to the East). Forcing the British out of the Balkans meant not only the severance of important lines of

communication but also Axis control of valuable sources of raw materials. The grain, butter, hogs, and other foodstuffs of these regions would enable the Germans and Italians better to withstand the British blockade. Thus the Balkans were caught in the middle of the contest. But the Axis powers sought to establish their control without the use of force. The means they employed were economic pressure, threats, and propaganda. So that they might exploit these countries to the utmost, Hitler and Mussolini wished to keep them from becoming embroiled with each other. Irredentist feelings were running high at the time. To eliminate one of the causes of friction the Axis powers ordered Rumania to comply with Bulgaria's claim to southern Dobruja.⁸ King Carol's government yielded in the hope of obtaining protection against further encroachments by the Russians, who had already occupied the Rumanian province of Bessarabia. It was, however, only the beginning of the partition of Rumania. Before the end of August, 1940, Rumanian and Hungarian delegates were summoned to Vienna, where the foreign ministers of Germany and Italy, Herr von Ribbentrop and Count Ciano, arbitrarily forced Rumania to turn over the northern half of Transylvania to Hungary. In Rumania the Vienna award provoked violent anti-Axis demonstrations, with vigorous denunciations of King Carol for having yielded Rumanian territory. Opposition to Carol became so strong that he abdicated on September 3 in favor of his son, Prince Michael, and departed into exile.

During the succeeding weeks Hitler's "diplomatic offensive" made excellent progress in the Balkans. Pressure was put on General Antonescu, who after King Carol's abdication had become the "strong man" of Rumania, until he accepted the course dictated by the Axis. On September 30 in the Berlin chancellery he signed on the dotted line, thereby making his country a member of the new Nazi order. Soon afterward German troops occupied certain areas of Rumania "by invitation." Three days before General Antonescu capitulated, Count Csacky, foreign minister of Hungary, had signed his country's formal adhesion to the Axis alliances. On October 1 Slovakia, which since March, 1939, had been a German protectorate, was added to Hitler's concert of Europe. In Berlin there was great rejoicing over these successes. The Nazis, however, were still not satisfied. Pressure was also being exerted to force Bulgaria and Yugoslavia into camp. The only Balkan state completely on the British side was Greece. Since the Greeks were immune to diplomatic offensives, it was decided to subjugate them by force.

⁸ For Hitler this was another opportunity to undo the peace treaties of 1919.

The Axis power which undertook to conquer Greece was Italy. Relations between the two had been strained since August 14, 1940, when a Greek mine layer was sunk by a submarine believed to be Italian. After much shouting and many threats in the Nazi manner, the Italian government issued a three-hour ultimatum to Greece at 3 A.M. on October 28 over an alleged "frontier incident." Before the government of premier Metaxas had an opportunity to reply, Italian troops had moved into Greece from Albania. On paper the odds against the Greeks seemed desperate. To oppose the modern mechanized forces of Italy, Greece had about two hundred obsolete planes which the Italians could have put out of action on the first day if they had followed German *Blitzkrieg* methods. For land warfare the Greek army possessed no mechanized equipment and very little heavy artillery. Another factor that seemed to be against them was that the strongest part of the so-called Metaxas line faced Bulgaria and not Albania. On the other hand, the Greek troops were hardy and well trained in mountain warfare.

The Italian army which crossed into Greece numbered about 200,000 men. It was apparently expected that at the approach of this force the Greeks would surrender with little or no resistance. For three days the army made good progress. It raced joyously down a half dozen parallel valleys while the Greek troops took to the hills. Confined within narrow valleys the Italians were unable to exploit their numbers or to make good use of their mechanized equipment. The Greeks waited until the columns were strung out and vulnerable, and then began their counterattacks with mountain artillery. "General Mud," who had failed to save the Poles and the French, came to the assistance of the Greeks. The Italians soon became so completely disorganized that the Greeks were able to pinch off the advance columns. Next a series of counterattacks caused the Italians to retreat toward Albania with the Greeks at their heels. Three weeks after they had crossed the border, the Italians were right back where they had started. But the Greek forces did not stop at expelling the enemy from Greece. Pushing on into Albania they took Koritsa (Corizza), the main Italian base, together with a large number of prisoners and much military equipment. Thereafter they continued to advance slowly, so that by the end of 1940 about a quarter of Italian Albania was in their hands.

Coming simultaneously with the naval losses, the failure of forty-three million Italians to crush seven million Greeks profoundly affected Italian morale. It was, indeed, a bitter pill for a nation that had been gulled with exaggerations of its strength in the air

and its mechanized striking power on land. Signs of discontent became manifest. As a means of allaying it, Fascist publicists called for more discipline and more purges. For the blustering Mussolini the reverses were a sore blow to his prestige, the Achilles heel of any dictator. It appeared as if the Germans would have to come to Italy's aid. The Duce, however, was still determined to redeem his prestige without help. An editorial in his own paper, *Il Popolo d'Italia*, stated: "Italy will settle her business without help until Greece's back is broken."

But there were more reverses in the cards for Italy. General Wavell, taking advantage of the defeats in Albania and of the British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean, launched an offensive against Marshal Graziani's army early in December. He had been preparing for this move for months by training a heterogeneous army of British, Australian, New Zealand, Indian, Polish, and Free French troops in desert warfare. From this army he picked a striking force of about 40,000, holding the rest in reserve. Although the army he sent against the Italians was small, it was well equipped with tanks and armored cars. More than this, plans were made to coordinate the movements of the mechanized land forces, the air arm, and the British Mediterranean fleet.

Moving out from Mersa Matruh on December 7, the British struck at Sidi Barrani. It surrendered on December 11, together with the entire garrison of 30,000 white and native troops. The British continued to move westward, taking Salum and Fort Capuzzo on December 16 and driving the invader out of Egypt. The next point of attack was Bardia, which surrendered on January 5. From there Wavell advanced immediately on Tobruk, where a stiffer resistance was encountered. But on January 22 that town also fell after a terrific combined attack from land, air, and sea. Nearly 25,000 prisoners were taken. Racing his mobile troops westward, Wavell took Derna on January 30 and Bengazi on February 7. More prisoners were taken at both places. In two months the British had not only conquered the entire northern coast of Africa from Sidi Barrani to Bengazi, but they had also taken vast quantities of military booty and about 140,000 prisoners, which was many more than there were troops in the striking force. It was the first real British success in land fighting during World War II. This success, coming at a time when British morale needed a lift, did much to cheer the entire empire. Wavell moved on to capture El Agheila on February 9, but then the offensive stopped.

The military balance in Libya was changing. General Rommel,

Germany's outstanding student of mechanized warfare, now took charge of the Axis forces in North Africa and a German mechanized division and a force of fighter and bomber planes appeared on the front. British public opinion clamored for the conquest of Tripoli, but Wavell did not have the necessary equipment to achieve this. Furthermore, events in the Balkans necessitated the transfer of British troops there from North Africa. The upshot of it all was that when Rommel's force recaptured Benghazi on April 4, Wavell decided to withdraw his troops to his Egyptian bases in order to avoid encirclement. He did, however, leave a strong garrison in Tobruk, which could be supplied from the sea. The Nazi forces did not stop at Tobruk. With complete recklessness as to lines of communication they charged past the British that had been left there and forthwith took Bardia, only eight miles from the Egyptian border. Pushing on into Egypt, they also captured Salum. Thus in ten days they recovered most of North Africa. Once again the Suez Canal, keystone of all British operations in the eastern Mediterranean, was threatened. But for the time being the center of interest shifted to the Balkans. Thenceforth the North African front was to remain static until the British launched a new offensive in the following November.

While the Libyan campaign was under way, preparations were being made for the conquest of Italian East Africa. An army of 60,000 men from New Zealand, South Africa, India, and other parts of the empire was collected and when it was ready moved against the Italian East African empire from four sides. The Fascists had stationed a modern army of 200,000, including both white and native troops, in their colonies. To overcome this force the British used the strategy of a series of drives against selected points. After the Italians had been driven out of Italian and British Somaliland, the British concentrated on Eritrea and Ethiopia. In the former area, where the pick of Italian troops was concentrated, the Italians entrenched themselves in strong positions on mountain tops and stubbornly held out for many weeks. In Ethiopia the advance of the British polyglot forces was more steady. Native warriors rose against the Italians, harried them behind the lines, ambushed them in the mountains, and made life miserable for them in general. As one British column neared Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, the Italians evacuated it, and on April 6 the imperial troops marched in without encountering resistance. In Eritrea, too, the Italians were driven out or surrendered. The surrender of the Duke of Aosta and his army on May 19 virtually completed the military conquest of Italian East Africa.

In addition to losing her East African empire Italy had also suffered a naval defeat in the battle of Cape Matapan on March 27. It all started with an attempt to intercept a convoy carrying a small British force to Greece. Upon being notified that Italian ships were in the open, a British squadron at once set out in pursuit. They overtook the Italians after nightfall and by a combined air and naval attack sank three heavy cruisers and two destroyers besides inflicting damage on other ships. The British sustained no damage to their ships and lost only two naval aircraft, an almost unparalleled ratio. This defeat, together with the defeats in Libya and East Africa, left no doubt as to the weakness of the Italian forces. As a result the morale of the people fell to a low level and in Milan and other cities crowds demonstrated against continuing in the war. But the Germans at once increased the number of their army and airforce units stationed in Italy. Thus Mussolini's country became more and more the virtual prisoner of Nazi Germany.

Reinforcement of the German units in Italy was not enough; the Italians also needed help in the Balkans. Although Mussolini had decided to "break the back of Greece" without German help, he made no progress in this direction during the early months of 1941. The Greek troops continued to hold the initiative they had gained earlier in the conflict. But German military preparations as well as the continued "diplomatic offensive" foreshadowed military intervention in the Balkans. On March 1 Bulgaria signed with the Axis; and almost before the ink was dry, German troops began to enter that country through Black Sea ports or across the Danube.

By using the German troops in Bulgaria as a threat, Hitler was able to put heavy pressure on Yugoslavia. This pressure finally induced the prime minister and foreign minister to sign an agreement at Vienna on March 25, according to which Yugoslavia was also to become a part of the "new Nazi order." But the masses had other ideas. A public demonstration followed by a *coup d'état* forced Prince Paul and his ministers into exile, and young Prince Peter was proclaimed king. The new government at once took steps to repudiate the pact of March 25, but nevertheless made professions of friendship with the Axis powers. This did not satisfy Hitler, who had hoped to engulf the Balkans by sheer threat of might. Just when he seemed to be on the verge of success, the doughty Yugoslavs had reversed the position of their government.

Hitler decided to use force where "diplomacy" had failed. The German press and radio at once began to rail against the Yugoslavs, accusing them of beating German residents and burning their

homes. This was followed on April 6 by a declaration of war. In Yugoslavia the Germans saw facing them about twenty divisions of troops or about 650,000 men, with an airforce of about nine hundred planes. There was also a Greek army of fifteen divisions or about 300,000 men. Then, too, the British had landed some troops in Greece, including seasoned Australians, New Zealanders, and Britons, all of them eager to avenge Dunkirk. These forces if put together would have constituted an army greater in numbers, though not in training and equipment, than the German force in the Balkans. Again Hitler applied the fundamental rule of his strategy, i.e., to cut the enemy into fragments and then to destroy the fragments one by one. In general, the Nazis employed the same tactics they used in Poland and the Low Countries. The airforce led off the attack by bombing airfields, demolishing bridges, smashing communications, and disrupting vital services in the towns. An American correspondent who was an eyewitness to the first raids on the town of Skoplje reported that the German bombing was "exceedingly accurate, although most of the bombs were of small caliber. Therefore the damage was not permanently serious but of a nature to disrupt all regular services. The power station was out of order. There was neither electric light nor telephone. The radio station had ceased functioning. Army headquarters was knocked about and had been transferred. Telephone cables lay twisted in the road."

Despite the success of the bombing attacks many observers believed that the Yugoslavs would do well in the land battles. Unfortunately their army had little modern fighting equipment, such as tanks, planes, and antitank guns, but it was hoped that this shortage would be offset by the mountainous terrain which was regarded as being more or less blitzproof. The Nazis again upset all calculations. Before the Yugoslavs reached their battle stations, the Germans had virtually completed the first phase of the *Blitzkrieg*. The mountains notwithstanding, they moved almost as fast as if the terrain had been Poland, Denmark, or France. The opening thrust came from Bulgaria through four passes into southeastern Yugoslavia, where the Yugoslav high command had stationed just one division of Croat reservists. While one spearhead turned south into Greece, the rest pressed on across Yugoslavia to meet the Italians at the Albanian border. On the sixth day German patrols met the vanguard of the Italian army. En route the Nazis had taken control of the cities of Nish and Skoplje and much of the strategic Vardar Valley. Two other spearheads, one moving southward from Rumania through Dragoman Pass, entered Belgrade, the capital of Yugo-

slavia, on April 13. The final collapse of organized resistance was hastened by the advance of another German army from Hungary toward Zagreb, which was taken on April 11. The army moved on toward Sarajevo, the scene of the assassination which kindled the fires of World War I. The Italians also took part in the campaign by sending an army into Slovenia and Croatia. By April 15 the strategical position of the Yugoslavs was so hopeless that negotiations for surrender were opened. The actual surrender took place two days later.

While the Germans were dividing and overwhelming the Yugoslavs, they were also moving against the Greeks. As three Nazi spearheads were driving across Yugoslavia, a fourth, as previously stated, turned southward toward Salonika. Still another column, after fighting a bloody engagement with the Greek defenders of Rupel Pass, moved into the Vardar Valley. Finding this part of Greece virtually unprotected, the spearheads rolled into Salonika. Next the Germans began systematically to take the forts in the Metaxas Line, which took its place in the list of such sad names as Maginot Line, Mannerheim Line, and Albert Canal. As another Nazi force drove down into Greece from the north, the British-Greek force sought to stem the German advance, but their equipment and supplies were inadequate and they were gradually pushed back. In the face of the German superiority the British did not permit themselves to be inveigled into another Dunkirk. They took the precaution of not losing contact with a suitable harbor for retreat. At Thermopylae a small force of Australians, New Zealanders, and Britons managed to hold up the Nazi advance long enough to permit the main British force to evacuate from southern Greek ports. On April 26 mechanized German forces rolled into Athens unopposed. Two days earlier the Greek army in Albania, whose retreat had been cut off, surrendered. By the end of the month the German occupation of the Greek mainland was virtually complete. *Blitzkrieg* methods, combined with air and mechanized superiority, had achieved another speedy triumph. In addition to 345,000 Yugoslavs the Germans claimed to have captured 218,000 Greek and 10,000 British prisoners while suffering but a small number of casualties.

Although the Germans dominated the mainland of Greece, the British still held the island of Crete, which they had occupied with Greek approval shortly after the Italian attack on Greece in the fall of 1940. The British, of course, realized that the Germans would spare no efforts to acquire control of an island of such strategic importance. The contest for its possession, which began on May 19,

was one of the strangest battles of the war. On the evening of May 19 waves of German bombers appeared over the three main airfields for the purpose of crippling as many RAF planes on the ground as possible and of putting the anti-aircraft guns out of commission. After midnight about a hundred transport planes swept in to drop paratroopers near the airfields. Dropped from a height of only four hundred feet, these men reached the ground before many of them could be shot. Other planes dropped rifles, machine guns, light mortars, and ammunition attached to parachutes of different colors. At the first hint of dawn new transport planes came with more parachutists. Gliders, towed by other transports, severed their tow lines over the airfields and, floating gently to the ground on air currents, skidded to a stop before discharging their human cargo. By the time it was light, fighting was well under way, the primary objects of the attack being the airfields and principal roads. As the day ended, the British claimed to have killed or captured 1800 of the first 3000 Germans that landed, but German planes continued to bring more men. By the end of the third day the British had lost the key points of the island. After that it was only a question of mopping up scattered groups. In one respect the Germans failed. They had hoped to capture the Greek king, George II, who had taken refuge in Crete, but he managed to elude capture and to escape to Cairo.



CHAPTER NINETEEN

The Turn of the Tide

THE NAZIS INVADE RUSSIA

THE winter of 1940–1941 saw the great German industrial machine again hard at work equipping the army for a specific campaign. In certain circles it was no secret that Hitler was preparing for a final showdown against Bolshevism. Plans to this end had been carefully elaborated by the general staff. If the Nazis were going to overwhelm Russia before armaments from the United States began to arrive in Britain in large quantities, they had to do so in one swift decisive blow; hence they summoned all their strength to deal it. The enormously powerful German army which had been made ready began its march into Russia at 4 A.M. on Sunday, June 22. An hour and a half later the German ambassador in Moscow called on foreign minister Molotov to inform him that German troops had crossed the frontier. The reason for this move, the ambassador said, was the concentration of Red army units near the German frontier. The Soviet foreign minister replied that the German government had presented no objections, that the attitude of the Soviet government was peaceful, and that Germany was consequently the aggressor. In a broadcast delivered later on the same morning Mr. Molotov labeled the attack as “perfidy unparalleled in the history of civilized nations.” He further asserted that during the entire period the treaty of nonaggression was operative the Soviet government had faithfully observed its terms.

Stalin said nothing as the Red army braced itself to meet the attack. He had never had any illusions about Hitler’s real intentions. Not only Hitler but also Dr. Alfred Rosenberg, the “official philosopher” of the Nazi Party, had advocated the conquest of Russia and the physical destruction of communism. Stalin therefore knew

that the Nazis would strike at the first good opportunity. In order to gain time to arm against this attack he had concluded the non-aggression treaty in August, 1939. More than this, he had on April 13, 1941, concluded a pact of neutrality with Japan as a means of protecting Russia's eastern flank in case of a German attack.

While foreign minister Molotov was broadcasting to the Russians, Hitler, his foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, and propaganda minister Paul Goebbels were making public Germany's purported reasons for the invasion. They alleged that the German government had signed the nonaggression treaty in good faith but the Russians had not cooperated. First, Russia had in contravention of the pacts of 1939 forced Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania to consent to the establishment of Soviet military and naval bases in those countries. Second, the Russian attack on Finland and the subsequent annexation of strategic territory and bases was beyond what Germany considered legitimate expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence. Third, instead of waiting for a peaceful adjustment, the Soviet government had insisted on forceful settlement of its claims on Rumanian territory in June, 1940. Fourth, Molotov had in November, 1940, presented an even more ambitious plan which included the complete abandonment of Finland by Germany, the establishment of Russian military and naval bases at the Straits of Constantinople, and a Soviet protectorate over Bulgaria. Fifth, the concentration of Russian troops near the German borders was a definite threat to Germany. Later, in his speech of October 3, 1941, Hitler stated that he had remained silent while the Soviet government was strangling Finland and overpowering the Baltic States. "I took decision only," he said, "when I saw that Russia had reached the hour to advance against us. . . . We gradually received proof that on our frontiers one airfield after another was set up and one division after another from the gigantic Soviet army was being assembled there."

The foregoing allegations by the Nazi bigwigs were only excuses to the German people for suddenly turning the giant military machine against the Soviet Union. The real reasons were somewhat different. Among the deciding motives was, first of all, the fact that the Nazis could not tolerate the presence of a major military power which could suddenly strike at Germany. Their leaders knew that the Soviet rearmament program was proceeding at a rapid pace. According to reports they had received, it would be completed in large part by August, 1941, after which time the Red army would be a definite menace. Hitler and his general staff realized that they did

not dare to launch an all-out attack on Britain so long as the huge Soviet army could fall on Germany's flank. So they decided to strike before preparations were complete. Another factor which motivated the attack was the Nazi hatred of Bolshevism. Ever since the founding of the Nazi Party the Bolsheviks had been Enemy No. 1, and Hitler had ranted endlessly against them. Nothing would have pleased him more than to announce from the steps of Lenin's mausoleum in Moscow that Bolshevism was dead and that National Socialism would reorganize the world. In the hope that he might win the support of anticommunist elements throughout the world and particularly in Britain and the United States, he announced that the time had come "to save the entire world from the dangers of Bolshevism." Finally, the attack on Russia was one of Hitler's oldest ambitions. It was a phase of the old *Drang nach Osten* dream so passionately set forth in *Mein Kampf*. His new order would be incomplete without the inclusion of the fertile Ukrainian plains and the oilfields of the Caucasus. If the war was to last a long time, the Germans would need all the foodstuffs and raw materials they could get from Russia, and Hitler preferred to control them directly rather than depend on Stalin's promises.


Hitler with his flair for ostentation and the dramatic started his campaign on the same day on which Napoleon attacked Russia in 1812. This was, so to speak, a challenge to the achievements of the Little Corporal. He, Hitler, would show the world that he could achieve what Napoleon had failed to accomplish, i.e., to overwhelm Russia. He confidently believed that he could destroy the Red army in a few weeks. His *Blitzkrieg* against Russia would be a repetition on a grander scale of his military triumphs in western Europe. Nor was he alone in his opinion. Military "experts" in many parts of the world believed that he would quickly crush the Red army in steam roller fashion. Some even ventured the opinion that he would reach Moscow in two weeks. As already indicated, the primary aim of the offensive was the destruction of the Russian forces in the shortest possible time. As the campaign developed, it became increasingly clear that Moscow, the main center of communications of European Russia, was the principal territorial objective. A second objective was Leningrad. The German high command seems to have assumed that the fall of Moscow and Leningrad would result in the disruption of the Soviet army and that then the Germans could seize the Ukraine and the Caucasus with little effort. Moreover, Hitler had a mania for capturing capital cities.

The German forces, joined within a short time by the Hun-

garians, Bulgarians, Rumanians, and Finns, advanced on a front extending more or less compactly for a thousand miles. Unready to meet the attack, the Russians quickly relinquished the Baltic states and Poland and retired behind the Stalin Line, a series of fortified positions where they hoped to make a stand. Not all Russian troops, however, managed to escape. The sweep of the German armored columns surrounded two large forces in the vicinity of Bialystock and annihilated them. Then the panzers rolled on to attack the Stalin Line. Counterattacks slowed the *Blitzkrieg* somewhat, but the pressure was so terrific that the Russians were forced slowly backward. Even the Stalin Line stopped the Nazis only temporarily. By July 16 they succeeded in piercing it at a number of points.

The Nazi forces reached the outskirts of Smolensk on July 17, but resistance in this sector was so determined that the city was not entirely in German hands until about the middle of August. A Russian general described the battle for Smolensk in the following words: "Having covered every inch of ground with corpses, the Nazis broke through to Smolensk. Stubborn fighting for the town proper raged for almost a whole month. The city repeatedly passed from hand to hand. More than one German division found its last resting place on the approaches to Smolensk and in the town itself. Every street and every house was contested by severe fighting and the Nazis paid very heavy for every yard of their advance." As early as July 13 the official German News Agency had announced that "the route to Moscow is open and no further natural or artificial barriers intervene." But the announcement proved to be greatly misleading. The Russian armies still stood as a formidable barrier between the Germans and Moscow. For weeks a stubborn defense held the Nazi forces more or less stationary around Smolensk. Time and again they hurled massive formations against the Russian positions without effecting any decisive change. Even the fiercest onslaughts broke against the rocklike resistance. On September 3 the Nazis themselves admitted that their drive on the central front had been stopped.

In other sectors, however, the Nazis were vigorously driving deeper into Soviet territory. In the northwest the push was nearing Leningrad. The capture of Shlisselburg, the great railway center, on September 9 brought Leningrad within artillery range, and the German guns began a systematic bombardment of the city on the next day. As a last desperate measure to save the city Marshal Voroshilov enlisted the entire civilian and military population to raise defenses. Thereafter operations around this city assumed the character of siege warfare punctuated by occasional attempts to drive



THE GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA

The grueling nature of the campaign may be inferred from the slowness with which the German line was pushed back from the advanced positions of December, 1941.

back the Germans. Meanwhile the Germans were making spectacular advances in the southwest, where they reached Kiev on August 8 and Odessa on August 13. Resistance at both places was so effective that the Nazi forces did not take the former city until September 20 and the latter until October 16. During the attacks upon the two cities other German forces drove toward the Dnieper. Fearing that he could not hold Dnepropetrovsk, General Budenny ordered the destruction of the great dam near Zaporozhe which besides being the principal source of power for the industries of the Donets basin symbolized Soviet progress to the entire country. One Russian announcement read: "We blew up this dam so as not to allow this first child of the Soviet five-year plans to fall into the hands of the Hitler bandits. The Germans will get nothing."

During the month of September the Germans were busy on the central front assembling a tremendous force for a drive from Smolensk toward Moscow. The drive, designed to open the way to the Soviet capital, was launched at the beginning of October. On October 3 Hitler boasted: "We have planned ahead to such a degree that I have been able, in the midst of this gigantic war of materials, to cease production in many fields, for I know that there is not a single enemy left whom we would not be able to force down with the quantities of war material available." For a time the drive made excellent progress, enabling the Germans to take Briansk and Vyazma. By October 16 they were within sixty miles of Moscow. Inside the city preparations were being made for a street-to-street defense. The Red troops fighting, as it were, with their backs to the wall, stopped the advance for the time being by desperate counterattacks. Although their advance was stalled on the central front, the Nazis were making considerable progress in the southern sector. On October 16 they took Odessa and on the 19th Taganrog on the Sea of Azov. On the 22nd Perekop at the entrance to the Crimea fell and two days later the great industrial city of Kharkov was occupied, but not before all its industrial plants had been either removed or completely destroyed. On November 1 the German forces began an invasion of the Crimea which carried them to the approaches of Sevastopol and Kerch. The latter city was taken on November 18, but Sevastopol continued to hold out. An advance into the Donets region resulted in the capture of Rostov on the Don on November 23. In the northwest the combined Finnish-German forces had also gained ground in their drive on Leningrad. By November 22 the city was surrounded on three sides, but the final impetus to take it was lacking.

In the meantime the Germans on November 15 had started a

drive on the central front with a large force. This time they proposed to encircle Moscow and cut it off from the rest of Russia instead of trying to storm its central defenses. Advance was slow. Gradually the prongs were extended until in the north they reached Klin, where the rambling red house of Tchaikovsky that had been converted into a museum was destroyed, and in the south to Tula, the home of Tolstoy who wrote the great epic of the Napoleonic struggle, *War and Peace*. The menace of encirclement was becoming serious. Just when it seemed as if the plan would succeed, the Russians stopped the offensive by desperate resistance. The drive had reached the limits of advance at all points for the year 1941. It was on December 5, 1812, that Napoleon drew his greatcoat about him and started for France, leaving his Grande Armée behind in Russia. The greatest adventure of the Little Corporal had failed. By the same date in 1941 Adolf Hitler, another corporal, must have realized that his mighty effort to beat down Russia had failed. Three days later, on December 8, he announced: "The German army does not expect to take Moscow this winter."

During five months of fighting, the Germans had occupied about 615,000 square miles of Soviet territory, an area about three times as large as Germany before the annexation of Austria. The cost was high. Hitler himself admitted that. The losses in killed, wounded, and missing had reached a total of 673,415 up to December 1, and during the fighting in December another 300,000 were added. Thus one may conclude that the Nazi losses in man power in the Russian campaign of 1941 were at least a million, exclusive of the sick and frostbitten. In addition they had suffered tremendous losses in equipment, particularly guns, tanks, and planes. Still they had been unable to bring about a decision in their desperate attempt to destroy the Red army. The Russian forces, while sorely beset, were not only resisting bravely but also making preparation for widespread counterattacks. When Hitler underestimated Soviet strength, he made the gravest mistake of his career. Russian armaments were far larger and stronger than Nazi spies had reported. Stalin, knowing that his Nazi "friend" would surely double-cross him, had left no stone unturned in making preparation for the great assault. What Hitler had underestimated above all was the Russian spirit of resistance. The German panzer spearheads, it is true, were able to drive through the lines and take large numbers of prisoners, but the troops that were left behind the spearheads refused to surrender. They organized guerilla groups which would shoot from hidden points, attack lines of communication, or pounce upon smaller groups.

Equal disappointment awaited Hitler in regard to the large

quantities of booty he hoped to collect. Although he had gathered rich stores of all kinds during his previous conquests, his need of foodstuffs, oil, iron, steel, and other strategic metals was still urgent. Under the terms of the trade agreement concluded in August, 1939, Russia was to supply these needs. Germany did actually receive great quantities of grain and oil and much manganese, chrome, and antimony, but she needed still more. Hitler believed that if he could control the vast resources of Russia, particularly the natural wealth of the Ukraine, the danger of losing the war through lack of basic materials would be over. None of these hopes was fulfilled. Soon after the invasion started, Stalin had ordered a "scorched earth" policy like that practiced by the Chinese against the Japanese. In other words, he called for the destruction of everything in the path of the invader. This policy was very literally and efficiently carried out. In all the captured industrial cities both factories and supplies had been removed or destroyed before the Nazis succeeded in reaching them. In the invaded territory generally bridges were burned, railroads torn up, and highways mined to make the advance more difficult. Even Hitler's hopes of quickly turning the Ukraine into a great German food arsenal did not materialize. Many grain-fields which were still uncut were ruined by troops and tanks. Where they were undamaged, agricultural workers were scarce, most able-bodied men having been summoned to the armed forces. Where workers could be found, there was little field machinery for them to use, and before much could be done about it winter set in. Thus the results were picayune. Hitler was temporarily master of the most fertile soil of Europe but could not harvest its coveted fruits.

Hitler's hopes that the conquest of western Russia with its natural resources and industrial centers would paralyze the Russian war effort were doomed to disappointment. Steel production was still about 50 per cent, and coal production large. Both new mines and new armament factories were being opened in the east. While a number of these plants had been successfully transferred from the west, others were equipped with new machinery which had been made in Russia or was imported. Consequently airplane production, for example, was soon at full blast far from the battle front. More important still, Russia was accessible to imports from the outer world. Some aid was soon on the way from Britain and the United States, although neither country had much to spare for the time being. Early in September prime minister Churchill revealed that the British had sent hundreds of planes and also a unit of the Royal Air Force to Russia. Nor was the United States government inactive.

On September 16 it was announced that American technicians were already at work in Russia assembling materials sent there from the United States. The next day \$100 million were made available by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for Soviet purchases in the United States. Finally, toward the end of September delegates from Britain and the United States made arrangements with Soviet officials for supplying war materials on a large scale so that, as Mr. Churchill put it, the Soviet command would "know what monthly quotas of weapons and supplies we can send and they can count upon." Even more important than any formal agreement was the problem of opening an avenue through which the goods could be taken into Russia. As the Leningrad–Murmansk railway had been cut by enemy action, only Vladivostok and Archangel were available as ports of entry. But neither was ice free in the winter, and the hostile attitude of Japan ruled Vladivostok out completely. The best southern route ran across Iran (Persia). German agents in Iran, however, did their utmost to block the passage of materials over this route. When the Iranian government refused to expel these agents at the request of London and Moscow, British and Russian troops invaded Iran on August 26. On September 16 they occupied Teheran. Although peace was concluded after the reigning shah abdicated in favor of his son, the Allied forces continued to occupy the northern provinces.

Before the Nazis invaded Russia it was predicted in many quarters that if they did not succeed in destroying the Russian armies in six weeks they would bog down for the winter. This is exactly what happened. In late September there was a light snowfall which did not interfere appreciably with the fighting but did serve as a warning that winter was approaching. Thereafter the Germans fought against time. The increased tempo of their drive betrayed their anxiety to wind up the campaign before winter set in. The advent of winter in mid-October, a month earlier than had been expected, caught them quite unprepared. They had been so certain that they would overwhelm Russia before the onset of winter that such necessities as fur coats and gloves, fur-lined jackets, and heavy footgear had either not been prepared at all or only in very inadequate quantities.¹ Nor had they assembled adequate stores of other essential materials. Moreover, their offensive weapons, particularly tanks, planes, and armored cars, had not been tested under and serviced

¹ Dr. Goebbels belatedly tried to solve this situation by ordering all German civilians to surrender their spare winter clothing. It was a makeshift attempt to atone for the lack of long-distance planning.

for zero conditions. Consequently the panzer divisions were largely immobilized after the beginning of December. There were, in fact, few divisions which had any training whatever in the special requirements of winter warfare in subzero temperatures. Thus the winter changed the situation on the eastern front. Whatever advantages of better organization and strategic initiative the Germans may have had in the summer campaign were to a large extent canceled by the conditions of winter warfare.

Early in December the Red army, which Nazi propaganda had repeatedly described as "destroyed," launched a major offensive along the entire front from Leningrad to the Sea of Azov. Winter having settled down in earnest, the Russians had better opportunities for a successful counterattack. For years units of their army had been systematically trained in the tactical needs of winter warfare. Special attention had been given to the training of infantry to travel and fight on skis. In addition the Red army also had many divisions of cavalry trained for winter combat and such special mechanized equipment as propellor-driven armored sleds. All these were now put to the test. In the south the Russians had already battered their way back into the great manufacturing city of Rostov on November 30, only two weeks after the Nazis had taken it. The advance did not stop until the Germans were driven back beyond Taganrog. In the north the counterattack relieved the pressure on Leningrad but failed to dislodge the Germans from Shlisselburg, possession of which severed railway communications between Leningrad and Moscow. On the central front the Nazis were swept out of Klin, Kalinin, and Tula. In these attacks the Cossacks, who had made Napoleon's retreat from Moscow a continuous misery, took heavy revenge upon the fleeing columns with their rifles and their glistening sabers.

On the map the Soviet gains did not loom so large as the great blocks of territory the Germans had conquered, but the Red army with the help of winter had done what no other nation succeeded in doing. It had slowed up and finally turned back the "invincible" *Wehrmacht*, inflicting upon it great losses in men and equipment. A correspondent on the central front wrote: "Never before have I seen such destruction over so many miles as that which followed in the wake of Kuznetzov's army from Klin westward. . . . There were at least a thousand military vehicles smashed and burned and destroyed in the first twenty-five miles. Tanks were on their sides, trucks overturned, windshields smashed, and engines shattered." Despite the wrecked equipment, roadside scenes were reminiscent

of the familiar paintings depicting the retreat of Napoleon's army, except that the twisted figures of the dead bore swastikas on their uniforms instead of the imperial arms of France.

Besides taking a high toll in human life and in equipment, the retreat had an immense effect on Nazi morale. Soldiers captured by the Russians during the retreat lacked the swagger and bravado which had characterized earlier captives. It even had a depressing effect on the morale of the civilian population in Germany. The mounting lists of dead and the long trains of wounded pouring back into the Reich brought home to the German people the seriousness of the situation. It also effected a change in German opinion of the Russian soldier. Whereas the Nazis had previously denounced the Red troops as being scarcely human, they now began to extol their fighting qualities. Thus a German military expert stated in the *Völkischer Beobachter*: "The toughness and staying power of the Soviet soldiers are almost beyond belief. The Soviets fought for every inch of ground even when their situation was obviously completely hopeless."



THE UNITED STATES AND THE WAR

The outbreak of the Second World War in September, 1939, posed a new set of problems for the United States. From 1935 to 1937 an imposing body of neutrality legislation had been enacted to keep from getting involved in foreign wars. In 1939 the people were still deeply influenced by the isolationist tradition and there was a determination to avoid being sucked into the maelstrom. On the other hand, sentiment was sympathetic to the Allies. From the very outset of hostilities Germany had few defenders except the underground propaganda organizations. Even those sections where a large part of the population was of German extraction sympathized with France and England because they were fighting to maintain the principles of democracy. President Roosevelt made veiled reference to this sympathy when he said on the eve of September 3: "This nation will remain a neutral nation, but I cannot ask that every American remain neutral in thought as well. Even a neutral has a right to take account of the facts."² On September 5 the President proclaimed the neutrality of the United States and in accordance with the provisions of the Neutrality Act placed an embargo on the shipment of arms to the belligerents. A few days later he proclaimed

² This was in sharp contrast to President Wilson's appeal of 1914 in which he called for neutrality in thought as well as in deed.

a national emergency and issued orders for increasing the defense forces.

But the currents of opinion soon shifted. What at the beginning had been passive sympathy soon became active. Before many weeks President Roosevelt took steps toward giving the Allies material aid. He summoned Congress to convene in special session on September 21 for the purpose of considering a revision of that part of the Neutrality Act which forbade the sale of arms to belligerents. In his message to Congress he styled the arms embargo as "most vitally dangerous to American neutrality, American security, and American peace." Although isolationists immediately denounced the requested revision as unneutral, sympathy for the Allies proved to be the deciding factor. On November 4, 1939, Mr. Roosevelt signed a revised Neutrality Act which permitted the Allies to purchase munitions. It did not, however, permit American shipping to enter the war zone, defined by the President as including the waters about the British Isles, the Atlantic coast of France, and the Baltic. Thus aid to Britain and France meant the right to purchase for cash and to transport the goods across the ocean in British ships. With the repeal of the embargo, large consignments of aircraft and other implements of war, much of which had been ordered by Britain and France before the combat started, could be shipped to Europe.

The events of 1940 caused a further shift in public opinion. After the attack on Norway and Denmark the isolationists lost ground rapidly. When the occupation of the two Scandinavian countries was followed by an attack on Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg a feeling of anger and horror swept through the country, particularly as a result of such acts as the bombing of Rotterdam. The American people became passionately partisan in that they wanted Hitler defeated. Mussolini's entry into the war at the moment when victory without risk seemed certain, further strengthened the anti-Axis feeling. But it was the French debacle that caused a more violent shock than perhaps anything that had occurred in Europe since the days of George III. As the march of the Nazi legions continued across France, anger and horror gave way to apprehension. It was believed that a victory for the Axis armies in Europe not only would mean a threat to democratic principles but would inevitably lead to war between the Axis and the United States. The possible acquisition of the Allied fleets by Germany convinced most of the remaining isolationists that it was time to take stock of the military establishment. What they found was the world's second strongest navy and one of the world's smallest armies. The size of the army was increased almost at once, and on June 17 the President signed bills

increasing naval tonnage by 11 per cent. The next day Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, recommended a 70 per cent increase of the navy so that the United States would be ready for every eventuality. It was the first step toward a two-ocean navy. In addition a program for an airforce of 35,000 planes and an army of millions was adopted.

When France crumpled and Britain stood alone against the control of Europe by the Axis powers, it became clear that only the United States, the one great industrial power outside Europe, could furnish Britain with the arms needed to fend off the German attack. Realizing that Britain was the last bastion of democracy, public opinion favored giving her every material aid the United States could command. In the presidential elections of 1940 support for the British cause was endorsed by the platforms of both major political parties. General John J. Pershing, who had led the United States expedition to Europe in World War I, supported the aid-to-Britain campaign with the statement: "By sending help to the British we can still hope with confidence to keep the war on the other side of the Atlantic." Even a majority of the isolationists asked only that the administration be careful not to plunge the country into actual fighting. Aid to Britain took various forms. Of the utmost importance was the increasing canalization of trade into Britain and British Commonwealth territories. During the period from September, 1939, to August, 1940, Britain, Canada, Australia, the Union of South Africa, and India received 95 per cent of all American exports of airplanes and airplane parts, and 90 per cent of the firearms, munitions, and explosives.

As the stream of materials which flowed to the British was hardly more than a trickle in comparison with their needs, used arms, ships, and planes were turned over to them. Thus, to replace some of the munitions they had lost in the evacuation of Dunkirk, equipment from the United States reserve stocks of World War I was sold to them in June, 1940. Included in this equipment were 600,000 rifles, 80,000 machine guns, 316 trench mortars, and nine hundred 75 mm. field guns as well as a large supply of ammunition. In addition, 240 obsolete army and navy planes were sold. To enable them to give their convoys better protection, fifty over-age destroyers were transferred to the British navy, in return for which the United States acquired eight strategic bases on British soil in the West Atlantic and the Caribbean. Finally, during the period from September, 1939, to the end of 1940 the United States sold 132 merchant ships to Britain and 43 to Canada.

During 1941 the United States became more and more deeply

involved in World War II. On March 11, after two months of spirited debate, Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act which empowered the President to provide goods and services to those anti-Axis countries whose defense he deemed vital to the security of the United States. The next day he submitted his seven billion dollar budget. During the succeeding months large quantities of materials financed by this budget were made available to the British and to a lesser extent to the Chinese and Russians. But the problem of transporting these supplies still remained most pressing. Britain was unable to replace her sea losses despite increased production. To relieve the need for ships the United States in the same month seized two German, twenty-eight Italian, and thirty-six Danish ships anchored in American harbors. This made it possible to release a corresponding tonnage to Britain, but even this was only a temporary solution of the problem. Early in April Washington negotiated an agreement with the Danish minister which placed Greenland under American protection for the duration of the war and gave this country the right to establish naval and air bases on the island. Thus the United States was able to extend protection to merchant ships to within 1800 miles of the embattled British Isles.

Month after month the country was moving nearer to a "shooting" war. On September 1, in an address marking the second anniversary of the opening of World War II, the President uttered the following "fighting" words: "I know that I speak the conscience and determination of the American people when I say that we shall do everything in our power to crush Hitler and his Nazi forces." The *New York Times*, commenting on this speech, stated in an editorial (September 3): "The United States is no longer a neutral in this war. It is no longer on the side lines. It has made its choice. It is a belligerent today. . . . The definitive action was the passage of the Lend-Lease Act." Next day the destroyer *Greer*, en route to Iceland with mail and plainly marked with a large American flag, was attacked in full daylight by a submarine. This submarine, which the Nazis admitted to be German, deliberately fired a torpedo at the *Greer* but missed. A week later the President took another step toward war when he announced in a radio address that he had ordered the navy to shoot if necessary. This statement was amplified in an article by the President published in *Collier's* on October 11, in which he stated that this country could not afford to wait until it was physically attacked "before starting to shoot." The real commitment came in the Navy Day address of October 27 when he said: "The forward march of Hitlerism can be stopped and it will be

stopped. Very simply and very bluntly—we are pledged to pull our own oar in the destruction of Hitlerism.” Not long after Congress as the result of the sinking of a number of ships during September and October repealed the remaining provisions of the Neutrality Act (November 14), thereby permitting the arming of the United States merchant ships and their entry into the war zones. Thus the United States had abandoned all but formal pretenses of remaining at peace with the Axis. The American people were now allied with those of the British Commonwealth in everything but fighting. Many began to wonder when the fighting would start.

The final decision was thrust upon the nation on December 7 when Japan attacked American possessions in the Pacific. After opening a decade of aggression by the invasion of Manchuria on September 18, 1931, Japan had joined Germany and Italy in signing the German-inspired anti-Comintern Pact in 1936 (November 25). The following summer saw the Japanese launch large-scale military operations in China. Although they succeeded in taking many large cities, they failed to subdue the country. By 1940 the “undeclared war” in China had developed into what appeared to be a stalemate, but increased aid to China from the United States during the succeeding months raised the specter of defeat. Their leaders began to look for an “honorable” way out of the dilemma. The answer was provided by the militarists—expansion to the south. In the years since Japanese troops had marched into Manchuria, conditions had changed greatly. Britain, occupied at home in fending off Nazi attacks, was no longer able to act as policeman. Nor could the Dutch and French do much to protect their interests so long as they were under the Nazi heel. Moreover, the United States, exponent of the *status quo* in the Far East, was busy aiding the British to resist the Nazi onslaught. Thus the time appeared auspicious for the Japanese to establish a “new order” in Asia, one that would not concern itself merely with the Chinese millions. For some years the Japanese had been enviously regarding two prizes in particular, the Dutch East Indies with their riches in rubber, oil, and tin, and French Indo-China, with its tin and zinc mines, its coal, and its great rice paddies.

When the Germans engaged the Russians in 1941, thereby removing another brake, the expansionists saw their way clear for a showdown with the United States and Britain. In September, 1940, Japan had moved completely into the Axis camp by signing the Tripartite Pact. This enabled the militarists to dangle the threat of a two-ocean war before the Americans. It was hoped that it would

induce the government to close its eyes to any territorial changes that might take place in the Far East. Before signing the Tripartite Pact the Japanese had insisted upon Hitler's endorsement of their plan to occupy Indo-China. The endorsement must have been given, for on September 22 the French authorities at Hanoi, the capital, announced surrender to the Japanese ultimatum, and the Japanese forces moved in. Determined that seizure of Far Eastern territory must cease, President Roosevelt on July 26 froze all Japanese assets in the United States. The nations of the British Commonwealth at once took the same step and the Dutch East Indies followed suit. A few days later President Roosevelt subjected all oil shipments to Japan to licensing and sharply restricted the shipment of scrap iron to any points outside this hemisphere.

Thus the Japanese government was harassed by economic pressure from within and without. On the outside the blockade which the so-called ABCD powers (America, Britain, China and the Dutch East Indies) established, cut off about 75 per cent of normal imports. Inside Japan the shortage of materials, added to the strain of a war economy and the needs of a growing population, caused widespread economic distress. Conditions became so bad that fear of an inner explosion gripped the leaders. Army and navy cliques who had sponsored the program of aggression that started in 1931, saw their influence on the wane and decided that action of some kind was imperative to regain their hold on the people. Meanwhile German advisers were also pressing for action. A war with the United States, the Germans hoped, would stop the flow of American materials to Britain and Russia.

Before resorting to arms, the militarists decided to see if they could not prevail upon the United States government to reverse its stand. For this purpose Mr. Saburo Kurusu was dispatched to Washington early in November of 1941. The same day on which he boarded the trans-Pacific clipper to San Francisco, the *Japan Times and Advertiser*, mouthpiece of the Japanese foreign office, stated that Japan's patience had "reached the point of exhaustion" and then proceed to set forth a list of minimum concessions that the Americans and British would have to make if they were really desirous of a peaceful settlement of affairs in Asia. Included in the list were the following: cessation of all military and economic aid to China; a policy of "hands off" in China so that the Chinese would be "free to deal with Japan"; acknowledgment of Japan's "co-prosperity sphere"; recognition of Manchukuo; and removal of all restrictions upon shipping and commerce. Envoy Kurusu arrived

at San Francisco on November 14, announcing that he might make "a touchdown"; but when actual negotiations began, it became evident that the ideas of the two nations were diametrically opposed.

President Roosevelt and secretary of state Hull had few doubts regarding the ruthless temper of the Japanese, but they clung to the hope that the militarists might still come to their senses before taking an irrevocable step. Preliminary discussions began on November 17 between Mr. Hull, Mr. Kurusu, and Mr. Nomura, the Japanese ambassador. As early as the next day the Japanese representatives left with Mr. Hull the notorious memorandum which set forth as Japan's terms for the settlement a list of demands almost identical with those published twelve days earlier in the *Japan Times and Advertiser*. In presenting the memorandum to Mr. Hull, Mr. Kurusu and Ambassador Nomura asked him to bring the matter to the attention of the President at once for a final answer, adding that they could not be responsible for the conduct of their government if the answer was delayed. During the next days President Roosevelt and Mr. Hull carefully canvassed the situation in search of a formula on the basis of which the "peace conversations" could be continued. Finally on the afternoon of November 26 the secretary of state handed the Japanese ambassador a note setting forth in detail the terms upon which the government believed an amicable settlement of all the outstanding difficulties in the Pacific and eastern Asia could be achieved. The proposals included the withdrawal of all Japanese forces from China and Indo-China, recognition by Japan of the territorial and political independence of the Asiatic countries, future adherence of Japan to the rules of law and order in her relations with other countries, relinquishment of her "Greater Asia Co-prosperity Sphere," and withdrawal from her association with the Axis powers.

The Japanese preferred not to make a complete about-face. Since the final decision to go to war must have been made very soon after they received Mr. Hull's note of November 26, the final stage of the "peace negotiations" was an elaborate piece of make-believe in order to gain time so that the units could reach Pearl Harbor for the surprise attack. On December 2, when the Japanese cabinet suggested that negotiations in Washington should continue, the aircraft carriers that appeared off Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7 must already have left port. President Roosevelt, it appears, did not expect the break to come before the receipt of the Japanese reply to the note of November 26. Evidently anticipating that it would give rise to a crisis, he dispatched a personal appeal to


Emperor Hirohito on Saturday, December 6, urging him to cooperate in the effort to maintain peace in the Pacific. The appeal closed with the words: "I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the war clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our great countries, but for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world."



PEARL HARBOR AND AFTER

Less than twenty-four hours later the Japanese dropped bombs on the naval fortress located on the Hawaiian island of Oahu. There was no warning of any kind, not even such an ultimatum as Hitler was wont to issue before he sent his legions across the border. At 7:55 A.M. on December 7 dive-bombers, torpedo-carrying planes, and fighter planes, totaling more than a hundred, with the insignia of the Rising Sun emblazoned in red on their wings, roared over Pearl Harbor. The attack was in imitation of the Nazi *Blitzkrieg* tactics. The Japanese appeared to reason that if they could destroy the Hawaiian fleet they could proceed to the occupation of selected points in the Far East without fear of a flank attack. The time was set for Sunday morning when most of the ship and aircraft crews would be on holiday leave. Aided by the element of surprise, the Japanese succeeded in sinking or damaging severely five battleships, three destroyers, a mine layer, a target ship, and a floating drydock. In addition they damaged three battleships, three cruisers, a sea-plane tender, and a repair ship. On nearby airfields their bombs destroyed more than 240 army and navy planes. Most serious were the losses in personnel. The treacherous attack caused the death of 2343 officers and enlisted men; the number of wounded was 1272. In short, United States naval and air power in the Hawaiian Islands was paralyzed for the time being. Within the next few hours the Japanese struck in a carefully planned offensive at the islands of Wake, Midway, and Guam, the city of Manila, and the British base at Singapore. Only after these attacks did they issue a formal declaration of war.

At 2:05 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, after the bombardment of Pearl Harbor had been under way for forty-five minutes and hundreds of American soldiers and sailors had already perished, Ambassador Nomura and Envoy Kurusu walked into the State Depart-



THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC

The vast extent of the war area in the Pacific is indicated by the fact that the approximate distance from San Francisco to Hawaii is 2400 miles, from Honolulu to Guam 3760 miles, from Guam to Manila 1700 miles, from Darwin to Singapore 2185 miles, from Singapore to Manila 1580 miles, and from Manila to Tokyo 1860 miles.

ment in Washington to deliver to Mr. Hull the Japanese answer to the note of November 26. Upon receiving the note the secretary of state proceeded to read it at once. Having finished the farrago of insults and falsehoods he arose and in a voice choked with anger, for he already knew of the attack, said to the Japanese representatives: "I must say that in all my conversations with you during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions—infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them." Mr. Hull abruptly dismissed his callers.

It was but natural that these perfidious attacks should generate a feeling of outrage and indignation in the United States, but they also wiped out any internal dissension that may have existed. All stood as one behind the President. Probably no President in the history of the country enjoyed such wholehearted support. In Washington Mr. Roosevelt held a cabinet meeting on the evening of December 7 and later conferred with Congressional leaders on arrangements for the delivery of a special message to the Congress. When the two houses met in joint session at 12:30 P.M. on the following day, it was in reality to ratify rather than to declare war. The President read his message which opened with the memorable words, "Yesterday, December 7, 1941—a date which will live in infamy." After he concluded, the Senate passed a formal declaration of war unanimously, while the House passed a declaration with only one dissenting vote.³ The absence of any debate such as had taken place when President Wilson asked for a declaration of war in 1917 was an eloquent commentary on the feelings the Japanese attack had aroused.

Other nations quickly stepped to the side of the United States. Britain, in fulfillment of the pledge made by Winston Churchill on November 10 that he would support the United States in a war with Japan, also issued a declaration of war.⁴ This example was soon followed by the other nations of the Commonwealth and by the Dutch East Indies. China, which after more than four years of fighting was resisting the Japanese more determinedly than ever, took

³ The one negative vote was cast by Miss Jeanette Rankin of Montana, who had also voted against war in 1917.

⁴ Because of the difference in time between England and the United States the British declaration actually preceded the one in Washington.

steps at once to act in close cooperation with Britain and the United States. Before many days passed, the doubts regarding relations with Germany and Italy were also resolved. On December 11 both Hitler and Mussolini announced that their countries were joining Japan. All that was left for Congress to do was to declare formally that a state of war had "been thrust upon the United States." Thus the circle of war closed around the world, almost every important nation becoming involved with the entrance of the United States and Japan.

Although the Japanese had sunk or damaged a large number of ships, wrecked a large number of planes, and taken a large toll of human life, they had failed in the primary purpose of "knocking out" the United States before the war really began. The attack, instead of discouraging the people, only strengthened their resolve to fight to a victorious conclusion. The nations aligned against the Axis had such a great preponderance of man power and such a tremendous potential of industrial power that there seemed little doubt in the Allied countries as to the outcome of the war. But the victory still had to be won; hence the people of the United States quickly set about making their war machine equal to the task. In every direction vast changes were inaugurated to transform the nation from a state of partial defense to one of total war, which demanded that every resource and device had to be organized and exploited and the energy of every individual employed in a common effort. In short, war became the major industry. Congress at once began to pass the legislation necessary to accelerate the war effort. It passed an amendment permitting the use of national guardsmen and selective service troops in countries outside the Western hemisphere, and another measure amended the Selective Service Act of 1940 by requiring the registration of all men from 18 to 64 years, inclusive. Every department and agency of the government, in fact, became busy with the new tasks. Nor was this all. Industry also speeded its output, with the result that ships, planes, tanks—all the machines of war—were soon pouring from the factories in an ever-swelling stream.



JAPANESE CONQUESTS

Japan's striking power proved to be much greater than had been thought possible. This put the Allies on the defensive throughout the broad expanse of the Pacific during the five months after Pearl Harbor. With the United States navy damaged so severely, the Japanese could have taken the Hawaiian Islands and might even have

threatened invasion of the mainland, but they decided to launch a series of attacks in other directions. As a nation already mobilized, Japan was ready. The United States, Britain, and the Netherlands, on the other hand, were not prepared to send adequate supplies and reinforcements to the East. At this time the navy was not as yet a two-ocean navy. What remained of the Pacific fleet was not large enough to fight off the Japanese, who had concentrated their entire navy in this area. Moreover, the Japanese had the advantage of operating from their home bases that were thousands of miles away. In regard to land forces they had an equal initial advantage. While they had their armies ready to strike, the United States was just in the process of collecting and drilling a force. Public opinion still regarded Germany as the chief enemy. Whatever war equipment could be spared was being sent to the conflict in Europe.

The efforts of the Japanese met with speedy success on all sides. Only three days after Pearl Harbor their bombers sank with a heavy loss of life the two British battleships, *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, which had ventured into the Gulf of Siam without fighter escort. Their naval supremacy strengthened by this victory, they proceeded at once to attack various American, British, and Dutch possessions. Their first target was the islands of Guam, Wake, and Midway which they believed would be used as steppingstones in moving American forces to the East. Guam, for the fortification of which Congress had voted funds too late, was quickly occupied, but the subjugation of Wake was more difficult. The contingent of 378 marines stationed on this island repelled attack after attack, sank seven Japanese ships, including a cruiser, and shot down a number of enemy planes, before it was overwhelmed. Although the military installations on Midway were subjected to severe bombings, no attempts were made during the first weeks to land enemy troops on it; hence this last island continued in United States hands. But the loss of Guam and Wake made the task of sending reinforcements to the Philippines almost insuperable.

Simultaneously with these attacks the Japanese had sent larger forces against other Allied possessions, among them Hong Kong. This colony, which had been a British possession for a century, had developed into the greatest trading center of southern China. It had been expected that in case of war it would be one of the first objects of enemy attack, and preparations had been made against assault; but the man power stationed there was not sufficient to repel the Japanese. As early as December 11 it became necessary for the defenders to abandon the mainland positions and retire to

the island. The rejection two days later of an ultimatum to surrender the island caused the Japanese to launch an all-out assault by land, sea, and air. The defenders still held out for almost two weeks. A particularly determined attack on December 23 and 24 with mortar fire and dive bombers caused the garrison to bow to the inevitable. The surrender came on Christmas Day.

The attack on Singapore was no less successful. This city, situated at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula, was the great British naval base in the East. Many regarded it as the key to the defense of both British and Dutch possessions in the region. After driving down the peninsula from various points, the Japanese forces reached the "gates" of Singapore at the beginning of February. On February 8, after an intense bombardment by artillery and dive bombers, assault troops crossed the Straits of Johore in steel barges to gain footholds on the island. The garrison, hoping that help would arrive, fought back desperately. The tightening grip of the Japanese, however, forced a surrender on February 15. The loss of Singapore was a severe blow to the strategic position of the Allies in the Far East. After renaming it Shonan (Light of the South), premier Tojo told the Japanese parliament that the possession of this base would enable the Japanese to conquer all British and Dutch possessions in the Far East, including India, Australia, and New Zealand.

Although events were to prove Tojo's statement overoptimistic, success did continue for some time. Before Singapore fell, the Japanese had started a campaign to conquer the Dutch East Indies. They had advanced into Sumatra and had also taken the naval base of Amboyna, east of Celebes. After the release of the forces that had been fighting on the Malayan peninsula, they made preparations for an all-out attack. On February 21 Allied air and naval units attacked a convoy carrying Japanese troops to the Dutch East Indies and inflicted considerable damage on it. But a Japanese fleet appeared on the scene to meet the main body of the Allied Far Eastern fleet in a series of engagements which began February 27 and ended March 1. In these engagements the Japanese succeeded in badly crippling the remainder of the Allied fleet. Allied losses included five cruisers and six destroyers. It was the greatest Japanese naval victory since Pearl Harbor.

For the Allies this disaster spelled the doom of the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese, unhampered by naval threats, could now bring up reinforcements to complete the conquest. Striking at three principal points in Java, their forces moved swiftly inland. The

army which the Dutch had organized in the East Indies, numbering about 130,000 men with 400 planes, fought back fiercely and took a heavy toll of men and equipment. This force, however, was not strong enough to stop the advance. On March 5 Batavia, the capital of Java, fell. The capture three days later of the Dutch headquarters at Bandung completed the campaign.⁵ With the surrender of the Dutch army on March 9 all but scattered resistance ceased.

Concurrently with these campaigns the Japanese were also waging a campaign in Burma. A woefully inadequate British force of not more than 20,000 set up one defense line after the other but was pushed back again and again until the Japanese were only sixty miles from Rangoon, the capital. At the beginning of March the British, aided by American volunteer fliers, made a last desperate stand on the Sittang River. Their line held for a time, but the Japanese finally managed to breach it, thereby sealing the fate of Rangoon. On March 8 the British troops evacuated the capital and made their way as best they could to India. The possession of Burma meant that the southern terminus of the famous Burma Road, the vital gateway for war supplies to the Chinese, was in enemy hands. As a result the situation of the Chinese became most critical. To relieve it the Allies had to find other means of transporting supplies to the Chungking government. The principal means employed thereafter was air transport, more particularly planes based in India.

Some of the most bitter fighting of the early months of 1942 took place in the Philippines, which the Japanese attacked simultaneously with Hong Kong. They were determined to secure the submission of the islands for at least two reasons: first because they lay across the path of Japanese expansion, and second because of their wealth of natural resources. They were defended by a force under the command of General MacArthur consisting of 40,000 Filipino and 15,000 United States troops, with a small airforce that was no match for the Japanese. The principal target was Luzon, the main island. Through the use of their superior air and naval forces the Japanese were able to make landings at a number of places and by Christmas of 1941 had succeeded in overrunning all the island except the area around Manila Bay. On January 2, despite the determined resistance of MacArthur's men, they took both Manila and the naval station at Cavite, forcing the troops to retreat to the Bataan Peninsula and the island of Corregidor.

The Japanese were to find the reduction of Bataan a slow and costly procedure. They gradually brought up more and more rein-

⁵ The Dutch naval base at Surabaya on the island of Borneo fell the next day.

forcements so that about 200,000 troops were eventually engaged in the attack. Day after day they launched assaults which were repulsed with the same regularity. At times General MacArthur's men even resorted to counterattacks which forced the enemy to retreat. Nevertheless, the process of attrition was wearing down the United States-Filipino force. Malaria and dysentery were also decimating the ranks. As only a small trickle of supplies reached them, hunger and exhaustion contributed their share toward weakening the defenders. By the beginning of March the situation had become so hopeless that President Roosevelt ordered General MacArthur to escape from Bataan and to proceed to Australia to assume supreme command of the Allied forces in the southwest Pacific. This change put Lieutenant General Jonathan Wainwright at the head of the Filipino-American force in its gallant but hopeless stand. During the succeeding weeks Japan attacked the defenders with renewed intensity, bombarding them from the air, pounding them with heavy artillery, and attacking them with infantry units. Finally on April 9, after four months of valiant fighting against insuperable odds, the soldiers accepted bitter defeat. General Wainwright removed 3500 troops to the fortress of Corregidor, after which the remaining troops, numbering about 35,000 surrendered.

But the conquest of the Philippines was not yet achieved. For almost a month the guns of Corregidor and its surrounding forts continued to bark defiance despite intensified artillery and air attacks. The last phase of the battle began with the heaviest artillery and air barrage of the entire struggle. After this had continued for four days, the Japanese succeeded on May 4 in landing assault troops on the rocky shores. All the next day to the following dawn the two forces fought a savage hand-to-hand struggle over the rugged two square miles of island before the Japanese finally overpowered the weakened and half-starved defenders. Finally on May 6 the fighting ceased and terms of surrender were discussed. General Wainwright was compelled to accede to the immediate surrender not only of Corregidor and its surrounding forts but of all the scattered forces operating in various parts of the Philippine Islands. Prisoners taken by the enemy numbered about 11,500. Thus the epic fight which won wide acclaim for the Filipino-American army came to an end.

Thus far the outlook for the Allied cause in the Far East had been gloomy indeed, but in May and June the clouds were lifted for a few weeks. The domination which the Japanese navy had exercised was sharply curtailed as the result of two battles. The first was the battle of the Coral Sea, fought off the coast of Australia.

Early in May a great Japanese armada was sighted moving through the southwest Pacific for the evident purpose of cutting the United States supply lines to Australia. Naval planes from aircraft carriers tore into the Japanese force, battering it so badly that it beat a hasty retreat. At least twenty Japanese ships were sunk or disabled, including an aircraft carrier, a heavy cruiser, a light cruiser, two destroyers, and four gunboats. It was the first serious defeat of the Japanese in the south Pacific. But they quickly rallied their forces and a month later aimed a new blow at Midway Island. Once again Allied air and naval forces rose to the challenge. In the battle of Midway (June 3-7) they met and drove back a powerful concentration of some eighty ships organized on the grand scale of modern war. Land-based planes from Midway Island struck the first blow and forced the armada to turn back. The retiring Japanese were then pursued by carrier-based planes which inflicted great damage. On the third day Admiral Nimitz announced: "A momentous victory is in the making. . . . Pearl Harbor has now been partially avenged." Of the eighty ships at least twenty were sunk or damaged, among them four carriers, two heavy cruisers, and three destroyers. It was a crippling blow, one which definitely ended Japan's naval superiority in the south Pacific.

While the main Japanese fleet was battling at Midway, a smaller force was busy seizing three islands of the Aleutian chain stretching from Alaska toward Siberia. On June 3 planes from a Japanese carrier bombed Dutch Harbor and Fort Mears on Unalaska Island, and several days later landings were made on Kiska and Attu, and later on Agattu. These desolate, fog-bound islands were of strategic importance because they might have served as a base for an attack upon Tokyo or upon the Japanese Kuriles which were only eight hundred miles away. Late in August a United States task force of army troops supported by the navy occupied the Andreanof Islands, 125 miles west of Kiska. Using these as a base, planes bombarded the Japanese positions on the Aleutians and also took a heavy toll of Japanese ships. By October the Japanese had retired from two of the islands to concentrate their installations on Kiska.

Up to this time the Allied forces had been largely on the defensive. The purpose had been to check the Japanese advance while the Allied nations were gathering strength to take the offensive. The first blow in this offensive was struck on the night of August 6 when an expeditionary force made a surprise attack on the Solomons, a fringe of volcanic islands strung for six hundred miles across the northern end of the Coral Sea. Since Japanese occupation of these

islands held a threat to the supply line to Australia, it was decided to dislodge the enemy. As the task force approached, General MacArthur's airmen began smashing at air bases at Rabaul, Lae, and Salamaua to prevent the Japanese from using their planes against the convoy. The first objective was Tulagi Harbor on Florida Island, one of the best harbors in the South Seas. Simultaneously landings were also made on the large island of Guadalcanal and on two smaller islands. Guadalcanal was of particular importance because the Japanese were cutting a large airfield out of the jungle on this island. On the morning of August 7 United States marines established a beach head and after three days of bitter fighting succeeded in driving the Japanese off the airfield into the jungle. The Allied force was equally successful in its attack at the other three points. On the night of August 8, however, the fleet suffered a severe loss when the Japanese surprised four cruisers that had been stationed to screen landing operations and quickly sank all of them. But the Allied force managed to hold the harbor of Tulagi as a base for naval attacks, and also the airport at Guadalcanal, named Henderson Field in memory of a hero of the battle of Midway.

The Japanese militarists refused to accept the loss of the Solomons, a loss that was a sharp blow to their prestige. Time and again they made determined attempts to drive the marines from Guadalcanal. Repeatedly under cover of midnight mists they landed small bodies of troops to reinforce the guerilla bands still lurking in the black mangrove jungles of the island. Heavy air attacks were aimed at the airfield on a number of occasions. Warships also approached to pour shells into the airfield zone. On October 11 Allied warships intercepted a Japanese fleet convoying a considerable number of transports to Guadalcanal. Other engagements in which Allied sea and air forces frustrated attempts to land reinforcements took place during the subsequent weeks. In mid-November a large force of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers was sighted convoying a fleet of transports headed for Guadalcanal. Although outnumbered, the Allied fleet drove them back with the loss of two battleships and five cruisers. It was another serious blow to the Japanese navy. Their futile attempts to retake the Solomons in 1942 cost them more than sixty ships sunk and more than eighty damaged, to say nothing of the 450 planes that were shot down over Guadalcanal. The ratio of United States losses was about one to seven.

At the end of the first year, the Japanese were well entrenched in Malaya, Burma, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines, territories rich in materials for which they had special need. It seemed

as if their plan for a Far Eastern co-prosperity sphere would be realized. In addition they possessed a chain of outposts which were advantageously placed to serve as bases for a further advance. But their successes had been largely achieved by default. The United States had been caught off guard and unprepared; British efforts had to be incidental; and the Netherlands were prostrate when the Japanese launched their attack. During this year while the Japanese were using up much equipment which they could not soon replace, the industries in the United States were outdistancing all previous production records. By the end of the year six of the eight ships that had been damaged at Pearl Harbor had not only been repaired but were back in service, and many new battleships, carriers, cruisers, and other types of ships had been added to the fleet. Planes were rolling off the assembly line in almost unbelievable numbers. What this would eventually mean was indicated when a group of army bombers operating from the U.S.S. *Hornet* carried the war to the very heart of Japan on April 18, 1942. The planes unloaded demolition and incendiary bombs on Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagoya.



FAILURE OF THE NAZIS IN RUSSIA

Throughout the winter of 1941–1942 the Russians continued to exert relentless pressure on the Nazis to force them westward. In the Leningrad area they slowly pushed them away from the old tsarist capital, and in the region southwest of Moscow they retook several towns. But all this did not deprive the Nazis of the initiative. It was universally expected that with the coming of spring they would reopen a major attack. In preparation, both sides were bringing up reserves of men and supplies. The primary objective of the new offensive was, however, different. In embarking upon the invasion the Germans had aimed at the annihilation of the Russian armies in a short time, but a year of fighting had convinced them that their resources were not adequate to the task. Not only the fighting qualities but also the fighting equipment of the Soviets had surprised the world. The new strategy therefore called for a major blow in one sector. The starting point was to be the Ukraine, where the Germans had made such spectacular advances in the preceding summer. A drive to the Volga and into the Caucasus would separate the Russian armies of the north from those of the south and would also cut off large areas from which they drew military supplies, food, and reinforcements. Conquest of these areas would also deprive the Russians of industrial establishments in which much of their heavy

equipment was produced and thus prevent them from organizing a major offensive against the Germans. Finally, the complete mastery of the Black Sea coast would render the Black Sea fleet ineffective and put the Germans in a position to drive toward Egypt around the eastern end of the Mediterranean.

Before starting the drive the Nazis had one task to complete. In the autumn campaign they had overrun most of the Crimea but had failed to take Sevastopol. They had begun to lay siege to it in October, 1941, and had continued throughout the winter. In a few weeks dive bombers and large mortars reduced it to a mass of ruins. Nevertheless, the Russians held out until the beginning of July. On the third of July the last Russians evacuated and the next day the Russian high command announced that Sevastopol had fallen.

Meanwhile on June 28 the big drive toward the Don River had begun. For it the Germans collected an estimated sixty divisions, of which ten to twelve were armored divisions with a strength of more than a thousand tanks for the battlefield and an equal number in reserve. As for strength in the air, they had collected over 3000 first-line planes or enough to permit the use of a thousand in a single mission. The immediate objective was Voronezh, an industrial city of 325,000 inhabitants a few miles east of the Don River or about 125 miles from Kursk, the starting point of the drive. The offense was opened by the *Luftwaffe* with a fierce bombardment of the Russian positions east of Kursk. After the planes had opened a gap in the Russian defenses, tank columns pressed on rapidly. At the end of a week Berlin announced that spearheads had advanced more than a hundred miles and had reached the Don on a broad front. On July 7 powerful tank forces crossed the Don and were followed by many divisions of infantry. Not many hours later this force was attacking Voronezh. Although the Berlin radio claimed that it had been taken, the Germans never did get a secure hold on it. Russian troops fought so determinedly for the possession of the city that the battle surged back and forth in the streets. On July 16 the Russians claimed the initiative at a number of points, and four days later the Germans were driven back across the river at one or two places.

If the Germans had been able to hold Voronezh, they would, it appears, have driven directly eastward to the Volga. By a rapid fanning-out they could then have moved northward to approach Moscow from the rear and southward to cut off the route along which lend-lease supplies reached Russia via the Caspian. But the stubborn resistance at Voronezh caused them to change their strategy.

They shifted the direction of their drive southward between Khar'kov and the Don toward the city of Voroshilovgrad. After taking it on July 20, they exerted their main pressure against the lower Don and the city of Rostov. Fighting in the outskirts of Rostov was fierce. Here the Russians sent into battle their giant fifty-two-ton tanks, called KV's,⁶ which were equipped with a three-inch cannon in addition to machine guns and were protected by armor so heavy as to make them almost invulnerable to fire from the 77 mm. guns of the Germans. The Russians did not, however, have enough KV's to overcome the Nazi superiority in armored vehicles, tanks, and planes. Berlin claimed capture of the city as early as July 26, but not until two days later did the Russians admit being forced out.

After the fall of Rostov the German high command divided its offensive, sending part of its forces to clear the Black Sea coast and the Caucasus and part toward the Volga at Stalingrad. In the Caucasus one of the major objectives was the petroleum fields. The great fields of Baku were more than seven hundred miles to the south, but smaller oil fields, including those of Maikop and Grozny, were nearer. The northern part of the Caucasus was also a fertile area from which the Russians drew a substantial part of their food supply. For a time the Germans advanced with remarkable speed. In rapid succession they took, among other places, Maikop, Krasnodar, and Georgievsk, the last being 275 miles southeast of Rostov. On September 10 they also captured the port of Novorossiisk on the Black Sea. But they failed to penetrate the Caucasus range and reach the Baku oil fields.

In the meantime the other drive had reached Stalingrad, which was to be the scene of a long epic struggle. This modern city was one of the proudest fruits of the Soviet economy and as such held a special place in the nation's affections. More than this, its large tractor and armament plants made it an essential part of the military effort. It was not a fortress like Sevastopol, but an industrial city protected by such fortifications as could be thrown up on short notice. When the Germans approached the city toward the end of August, they admitted that it would take them two weeks to drive the Russians out of the city. The Russians, however, had different ideas. The garrison, composed of both civilians and troops, met the attacks with a do-or-die determination. Although the Nazis had a distinct superiority in tanks and planes, the defenders made up in fighting spirit what they lacked in equipment. At first the Germans achieved a series of penetrations, but their advance was gradually slowed.

⁶Named after Marshal Klementi Voroshilov.

The Russians contested not only every building but every room with their lives. Casualties were so numerous that, as almost every report stated, it was "impossible to count the corpses." German dead often numbered two thousand in a day. Despite the great sacrifice in men and materials, the Germans were unable to take the city. Vanity induced Hitler to continue the attack even after his generals advised him that further attempts were fruitless. The most determined effort was made on October 14 after Hitler demanded the occupation of Stalingrad regardless of cost. But the Russian defenses held. General Chuikov said of this attack: "I would not have believed such an inferno could open up on earth. Men died but they did not retreat."

While the Germans were battering away at Stalingrad, the Russian high command projected a plan for encircling the attacking forces. On November 19 they launched two spearheads, one from the north and the other from the south. Both were to proceed westward and then toward each other in a pincer movement. Driving rapidly toward their objectives in *Blitzkrieg* fashion, they succeeded in a short time in encircling fourteen divisions. The ordinary means of supply being cut off, the German high command had to use aerial transports to provide these troops with food and ammunition. On Christmas Day they made a desperate attempt to relieve the encircled divisions, but were unsuccessful. All that remained for them was to sell their lives as dearly as possible. At the end of the first week of January less than 200,000 Germans remained of the original force of 330,000.

When the Nazis did not reply to an ultimatum of January 8 which demanded surrender, the Russians launched a determined attack to annihilate them. On January 17 it was estimated that the German garrison had been reduced to less than 80,000. Ten days later only 12,000 remained. The decisive triumph came on January 31 when the German force in central Stalingrad, together with sixteen generals, surrendered. The last of the resisting groups was overwhelmed during the succeeding days, thus bringing the epic of Stalingrad to a close. For the Russians it was an occasion for jubilation tempered by the knowledge that a bitter struggle was still ahead. Nevertheless, Stalingrad was the definite turning point in the Russian campaign.



THE DESERT SEESAW

In North Africa the year 1942 saw the desert seesaw swing back and forth. At the opening of the year the British Eighth Army was

engaged in an offensive which had started in November and by January had pushed General Rommel back to El Agheila. But the tide of battle soon began to flow against the British. While they had weakened their forces to send aid to the Far East, the Axis forces had succeeded in getting reinforcements in tanks, aircraft, and artillery. Rommel had, above all, received new 88 mm. guns which were far superior to the British 25 pounders. This gave him the necessary strength to strike back. Starting slowly, he retook Benghazi in late January. For the next few months the lines remained fairly constant, but in June Hitler's "master of desert warfare" unleashed the long-expected offensive with terrific force. On a single day (June 13) his forces destroyed 224 British tanks out of a force of 300. The British quickly retreated into Egypt after leaving a garrison of 25,000 men in Tobruk. Previously Tobruk had held out against the fiercest Axis bombardment for a period of eight months. This time General Rommel concentrated the bulk of his forces in a violent attack on the port by planes, artillery, tanks, and infantry. The next day (June 21) Tobruk surrendered with its entire garrison and large quantities of equipment, including one hundred tanks. Hitler was so jubilant that he immediately promoted Rommel to the rank of Field Marshal.

But Rommel did not stop with the capture of Tobruk. He pursued the retreating British into Egypt, where he engaged them at Mersa Matruh. The British commander, realizing that his army was in danger of being encircled, withdrew farther eastward. Rommel quickly took Mersa Matruh with six thousand prisoners and again set out in pursuit of the British. This time the British decided to make a stand at El Alamein where the desert narrows to a passage of thirty miles. Here Rommel could not employ his favorite strategy of using his tanks in wide sweeps to threaten the British with encirclement, for they were protected on the right by the Mediterranean and on the left by the swampy and impassable Qattara Depression. On July 1 the Nazi marshal hurled his entire strength against the British, but the line held. The Axis forces had finally been stopped. As El Alamein was less than seventy-five miles from Alexandria, it was feared that Rommel might try again to smash through to Cairo and the Suez Canal. The Afrika Korps was by this time, however, not only battle weary from months of fighting but also far removed from its supply bases. In August Rommel did probe the British line for weak places, but for the time being no major offensive developed. Nevertheless, so long as Rommel remained in Egypt he constituted a menace to Alexandria and the Suez Canal.

In August General Auchinleck, who had made the successful stand at El Alamein, was replaced by General Montgomery. Preparations were soon under way for a counteroffensive. Nor was Rommel idle. He prepared a line of fortifications which he confidently believed would hold against any assault. On a visit to Berlin in early October he told reporters: "We did not advance into Egypt merely to be thrown out again. We propose to hold what we have." On the night of October 23 General Montgomery opened his offensive with a terrific artillery barrage and air bombardment. For a week he continued to attack various points of the line. Finally on November 4 he succeeded in driving two armored wedges through the defenses. Making the most of the opportunity he quickly sent three armored divisions through the gaps, with the result that Rommel was forced to a retreat which gradually became a rout. The Axis forces were mercilessly bombed by British and United States planes. Six Italian divisions, which had been abandoned by the German mechanized divisions without food and water, surrendered en masse. By November 8 the British were in possession of Mersa Matruh, and before another week passed the Axis forces had been driven out of Bardia and Tobruk. On November 4 prime minister Churchill told parliament that the forces in North Africa had suffered 75,000 casualties. After Derna and Bengazi fell to the British in quick succession, a lull of three weeks ensued during which both sides reorganized. Next the British advanced on El Agheila and forced the Germans to evacuate it. The British continued to pursue the Germans, and the end of the year saw Rommel still in full retreat toward Tripoli and the Mareth Line.



ANGLO-AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

The success of the British in Libya made the Allied nations fear that the Axis leaders might decide to occupy the French North African colonies as compensation. To forestall such a move President Roosevelt and prime minister Churchill decided upon an Anglo-American expedition to occupy the colonies. Plans were laid for the greatest armada of its kind ever undertaken, one that was to include more than 500 troop and supply ships and a protecting force of more than 350 warships of all kinds. Preparations were carried out with such secrecy that the blow, when it came, was a complete tactical surprise. Gibraltar was made the rendezvous of the armada. Divided into two convoys it proceeded to establish beach head landings at a dozen points in French Morocco and

Algeria. On the night of November 7, just eleven months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt surprised the world with his announcement that a powerful United States force under the command of Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower was landing on the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts of French North Africa.⁷ The element of surprise greatly reduced the opposition. Algiers, one of the three main objectives, surrendered at the end of the first day. At Oran the resistance was stiffer, but by November 10 troops gained control of the city and the nearby naval base at Mers-el-Kebir. The most determined resistance was encountered at Casablanca. Not only did the French coastal batteries fire at the assault boats but the immobilized French battleship, the *Jean Bart*, hurled 15-inch shells at the armada. Her guns were, however, soon silenced by dive bombers. A French destroyer squadron which harassed the landing forces also had to be eliminated. After the landing had been made, tanks and infantry quickly forced their way into the city, but the French commander and his forces continued to resist until November 11. On that day Admiral Darlan, commander in chief of the Vichy-French forces, ordered resistance to cease in all of French North Africa.

All in all, the occupation of this vast territory with its coast line of 1500 miles, was accomplished in less than four days and with small losses. The total casualties were 860 killed or missing and 1050 wounded. The occupation placed Marshal Rommel's army in danger of being gripped by powerful Anglo-American pincers. The drive by the United States forces from the west and the British from the east to expel the last Axis troops from North Africa was soon to begin. In Europe Hitler responded to the occupation by sending troops into unoccupied France and by permitting Italian troops to occupy Corsica and Nice. Marshal Pétain, head of the French government which had its headquarters at Vichy, protested that Hitler was violating the terms of the armistice. The Germans ignored the protest. Hitler had also promised that the French warships would not be used by Germany or Italy. This pledge was no more sacred than previous Nazi promises. On November 27 a Nazi force entered the naval base at Toulon to take over the ships that were anchored there. The plan was frustrated by the garrison. Some of the ships escaped to North Africa; the others were scuttled by their crews.

In the Atlantic the loss of shipping to U-boats continued at an alarming rate. In January, 1942, losses in United States and British

⁷ Because of the difference in time the landings actually took place at 1 A.M. on November 8.

ships set a new record. As the Allied naval resources were strained almost to the limit in furnishing convoys for the main supply routes, shipping in the Caribbean and along the eastern coast of the United States was almost without protection during the early months of 1942. Hence these areas became the favorite hunting ground of the U-boats. During one week in March submarines sank twenty-two ships in the Atlantic. On June 16 the United States navy reported the sinking of ships off the Virginia coast in sight of thousands of spectators on the shore. A week later the navy announced that the system of convoys had been extended and that plans had been projected whereby lanes of coastwise shipping would be patrolled in an effort to cut down the losses. When convoys were established, the submarines went elsewhere in search of victims. Hence the losses continued. The total number of Allied ships sunk during the first six months of 1942 was set unofficially at 327. United States shipyards set a new record in June by launching sixty-six new ships, but the situation called for still more. The losses of the next six months brought the total for 1942 to well over ten million tons, while production for the year was only eight million tons. Replacement of tonnage became such an urgent problem that President Roosevelt called for sixteen million tons in 1943. But the sinkings were not all one-sided. On June 18, 1942, it was claimed in London that the RAF alone had sunk or damaged 750,000 tons of Axis shipping thus far in 1942.

The Allies Triumphant

NAZIS DRIVEN BACK IN
RUSSIA

FOR the Germans the year 1943 had opened with the Stalingrad disaster. It was the most serious setback they had suffered in the war. Shortly after Hitler announced that Stalingrad was practically taken, they were told that most of the large force had been wiped out and the rest captured. To many the report seemed incredible. As further details arrived, however, they realized the import of the defeat. Nor was this the only bad news. On January 1 the Russians had taken Velikiye Luki and annihilated the entire garrison when it refused to surrender. This loss was not acknowledged until January 25.

The Russian successes were all the more remarkable because they had been achieved without the full use of their available power. They had held large forces in reserve which were now ready to undertake a widespread counterattack. During the fall and early winter the high command had labored strenuously to replace the heavy losses suffered during 1942. They were now, in fact, better equipped for a counterattack than they had been in 1942. New production centers, set up in the Urals where they were out of bombing range, were beginning to turn out vast quantities of planes, tanks, mines, mortars, and artillery. By the beginning of 1943 Russia was producing practically as many planes as Germany. This production was also supplemented by lend-lease supplies from Britain and the United States. Furthermore, the Russians had to a large extent solved the problem of mobility under winter conditions which had seriously hampered their efforts in the preceding winter. The Germans, on the other hand, faced the Russians with their lines extended. Their generals had urged withdrawal to a more

favorable position but had been overruled "by the intuition of Corporal Hitler," as Winston Churchill put it. The Führer, it appears, feared the effect of further withdrawals upon the morale of the satellite nations. Rumania was already in a state of panic and there was danger that this panic might spread to Hungary and Bulgaria, thus crumbling the whole Balkan front. The Finns, too, were so tired of the war that the Germans feared their exit from it. In any case, the German troops remained in their perilously advanced position.

In the early weeks of 1943 the Russians moved westward on a front extending from Moscow to the Caucasus and were able to wrest a number of centers of resistance from the Nazis. On February 8 they took the strongly fortified city of Kursk, which had been the main bastion of the Nazis' winter line in the Ukraine. A week later (February 16) Kharkov, which had been in German possession fifteen months, was taken. When the Red army reached the outskirts of Kharkov, the Nazis had begun a systematic demolition of the city's newest and largest buildings, many of which were the pride of the Ukraine. After the Russians occupied the city, the *Luftwaffe* caused further destruction by bombing it. On the same day on which Kharkov fell the Soviet forces also entered Rostov, the key to the entire German southern front. It was their greatest victory since the battle of Stalingrad. Nor was this all. On March 3 they regained R/hev, a stronghold on the central front 130 miles from Moscow. Nine days later (March 12) they took Vyazma, an important point on the railway between Moscow and Smolensk. But they had gambled too boldly. In their rapid advance they had overextended their supply lines and made themselves vulnerable to counterattack; the Nazis made the most of the opportunity to retake Kharkov on March 14. When heavy rains and spring thaws at the end of March stopped major military operations, it was found that the Red army in its winter drive had reconquered 185,000 square miles of territory.

As the summer of the third year of the Russian war approached, Hitler was faced with a difficult decision. Should he launch a major offensive against Russia or not? An all-out attack offered the only chance of winning, but there were great obstacles to overcome before the Germans could be ready. At Stalingrad they had lost a large number of their best troops, and an all-out attack would have required the use of all available reserves at a time when the shortage of man power was becoming a pressing problem. Furthermore, they no longer enjoyed air superiority. Constant fighting and

Allied bombing of production centers had weakened the *Luftwaffe* to a point where they could no longer control the skies. Then, too, the Red army had found the answer to the German *Blitzkrieg*, thereby robbing the Nazis of their tactical superiority. In 1941 the Germans had attacked along a front of 1800 miles; in 1942 a 480 mile sector was chosen for the summer campaign; but in 1943 the attack was restricted to a 160 mile sector running from Orel through Kursk to Belgorod. Moreover, this time the element of surprise was completely lacking. The offensive which finally got under way on July 7 almost immediately encountered superior forces. In three days the Russians claimed to have destroyed more than two thousand tanks and nearly a thousand planes. By the end of the first week the offensive had been stopped at most points.

As early as July 12, after one of the heaviest artillery barrages in history, the Russians began their counteroffensive, which was aimed at the German fortified base at Orel. They employed enveloping movements and hoped that the Germans would endeavor to maintain their positions despite flanking. But the Germans chose to retreat after destroying everything of value and planting mines to delay pursuit. On August 5 they were defeated in an unusually heavy tank battle and evacuated Orel. On the same day Belgorod, 125 miles to the south and only less important than Orel, also fell. Thus the Russians took the last two important bases which the Germans could have used for an attack on Moscow. Farther south the offensive was equally successful. Slowly forcing the Germans back day after day, the Red army on August 24 regained Kharkov, which before the war had been the third largest Russian city. It was the fourth time Kharkov had changed hands since 1941. Early in August a third and equally heavy offensive had been launched in the sector between the German strong points of Bryansk and Smolensk. On September 7 Stalino, which had been one of Russia's important steel centers, was taken. By October 1 both Bryansk and Smolensk were in Russian hands and the reconquest of the Ukraine was in sight. They were beating the inventors of the *Blitzkrieg* at their own game. On a curving line from Smolensk to the Sea of Azov and the Caucasus the Germans were in retreat.

By the beginning of October the Russians had reached the midsections of the great Dnieper River. On the other side of the river, protected by 600-foot cliffs, stood Kiev. Crossing the river to the north and the south, the Russians employed a pincer movement which after much bloody fighting resulted in the capture of the city on November 6. Surviving citizens presented evidence of the mass

slaughter of thousands of Jews and others by the Germans before they retreated. After the fall of Kiev the Russians pushed on toward Zhitomer, situated only sixty-seven miles from the old Polish border. They took the town, but lost it to the Germans a few days later. Nevertheless, they made considerable gains on the whole. It was estimated that they had retaken more than 135,000 square miles during the summer campaign, thereby raising the total territory recovered since Stalingrad to 335,000 miles. The price in blood and lives was high. In June, 1943, they stated that their losses in dead and wounded since the Germans entered Russia were 4,200,000 and estimated the German casualties at 6,400,000. The Germans responded by making extravagant claims of Russian casualties and by minimizing their own. Whatever the German losses, the Russian drive had exposed the lack of German reserves. It was clear that the Germans were near the bottom of their man power reservoir. The fighting from June to November, 1943, further drained the available supply.



DESTRUCTION FROM THE AIR

After using their bombers sparingly during the first period of the war, the British decided in 1942 that the time had come for a more intensive bombing campaign. Up to this time the scattered attacks by small numbers of planes were little more than pin pricks, and the damage they inflicted could be repaired in a short time. Repeated blows by hundreds of bombers, on the other hand, could ruin entire industrial districts so completely that it would take many months to rebuild them if they were rebuilt at all. Then, too, large-scale bombing would overwhelm the enemy defenses by the sheer weight of the attack. Mass formations sent out in the summer of 1942 devastated a large part of the old Hanseatic city of Lübeck and also of Rostock where the Nazis had built a huge plant for the manufacture of Heinkel planes. The bombings of 1942 reached a climax in the raid on Cologne, when more than a thousand planes dropped two thousand tons of explosives during a ninety-minute attack (May 30, 1942) and in the bombing three days later of Essen, the home of the Krupp munitions works, by more than one thousand planes. The British, however, sustained such heavy losses from anti-aircraft guns and from the attacks of German fighter planes that for the remainder of the year they contented themselves with sending out smaller detachments.

Everything that took place in 1942 was dwarfed by what fol-

lowed in 1943. First of all, the British had larger bombers which could carry eight-ton loads of bombs as compared with the two-ton loads of the earlier bombers. Second, the bombs were larger and more deadly, as the name "block busters" indicates. Third, the fact that the British made most of their raids at night greatly reduced their losses. Fourth, the efforts of the Royal Air Force were supplemented by the Eighth United States Army Air Force based in Britain. After many months of preparation, this force assayed its first raid on the Reich in January, 1943. The Flying Fortresses, with their strong defensive equipment and precision bombing sights, made high-altitude bombing possible in the daytime. Finally, the conquest of North Africa made possible a new system of "shuttle bombing." Instead of turning back over Germany where Nazi interceptors were awaiting them, the planes would fly southward to North Africa and after resting a few days would drop another load of bombs on Germany on the return trip to England.

Beginning in January, 1943, the combined Allied air force based in England dropped an ever-increasing tonnage of bombs on vital war industries, strategic railway centers, and other military objectives in both Germany and the occupied countries. Until the Allies were ready to open a second front this remained the most effective way of weakening the enemy. Good weather often enabled the Allied force to continue the "around-the-clock" bombings for days in succession. These huge loads of death repaid the Germans a thousand-fold for their attacks on London and Coventry in 1940. The once mighty *Luftwaffe*, now hopelessly outnumbered, struck back fiercely at the raiders but could not stop them. The principal target of the bombers was western Germany and particularly the Ruhr Valley, where many of the vital war industries were situated. During one period of thirty days beginning in May more than ten thousand tons of bombs were dropped in this area. Besides destroying the factories with explosive and incendiary bombs the Allies blasted the Mochne and Eder dams (May, 1943) in the Ruhr area, causing devastating floods which wrecked many industrial plants. Among the cities used as targets were Düsseldorf, Essen, Cologne, Dortmund, Stuttgart, Mülheim, Krefeld, Duisburg, and Hamm. Cologne, with its U-boat equipment plants, was bombed with monotonous regularity. On June 24 two thousand tons of bombs were dropped on this city, causing fires which could be seen a hundred miles away. On July 4 and 9 the attacks were repeated, the raid on the latter date being the 119th attack on this city since the beginning of the war. These bombings spelled the death of Cologne as an industrial city.

The destruction was, indeed, appalling, but the bombing was so accurate that the great cathedral was not leveled.

But the raids were not restricted to the vicinity of the Ruhr Valley. Bombs were dropped as far north as Trondheim in Norway and as far south as the industrial cities of Italy. Among the many objectives were the great Renault tank works near Paris, the Skoda arms plants in Czechoslovakia, the Diesel engine works at Nuremberg, the Zeiss instrument factories at Jena, the locomotive and aircraft plants at Kassel, the great Ploesti oil refineries in Rumania, and the ball-bearings works at Schweinfurt. One of the most frequent targets were the two submarine bases of Lorient and St. Nazaire. Other U-boat centers, shipyards, and ports that were raided included Kiel, Antwerp, Bremen, Emden, Wilhelmshaven, and Flensburg. The great summer offensive of 1943 was climaxed by raids on Hamburg, Germany's greatest seaport. During a period of six days, beginning July 24, over 8000 tons of bombs were dropped on this city. Fires that could be seen a hundred miles away caused the death of many thousands who had sought safety in air raid shelters. No less than 75 per cent of Hamburg was destroyed. As the news of the destruction spread, the citizens of Berlin became panicky, fearing that their city would be next. By this time they no longer had any faith in Göring's promise that not one enemy plane would darken the sky over Germany. Nor did they have to wait long before their fears were realized. Minor raids were, of course, no novelty. On a number of occasions speedy British Mosquito bombers which carried only small bombs had harried Berlin. But in August, 1943, a force of British and Canadian bombers dropped eighteen hundred tons on the German capital in forty-two minutes, completely devastating four square miles of the city. The raid cost the Allies fifty-eight heavy bombers.

Although the Allies often suffered heavy losses, they did succeed in greatly curtailing the production of war materials. The raid on Schweinfurt, for instance, which had cost 593 men and 60 planes had cut German production of ball bearings in half. As a result of such bombings bottlenecks developed in many industries which reduced the output of planes, tanks, and submarines. It was the destruction of submarine bases which accounted in part for the drop in shipping losses during the summer of 1943. Besides reducing production, the raids also lowered German morale. It was reported toward the end of 1943 that one million homes had been destroyed, rendering five million Germans homeless. In many of the bombed districts such bitter remarks as "For this we are indebted to the

Führer" became commonplaces. At first, propaganda minister Goebbels and his assistants sought to bolster the sagging morale with stories of how German planes were bombing New York. These stories found such general acceptance that when Nazi prisoners reached New York they were amazed at not finding the city in ruins. The official statements invariably admitted only a few casualties after a bombing raid and reported that only churches and hospitals had been hit. But in 1943 the destruction was so widespread that Goebbels could no longer conceal the facts. He now told the naked truth in the hope of exciting hatred and of arousing the people to greater effort against the Allies. Thus a German radio commentator said of the devastation in the Ruhr: "Nobody who has not seen it with his own eyes can have the faintest notion what it is like."

The Germans struck back as best they could with their weakened *Luftwaffe*, even to renewing the bombing attacks on England. Meanwhile they were developing a *Vergeltungswaffe* (vengeance weapon) in the form of a flying bomb which Hitler hoped would wreak the same destruction on Britain which the Allies had visited on Germany. "Our enemies," he said, "will pay in blood and lives." The flying or robot bomb, known as the V-1, was actually a small pilotless plane which carried in its nose an explosive equivalent to a one-ton bomb and was capable of attaining a speed of four hundred miles per hour. During the winter of 1943-1944 Allied reconnaissance discovered concrete installations along the French coast for launching robot bombs. After these were destroyed by bombing raids, the Germans developed other sites and on the night of June 12-13 began the attack on southern England. During the next eighty days they launched approximately 8000 bombs, of which about 2300 or 29 per cent reached their mark. Of the remaining number, 46 per cent were shot down or brought down by balloons, while 25 per cent were erratic in the direction of their flight. Nevertheless, those that reached their mark, most of them landing in the London area, killed 5479 persons and injured 15,934 besides destroying 25,000 houses, rendering 50,000 uninhabitable, and damaging almost a million.

In September the Germans began to send over the second "vengeance weapon" in the form of a rocket bomb known as the V-2. Although considerably larger it carried only the same charge of explosive as the V-1. It did, however, possess a number of advantages. As its speed was about 3000 miles per hour, which is many times faster than sound, it gave no warning and therefore could not

be so easily intercepted. Furthermore, it rose into the stratosphere to a height of sixty or seventy miles, after which it would descend at a terrific rate and hit the ground with such velocity that it buried itself deeply before exploding. Hence the explosion caused earth tremors in the vicinity, but the blast effect was not nearly so great as that of the V-1. It was also more inaccurate than the V-1. Nevertheless, the damage it wrought was considerable. During the months from September to December, 1944, no less than 1425 were killed and 3134 were injured by the V-2.

Meanwhile the Allies were making excellent progress in subjugating the U-boat. Whereas in 1942 shipping was being sunk about as rapidly as it could be constructed, the situation changed in 1943. Although Atlantic shipping was at the highest level of the war thus far and although the German "wolf packs" had increased to fleets of twenty-five to thirty U-boats, the rate of sinkings declined sharply. During the month of June the losses were lower than in any previous month of the war. The total losses for the first half of 1943 were about 175,000 tons monthly. During the same six months from about 1,000,000 to 1,780,000 tons were completed monthly in United States shipyards alone, permitting the Allies to accumulate tonnage for a far-reaching offensive. A joint Anglo-American statement of January, 1944, reported: "In 1943 U-boats sank but 40 per cent of the merchant ship tonnage that they sank in 1942." A number of factors were responsible for the decrease. In addition to the reduced output of submarines one might mention the use of aircraft carriers to protect convoys. Another very important factor was the development of improved detection devices, among them sonar which forced the U-boats to proceed more cautiously. During the summer months of 1943 enemy submarines were destroyed at the rate of one a day. In the fall, speedier and more heavily armed U-boats appeared. Their new anti-aircraft guns were such as to enable them to fight it out with a plane instead of submerging. But the improvement was not enough to redress the balance.



THE BATTLE FOR ITALY: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

In North Africa the year 1943 saw the continuation of the Allied drive which started in the previous year. The British pressed on from the east to force the surrender of Tripoli on January 24. By the end of the month Rommel's Afrika Korps had abandoned Tripolitania and withdrawn to Tunisia. Meanwhile United States troops had been moving eastward but were stopped at Faïd Pass

and driven back a considerable distance. Both forces, however, gradually pushed ahead. Tunis and Bizerte were captured on May 7, and during the succeeding days the remnants of the Axis force were harried from the air. Seeing that his situation was hopeless, General von Arnim, who had succeeded General Rommel as commander of the Afrika Korps, surrendered the rest of his troops. The British-American forces took 267,000 prisoners during the campaign. It was another serious blow to German morale.

Overwhelming Allied air superiority was a leading factor in the victory. No less than 1253 Axis planes were shot down during the drive. The air power which had been developed in the battle of Tunisia was at once turned on the little Italian island of Pantelleria, midway between Tunisia and Sicily. Stunned by the repeated bombings, the island surrendered as the first British troops waded ashore. It was the first step toward the invasion of Sicily. Having blasted Mussolini's dreams of empire, the Allied forces now made preparations to invade the mother country.

After extensive preparations the long-expected assault on Sicily got under way during the night of July 9-10 when large numbers of parachute troops were landed several miles behind the coast to disrupt communications and attempt to occupy the airfields. Early the next morning two thousand invasion vessels of all kinds, including warships, barges, and landing boats, arrived from North Africa to land British, Canadian, and United States troops on more than a hundred miles of the coast. As the troops landed, they met only light opposition, mostly from Italian shore units. Before the sun was high that morning, General Eisenhower reported that "the success of all landings was already assured." The British and Canadians had little trouble maintaining their beach heads, but the Americans were opposed by units of the crack Hermann Göring division. While the Germans were being pushed back, the Italians surrendered in droves. By August 17 the conquest of Sicily was complete. Besides taking quantities of undamaged war materials, the Allies captured about 130,000 prisoners. Allied casualties numbered 21,000 as against 30,000 Axis casualties. Above all, it was an important advance movement. General Eisenhower called it "the first stage in the liberation of the

THE ALLIED INVASION OF SICILY AND ITALY. *Some of the heaviest fighting of the war raged about Cassino and along the "Gothic Line" from Pisa to Rimini.*

European continent," and President Roosevelt hailed it as "the beginning of the end."

The loss of Sicily completely disillusioned the Italian people, whose morale Mussolini had sought to bolster with empty promises. Instead of seeing the glories of the Roman Empire revived, they saw their colonies conquered, their armies destroyed, their fleet defeated, their cities devastated by bombers, and their economy wrecked. More than this, they saw the Gestapo further curtail their already restricted liberties. And the future held out no hope for better things. Even the members of the Fascist Council were anything but optimistic. They had so completely lost faith in the Duce that they demanded his resignation on July 24. When he became defiant, King Victor Emmanuel III summoned him to the palace, informed him of his dismissal, and had him taken into custody. The formation of a new government was then entrusted to General Badoglio. Within a few hours most of the Fascist leaders were either under arrest or in hiding. The rank and file of the party now melted away and Fascism vanished like a long nightmare. The Italian masses upon hearing of the change surged about the streets, giving themselves up to unbridled rejoicing and to shouting invectives against the former dictator. Almost at once socialists, communists, and other groups which had existed underground for nearly twenty-two years made their appearance with printed proclamations. Beneath the joy of being rid of Fascism there was a deep desire for peace. In a broadcast from his headquarters in North Africa on July 29 General Eisenhower praised the Italians for ridding themselves of Mussolini and Fascism and intimated that he was ready to deal with a representative of the Italian government. Marshal Badoglio opened secret negotiations for the cessation of hostilities. On September 3 the Italian government accepted "unconditional surrender."

After the conquest of Sicily the Allied force was ready to be used against the European continent itself. The first phase of the new campaign began on August 19 with a heavy air attack on various points of the Italian peninsula which continued during the succeeding weeks. The principal targets were the railroads. On one raid more than five hundred United States bombers attacked Rome's airfields and railway facilities. Just before dawn on September 3 spearheads of the British Eighth Army together with Canadian divisions moved across the Strait of Messina to establish beach heads on the toe of the Italian boot. On September 8, by which time the British had established a firm grip on the peninsula, General Eisenhower announced that the Italian government had negotiated an

armistice five days previously. Hitler, however, was determined not to let the Allies occupy Italy and sent in as many divisions as he could spare to stop their progress. The day after the armistice was announced, United States troops established a beach head at Salerno within striking distance of Naples. As the Germans had prepared defensive positions for just such an attack, the fighting was bitter. For a time it seemed as if they would drive the Allied force into the sea, but the latter fought grimly and finally forced the Germans back. Thereafter the Germans employed every sort of booby trap and gunfire to retard the advance. Although considerable progress was made, the end of the year saw the Allied armies still closer to Naples than to Rome.

The early months of 1944 were marked by the failure of the Allies to achieve their immediate objectives. The terrain, the bad weather, and the determined fighting of the Germans whose forces were about equal to those of the Allies, made any kind of progress difficult. Prime minister Churchill described the situation to parliament in the following words: "Many people have been disappointed with the progress there since the capture of Naples in October. This has been due to extremely bad weather which marks the winter in a supposedly sunshiny land and which this year has been worse than usual. Secondly, it is because the Germans bit by bit have been drawn into Italy and have decided to make exertions for the retention of the city of Rome." To block the Allied drive on Rome the Germans had utilized the natural barriers to set up a defense line about eighty miles south of the city. The opposition was light at first, but the Germans quickly brought up 98,000 men to oppose the Allied force of 92,000. Thus they managed to stop the attempt to drive inland. For a time it appeared as if a stalemate had been reached. In May, however, the Allies succeeded in breaking through the line at Cassino,¹ after which the drive went forward over the rugged terrain.

After weeks of bloody fighting the Allied forces finally came within sight of Rome, the Eternal City, the city of Cicero, Caesar, and a host of emperors, popes, and kings. Since no purpose could be served by a defense which would certainly have resulted in the destruction of many priceless historical monuments, the Germans fought only rearguard actions to permit the withdrawal of their troops. On June 4 the Allies occupied the relatively unscarred city. It was the first Axis capital to capitulate to the Allies

¹ During the attack the famed monastery of Monte Cassino, original home of the Benedictine Order, was destroyed after the Germans made it an artillery post.

and the first time the city had been taken by an attack from the south. United States tanks which led the Allies into the city were greeted by cheering throngs who tossed flowers at their liberators and presented them with fruit and wine. But for the troops the grim business of war was not finished. On June 5, the day on which the inhabitants of Rome really welcomed the Anglo-American soldiers, King Victor Emmanuel III signed a decree "irrevocably" turning over his royal powers to Crown Prince Humbert, who became "Lieutenant General of the Realm." Victor Emmanuel, however, still reserved for himself the title of "King of Italy and head of the House of Savoy." When General Badoglio was unable to form a new cabinet at Prince Humbert's orders, he was succeeded by Ivanoe Bonomi, who had been prime minister in the pre-Mussolini era. Bonomi formed a cabinet of anti-Fascist patriots and in October the free government of Italy was recognized by the United Nations.

The fall of Rome was rather the beginning than the end of the Italian campaign. Without a pause the Allied troops rolled on through the city and across the Tiber. During the months that followed, they moved steadily northward through Tuscany to the Gothic Line in the northern Apennines. In his message to the Congress on January 6, 1945, President Roosevelt said of the fighting in Italy: "Over very difficult terrain and through adverse weather conditions, our Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army have in the past year pushed north through bloody Cassino and the Anzio beach head and through Rome until they now occupy heights overlooking the valley of the Po."




D-DAY: THE INVASION OF FRANCE

When President Roosevelt made a speech in Washington on the evening of June 5, 1944, to proclaim the capture of Rome to the nation he said: "Our victory comes at an excellent time . . . while our forces are poised for another strike at western Europe." The next day the long-awaited "second front" was opened in France. For many months preparations for the invasion had been under way. Large numbers of troops and vast quantities of supplies were assembled in England. After the preliminary preparations were completed General Eisenhower, fresh from his victories in North Africa, was called in to weld the diverse elements into a powerful fighting machine. It was a force composed of representatives of many peoples, the bulk being British, Canadian, and United States troops. During final inspection General Eisenhower said of his troops: "If their

fighting is as good as their training, God help the Nazis!" To carry this vast army to France, thousands of transports and landing barges were collected and also combat ships to protect them. During the early hours of June 6 a thousand planes either dropped parachutists in Normandy or towed gliders there. These airborne troops landed behind enemy lines to sever communications and seize key defense posts. A thousand heavy bombers were also attacking the beach defenses along the coast of France, dropping no less than ten thousand tons of bombs on them.

Meantime between midnight and dawn a fleet of more than four thousand ships, protected by a canopy of planes, was approaching the coast of Normandy in the greatest amphibious operation of all time. Shortly after 5 A.M. the warships opened fire on the shore batteries and defense installations, and an hour later the first waves of troops began to go ashore. Although the Germans knew that an invasion attempt was in the making and also approximately when it would be launched, they did not know where the blow would fall. The feints made by the Allies at Calais and Dieppe, which were the logical points of attack, appear to have misled the Germans. Hence the choice of Normandy in preference to the so-called "invasion" coast took them by surprise and enabled General Eisenhower to establish a sixty-mile beach head between Cherbourg and Le Havre. On the whole the landings were carried out smoothly and with fewer losses than had been anticipated. Overwhelming naval and air support permitted the Allied command to land large numbers of men and much matériel on the coast to protect their beach heads. The Nazis missed their chance, first, in not attacking the invaders from the air and, second, in not launching a vigorous counterattack while they were disorganized on or near the beaches. After the beach heads had been established, General Eisenhower broadcast a message to the peoples of the Hitler-controlled continent which read in part: "People of western Europe! A landing was made this morning on the coast of France by troops of the Allied Expeditionary Force. This landing is part of the concerted United Nations plan for the liberation of Europe, made in conjunction with our great Russian allies. I have this message for all of you. Although the initial assault may not have been made in your own country, the hour of your liberation is approaching."

The nub of the immediate Allied problem was to gain a port of entry. The obvious goal was Cherbourg. With the aid of a strong airforce operating from airstrips established on the beach heads, United States troops lunged westward toward Cherbourg. German




THE ALLIED INVASION OF FRANCE

Picturesque code names were given to various attacks during the Second World War, such as Operation Overlord for the cross-channel invasion of June 6, 1944; Operation Anvil for the invasion of southern France; and Operations Veritable, Grenade, and Lumberjack for the drives toward the Rhine.

resistance notwithstanding, they moved closer and closer. By July 2 the city was not only in their hands but they had also completed the mop-up of the peninsula on which it is situated. The occupation of this port blasted the German hopes of driving the Allied force into the sea. The beach heads were now secure. Progress inland, however, was very slow. At first the troops managed to move at the rate of about three miles a day. But the Germans sent in more troops and panzer divisions to localize the conflict. After being restricted for about six weeks an American armored column broke through the lines at St. Lô. This turned the tide of battle. Armored elements under the impulsive and brilliant General Patton quickly moved through the breach to strike out in two directions. While one spear-head turned into Brittany and toward the ports of Brest, St. Malo, Lorient, St. Nazaire, and Nantes, the other turned eastward toward Paris and the Seine through Tours, Orleans, and Chartres. On August 15 an army of American and French troops landed on the Mediterranean coast of France, east and west of Toulon. Without encountering much opposition they speedily took Toulon, Marseilles, and Nice. By September 3 they had also occupied Lyons.

Meanwhile in the north over a million American, British, Canadian, French, Polish, Belgian, and Dutch troops were pushing the Germans steadily eastward. Allied forces in crossing the Seine at first by-passed Paris, where French irregulars were fighting to drive out the German garrison. When the fighting continued for some days with the outcome uncertain, General Patton sent a French tank division and supporting American units to settle the issue. Two days later, on August 25, the Germans surrendered. That night Paris blazed with light. Swirling in street serpentine the Parisians went wild with joy. Their beloved city was free.

Other Allied forces joined Patton's army in the movement toward Germany, while a force of British and Canadians, with a sprinkling of other nationalities, turned toward Belgium. The advance during the last days of July and the month of August was a *Blitzkrieg* unmatched by the German drives of 1940. It not only shook the *Wehrmacht* to its foundations but was literally breaking it to pieces. In all it cost the Germans nearly a million casualties including most of their remaining armored divisions. Progress was so rapid that the middle of September saw no less than six of General Eisenhower's armies drawn up against Germany's western borders. Attempts to enter Germany, however, were halted by the Siegfried Line or West Wall. A renewed attempt about the middle of November to break through made steady if somewhat slow progress. Suddenly



THE ALLIED INVASION OF GERMANY

on December 16 General Eisenhower's plans were disrupted by a major German counteroffensive launched by Marshal von Runstedt with great force in the Ardennes sector held mainly by United States troops. As a result of the blow the Germans were able to push toward the Meuse about fifty miles. After stopping the drive on December 25 by tenacious resistance, American troops gradually regained most of the territory. Prime minister Churchill referred to this "battle of the bulge" as "the greatest American battle of the war." It was the last great German offensive. Although it did delay the final Allied drive for a time, it also greatly weakened the German forces.



CLIMAX: THE DRIVE INTO GERMANY

Meanwhile the Russians were driving rapidly toward Germany. After capturing Sevastopol on May 12, 1944, and clearing the Germans out of the Crimea, the Red army opened a drive in June on the Finnish front which carried them to the 1940 Finnish-Soviet frontier by July. On June 22 the main summer offensive got under way on the central front with an attack on Vitebsk. Although this was the strongest sector of the German defenses, the drive quickly gathered momentum. Numerical superiority permitted the Russians to flank and surround the German strong points instead of trying to take them by frontal attacks. This strategy enabled the Red armies to take both Vitebsk and Minsk within a short time. By the middle of July Vilna in Lithuania was in Russian possession, while farther south the fighting was everywhere on Polish soil. Progress was so rapid that in August the Red armies had to stop to reorganize. Besides taking vast stretches of territory and a large toll of men, the drive also had political results. When the Soviet troops crossed the Rumanian border and began moving nearer the capital, King Michael issued an order to cease fighting the United Nations. On September 13 he signed an armistice with Russia on condition that Rumania furnish twelve divisions to fight Germany. In the north, Finland had agreed to leave the Axis camp on September 4. On October 28 Bulgaria also joined Finland and Rumania in the fight

THE ALLIED INVASION OF GERMANY. In "one of the outstanding military successes in history" the Americans liquidated the Ruhr pocket, capturing 325,000 Germans, among whom were thirty generals (April 18, 1945).

against Germany. Finally, by the end of October the progress of the Red army had forced the Germans to abandon Greece. This left Hungary as the only German satellite. Admiral Horthy, the ruler of Hungary did, it is true, appeal for an armistice, but Fascist elements seized control of the country and continued the fight against Russia.

After reorganizing their forces, the Russians opened their last great offensive in January, 1945, with their main power moving through Poland directly toward Berlin. At the same time Russian divisions were moving through East Prussia, and in Hungary the Soviet troops encircled Budapest. By early February they were along the Oder in places not much more than thirty miles from Berlin. The Germans had neither the men nor the material to stop the advance on so wide a front. If the high command had recalled its troops from Norway, Denmark, Italy, and other parts of Europe to stand on the defensive behind the Siegfried Line or on the Rhine, they might have held off the Allied forces for a long time. As it was, the Russians swept everything before them. On April 13 they took Vienna, and three days later the final push for Berlin was under way. April saw the first divisions entering Berlin.

In western Europe a major Allied offensive was to have started in January, but the Ardennes counterattack forced a postponement. When it was finally launched on February 23, eight armies began moving toward the Rhine. After breaching the successive defenses of the Siegfried Line, Eisenhower's troops gradually forced the Germans back across the river. At the Rhine there occurred an historic incident which greatly aided the crossing and thereby shortened the war. The First United States Army succeeded in reaching a railroad bridge at Remagen before the Germans could destroy it, although they did damage it. Making the most of the opportunity, an armored division crossed the bridge and was quickly followed by other forces. By the time it collapsed from cumulative damage, the Allies had a firm, deep, and wide bridgehead on the east bank. The advance out of the bridgehead was accompanied by a general crossing along most of the river in Germany. After the crossings had been made, one army cut off Holland while the rest gradually segregated the Ruhr cities from the Reich. As the Allied armies deprived Germany of most of her industrial areas, her strategical position became more and more hopeless and the *Wehrmacht* became more and more disorganized and demoralized, permitting the Allied armies to race across Germany with only scattered opposition. On April 26 the Russian and Allied armies, meeting at Torgau, split Germany in two.



International News

AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN SOLDIERS MEET ON THE BRIDGE
AT TORGAU, GERMANY



DEATH COMES TO TWO DICTATORS

During the succeeding days fate knocked at the door of two of Europe's dictators. Mussolini, since his release from arrest by German paratroopers in September, 1943, had been leading a wraith-like existence in northern Italy as a Nazi puppet ruler. When the resistance collapsed, the Nazis abandoned him and he was apprehended near Lake Como by anti-Fascists (Partisans). With him at the time was the last of a long line of mistresses, Claretta Petacci. "Let me save my life," Benito said to his captors, "and I will give you an empire!" But they made short shrift of the erstwhile dictator. The next day, April 28, he and his mistress, together with sixteen of his Black Shirt henchmen, were shot. The reputed executioner, known to the Italian underground as Colonel Valerio, reported that the man who was responsible for the death of so many thousands "died a coward." As he was about to be shot, he kept babbling: "But, but, but, but Mr. Colonel." After the execution his battered, bullet-riddled corpse and also the others were carted to the Piazza Loreto, a public square in Milan, where they were strung up by the heels. Thousands of men and women milled about the eighteen disheveled bodies in the muddy square. The crowd vented their pent-up fury by kicking Mussolini's corpse, spitting upon it, or reviling the ex-dictator. One eye-witness reported that "the mob surged and swayed around the grisly spot. One woman emptied a pistol into the Duce's body. 'Five shots!' she screamed; 'five shots for my five murdered sons.' Others cried: 'He died too quickly! He should have suffered!' But the hate of many was wordless. They could only spit." Thus ended the man who tried to be Caesar.

Two days after Mussolini's death it was announced over the German radio that Hitler had died in the Berlin chancellery then under attack by the Russians. According to Gerhard Herrgesell, stenographer to Germany's supreme headquarters staff, Hitler realizing that the cause was irretrievably lost had after the Russians began their attack on Berlin repeatedly said during a meeting in the basement of the chancellery: "I will fall here," "I will fall before the chancellery," and "I must die here in Berlin." "The Führer," Herrgesell stated, "always maintained that no force, however well trained and equipped, could fight if it lost heart, and now he felt his last reserve was gone. . . . During all this time artillery fire on the chancellery was increasing and even deep down in the cellar we could feel concussions shaking the building." After the meeting

Herrgesell left Berlin by plane. It was after his departure that Hitler died. Various reports regarding the manner of his death are extant. Herrgesell believes that Hitler went "looking for death to which he was not so completely resigned, and that he may have died by artillery fire." Others reported that Hitler and Eva Braun, his wife of a few hours, died in a suicide pact. Despite conflicting stories of his death and the absence of absolute proof that he had died, it was generally assumed in Allied countries that he was dead. With his death another attempt to dominate the continent of Europe had been blocked. Never in modern times had a man so insignificantly monstrous become the absolute head of a great nation. The ruin he caused in terms of human life alone is incalculable. The bodies of his victims were heaped across Europe from London to Stalingrad. The tragedy of his life left only one lesson: he gave terrifying evidence of the hell let loose on earth when hate becomes the motive around which men rally for action; he demonstrated that hate produces nothing but destruction and finally destroys the hater.



VICTORY IN EUROPE

In certain Allied circles it was believed that fanatical Nazis would continue to resist in scattered pockets after the armies had stopped fighting. But the announcement of Hitler's death seems to have sapped the German morale completely. Collapse was rapid during the succeeding days. On the day of Hitler's death fighting ended in Italy. After a lull of five months the Eighth Army had on April 9 launched a full-scale attack which secured a complete breakthrough in a week, causing the Germans to sign unconditional surrender terms on April 29. The next day the Russians took Berlin after a period of fierce day-and-night house-to-house fighting. On May 4 more than a million Germans surrendered to Field Marshal Montgomery's army, thus bringing the fighting in Holland and northern Germany to a close. It was the biggest mass surrender of Germans since the armistice of 1918. By this time the rest of the armies had disintegrated to such an extent that General Eisenhower declared: "On land, sea, and in the air the Germans are thoroughly whipped. Their only recourse is to surrender." By May 7 even Admiral Doenitz, who appears to have usurped the Hitlerian succession, realized that the Reich which Hitler had said would last a thousand years had fallen into ruins. On that day the surrender agreement was signed at Rheims, and on May 8 in Berlin virtually the same terms were signed in the name of the German high command. Hos-

ilities ceased at 12:01 A.M. on May 9. So the curtain fell in Europe on the greatest tragedy in the history of that old and weary continent.

After five years, eight months, and seven days the war in Europe had come to an end. No war ever ended more decisively. The terms of surrender were explicit. "We, the undersigned," they read, "acting by authority of the German high command, hereby surrender unconditionally to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and simultaneously to the Soviet high command, all forces on land, sea, and in the air which are at this date under German control." The surrender was complete and the terms placed no obligations on the victors. Thus it could not be said, as was the case after World War I, that the German army was never beaten or that the terms of the surrender were violated. General Eisenhower's Order of the Day for May 8 read in part:

"It is my especial privilege, in the name of all nations represented in the theater of war, to commend each of you for the valiant performance of duty. . . . Your accomplishments at sea, in the air, on the ground, and in the field of supply have astonished the world. Even before the final week of the conflict you had put 5,000,000 of the enemy permanently out of the war. You have taken in stride military tasks so difficult as to be classed by many doubters as impossible. You have confused, defeated, and destroyed your savagely fighting foe. . . . Full victory in Europe has been attained. Working and fighting together in single and indestructible partnership you have achieved a perfection in the unification of air, ground, and naval power that will stand as a model in our time. . . . Let us have no part in the profitless quarrels in which other men will inevitably engage as to what country and what service won the European war. Every man and every woman of every nation here represented has served according to his or her ability and efforts and each has contributed to the outcome."

In the United States President Truman announced the Allied victory in a message which began: "This is a solemn but a glorious hour. I only wish that Franklin D. Roosevelt had lived to witness this day." President Roosevelt had seen the coming victory from a distance, but did not live to see it achieved. He passed away suddenly on April 12, 1945, less than three months after his fourth inauguration, as a result of a cerebral hemorrhage. His hold on the imagination of people everywhere was such that the shock of his death was felt as profoundly in Moscow, Paris, and Mexico City as in the United States. To millions in all parts of the earth he was the embodiment of the finer virtues of the American people, a gleaming

symbol of liberty, and a tireless champion of freedom. As Stalin said of him, he was "a great organizer of the struggles of freedom-loving nations against the common enemy, and the leader in the cause of ensuring the security of the whole world." Shortly before his death, with supreme confidence that victory was in sight, he summoned the nations of the world to meet in San Francisco on April 25 to formulate a global charter as the basis for international peace and cooperation. The result was the United Nations charter. Death came to President Roosevelt so suddenly that he left a speech scheduled to be delivered the next day. Its theme was: "The only limit to our realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today. Let us move forward with strong and active faith."



VICTORY OVER JAPAN

In the United States the joy over the result in Europe was tempered by the fact that the task of defeating the Japanese was still ahead. On V-E Day President Truman had said in his message: "Our victory is but half won. The West is free, but the East is still in bondage to the treacherous tyranny of the Japanese. When the last Japanese division has surrendered unconditionally, then only will our fighting job be done." To the Japanese the defeat of Germany was of course disappointing. They certainly would not have attacked Pearl Harbor in December, 1941, if the Germans had not seemed to be winning. But the defeat did not incline them to surrender. They continued to fight in their fierce, stubborn manner.

During the early months of 1943 there had been a lull in the fighting. This lull had been broken only by the battle of the Bismarck Sea (March 2-4, 1943), in which a Japanese convoy of ten warships and fifteen transports carrying 15,000 troops had been totally destroyed. When the Allied forces in the southwest Pacific started a new drive in early June, 1943, it was a relief to many who feared that the absorption of the United States in the European phase of the war would give the Japanese opportunity to entrench themselves so firmly in their newly acquired territories that it would be extremely difficult to dislodge them. The general goal of Allied strategy was to smash the outer defenses of the Japanese fortress. In other words, it aimed at the capture of the important bases in the south Pacific, after which the Allies planned to move gradually northward toward Japan.


The first step was to eliminate all Japanese from the Solomons and New Guinea. Allied forces under Admiral Halsey occupied

Rendova Island (June, 1943) and at the beginning of July began the attack on Munda air base, situated on nearby New Georgia Island. The pattern of the fighting closely resembled the battle of Guadalcanal. Despite stubborn resistance Allied forces moved in until they had possession of the coveted air strip. After weeks of jungle fighting the entire island was overrun (August 7, 1943). The struggle for Munda was featured by a naval battle in Kula Gulf on July 5, during which nine Japanese warships were believed to have been sunk. After the taking of New Georgia the Allies moved northward to attack Bougainville, the last Japanese stronghold in the Solomons. On October 31 a force of marines landed at Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville Island and after a bitter struggle took possession of it. In the meantime another force under General MacArthur had moved against New Guinea, taking the important bases of Salamaua, Lae, and Finschafen before the end of November.

The success of the Allied operations in the Solomons and New Guinea opened the way for an attack farther north. The new targets were low atolls in the British Gilbert Islands which the Japanese had seized in December, 1941. Makin atoll² was occupied with only moderate resistance, but the attack on Tarawa was the most difficult task the marines had attempted up to that time. Before landings were made, Betio, a little island a scant square mile in size, which was the main fortification of the Tarawa atoll, was subjected to a severe aerial attack in which seven hundred tons of bombs were dropped. Warships also poured in 2900 tons of shells. It was difficult to see how any Japanese could survive this attack. But their engineers had used stonehard coconut logs, steel rails, and concrete to build pillboxes which they covered with three or four feet of sand. These fortifications were so incredibly strong that only a direct hit by heavy shells or bombs could damage them. There were five hundred of them in the small area of Betio, staggered in such a way that marines who captured one came under fire from two others. The water was so shallow near the island that the attacking marines had to debark some distance from the beach and as they waded toward the island made excellent targets for the sharpshooters. Only after three days of the bitterest fighting, in which they lost 1026 killed and 2557 wounded, did the marines succeed in occupying the atoll.

At the end of 1943 the position of the Allies was still poor

² The dictionary defines an atoll as "a coral island or islands consisting of a belt of coral reef surrounding a central lagoon."



THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

despite the fact that considerable progress had been made in breaching the outer defenses of the Japanese fortress. On the other hand, attempts of the enemy to extend his gains had been definitely blocked. Moreover, during the year supplies had been sent to the Pacific in ever-increasing quantities. Some idea of the progress made in the United States during the twenty-four months after Pearl Harbor in turning out war materials can be gained from the fact that the tonnage of warships increased from two to five millions, the number of men in the armed forces from 1.8 million to 7.7 million, and the number of planes from 12,000 to 80,000. Having received large numbers of men and great quantities of material, the Pacific commanders were now ready to begin a coordinated offensive aimed at the heart of Japan. No sooner had they gained control of the Gilberts and southeastern New Guinea than they began to build air bases, improve harbor facilities, construct barracks and supply bases—in short, they developed jumping-off places for future thrusts. Progress was in no sense easy. The Japanese clung tenaciously to the territories they had occupied.

The first great operation in 1944, designed to secure stepping-stone bases closer to the Japanese isles, was against the Marshall Islands. Soon after the occupation of the Gilberts the “softening up” process by means of air bombing had begun. Actual invasion started on January 31, when a force under Admiral Nimitz went ashore unopposed on Majuro atoll. It was the first time United States soldiers had set foot on soil that had been Japanese prior to Pearl Harbor. Next day another force landed on Kwajalein, the world’s largest atoll, sixty-six miles long and eighteen miles wide. Here the fighting was bitter and it was necessary to kill more than 8000 Japanese before it could be occupied. American losses in killed were 286. On February 17 Admiral Nimitz’s forces landed on Eniwetok and by February 22 control of this atoll was complete. United States losses were 169 killed, compared with Japanese losses of 2665 killed. The explanation of the small number of American dead lies in the fact that the atolls were thoroughly bombed and shelled before landings were made. The Japanese government was gravely concerned over the conquest of the Marshall Islands. Soon after the

THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. *The first goal of Allied strategy was to smash the outer defenses of Japan—the Solomons, New Guinea, the Gilberts, the Marshalls, and the Philippines.*

landings on Kwajalein, premier Hideki Tojo said that the war "keeps increasing in ferocity day by day and we are now being confronted with the situation where the fate of the Greater East Asia sphere and the rise and fall of Imperial Japan will be decided."

Next Admiral Nimitz took the most daring single step attempted thus far. He invaded the Marianas, some parts of which were only about 1400 miles from Tokyo. Because of the great distance from airfields the "softening-up" had to be carried out by planes from carriers. The first landing was made on Saipan (June 14) and it encountered some of the most determined opposition in the Pacific war. It required more than three weeks to overcome the organized resistance, while sniping continued for months thereafter. According to official estimates 26,571 Japanese were killed and 2099 were captured in the attack. American casualties in dead and wounded numbered about 15,000. Following the landings on Saipan, troops began the reconquest of Guam, which had been a United States possession before the outbreak of the war. When mopping-up operations had been completed, it was announced that 17,436 Japanese had been killed. In the attack on Tinian Island 6932 Japanese were killed. The conquest of the Mariana Islands was followed on September 14 by an invasion of the Palau Islands, which were so strongly defended that organized resistance was not overcome until October 12. This time the number of Japanese dead was 13,354. Simultaneously the strength of the Japanese navy was also being whittled down by repeated attacks. For example, while the land action against the Marianas was under way, planes from carriers attacked a Japanese squadron and sank two airplane carriers, two destroyers, and one tanker. Numerous other engagements took place with similar results.

In October General MacArthur's forces undertook the largest operation attempted up to that time. After many weeks of preparation, United States troops invaded Leyte in the central Philippines. A few hours after the first wave landed, General MacArthur went ashore together with President Osmeña of the Philippines. Over an army radio on the Leyte beach he delivered his liberation speech in a tone of deep emotion. "People of the Philippines," he said, "I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God our forces stand again on Philippine soil. . . . The hour of your redemption is here." Douglas MacArthur, in fulfillment of his vow, had returned to free the Philippines. Although the Japanese resistance was determined, the American forces steadily moved forward and by Christmas Day occupied the entire island. On December 15 landings were made on

Mindoro, where an airfield was quickly established within 155 miles of Manila. The actual invasion of Luzon, on which Manila is located, did not take place until January 9, 1945. Japanese resistance was not as heavy as expected until Manila was reached. On February 6 the capital was attacked from every direction. It was occupied only after bloody house-to-house fighting in which the Japanese destroyed much of the city. While this battle was in progress, General MacArthur's men were also fighting for Bataan and Corregidor. The attack was made both by parachute troops and by infantry landing from boats. The battle on Corregidor lasted for two weeks until the remaining Japanese were driven out of the underground passages. Thereafter General MacArthur's men went from island to island, most frequently outwitting the enemy by attacking at points where landings were not expected.

Next the Allied commanders moved to obtain island bases on the very doorstep of Japan. The first objective was the ugly volcanic island of Iwo Jima, eight square miles in size and some 400 miles from Kyushu, southernmost of the Japanese home islands. Possession of Iwo Jima was important because it was the seeing eye that warned Tokyo of the approach of bombers and also because it would be of great value in pushing the B-29 attacks against Japanese cities. Then, too, it would afford a haven for crippled or battle weary superfortresses on the return trip from Japan. The battle for the possession of Iwo Jima, defended as it was by the cream of the Japanese army, was one of the toughest and most costly of the war. Although the airforce bombed the island for fifty-four consecutive days, the defense works were constructed in such a way that the bombing did not damage them too seriously. The Japanese guns had all been trained on the only landing beach, and when the United States troops went over the sides on February 19, 1945, Japanese troops fired point blank at the landing party. Progress was difficult and costly as the Japanese had to be blasted out of the pillboxes and driven out of large fortified caves. It was not until March 15 that the United States flag was raised over the entire island.

A fortnight after the Iwo Jima battle, the United States navy had assembled for action the greatest invasion armada ever to operate in the Pacific. It was composed of 1400 ships and about 100,000 soldiers and marines. The target this time was poverty-stricken, malaria-ridden Okinawa, an island in the Ryukyus sixty miles long and from two to twenty miles wide, about 370 miles from Kyushu. After a terrific preparatory bombardment marines and soldiers

swarmed ashore on Easter Sunday morning (April 1). Japanese resistance on the beach was weak, permitting the troops to push on to the east coast and cut the island in two. But Okinawa was far too important a strategical prize for the Japanese to sell it cheaply. The commander, who had about 70,000 troops and some 500 artillery guns at his disposal, decided to make a stand at the southern end where it would be difficult for troops to land behind them. Hence occupation of the northern end was comparatively swift but in the south progress was slow and the cost in blood tremendous; in fact, Okinawa was one of the bloodiest battlefields of the war. Not until June 22 was the hold of the United States troops on the island secure, but resistance by small groups of Japanese continued for some time thereafter. Japanese casualties included 101,853 killed and 9498 captured, while American losses in killed were 7283 and in wounded 31,398.

During the time the ground fighting was in progress, the Japanese struck repeatedly at the supporting Allied naval forces. Among other means of attack they organized a suicide corps of flyers whose mission it was to crash-dive their explosive-laden planes into ships. Although most of these "kamikaze" planes were shot out of the air, those that struck ships did considerable damage. They failed to sink any major vessels but they did sink thirty-three destroyers and smaller units besides damaging sixty ships. The resulting American casualties were 4907 killed and 4824 wounded. In their attempts to destroy the Allied naval force the Kamikaze (Divine Tempest) Corps lost more than 4000 planes and pilots. On April 5-6 the Japanese attempted to deliver a decisive sea-air blow by sending out a naval task force which included their last big battleship flanked by cruisers and destroyers. But before it reached Okinawa it was sighted by patrol flyers and quickly attacked by four hundred carrier planes which sank most of the ships. It was the swan song of the Japanese navy.

Besides losing Iwo Jima and Okinawa the Japanese were also dislodged from other bases. During April, May, and June the Philippine campaign was pressed to a relentless conclusion with the result that General MacArthur was able to announce on July 5, 1945, that the entire archipelago had been liberated with the exception of areas infested by guerilla bands. Thus MacArthur and his men had erased a tragic defeat with a remarkable victory. With the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa safely in their hands the Allies were in position to move northward toward Kyushu. In the Philippines they had an area for massing troops in preparation for a final assault; on Okinawa they had a number of airfields only ninety minutes' flying time

from Tokyo; and the airfield on Iwo Jima had been developed as a base for superfortresses and for long-range fighter planes which accompanied the big bombers on their raids. Repeated bombing and incendiary raids by seven hundred to one thousand planes had carried destruction to the principal industrial cities. On May 31 our War Department listed a large number of war industries in Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe which had been attacked, in addition to dockyards, communication centers, and transportation facilities. During the months of March, April, and May bombers had dropped approximately 58,000 tons of bombs on Japanese targets. At least a quarter of the population had felt the terror of the devastating raids, and the government officials were able to give the frightened people but scant consolation. All indications pointed to the fact that Japan's sands were running out rapidly.



THE END OF WORLD WAR II

As the Allied forces were preparing to strike at the heart of Japan, the cataclysmic bursts of two atomic bombs brought the war to a sudden end. On July 26 representatives of the United States, Britain, and China, meeting at Potsdam, had called upon Japan for unconditional surrender, stating that "the alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction." The Japanese government had turned down the ultimatum. Then, on August 6, as if in fulfillment of the threat, the first atomic bomb ever to be used in warfare was dropped on Hiroshima. President Truman in announcing the event said in part: "Sixteen hours ago, an American airplane dropped one bomb at Hiroshima, an important Japanese army base. That bomb had more power than 20,000 tons of TNT. It had more than 2000 times the blast power of the British 'Grand Slam,' which is the largest bomb ever used in the history of warfare." The President then went on to explain that it was an atomic bomb, "a harnessing of the basic power of the universe." Some idea of the destructive power of the bomb may be gained from the fact that it would have required two thousand bombers to carry twenty thousand tons of TNT. The force of the blast was such that three fifths of Hiroshima was blown off the face of the earth. According to a report issued by Allied headquarters some months later, 78,150 people were killed.

On August 8 Russia entered the war in fulfillment of Marshal Stalin's promise at the Yalta Conference (February, 1945) that the Soviet Union would join in the war against Japan within ninety days after the end of the European war. Russian armies at once

marched into Manchuria, but it was all in the nature of an anti-climax. The position of Japan was already hopeless. The next day (August 9) a second bomb was released with even more disastrous results on Nagasaki, a shipbuilding port and industrial center. This bomb was already an improved type which made the first one obsolete. It convinced even the Japanese that their situation was hopeless. On August 10 the Tokyo radio broadcast an acceptance of the Potsdam ultimatum, asking only that Emperor Hirohito retain his sovereignty. The following day the Allies dispatched a note to Tokyo which accepted the Japanese offer with the stipulation that "from the moment of surrender the authority of the emperor and the Japanese government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers." After days of suspense the Japanese finally announced acceptance of the terms on August 14. In his rescript Emperor Hirohito stated: "The enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to damage is, indeed, incalculable." A continuation of the war, the emperor said, would "result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation." General MacArthur, who was appointed Supreme Commander for the Allied powers, conducted the formal surrender ceremonies on board the battleship *Missouri* in Tokyo harbor on September 2. In obedience to Emperor Hirohito's instructions, Japanese troops in China, Manchuria, Formosa, and the many islands of the Pacific laid down their arms and submitted themselves to the directions of the Allied commanders. World War II, after six years of the most bloody fighting in history, was officially ended.

Europe Since World War II

The Postwar Years

THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE

THE curtain had fallen on the bloody battlefields. The war which to the Chinese had meant eight years of torture and destruction; which to the British signified Dunkirk, the Blitz, and a long postponed victory; which to the Russians meant a colossal casualty list and the thorough devastation of the western part of their country; which to the United States signified long rows of crosses from Belgium to Okinawa—the greatest and most terrible war of all times was over. The time for which people everywhere, victors and vanquished, had lived and died, which had been the terminus of all their thoughts, the goal of their working, fighting, and enduring, had finally arrived. All were now released from the agony of suspense regarding the outcome. While the vanquished were sad and disappointed, the peoples of the United Nations were happy over the victory they had scarcely dared hope would ever come. In thousands of cities, towns, and villages the inhabitants wildly hailed the end of armed combat. There was a joy over the defeat of the forces of aggression. But the realization of the problems yet to be solved tempered the spontaneity of the joy. Although the awful heartache of the war was over, there was the headache of tomorrow in the offing. More fearful responsibilities and more crucial liabilities rested on the victors than on the vanquished.

Among the problems which confronted the Allies were the problems of forging a peace out of weariness, cynicism, inertia, and disunion, of coping with hunger, misery, and disease, of rehabilitating the economic life of both victors and vanquished—in short, of re-

building a shattered world order. Above all, there was the problem of the atomic bomb, a problem so fraught with significance for the future that the war itself shrank to minor importance. Even a world jaded by destruction was moved by the horror of the bomb which in a split second returned so many thousand human beings to the dust from which they sprang. People everywhere realized that the discovery which had suddenly ended the war had possibilities so tremendous as to stagger the imagination. "I realize," President Truman said in the hour of victory, "the tragic significance of the atomic bomb. . . . We thank God that it has come to us, instead of to our enemies; and we pray that He may guide us to use it in His ways and for His purposes."

Among the many differences that distinguished the peacemaking of World War II from that of World War I two are outstanding. First, the peace efforts after World War II were not based on lofty principles or openly expressed idealism comparable to that which heralded the peace talks after World War I. There were no such wholesome aspirations as those embodied in President Wilson's Fourteen Points. The evident assumption was that the Big Three (the United States, Britain, and Soviet Russia) had by their power, wealth, and strategy won the war and that they could by the same token establish an enduring peace. The inclusion of China and France in the peace talks was distinctly a concession. Second, after no great war in modern times have the victors allowed so much time to pass before making a settlement with their enemies. After World War I the Allied statesmen had taken up the work of making peace almost immediately. Within three months after the armistice delegates from the nineteen victorious powers gathered in Paris to begin the work and in another three months the treaties were practically ready. After World War II it was more than eighteen months before the lesser treaties were ready for the signing.

The first stage in the process was made up of conferences of the heads of the great powers at which certain preliminary plans were laid while the war was still going on. Among the conferences were those at Cairo, Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam. Peacemaking moved into the second stage after the cessation of hostilities. This was a series of conferences by the Council of Foreign Ministers whose work it was to draft the treaties. The third stage called for the discussion of the treaties by representatives of the twenty-one victorious powers, after which the Council of Foreign Ministers prepared the final drafts.

Since the making of the peace rested solely in the hands of a few

powers, the drawing up of the treaties appeared to present no extreme diplomatic difficulties. The one essential was agreement among the Allies themselves. It had been a frequent experience of previous centuries that coalitions formed against a common danger tended to dissolve as soon as the danger was removed. Thus the concert of powers which in 1814 had defeated Napoleon was in 1815 at the point of dissolving into a war between Great Britain and France on the one hand and Russia and Prussia on the other. Even in World War I the united front gave way to disunity during the peace talks. In this respect the situation after World War II was no exception. During the struggle to defeat the Axis powers there had at least been an outward semblance of unity among the Allied nations. It is, of course, easy to exaggerate the degree of unity that existed. Quite understandably Allied propagandists did their utmost to conceal from the enemy all discord. As an example of non-cooperation one could cite the fact that the Russians always insisted on fighting their own war in their own way. Until late in 1944 when his armies had already crossed the German borders, General Eisenhower had to plan his campaigns without knowing where and when the Russians would strike. But there had been some degree of unity and cooperation among the Allies. At least they were united in their determination to defeat the Axis.

Whatever unity had existed during the war quickly evaporated when peace discussions began. In place of the common objective each of the victors substituted new objectives as varied as there were nations. Especially evident was a determination to acquire strategic areas and to establish spheres of influence. But the fundamental cause of the cleavage was Russia's brusque efforts to expand her sphere of influence. The Russian leaders planned their diplomatic campaign as carefully as they had planned their military campaigns. Such expansion was in complete variance with the aims of the United States and Britain and was therefore resisted by them. Previously, however, the Allied representatives had not been so firm in their stand against Soviet Russia. At the Yalta conference of the Big Three (February, 1945) both Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt, in their eagerness to secure Stalin's cooperation against Japan as well as against Germany, had shown a readiness to pay the price the Russian dictator asked. For example, they accepted the proposal made that Poland "must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west" at the expense of Germany. This addition of territory was, of course, to compensate for the eastern half of Poland, which Stalin had annexed in 1939. In general, most

of the decisions at Yalta were made entirely in accord with Russian desires.

At the Potsdam ¹ meeting of the representatives of the Big Three (July 17–August 2, 1945) President Truman was not only bound by the promises President Roosevelt had previously made but also by the exigencies of the war against Japan. Now knowing how long it would still take to crush the Japanese both President Truman and the British delegates ² continued the policy of capitulating to Stalin's wishes. Thus the Soviet Union was promised the lion's share of reparations based upon a plan to divide Germany into four zones of occupation. Russia was to receive not only the reparations from her own zone but also 25 per cent of the reparations taken from the American, British, and French zones. Moreover, the German assets in Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, and eastern Austria were also awarded to Russia. The Soviet government did not fail to make the most of the opportunity this decision presented to establish control over these countries. The conference also assigned most of East Prussia, including the city of Königsberg, to Russia. The remainder of East Prussia, the port of Danzig, and the important mining and manufacturing center of Silesia were assigned to Poland "pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier." In the Far East Stalin also got what he wanted. It had been a cardinal principle of United States foreign policy not to recognize the domination of Manchuria by any foreign power. President Roosevelt apparently was misled into believing that the area was swarming with Japanese troops and that Russian help was necessary to overcome them. He therefore agreed at Yalta to recognize Russia's "special position" in Manchuria. When the Japanese capitulated a few months later, the Russians occupied the country without much effort.

Having gained so much as a result of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, Stalin and his associates hoped to continue the game of diplomacy according to the same rules. They were ready to cooperate, but only on their own terms. After the defeat of Japan, however, Britain and the United States adopted a more independent and determined attitude. The surrender of Japan freed the western democracies from the entanglements of war, and the possession of the atomic bomb gave them a trump card of incalculable power. Furthermore, the death of President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill's retire-

¹ Known to many historians as the Berlin Conference.

² During the conference prime minister Churchill was replaced by prime minister Clement R. Attlee as the result of British parliamentary elections held on July 23.



Press Association

THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE

ment from Downing Street brought to the front a group of men who were not bound by personal commitments to Stalin.

The stiffening of policy became evident at the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers which opened in London on September 10, 1945.³ Soon the ministers were wrangling over strategic areas, colonial possessions, and spheres of political influence. Disagreement began with the question of a peace treaty for Italy. While it was agreed that the Italian colonies be placed under the trusteeship of the United Nations, the Big Three could not agree on the method of administering them. As the discussions continued, it became increasingly evident that Russia was bent on expansion in the direction set by the tsarist empire. Mr. Molotov himself demonstrated this when he proposed that Italian Libya be assigned to the Russians, a proposal which was vigorously opposed by Britain and the United States, both of whom were opposed to Russia's becoming active in the Mediterranean where British influence had previously prevailed.

Nor did differences regarding the treaty with Italy end with the question of the African colonies. Mr. Molotov asked that Italy pay Russia \$300 million as reparations, a request which was also opposed by the western democracies. Russia further wished to give the Adriatic port of Trieste and its adjacent province to Yugoslavia, a Russian satellite, whereas Britain and the United States wanted it to go to Italy. They also objected to Russian domination of totalitarian governments in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, stating that treaties could not be signed with the governments of these countries unless free and unfettered elections were assured. The general result of all this was that the conference which had been expected to draw up a peace plan for Italy adjourned after twenty-two days without having reached one major agreement. The ministers of the Big Five found themselves so far apart that they did not even issue a final communiqué. What the London Conference did demonstrate was that the task of peacemaking would be a difficult one.

The failure of the Conference augured ill for the success of the United Nations General Assembly, which was scheduled to hold its first meeting in London on January 10, 1946. Without agreement among the Great Powers there was little hope that harmony would prevail in the General Assembly. The situation impelled the United States secretary of state James F. Byrnes to urge a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at Moscow in December, and his

³ Present were James F. Byrnes for the United States, Ernest Bevin for Britain, V. M. Molotov for Russia, Georges Bidault for France, and Shieh-chieh for China.

proposal was accepted. The ministers conferred from December 16 to 26, while the world anxiously awaited developments. The answer came in a communiqué on December 24 which revealed that at least a semblance of unity had been restored. This had been achieved in large part by concessions to Russia. One correspondent summed up Mr. Byrnes' trip to Moscow in the following words: "He came, he saw, he concurred." One of the major achievements was a formula for drafting the treaties. It was stipulated which foreign ministers were to draft which treaties and that a conference of representatives of the United Nations would be convoked to study the completed drafts and to make recommendations.


Agreement was also reached on what was regarded as the most vital question that had come up for discussion, the question of the atomic bomb. It was agreed to recommend to the United Nations General Assembly the establishment of a commission of eleven members who should inquire into all phases of the problem with the utmost dispatch. The Council also decided that General MacArthur should remain as supreme commander in Japan but that Russia, Britain, and China should share in the control of the defeated empire. It was agreed that both the United States and the Soviet Union should withdraw their troops from China as soon as a unified democratic government was established. Finally, a plan for the control of Korea for a period of five years was accepted, and the United States agreed to recognize the governments of Rumania and Bulgaria as soon as they carried out democratic reforms.

On April 25, 1946, the Council of Foreign Ministers (representing the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and the United States) opened their conference in the Luxemburg Palace in Paris. The meeting began auspiciously. The ministers unanimously agreed to limit the future naval strength of Italy and to appoint a committee of naval experts to apportion surplus Italian craft among their countries and Greece and Yugoslavia. Transylvania was awarded to Rumania. It was agreed that the southern Dobruja, which was awarded to Bulgaria in 1940, and Bessarabia and northern Bucovina, which were occupied by the Russians, should not be returned. No agreement was reached on the control of the Danube River. By May 15 the Council had again become so hopelessly deadlocked that a recess to June 15 was voted. When it reconvened some progress toward a settlement was made. It was, for example, agreed that Italy should pay Russia \$100 million in reparations over a period of seven years, mainly out of current production. The conference finally ended on July 12 with an agreement to call a conference of the

twenty-one victor nations to consider the peace terms with Italy, the Axis satellites in the Balkans, and Finland.

On July 29, 1946, the first peace conference resulting from the Allied victory over the Axis in World War II opened in Paris. Besides the delegates of the Big Four, representatives of the "Little Seventeen" who had participated in the fight were also present. But it was actually not a peace conference at all. At Vienna in 1815, at Berlin in 1878, and at Paris in 1919 peace conferences had assembled for the actual purpose of making peace. In 1946 the purpose was to give the representatives of the Little Seventeen an opportunity to submit their views on treaties which had been drawn up in large part by the Big Four. Even so, they were not to change the clauses on which the Big Four had agreed. Their official activities were limited to making "recommendations" which the representatives of the Big Four would consider among themselves at some subsequent private meeting. Furthermore, consideration was limited to the treaties with Italy, Finland, and the Axis satellites; there was to be no discussion of the treaties with the two chief aggressors. The real settlement was, therefore, yet to come. The so-called peace conference dealt only with the periphery of the settlement instead of its core.

In one respect there was a parallel between the peace conferences of 1919 and of 1946. Both were dominated by the Great Powers. At the very first session in 1919, Clemenceau made it perfectly clear that the Big Four would dominate the meetings. Thereafter they decided all the important issues while the smaller nations looked on. In 1946 the Great Powers felt that their domination of the conference should not be questioned. Nevertheless, it was. Even before the meeting opened, Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, Australia's representative, indicated that the smaller nations intended to express their opinions when he said: "It is a fallacy to suppose that all knowledge and all wisdom reside at the center of military power." At the first session he demanded that the small nations have an equal share with the Big Four in the final decisions. "The right of making peace," he stated, "should belong to all those nations who have been parties in achieving a common victory." He demanded that the rule of the majority vote be established. But Secretary Byrnes definitely stated that he was opposed to Dr. Evatt's effort to upset the two-thirds majority recommendation tentatively accepted by the Big Four. The Russian representatives also demanded a two-thirds majority voting procedure. The votes of the Big Four, plus the Moscow-controlled votes of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the Ukraine,



and White Russia made it impossible for the small nations to get a two-thirds majority. On August 9 the proposal was approved that the conference might recommend amendments by either a two-thirds or a majority vote.

In general the leading question was: how much of the world shall be included in the Russian sector and how much is to be kept outside? This was the real issue in every dispute. Some correspondents frankly styled the conference "the battle of Paris" as if it were an integral part of World War II. The Russian representatives missed no opportunity to make demands for Russia and her satellites. On August 16 the New Zealand delegate was moved to say: "We are sick of listening to this quack, quack, quack, hour after hour, and we want to get something done." Previously on August 9 the conference had officially invited the former enemy nations to present their views on the treaties. The next day premier de Gasperi of Italy appeared before a plenary session to condemn the "punitive character" of the Italian treaty and to make an impassioned plea for easier terms. Foreign commissar Molotov of Russia denounced de Gasperi's plea and demanded that Italy root out Fascism. Mr. Molotov also opposed the Finnish foreign minister's request for a \$100 million reduction in the \$300 million Finland was asked to pay as reparations. When, however, such satellites of Russia as Bulgaria and Rumania asked for treaty changes, the Soviet delegation supported the demands.

After a session of seventy-nine days the conference ended on October 15 after it had approved the treaty drafts with Finland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Italy. No agreement was reached on a number of questions such as the Trieste problem and opening the Danube to international commerce. The task of solving these problems and of writing the final drafts of the treaties with Italy, Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania was assumed by the Council of Foreign Ministers when it met in New York City on November 4, 1946. When Mr. Molotov opposed many recommendations that were made by the Paris conference, a deadlock ensued which was not broken until November 27, on which day an agreement was reached

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR II. *This map shows the four zones into which occupied Germany is divided, the area of greatest Soviet pressure, and the danger spot centering in Greece, the Aegean, and the Dardanelles.*

regarding Trieste.⁴ On succeeding days Mr. Molotov made several important concessions to hasten the final draft, with the result that the treaties were virtually ready by December 6. On December 12 the Council closed its New York session with the announcement that the treaties would be signed in Paris on February 10. It had taken fifteen months and 115 meetings to agree on the peace terms for Italy and the four Axis satellites.

On February 10, 1947, the peace treaties ending World War II with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland were signed in the historical Salle de l'Horloge of the Quai d'Orsay, the great hall in the French Foreign Office in Paris where in 1928 the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war was signed. Foreign minister Georges Bidault of France stated in the opening address to the delegates that he hoped the former enemy nations would take their places in a world "forever delivered from war." After M. Bidault had opened the ceremonies, the signing proceeded with dispatch and without incident. The table upon which the actual signing took place had once been owned by Louis XV and Louis XVI. It was the table upon which the wounded Robespierre had lain before he was guillotined. The five former enemy countries and the Allied nations which had actively fought against them, signed the treaties. All doubt regarding Yugoslavia's adherence to the treaties because of dissatisfaction in not receiving Trieste was dispelled when the Yugoslav foreign minister signed under protest. In all five treaties there are definite provisions designed to limit armaments, prevent the recurrence of Fascism, and guarantee civil rights. Notable among the agreements was the one which made the strategic Adriatic city of Trieste a Free Territory under the rule of the United Nations. A second important agreement was that which gave equal rights to all nations in the Danube trade. Previously it had been declared that only the riparian states would share control of the Danube.

The first treaty to be signed was that with Italy, the chief satellite of Nazi Germany. It reduced the fledgling Italian Republic to a third-rate power. First of all, Italy was shorn of her African empire—Libya, Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, and Ethiopia—which included an area of 1,240,000 square miles and a population of fifteen million. Second, Italy was compelled to cede the Dodecanese Islands to Greece, give five small Alpine boundary areas to France, transfer two thirds of her North Adriatic province of Venezia Giulia to

⁴ After a long session on Thanksgiving Day secretary of state Byrnes suggested that the session adjourn for a turkey buffet. Mr. Molotov, as usual, led the opposition by saying humorously: "Turkey is not on the agenda." Nevertheless, the Council adjourned to eat turkey.

Yugoslavia, and surrender the port of Trieste. Third, Italy was required to pay reparations totaling \$360 million (\$100 million to Russia, \$125 million to Yugoslavia, \$105 million to Greece, \$25 million to Ethiopia, and \$5 million to Albania), and to make compensation up to two thirds of the value of Allied property damaged in Italy during the war. Fourth, Italy was deprived of the right to maintain military forces that could again threaten the peace. The army was limited to 250,000 men, the airforce to 25,000 men (no bombers), and the navy to 115,000 tons.

For the other satellites the treaties prescribed similar terms. All except Bulgaria lost territory and all were compelled to pay reparations. For Rumania it meant the loss of Bessarabia and part of Bucovina to Russia, and southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. On the other hand, Rumania received part of Transylvania from Hungary. As regards reparations, the Rumanians were to pay \$300 million to Russia. The army was restricted to 125,000 men, the airforce to 8000 men (no bombers), and the navy to 15,000 tons. The treaty with Bulgaria provided for the limitation of the army to 55,000, the airforce to 5200 men (no bombers), and the navy to 7250 tons. While Bulgaria lost no territory, she was ordered to pay Greece \$45 million and Yugoslavia \$25 million. On the credit side Bulgaria gained southern Dobruja. Hungary's share of reparations totaled \$300 million (\$200 million to Russia, \$50 million to Czechoslovakia, and an equal sum to Yugoslavia). The military forces were trimmed to a shadow. Territorial losses consisted of a few towns to Czechoslovakia and part of Transylvania to Rumania. Last of all, Finland ceded the Arctic ice-free port of Petsamo to Russia along with the province of Petsamo. Her share of reparations, to be paid to Russia, was set at \$300 million. As in the case of the other Axis satellites, her armed forces were limited—the army to 34,000 men, the airforce to 3000 men (no bombers), and the navy to 10,000 tons.

Thus twenty-one months after V-E Day, a formal state of peace was restored for part of Europe. The treaties, in the words of Secretary Byrnes, were "not perfect [but] as good as we can hope to get by general agreement." But even before they were signed, the treaties had become the subject of new disputes. Four of the five former enemy states brought up the revision issue the same day the treaties were signed. Only Finland did not protest. Yugoslavia and Greece also issued protests. While the former did not give up hope of obtaining Trieste, Greece objected because her northern border was not rectified to give her better strategic protection against possible invasion from Bulgaria.

The Italians were particularly bitter. The treaty, it seemed, did not please anyone. Count Carlo Sforza, the Italian foreign minister, stated that it must be revised because an Italy stripped of its colonies and some of its homeland "cannot possibly nourish" its 45 million inhabitants. In Rome most newspapers appeared with heavy black borders, flags were flown at half-staff over public buildings, and many houses were hung with black crepe. At 11 A.M. on the day the treaty was signed, ten minutes of silence was observed as a period of mourning. No sooner had the silence ended than crowds in Rome began to riot. The principal demonstration occurred in the Piazza Venezia which had frequently been the site of Benito Mussolini's famous harangues. After the disturbers were driven from the square, they organized processions which filed through the streets waving flags and singing patriotic airs. Hostile demonstrations were staged before Allied offices and legations. At the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier a United States flag was torn to bits. When the mob arrived before the Yugoslav Legation it smashed the windows, and some hoodlums entered the building to break the furniture. Some of the young men even raised the cry of "Duce, Duce."

Peace had been concluded with the smaller countries, but agreement on Germany, the key country in Europe, was still lacking. It was for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the treaties with Germany and Austria that the Council of Foreign Ministers met in Moscow on March 10, 1947. Present besides Ernest Bevin of Britain, Georges Bidault of France, and Vyacheslav Molotov of Russia was the new United States secretary of state, George Marshall, who had succeeded James F. Byrnes. The task confronting the Council was a formidable one. It was to reconcile, if possible, the clashing interests of the great powers. Before the meeting opened it was clear that the Big Four did not see eye to eye on the prospective treaties. The American policy called for a federated Germany and for reparations which would not choke off production. This was also, in a general sense, Britain's aim. While France's interest was again her own security, Russia was working for a strong, centralized German government with a pro-Soviet orientation and for large reparation payments.

Although the meeting of the Council continued until April 24, thereby becoming the longest in the series, no agreement was reached on the basic differences. At the end the Western Allies and Russia were more rigidly committed to their opposing views than they had been at the beginning. The Western Allies refused to consent to the Russian demands for a strong, centralized German government and

for the retention by Poland of the German territory she was occupying. But the issue that was the greatest cause of division was the question of reparations. Mr. Molotov insisted upon \$10 billion in reparations from German production and industrial equipment. He declared that Russia had "legitimate rights" as the country that suffered the greatest devastation from Hitlerian aggression. Since neither side would retreat from its stand, the meetings failed to produce concrete agreements on the treaties. On the credit side it may be said that the ministers laid plans for the liquidation of the Prussian state, that they agreed to take steps to reduce the occupation forces in Germany, and that they settled a number of controversial points in the Austrian treaty. At the conclusion of the meetings Molotov said: "Our work is not finished; nevertheless we have done a substantial amount of preliminary work." Secretary Marshall declared upon his return from Moscow: "We are naturally disappointed but I think we have a fair chance of reaching agreement on these critical matters within a reasonable time, however depressing delays may seem."

Thus on the second anniversary of the unconditional surrender a peace treaty with Germany was still far from completed. Deputies of the Big Four foreign ministers met at London early in November, 1947, in an effort to iron out some of the disagreements preliminary to the meeting of the foreign ministers. A correspondent wired the following description of the second session: "One after another of the subjects on the agenda was placed patiently before them by Patrick Dean, British deputy in the chair, and one by one they were put back into their folders without agreement. . . . As the Kremlin has shown in the past two years of negotiations, it will not give its deputies the authority to yield an inch or compromise in any way."⁵ The Council of Foreign Ministers is scheduled to convene on November 25.



THE UNITED NATIONS

When World War II broke out, the League of Nations as a peace-keeping agency was, of course, dead. Its nonpolitical activities were continued during the war but in reality they represented a "marking time" until some new international authority could be established. The first step toward a new world organization was taken in August, 1941, when President Roosevelt and prime minister Churchill met at sea on the U.S.S. *Augusta* and summarized the principles for which their nations stood, principles which were

⁵ *The New York Times*, November 9, 1947.

promptly called the Atlantic Charter. Soon representatives of the Soviet Union joined the representatives of the other two nations in a series of conferences. On January 1, 1942, the Allied war coalition came into formal existence when twenty-six nations signed a United Nations declaration in Washington. At various conferences during the succeeding years the question of founding a new body to settle international difficulties without recourse to war was discussed. At the Yalta meeting (1945) which was attended by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin the following statement was issued: "We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our Allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe that it is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic, and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples."

It was agreed that the basis was to be the war coalition of United Nations. Invitations were sent out for a meeting to be held toward the end of April in San Francisco for the purpose of founding the organization. During the preceding two months special trains and airplanes carried more than 3500 staff members and much equipment to the West Coast city. The meeting opened on April 25, 1945, with delegates from fifty nations representing about 80 per cent of the world's population. In a broadcast address President Truman welcomed the representatives as "the architects of the better world," after which the conference got under way. The San Francisco Conference was actually an extension of another meeting which had been held nine months earlier in an old Washington home called Dumbarton Oaks. This meeting had been attended only by representatives of the United States, Britain, Russia, and China. These four turned out the first draft of the World Charter in the form of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals which were sent to all the United Nations. It remained for the San Francisco Conference to refine and extend what the four powers had written.

On June 25 the work of drafting the Charter was completed and the next day it was signed by the representatives of fifty nations. It was to come into force as soon as it had been ratified by the great powers and a majority of other signatory states. This took place on October 24, 1945. The purpose of the organization is stated in the preamble of the Charter: "We, the people of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind . . . do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations." The nations that signed the Charter

agreed to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered," to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or independence of any state." Those states which took part in the conference were to be known as the original members, but membership was declared open to all peace-loving states which are ready to accept the obligations contained in the Charter. As a document the Charter is much longer and more detailed than the Covenant of the League of Nations. The concept of the Charter is largely that of the Covenant. In its greatest advance over the Covenant of the League, the Charter provides that when the Security Council is unable to preserve peace and to stop aggression by peaceful means it may invoke military force, to be provided by all members of the United Nations.

The Charter called for the establishment of six principal organs: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat. The functions of each are appropriate to the name. The General Assembly is to recommend measures in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security and to assist "in the realization of all." Politically it is the basis of the United Nations. It has been described as "a town meeting of the world" in which all member nations have an equal vote. It meets annually, and in special sessions when required. The dominating position in the UN is held by the Security Council, which is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. The five permanent seats on this Council are occupied by China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. In addition there are six nonpermanent members elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. It is through these elected members that the smaller nations can express their opinions. Although each nonpermanent as well as each permanent member of the Security Council has a vote, in matters which might necessitate the use of force a unanimous vote of the permanent members is necessary for a decision.

The activities of the other organs may be summarized briefly. The Economic and Social Council, consisting of eighteen members elected by the Assembly for a period of three years, was organized for the purpose of advancing social progress and human rights. Among its many endeavors are the promotion of higher standards of living, the cultivation of educational cooperation, and the solu-

tion of economic problems. The Trusteeship Council exercises authority over the territories held under League of Nations mandates, territories taken from enemy states in World War II, and territories voluntarily placed under its administration. The International Court of Justice was set up to replace the World Court of the League, which had been established to settle disputes of an international nature. Finally, the Charter provided for a Secretariat consisting of a secretary-general, appointed by the Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council, and a staff of assistants who draft reports, prepare material for meetings and conferences, and do general clerical work.

At the conclusion of the San Francisco Conference the UN still existed only on paper. No time was lost, however, in assembling the machinery blueprinted in the Charter. The first General Assembly met in London on January 10, 1946, in the blue and gold auditorium of the Central Hall of Westminster, with delegates from fifty-one countries answering at roll call. The session was confined to organizational matters. Paul Henri Spaak, the foreign minister of Belgium, was elected president of the First Assembly, and Trygve Lie, the Norwegian foreign minister, was chosen secretary-general. Other activities included the election of the nonpermanent members of the Security Council and the fifteen judges of the International Court of Justice. An Atom Energy Commission was also established, as recommended by the Council of Foreign Ministers (Moscow, 1945), to consider problems arising from the discovery of atomic energy and related matters. A further important decision was the one which located the organization's headquarters in the United States.

The second part of the first session of the General Assembly opened in New York City on October 23, 1946. Between this date and December 7 there were 34 plenary meetings, 190 committee meetings, and 159 subcommittee meetings. No less than 71 items appeared on the agenda for consideration. Among the major political questions were those regarding Iran, Greece, Spain, and the Balkans. In the case of Iran a small nation successfully appealed against a large neighbor. On March 18 the Iranian ambassador to the United States reported continued interference by Russia in Iranian affairs. He stated that contrary to the treaty of January 29, 1942, Russia was maintaining troops in Iranian territory. After several meetings of the Security Council action was deferred until May 6. On this date the ambassador reported the withdrawal of the troops, and further discussion of the question was postponed. Other

questions were not solved so easily, but the UN did succeed in satisfactorily disposing of a number of international problems. In other instances the solution is still in the offing. One of the most thorny problems calling for a solution is the restriction of armaments and the control of atomic energy. The peoples of the earth will be watching any efforts in this direction with intense interest.

An important nonpolitical decision was the choice of a site for the permanent home of the UN. After the site committee made hurried trips to points in New York state, San Francisco, Boston, and Philadelphia, an offer was received from John D. Rockefeller, Jr., who agreed to spend \$8.5 million for the acquisition of a six-block area in the heart of New York City for a skyscraper UN home. The General Assembly accepted the gift "with a feeling of sincere gratitude."

In general, the UN at the end of two years of its existence had demonstrated the power of world opinion even when it is expressed through an imperfect instrument. During this period it not only established machinery for the preservation of peace; it also made a beginning at trying to cope with the issues which threaten the peace of the world. The architects of this second attempt to establish a workable system of world organization have been unsparing of their energy in their determination to make it succeed. Nevertheless, what the UN achieved does not add up to a very impressive list of gains. On the other hand, there have been no sweeping claims that the UN would solve the fundamental problems of human existence. The hopes which greeted its founding were much more restricted than the extravagant enthusiasm that greeted the organization of the League of Nations. On the second anniversary of the founding (June 26, 1947) President Truman stated: "The existence of the United Nations obviously affords no guarantee that every international problem can be solved easily, or automatically, or immediately. It should not be a matter for surprise or disillusionment that many issues arising as a result of the war still remain unsettled."



POSTWAR EUROPE

It is extremely difficult for one who has not seen it with his own eyes to visualize the tremendous destruction wrought by World War II in Europe. The job of reconstruction was gigantic. In Britain the rubble heaps were removed quite rapidly, but in Germany the job was so vast that two years after the cessation of hostilities towering piles of rubble lined the streets of scores of communities. "Re-

construction," a correspondent wrote,⁶ "is still a term applicable to some vague future period when adequate tools and materials and the liberty to utilize them for municipal purposes will enable the population to begin the clearance job, which is still impossible." Before the peoples of those European states which felt the greatest impact of the war could remove the physical wreckage of war they had to begin, as it were, from scratch to rebuild their industrial and agricultural life. In addition, most of the causes of the war were still active at its conclusion. The treaties may have been the best possible under the circumstances, but the fact remains that borders were drawn and territories bartered about in complete disregard for the wishes of the populations affected. The old question of nationalism and irredentism remained in the foreground, particularly in eastern Europe. Nor did the treaties settle the problems of imperialism, raw materials, and markets. Thus Europe was beset with all its old troubles and in addition had the new ones generated by the war.

After the defeat of Germany in 1918 a new German government was set up at once and continued to function despite the many difficulties it encountered. The situation was quite different in 1945. Upon the defeat of the Nazi armies and the suicide or disappearance of Hitler and many Nazi leaders the entire framework of government collapsed and the Allied armies assumed supreme authority on all levels of administration. For administrative purposes Germany was divided into three major zones. The eastern part was allotted to Soviet Russia, the northwestern to Britain, and the southwestern to the United States. In addition a smaller zone, carved out of the British and American sections, was put under French authority. Furthermore, an Allied Control Council, consisting of the commanders in chief of the occupation forces, was set up by the four powers. While each commander in chief exercised supreme authority in his own zone, the members of the Council jointly ruled Germany as a whole.

One of the first moves of the military governments was to purge Germany of Nazis and nazism. On July 17, 1945, President Truman, prime minister Churchill, and premier Stalin met near Potsdam and decided that Germany should be completely disarmed and demilitarized; that the Nazi Party and all its institutions should be uprooted; that German education should be controlled in such a way "as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas."

⁶ *The New York Times*, April 1, 1947.

The task was pursued with varying degrees of intensity in the different zones. In the American zone a division of opinion developed among the officials of the military government regarding the thoroughness of the purge. It was claimed by some that the whole issue of nazism and militarism was neglected because it was believed to be more important to put the economic system and administrative machinery in running order.

If the military governments were lax in purging the masses, they were not remiss in punishing the leaders. With the arrest of foreign minister von Ribbentrop in June all the former Nazi bigwigs were in custody except Martin Bormann, Heinrich Himmler, Hitler, and Goebbels. The first was missing, Himmler had committed suicide, and Hitler and Goebbels were presumably dead. On October 18, 1945, an indictment was handed by the four powers to the International Military Tribunal in Berlin charging twenty-four war leaders with participation in the plot against peace and humanity conceived by Adolf Hitler. This indictment set a precedent in calling before a tribunal of justice men of a defeated nation who were responsible for war crimes, atrocities, and acts of aggression on a vast scale. "If there is no law now under which to try these people," Justice Robert H. Jackson said in his opening address to the court on November 20, 1945, "it is about time the human race made some." All the defendants responded to the accusations in the indictment with the words "not guilty." To prove the guilt of the accused, vast quantities of evidence were presented to the court, including captured films and documents of many kinds, some of them containing secret orders from Hitler.

The trials continued for many months. Finally on October 1, 1946, the Court brought in a decision condemning twelve of the surviving leaders to death by hanging, three to life imprisonment, and four to prison terms ranging from ten to twenty years, while three were acquitted. Prominent among those who were condemned to death were Hermann Göring, commander in chief of the *Luftwaffe* and next to Hitler the most prominent figure in the Nazi regime; Joachim von Ribbentrop, Nazi foreign minister; Alfred Rosenberg, official philosopher of the Nazi Party; Julius Streicher, militant anti-Semite and one of the earliest members of the party; General Wilhelm Keitel, chief of the high command; and Arthur Seyss-Inquart, governor of Austria after the *Anschluss*. Hermann Göring cheated the gallows by taking poison a few hours before his scheduled execution. Dr. Robert Ley, former head of the Labor Front, had committed suicide during the previous October. Rudolf Hess, Hitler's

closest personal confidant and the man who made the sensational flight to Britain during the war, was sentenced to imprisonment for life. Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, financial expert of the regime, was acquitted.

Meanwhile steps were being taken to effect a gradual transition from military rule to self-government. The first elections were held in the rural districts of the American zone early in 1946. Predictions that the masses could not be roused from their political apathy were thoroughly discredited when returns showed that between 85 and 90 per cent of the eligible voters had exercised the right of franchise. On June 30, 1946, elections for constituent assemblies were held in Bavaria and Württemberg-Baden. Similar elections were also held in the British, French, and Soviet zones. Thus German administrative responsibility was gradually expanded. In the elections the trend to the left was unmistakable. This was true not only in Germany but also in other European countries. The future of Europe appeared to be in the hands of the democratic left, with a dominant socialist orientation.

Such a marked shift to the left took place also in Great Britain. The fact that Big Ben lighted up again at dusk above the House of Parliament was a sign that peace had returned to Britain; but the troubles of the British were far from over. A number of problems were clamoring for solution. Compared with Russia and the United States, Britain came out of the war weak in man power and resources. Raymond Postgate, the distinguished British historian, wrote: "The main difficulty that the government will have is the knowledge of British weakness. The apparently enormous strength of Britain today, like France in 1919, is hollow."⁷ Food was so short that the government offered free cartridges to anyone wanting to shoot gray squirrels. So many houses had been destroyed that almost a quarter of the population was in need of housing. Furthermore, Britain's entire industrial system had to be reconverted to peacetime production, and her position in world trade was in need of restoration. Moreover, her colonial empire was seething with discontent. At a number of points in the empire disorders and revolts had flared up. Even in Europe her position had changed in that she no longer directed a balance of power on the Continent.

Although Mr. Churchill had played a giant's part as the architect of victory, the British people were not certain that he was the man who could best solve the problems of peace. In the eyes of his countrymen the great war leader appeared to diminish in stature after

⁷ *New Republic*, vol. 113 (October 22, 1915), p. 521.

the defeat of the Nazis. He himself had written in an autobiographical volume entitled *My Early Years*: "Those who can win a war well can rarely make a good peace, and those who could make a good peace would never have won the war." Every day that carried the British deeper into their postwar problems convinced them that the foregoing statement was sound. When after Hitler's fall Mr. Churchill proposed that the coalition government continue in office until the end of the Pacific war, the proposal was rejected by the Labor Party. Consequently the prime minister resigned and an election was called for July 6, 1945. When the results were announced on July 26 it was discovered that the Labor Party had won a victory far more sweeping than its leaders had expected. The new standing in the House of Commons was Labor Party 393, Conservative Party 189. Thus Britain replaced the coalition government and Winston Churchill with a labor government headed by Clement R. Attlee as prime minister.

The program of the Labor Party was socialistic but it was not modeled on the Russian brand. The central feature was nationalization of key industries. A beginning was made in the nationalization of the Bank of England. The transfer to public ownership was effected by the issuance of government stock for that held by the shareholders, each shareholder being guaranteed the same income for twenty years that he had received during the preceding twenty-two years. Before the end of 1945 a bill to nationalize the coal industry was introduced. This bill, which became law on July 12, 1946, provided for a nine-member National Coal Board with full power to carry out all operations involved in production and distribution.

Although the coal production per man increased, it was not enough to satisfy the fuel demands of the country. The coal shortage, combined with the coldest winter in fifty years, caused a crisis during the last months of 1946 and the first of 1947. The shortage of electric power became so acute that factories had to close down, and almost five million persons were thrown out of work. Cities were without street lights, train service was seriously curtailed, and even homes were without electricity for five hours a day. The shortage was not the result of wartime exigencies, a couple of snowstorms, or political changes, but of the gradual decline in coal production since World War I. In 1946, for example, 20 per cent less coal was mined than in 1927. The decline was due to a number of causes, including exhaustion of the mines and antiquated equipment and methods.

In general, Britain's industrial plight was a sad one during the

months after the end of the war. To understand the situation one must remember her basic dilemma which, put briefly, is "export or die." Half the country's food and all the industrial raw materials except coal must be obtained from abroad. These imports must be paid for with exports or with borrowed money. Whereas the British formerly had large assets abroad, this was no longer true after World War II. During the war years the government had liquidated more than \$5 billion of its foreign assets to purchase war materials. As to exports, there were few moving out of Britain. With 42 per cent of the nation's man power in the armed forces or directly supplying them at the end of the war, only about 2 per cent were producing for export. As early as September, 1945, British-American talks began in Washington regarding a large loan, and finally on December 6, 1945, an agreement was signed which provided for a loan of \$3.75 billion, to be repaid by the year 2001.

The money gave temporary support to a weakened economy. During 1946 British military forces abroad were reduced in order to provide more man power for industry. But the question that many were asking was: "Will Britain be able to export enough to pay for her imports by the time the loan has been spent?" On August 6, 1947, in a long-awaited speech on the nation's economic crisis, prime minister Attlee stated that longer working hours and a reduced standard of living would be the lot of Britons for an indefinite period. Such sacrifices, he said, were essential if the rapidly diminishing dollar reserves were to be conserved and the country's foreign trade brought into balance. He further declared that the loan from the United States would be exhausted by the end of 1947.

Political changes took place in France also. On June 16, 1940, Marshal Pétain, a soldier of eighty-five, took the reins of government handed to him by premier Paul Reynaud. The regime sponsored by Pétain was a strange mixture of Fascist and royalist ideas. It became known as the Vichy regime because its headquarters were established in the city of Vichy. As the exploitation of France by the Nazis increased, the French people became more restive. To prevent outward rebellion, Pétain's collaborationist government decreed further repressive measures. Freedom of speech, of press, and of association was abolished and anti-Semitic legislation was passed in imitation of Nazi Germany. After the Allied invasion of Italy the Vichy ringleaders sought to escape the consequences of their treasonable acts by trying to surrender their power to a National Assembly so that it could select a government favorable to the Allies. When this move failed, Pétain called upon the people to be neutral

in the announced invasion of France. The actual invasion on June 6, 1944, caused Pétain, Pierre Laval, his right-hand man, and the rest of the cabinet to flee to Belfort after the cabinet voted itself out of existence. Later Pétain and his quisling associates were removed to Germany, while Laval fled to Spain. In April, 1945, Pétain surrendered to the French authorities and several months later was tried for "intelligence with the enemy." The court sentenced him to death, with a recommendation of clemency. Two days later General de Gaulle commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. Upon demand of the French, the Spanish government ordered Laval's expulsion from Spain. His trial resulted in a death sentence and on October 14, after a futile attempt to take his own life by poison, he was executed by a firing squad.

In the meantime a provisional government was set up in France. At the time of the surrender in 1940 General de Gaulle, who had refused to participate in the overthrow of the Third Republic, went to London and there organized the "Free French" movement which later became known as "Fighting France." The basic purpose of this movement was to free all French territories of Axis domination and to restore independent sovereignty. For the next five years Frenchmen regarded General de Gaulle as the symbol of French resistance. His famous declaration of June 18, 1940, "France has lost a battle but France has not lost the war," made him the spokesman for all the occupied countries of Europe in their resistance against Nazi domination. In 1943 de Gaulle's movement was merged with the French resistance movement in North Africa, and a Committee of National Liberation was organized. Gradually de Gaulle became the sole leader of all the political and military forces of the Committee. In June of 1944 the Committee adopted the title of "Provisional Government of the French Republic" and was accorded recognition by a number of European states. General de Gaulle as president exercised general supervision over governmental affairs, assisted by a cabinet representative of all shades of prevalent opinion.

An ordinance of August 17, 1945, set October 21 as the date for choosing delegates for the National Constituent Assembly, to be composed of 586 members, of which 522 represented European France and 64 overseas territories. The voters in addition to choosing their delegates were asked to decide whether the new body was to function as a legislative chamber as well as a constituent assembly and whether the power of the Assembly over the president should be restricted. Both questions were answered with resounding affirmatives. The election was unique in several respects. Nearly 80 per cent

of the 24 million eligible voters went to the polls. What is more, it was the first time that women voted in a national election in France. Thirty parties presented candidates. About three quarters of the votes went to three groups. The communists won 151 seats, the MRP (*Mouvement Républicain Populaire*, a Catholic organization with an advanced social outlook) 150, and the socialists 139.

When the Constituent Assembly met on November 6, president de Gaulle surrendered his powers but on November 13 he was re-elected provisional president by unanimous vote. He did not, however, remain in office long. In picking his cabinet he refused to give the communists one of three major positions—foreign affairs, war, or interior—which they demanded. He resigned several times, but when the impasse could not be broken he presented his “final” resignation on January 22, 1946, after which he announced his retirement from public life. His successor was the socialist Félix Gouin whose tenure of office was also shortlived. When the draft of the constitution, which was largely a communist-sponsored project, was presented to the voters on March 4, 1946, for their approval or rejection, they rejected it. A new Constituent Assembly was elected on June 2. This time the MRP won the most seats, with the communists in second place and the socialists a poor third. M. Gouin resigned and M. Georges Bidault, member of the MRP, was chosen provisional president. The Constituent Assembly then drafted a revised version of the first constitution and this was accepted by a small majority of voters on October 13, 1946. In accordance with the new constitution elections for the National Assembly or first chamber of parliament were held on November 10. In these elections the communists won 169 seats, the MRP 163, the socialists only 103, and the right group 62.

Thus the Fourth Republic was born in France. All attempts to agree on a premier were vetoed by one group or another until December 12, when Léon Blum, the seventy-four year old socialist leader, was accepted as a compromise premier. Voting for a president was set for January, 1947. It resulted in the election of Vincent Auriol, socialist leader. His election is an eloquent commentary on the tangled political situation. Representing a party which held only 11 per cent of the seats in the National Assembly, he was chosen by the votes of the communists joined to those of the socialists. In other words, M. Auriol owes his position to the communists. When Léon Blum declined because of bad health to continue as premier, M. Paul Ramadier, also a socialist, was given the task of forming a cabinet. The problems were much the same as those confronting

other countries. They included a disordered economy, food shortages, transportation crises, unemployment, and the rehabilitation of areas ravaged by war.

A noteworthy development in French foreign policy was the pact signed with Great Britain in March, 1947. Weeks of negotiations were followed by the signing of a fifty-year pact on March 4 at Dunkirk, the battered Channel port where British and French troops were nearly trapped in 1940. The basic agreements may be summarized under four heads: (1) the two countries agreed to take such common measures as are necessary if Germany adopts a policy of aggression or takes any initiative that may threaten the security of France or Britain; (2) if France or Britain again is at war with Germany, each will immediately come to the military aid of the other; (3) France and Britain will consult regarding common action if Germany fails to fulfill obligations of an economic character that may be imposed on her; (4) the two countries will consult regarding all economic questions of mutual interest. The text also states that all actions under the alliance will be taken in harmony with the obligations of the signatories under the United Nations Charter.

In Spain Generalissimo Francisco Franco still occupied the seat of power as Caudillo (leader). During the early years of the war Nationalist Spain wavered between outright participation on the Axis side and a position of pro-Axis nonbelligerency. Pressure was naturally exerted from both sides. While the Axis powers sought to entice Spain with promises of Gibraltar and a part of North Africa besides demanding that General Franco repay the assistance he had received during the civil war, Britain threatened to establish a complete blockade of hungry Spain. When the Germans invaded Russia in 1941, a new wave of pro-Axis feeling welled up. In Madrid Falangist demonstrators stoned the British embassy. Volunteers were recruited for service against the Russians. In November, 1941, Spain joined the Axis powers in renewing the anti-Comintern pact for a period of five years. It appeared as if Spain was about to cast its lot on the side of the Axis.

But German reverses in Russia appear to have prevented the Caudillo from taking the final step. Then came the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the entrance of the United States into the conflict. Three days later, on December 10, Franco announced that Spain would adhere to its policy of nonbelligerency. As it gradually became evident that the Allies were increasing their strength, the government officially retreated from its policy of "all aid to the Axis short of war" to one of more definite neutrality. But Franco

continued to give secret aid in various ways. In July, 1942, he pronounced liberal, democratic forms of government as inferior to the totalitarian system. After the progress of the Allied offensives in Russia and North Africa convinced him that the Axis cause was doomed, he sought to ingratiate himself with Britain and the United States by offering Spain's offices in the cause of "a speedy and just peace." His offer of mediation was, however, spurned by the Allies.

The nearer the Allies moved to victory, the greater did the dissatisfaction become in Spain. Private business grew more bitter in its opposition, the monarchists more insistent regarding the restoration of the monarchy, and the republicans more determined to overthrow the Nationalist government. Even the army, one of the chief props of Franco's throne, had its malcontents. After the fall of Mussolini eight lieutenant generals, all of them members of the Superior War Council, the highest body in the Spanish army, requested the restoration of the monarchy; in fact, anti-Franco elements could be found in every social group. As one observer put it, the principal strength of the Franco regime lay in the lack of unity among the opposition. To keep the opposition from overthrowing him, Franco continued his "divide and rule" policy. To offset the influence of the monarchists who were demanding the restoration of Don Juan, the Bourbon prince, he attempted by supporting the aspirations of Carlos VIII to awaken the Carlist movement which had caused so much dissension during the nineteenth century.

After the Allied victory in Europe was assured, Franco sought to improve his international position and to allay internal opposition by "liberalizing" his regime. He promised less harsh treatment for political prisoners and the restoration of civil liberties and freedom of the press. On May 7, 1945, he proclaimed a bill of rights permitting freedom of speech, of assembly, and of religion. Closer examination, however, revealed that the "freedoms" forbade criticism of the "fundamental principles" of the Franco state, permitted assemblies only for "lawful purposes," and barred non-Catholics from holding public services.

If criticism was severe inside Spain, it was equally so on the outside. On August 23, 1945, President Truman declared: "We don't like Franco and his government." In March, 1946, Britain and the United States issued a joint declaration labeling Franco a silent partner of the Axis and calling for the peaceful abolition of his regime. Throughout most of 1946 the Spanish question was discussed by various UN organs without a solution. The Security

Council, at the request of the Soviet Union, conducted an official inquiry to ascertain whether the activities of the Franco government had caused international friction and whether they endangered peace and security. Finally in December, 1946, the General Assembly passed a resolution which recommended that all UN members recall their ambassadors from Madrid. The resolution further provided that if the Franco regime continued in power the Security Council should adopt adequate measures to remedy the situation. Spain was also barred from membership in the UN so long as the government remained unchanged.

On March 31, 1947, Franco issued a decree which paved the way for the restoration of the monarchy. It announced the organization of a Regency Council to take charge of the government if the chief of state dies or is incapacitated. A further duty of the Council is the appointment of the Caudillo's successor. "Spain, as a political unity," the decree stated, "is a social state, which in accordance with its tradition is constituted as a kingdom. . . . In case of death or incapacity of the chief of state, there will be called to succeed him that person of royal blood with the best right to the position. . . . To exercise his rights as chief of state, either as king or regent, the candidate must be male, have completed thirty years of age, be a Spaniard and a Catholic, and swear to the fundamental laws of the nation." The decree also provided that Franco might at any time suggest to the Cortes that it summon "the person of royal blood" best qualified to assume the Spanish crown.

If the end of the war was welcome to the other Allied nations, it was particularly so to Russia. No nation had paid a larger price in blood for victory; in fact, the Russians suffered more casualties and greater devastation than all the other Allied nations combined. According to premier Stalin's statement of March 13, 1946, more than seven million Russian lives were lost in battle. Civilian deaths were estimated at eight million. In addition there was an appalling destruction of property. The report submitted to the Allied Reparations Commission on September 13, 1945, listed the number of buildings destroyed as six million, including 84,000 schools. At the end of the war many Russians were living in abandoned army dug-outs, in caves, and in storm cellars. The estimated number of factories destroyed is 31,000. Thirty per cent of the lumber industry was destroyed and 50 per cent of the cement industry. The railroads offer an even more striking illustration of the destruction wrought by the war. About 40,000 miles of track were destroyed; the loss in freight cars was about 428,000, or nearly half the prewar rolling

stock. Equally high was the destruction of domestic animals. The losses are listed as seven million horses, seventeen million cattle, twenty million pigs, and twenty-seven million sheep and goats.

Industrial establishments were the special targets of the German attack. The occupied areas contained half of the power plants of the country. The Nazis not only removed some 1,400 turbines, 11,300 generators, and 14,000 steam boilers but burned out or put out of commission those they did not carry off. A noteworthy piece of destruction was the blowing up of the Dnieper Dam so effectively that the necessary repairs will be a matter of years. Of all the devastated regions the Donbas, a small region in the Ukraine which has been called the Russian Ruhr, probably suffered most. This area had been a dominant factor in prewar production. From it came between 50 and 60 per cent of the coal, iron ore, steel, and aluminum produced in the U.S.S.R. Power stations in this area produced nearly a quarter of the electrical energy generated in Russia. After the Germans had taken what they wanted, their demolition squads made certain that none of the machinery they left behind was usable. More than 80 per cent of the productive capacity of this region was destroyed. Furthermore, the war also decimated the industrial labor force of Russia. Most of the skilled workers who had been trained during the preceding fifteen years were not only between twenty-five and thirty-five years of age but they were also best fitted for military operations. Hence they formed the nucleus of Russia's best troops and suffered the highest casualties. In the regions captured by the Germans those who were not in the military forces were deported to labor in Germany.

Shortly after the end of the war in Europe, the Russian government formally announced a new Piatiletka or Five-Year Plan, this one being the fourth. The plan had a twofold goal. First of all, it aimed at complete rehabilitation of the devastated areas by 1950. Second, it purposed to increase industrial production and potential military strength to match the might of any power in the world. In other words, the Fourth Five-Year Plan was to make the Soviet Union strong enough to play the role of a superpower. The plan as such is not rigid and is subject to modification as conditions change.

The new Plan included other major aims. Among these were the expansion of internal and external communications, the building of a large fleet of merchant vessels, and the construction of highways and canals. It further projected a substantial railway building program and increased production of railway cars and equipment. It also called for the building of twice as many tractors by 1950 as

there were on the collective farms when the Nazis invaded Russia. Another noteworthy project was the creation of a new building industry to make prefabricated factories and houses. An interesting point in connection with this program is that the new houses are not to be owned by government agencies as in the period before the war, but are to be sold to the workers on generous terms.

The main emphasis, as in the earlier Plans, is on expanding the capital goods industries. Russia's standard of living is to rise somewhat, and the output of consumers' goods is to increase. But the promise of abundance and plenty which served to sustain morale during years of incredible hardships is not to be fulfilled by the Fourth Five-Year Plan. Consumer demands are again to be subordinated to heavy industry. In his speech of February 9, 1946, premier Stalin called for an industrial output of 50 million tons of pig iron a year, 60 million tons of steel, 500 million tons of coal, and 60 million tons of oil. When these goals are reached, he said, "only then can we consider our country guaranteed against any eventuality." He believed that "perhaps three new Five-Year Plans will be required" to achieve the goals he set. "But it can be done and we must do it," he said in conclusion. Besides being able to supply Russia's own peacetime and wartime needs the leaders desire to sell capital equipment and instruments of warfare to the countries in the Russian zone of influence.

Russia possesses all the necessary raw materials to reach the goals set by premier Stalin. Although vast stretches of the country are still unexplored, it has more than 50 per cent of the known world supply of many minerals in addition to other raw materials vital to industrial growth. Thus Russia claims 53 per cent of the known iron ore deposits of the world, 58 per cent of the oil reserves, and 20 per cent of the coal deposits, with many potential coal-bearing areas yet unexplored. The Soviet Union has developed processes that yield great quantities of synthetic rubber. The Russians have also discovered a rubber-yielding plant (*kok-sagyz*), which is extensively cultivated as a source of natural rubber. The vast fertile areas have unlimited possibilities for the production of grains, fibers, and materials for plastics. Even before the war mechanization was in wider use on the farms than in the United States. One of the bottlenecks in the plans for industrial expansion is transportation. In many parts of the country highways that can be used during all seasons of the year are almost unknown. As for railroads, the total trackage in 1946 was less than 60,000 miles, much of it single track as compared with some 240,000 miles of mainline tracks in the United States.

All efforts were at once turned toward the fulfillment of the new Five-Year Plan. Mines were pumped dry or the water was drained into subterranean sand pits with the aid of drilling equipment. A beginning was also made in repairing or rebuilding the wrecked dams, pumping stations, reservoirs, and power plants to provide power for the coal mines and steel mills. At the end of 1945 no less than nineteen blast furnaces, seventy-eight open-hearth furnaces, and forty-two rolling mills which had been damaged by the Nazis were again in operation. The opening of more than one hundred major mines and hundreds of small pits, for example, restored a large part of the coal output of the Donbas. While industry was being restored, the process of decentralization which had started during the war was continued. Instead of being grouped in the west as before the war, industrial plants were being scattered over both the eastern and western parts of Russia. To escape the Nazi armies the government had moved a number of industries eastward. Not only are they to remain in their new localities but others are also being established there.

As soon as the war ended, the Soviet government began to marshal the man power necessary for the proposed industrial development. The process of demobilization which started in 1945 was continued in 1946. By midsummer of the latter year the number of troops in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria had been sharply lowered. It was estimated that by the end of 1946 the armed forces had been reduced to less than six million. This does not mean, however, that the Soviet Union is pursuing a course of demilitarization. On February 23, 1946, the twenty-eighth anniversary of the founding of the Red army (officially renamed Soviet army on September 20, 1946), Stalin enjoined it "not only to keep up with progress in the art of war, but to advance it."

Probably the most significant change in the administrative structure of the U.S.S.R. during the war years took place in 1944 when amendments to the federal constitution and to the constitutions of the republics which make up the Soviet Union restored some authority over foreign and military affairs to the republics. In other words, there was a reversal of the trend of centralization which had culminated in the constitution of 1936. The shift of authority can, however, be overstated. It was limited in nature. The federal government still retains the power to conduct international relations and to conclude and ratify treaties. It likewise retains the authority to organize and direct the armed forces of the Union.

Perhaps the most noteworthy fact regarding the Communist Party

was the increase in membership from 1,588,852 in 1939 to 2,515,481 in 1941. During the succeeding years it continued to grow. In November, 1943, it was announced that the members together with the candidates for admission totaled 4.6 million and by the beginning of 1945 the total had risen to 5.7 million. This increase resulted from the liberalization of the admission requirements. Despite the growth, the total membership is only a small fraction of the population.

On the second Sunday of February (February 10) 1946, Soviet citizens went to the polls for the first time since 1937 to vote for candidates for the Supreme Soviet. Only one party, the communist, nominated candidates, one for each position. The voters' choice consisted either in voting for the one candidate or in handing in a blank ballot. Of the eligible voters 98 per cent turned out for the elections and 99 per cent of them voted for the candidate whose name appeared on the ballot.

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union since World War II has been assertive and ambitious. The leaders feel that Russia's performance in the war entitles her to a leading voice in world affairs. When it appeared that the war would soon end, the government began to push its influence in all directions. Three months after the German capitulation (August 8) the U.S.S.R. joined the Allies in the war against Japan. During the week before the Japanese surrender (August 14) Soviet forces invaded and took Manchukuo, thus giving them a firm hold in that territory. Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands passed to them in August, 1945, under arrangements made at Yalta. Along its western border the Union had already secured possession of Bessarabia and northern Bucovina by the Rumanian armistice of September 12, 1944. From Finland the Russians obtained Petsamo, and by agreement at Potsdam Russian troops occupied Königsberg and northern East Prussia pending permanent transfer. A Polish-Soviet treaty of August 16, 1945, established a new frontier along the Curzon line. A further treaty with Czechoslovakia (June 29, 1945) transferred Carpatho-Ukraine to the U.S.S.R., thus uniting all Ukrainians under one rule for the first time.

But the Soviet government was not satisfied with these gains. Making the most of the opportunity it brought under its sway the countries through which the Russian forces passed in their drive toward Germany. Among these were Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Poland. According to the leaders this action was motivated by considerations of military protec-

tion. "The Germans," premier Stalin stated, "carried out an invasion of the U.S.S.R. through Finland, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. . . . What can be surprising in the fact that the Soviet Union, in a desire to ensure its security for the future, tries to achieve that these countries shall have governments whose relations to the Soviet Union are loyal?"



THE SEETHING EAST

Hardly had World War II come to an end when large sections of the Eastern world began to seethe in the cauldron of unrest. In the Middle East as well as in the Far East political nationalism was asserting itself in the form of widespread revolts against the old imperialisms. On all sides native peoples were demanding the right to independence and self-government. This struggle for freedom, which had started decades earlier, received a great impetus when the Japanese demonstrated that the Europeans could be driven out of southern Asia. This robbed the white empire builders of much of the respect the natives had for them. During the years they were able to hold their conquests the Japanese had excited resentments against the French, Dutch, and British with such slogans as "Asia for Asiatics." The natives did not, of course, get the "freedom and independence" which the Japanese promised them; but after the collapse of the Japanese empire they were nevertheless reluctant to give up the idea of freedom and return to their former status as European dependents.

The areas involved in this tidal wave of colonial unrest are enormous. Exclusive of India, the territories affected contained a total of some 145 million persons in an area almost four times the combined size of Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands. If India's 400 million are added, then the populations of the Far East total about six times the combined populations of Britain, France, and the Netherlands. The revolts began with an uprising of the Annamese of Indo-China during September, 1945. Constituting about 75 per cent of the population, the Annamese were determined to prevent the restoration of French rule. The Nationalist Party (Viet Nam) demanded a Constituent Assembly elected by universal, direct, and secret suffrage, which was to proclaim the complete independence of the whole of Indo-China. Over against these demands the French, in March, 1946, recognized the Viet Nam republic as part of a French Federal Union. But there was no agreement regarding the boundaries of the republic. While the leaders insisted

that it include Cochin-China, Cambodia, and the territory of Laos, the French recognized it as including only Annam.

Nationalist demands also became more definite in the other French colonies. The autonomy movements that existed throughout all the colonies prior to the war gained momentum during the war years. Whether the colonies were protectorates like Tunis and Morocco, whether they were treated as Departments of France like French Guiana, or whether they were mere colonial possessions like Indo-China, Madagascar, and Réunion, in all the movement for complete independence was asserting itself. The French defeat by the Germans in 1940, the postwar economic difficulties, and the general lack of military power, have all encouraged the native populations to make their claims. This, in turn, has brought France squarely before the problem of the survival of her empire.

About the same time that the Annamese revolted, fighting also broke out in Java, where the nationalists proclaimed an Indonesian Republic. Just before their surrender the Japanese had set up an Indonesian regime and this regime had collected as many weapons as possible from the beaten Japanese. When the British arrived to drive out the remaining Japanese, intermittent fighting took place between the Indonesians and the British. Later the Indonesians also fought the Dutch when they returned to re-establish their rule. The revolting Indonesians, led by Achmed Soekarno, demanded complete independence and declared their determination not to revert to a colonial or semicolonial status. The Dutch, for their part, were of no mind to permit so rich an area as the Netherlands Indies to slip from their grasp. These islands, about fifty-seven times the area of the European Netherlands, are one of the world's richest prizes. During the years prior to the war, for example, they produced nearly all the world's quinine, 83 per cent of its pepper, 37 per cent of its rubber, and 31 per cent of its copra. In an effort to save this prize the Dutch offered a compromise agreement (March, 1947) which recognized the Indonesian Republic's authority over Java, Sumatra, and the smaller island of Madura. A second state, East Indonesia, was organized to embrace the Netherlands Indies islands east of Java, except Borneo and New Guinea. After an interim period lasting until January 1, 1949, the new states were to become part of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union, with equal status under the Dutch crown.

But differences arose regarding the interim period. On the one hand, the Dutch accused the Indonesians of violating the truce by killing more than a hundred Dutch soldiers and by refusing to send

food supplies to the port cities which were held by the Dutch. On the other hand, the Indonesians wanted sole control of the police during the interim period against Dutch insistence that control be held jointly. After sending several ultimatums to the Indonesians a Dutch force of about 60,000 equipped with such weapons of modern warfare as tanks and rocket-firing planes began their march into the hinterland on July 20, 1947. Although the natives had an estimated strength of 100,000 troops, they lacked training and equipment. They therefore fell back, burning their towns as they retreated. On August 1, 1947, the UN Security Council took the most affirmative step in its history by calling upon the Dutch and Indonesians to "cease hostilities forthwith" and "settle their disputes by arbitration or by other peaceful means." Both sides quickly announced their willingness to abide by the orders of the Security Council. In halting this conflict the UN won its first major victory in behalf of peace.

The most widespread uprisings and disturbances took place in the British Empire. In many parts the earlier trend toward independence which had started centuries earlier was accelerated by British weakness after the war. The fact that Britain was a mere shell of her former self was bound to weaken her authority in those sections of the empire which were striving for independence. But the British had no intention of giving up their empire. As Winston Churchill put it in 1942: "I haven't become the King's First Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." Nor does the Labor Party feel otherwise. Not even its most ardent member wants to weaken or dissolve the empire. "I'm not prepared to sacrifice the British Empire," Mr. Bevin said, "because I know if it fell a great collection of free nations would go into the limbo of the past and would create disaster." The British are, therefore, changing their policy to meet the conditions of this new age of nationalism when native peoples are progressing toward political maturity and violently demanding independence. They have decided that when the native peoples mature politically they must be treated as equals, in the hope that they will then want to continue their partnership in the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Among the peoples of the British Empire who demanded partial or complete independence at the end of World War II were those of Burma and of Egypt. Burma, which until 1937 had been a part of India, was proclaimed an "independent" state by the Japanese in 1943, with a government under the control of the Japanese commander in chief. When after the collapse of the Japanese rule the

independence movement again asserted itself, the British offered to assist the Burmese in attaining a Dominion status. Nationalism rose to a much higher pitch in Egypt. The real issue was the replacement of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 which expired in 1946. In anticipation of this event the Egyptians demanded the withdrawal of all British troops from the country and the incorporation of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan into Egypt. Realizing that it was a prerequisite for a new treaty, the British government decided to withdraw its troops. A treaty, drawn up in London in October, 1946, was approved by the Egyptian cabinet, but in Cairo and Alexandria mobs staged riots shouting "Down with Britain." The principal cause of dissatisfaction was the clause which provided for the joint rule of the Sudan by Britain and Egypt "until the Sudanese are ready to decide their own future."


The end of the war saw no improvement in the relations between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine. The same irreconcilability existed as before the war; in fact, the unremitting conflict was intensified by the pressure of Jewish immigration. For the British it was the old story of being unable to satisfy either party. In seeking to win Arab support on the eve of World War II the British had stated in a White Paper: "Jewish immigration during the next five years will be at a rate which, if the economic absorptive capacity permits, will bring the Jewish population up to approximately one third of the total population of the country. . . . After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it." But the British did after 1944 agree to permit 1500 Jewish immigrants to enter Palestine each month. This did not satisfy the Zionists, who wanted to open Palestine as a haven for the Jewish victims of Nazi persecution. Unable to offer a satisfactory solution of the problem, the British Labor government proposed and the United States accepted the proposal that an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry be named to determine the facts of the situation and to make recommendations. The committee recommended in its report of April 30, 1946, that 100,000 displaced persons be admitted to Palestine immediately.

The situation deteriorated rapidly after the suggestion of the committee was made public. When the Arab leaders threatened outright war if the recommendation were carried out, the British did not proceed with the plan. Instead they sought to placate the Zionists by increasing the monthly immigration quota from 1500 to 2000. This was not enough to satisfy the Zionists, particularly the Jewish underground groups of Palestine. In the hope that it would force

the British hand, these groups inaugurated a series of terrorist outbreaks which wrecked or damaged bridges, railway lines, shops, and police stations. On July 17, 1946, the Irgun Zvai Leumi, one of the underground groups, blew up a wing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, killing ninety-one, wounding forty-five, and leaving twenty-nine missing. In a further effort to resolve the dilemma the British advocated a partition of Palestine into semiautonomous Arab and Jewish states with increased Jewish immigration. The suggestion was opposed by both Arabs and Jews. When new violence broke out, the British evacuated their civilians and then laid the problem on the doorstep of the UN. A special session of the General Assembly, called in April, 1947, to consider the question, appointed a commission to investigate the issue and report to the regular Assembly in September. In its report the commission advocated the division of Palestine into two states, one Arab and the other Jewish.

India was a further problem for the British. When the war broke out the Indian National Congress, the largest political party in India, refused to give its support to the war. In an effort to gain the wholehearted backing of the nation the British government sent Sir Stafford Cripps to India with an offer of almost complete authority over internal affairs in return for active Indian participation in the war. Although the people made notable contributions to the war effort on the Allied side, the leaders did not believe that the British were sincere in their promises of postwar freedom. If the British, they asked, are convinced that the peoples of India are ready for freedom, why do they not grant it at once? Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, president of the Congress Party, said: "Come what may, we will come out as a free nation or be thrown into the ashes." Soon after the cessation of hostilities the British took measures toward carrying out their promises, but many leaders remained skeptical. The executive committee of the Congress Party stated that "British policy toward India . . . seems to be based on delaying every advance and attempting to create new problems and fresh complications."

During the months after the surrender of Japan the situation deteriorated rapidly. While both the Hindus and the Moslems opposed the British, the relations between Hindu and Moslem became extremely bitter. The Moslems, having been slighted in the political arrangements by the Hindus who controlled the Congress Party, early in 1946 proclaimed the slogan, "Pakistan (independent Moslem state) or death." Mohammed Ali Jinnah, absolute leader of the Moslem League, began by asking for complete separation of all re-



THE NEW INDIA

On August 15, 1947, the British flag was hauled down in India, and the Hindu Dominion of India and the Moslem Dominion of Pakistan entered the British Commonwealth of Nations.

gions inhabited by a Moslem majority. Severe Hindu-Moslem riots followed. The British, after vainly trying to settle the differences, decided that whatever happened they would transfer power to Indian hands. The announcement aggravated the bitterness between the two groups, causing the riots to increase in intensity. It is estimated that in Calcutta alone ten to fifteen thousand people were killed. Riots and massacres in other parts also took a high toll of lives.

Nevertheless, the British continued with their plan. Gradually the mechanism for the transfer of power was worked out and the settlement was accepted. It was of necessity a compromise which fell short of the desires of all parties concerned, but it was the best that could be arranged at the time. It provided for the division of India into two or more states according to the wishes of the people. These new states were promised Dominion status, which would put them on a par with Canada and Australia. Thus India would be partitioned into a Hindu-ruled Hindustan with a population exceeding 220 million, and a Moslem-ruled Pakistan with a population of about 90 million. In addition there were more than five hundred states ruled by native princes and comprising nearly half of India's territory, with some 95 million inhabitants. The choice for these is either to form a third state called Rajistan or to join Hindustan or Pakistan. When Hindustan and Pakistan were established, it appeared that the princely states would federate with one or the other of the Dominions instead of organizing a third state. Most of the states manifested a distinct leaning toward Hindustan.

On August 15, 1947, at the clock stroke of a new day a new chapter was opened in the history of India. It was the day which ushered in freedom for that teeming subcontinent. All over India the British flag was hauled down after two hundred years of British rule. In place of the Union Jack there rose the orange, white, and green banner of the Indian Union (Hindustan) or the white and green flag of Pakistan. India and Pakistan celebrated their first day of independence with both Hindus and Moslems cheering their new-found freedom and appealing for an end of their religious strife. Prime minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru concluded the Hindu Dominion's first day at New Delhi with a nationwide broadcast in which he told the people that "our first and immediate objective must be to put an end to all internal strife and violence, which disfigure and degrade us and injure the cause of freedom." In Karachi, capital of the new Moslem Dominion, Mohammed Ali Jinnah was sworn in as Governor-General. "Our object," he said, "shall be

peace within and peace without." Thus the new India was born without violence between the British and their Indian subjects. But there was violence between the Indians themselves. Rioting continued in parts of India pending the final settlement of the boundaries between the two states. At Lahore in Punjab province the death toll was 153.

From the British standpoint August 15, 1947, spelled the end of the grandeur of empire. In the words of one writer: "The whole world of Kipling's imagery sinks into oblivion, the captains and the kings that strutted across the scene of India's history depart." George VI no longer bears the title, Emperor of India. On the other hand, India and Pakistan became Dominions of the British Commonwealth and as such owe a common allegiance to the British crown. But this status is established only until June, 1948. Thereafter each Dominion is free to cut its strings with the British Empire in favor of complete independence. The relationship between the two new states and the British government at the time the independence of the former was established was, however, so cordial as to give every indication that "the brightest jewel of the imperial crown" would long remain a voluntary member of the British Commonwealth.

China was also in a state of turmoil. After many years of intermittent warfare the communist and Kuomintang parties established a united front against the Japanese in 1937. Chiang Kai-shek even went so far as to give money and arms to the communists. On the other hand, the communists did yeoman service both in fighting the Japanese and in organizing popular resistance. Wherever they succeeded in driving out the Japanese, they set up their governments and recruited men for their armies. This caused the nationalist government to become suspicious and later to stop sending money and arms to the communists. After that the relations between the two were at best an armed truce, which in a number of places gave way to civil war. Thus the Chinese masses passed dumbly from one form of war's misery to another. At the beginning of 1946 both sides agreed to meet with General Marshall as arbiter for formal conferences to discuss ways of ending the civil war. On January 10 it was announced that an agreement had been reached.

All hopes of a final settlement, however, proved illusory. Before long renewed political and military strife widened the rift. Fighting soon broke out in Manchuria over its occupation by Kuomintang forces, and on February 17 General Chou, a communist leader, stated that unless Generalissimo Chiang's government con-

sulted the communists and other groups regarding the re-establishment of a Chinese administration in Manchuria, there would be a resumption of the civil war. Nevertheless the communists entered a formal agreement which called for the absorption of their forces into the National Army within eighteen months. But in northeastern China the communists soon attacked the Kuomintang troops to prevent them from taking over Manchuria. Truce teams composed of Kuomintang and communist representatives and members of General Marshall's staff tried repeatedly to negotiate a truce. They succeeded in arranging temporary cease-fire arrangements but failed to compose the differences of the opposing groups. Both sides wished to end the civil war, but neither was ready to offer a basis acceptable to the other. The diplomatic stalemate coupled with the increasing intensity of hostilities caused General Marshall to admit on August 10, 1946, that "it appears impossible for the two sides to reach a settlement."

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek did order his troops to cease fire on November 11, 1946, "except as may be necessary to defend their present positions" in preparation for the scheduled opening of the National Constituent Assembly on November 12. The purpose of this order was to induce the communists and other minority groups to participate in the Assembly. When it opened at Nanking on November 15, there were only representatives of the Kuomintang present. The communists asserted that the delegates were handpicked even from areas occupied by the communists, thus robbing them of delegates from these areas. To this Kuomintang spokesmen retorted that they could wait no longer, since they had already postponed the inauguration of constitutional government for ten years. Generalissimo Chiang himself offered the Assembly a draft of the constitution on November 28 with the remark: "This presentation marks the end of responsibility of the nationalist government and the beginning of the government by the people."

The new constitution, accepted on Christmas Day, 1946, went into effect on December 25, 1947. It provides for the equality of all persons, racial groups, sexes, and individuals regardless of party, and for secret ballot and universal suffrage for all over twenty. It further provides for the election of a Legislative Yuan (lawmaking body) and a Control Yuan (upper house), and for a National Assembly which will be named every six years and elect the president and vice-president. Although the constitution was hailed in many circles, the communists did not recognize it.

Meanwhile pressure was being put on Chiang to democratize his

government by eliminating its totalitarian features. A number of writers have scored Chiang's government as a "corrupt, reactionary, and quasi-fascist regime." One writer who visited China in 1946 has said: "After the surrender the locusts swarmed over the Chinese cities, too. Kuomintang machine politicians and carpetbaggers seized what the Japanese had left and sometimes what the Chinese had, too. Administrative inefficiency and the spoils system the Chinese may be accustomed to; but the corruption, worse now than ever before in modern times and hard to bear in a time of inflation and impoverishment, has produced a sullen resentment. . . . Equally effective as a means of repression are the secret police and the espionage service of the Kuomintang. The pretense that censorship has been abolished deceives no one. No university professor dares openly express an opinion, in or out of the classroom, unless it is favorable to the regime. Newspapers take a little more latitude, but not often on serious questions or in such a way as to reflect unfavorably on those at the top. It would not be accurate to call contemporary China fascist, since the system is not closely enough organized, but fascistic it certainly is."⁸

In 1947 the rift between the Kuomintang and the communists widened to a point at which a rapprochement appeared to be only a faint possibility. The immediate future held only the prospects of intensified civil war. The communists, realizing that their troops are no match for the better-trained and better-equipped troops of Generalissimo Chiang, decided to wage guerrilla warfare as a means of disrupting communications and causing confusion. They feel that if this is continued long enough it will bring about economic disintegration and a collapse of the Kuomintang rule, after which they will inherit power. The Kuomintang leaders, on the other hand, are convinced that they can crush the communist forces in a few months with their modern equipment, much of which was acquired from the United States. The communists loudly denounced the help given by the United States, proclaiming that this help has not contributed to a solution of China's problems but has only increased Kuomintang intransigence. On January 29, 1947, the State Department announced that American peace efforts in China had failed and that all United States forces would be promptly withdrawn.

Japan was equally in a state of chaos at the end of World War II. In the words of General MacArthur, "Japan, industrially, commercially, militarily, and in every other way is in a state of complete collapse. Her food supplies are scarce and she faces conditions in this

⁸ Nathaniel Peffer in *The New York Times*, May 4, 1947.

emergency that may well become catastrophic. Her punishment for her sins, which is just beginning, will be long and bitter." According to private estimates 2,210,000 dwellings were destroyed by Allied bombs and 9,200,000 were made homeless. The food situation was so critical that the allotment to individuals was reduced to 1500 calories daily, which is about a third of the American standard. During the succeeding months the millions of returning servicemen and civilians further aggravated the food crisis. The shortage of food, in fact, remained the most critical problem of the postwar years. Furthermore, the entire industrial structure had to be rebuilt. The nation's manufacturing industries were so completely smashed by Allied bombs that the problem was not one of reconversion but of rebuilding. Even the textile plants, converted to military uses during the war, had been flattened by bombers. It is estimated that of 13.7 million prewar cotton spindles only 270,000 were usable at the close of the war. The prewar capacities for the manufacture of rayon were reduced to 22 per cent. Other branches of the textile industry suffered equally.

In accepting the terms of unconditional surrender the Allies had announced that "the armed forces of the Allied powers will remain in Japan until the purposes set forth in the Potsdam Declaration are achieved." From his headquarters in Tokyo General MacArthur set about the task assigned to him, which entailed the establishment of a peaceful and responsible government. After close consultation with the Allied military authorities a new constitution was drafted and officially endorsed by Emperor Hirohito. Later the new Diet elected under its provisions put its stamp of approval on the document. The two principal clauses embodied a renunciation of war and divested the emperor of his sovereign rights. Thus the old Emperor Meiji constitution of 1899 was replaced by a democratic one. The first election held under its provisions on April 10, 1946, permitted all males over twenty-one to vote and also enfranchised women for the first time in Japanese history. When none of the parties succeeded in gaining a majority, Shigeru Yoshida, former ambassador to London, accepted the leadership of the liberal party and formed a ministry characterized by its conservative leanings. There were various cabinet changes during the two years after the war, but the parties involved were never those of the extreme right or left.

Before the constitution was drafted, Emperor Hirohito himself had in his Imperial Rescript of New Year's Day, 1946, repudiated the legend of his divinity. He ordered the Japanese people to forget "the false conception that the Emperor is divine," that he is a

direct descendant of the Sun Goddess Amaterasu. He also scrapped the Shinto doctrine that "the Japanese people are superior to other races and fated to rule the world." Thus "the small bespectacled man with a chronic twitch, a wispy mustache, and an unhappy expression that seldom changes" sought to make his people break with their feudal past of nearly 2000 years' standing. Although Hirohito continues to occupy the throne, he is no more than a symbol of what his ancestors were.

A further task of the Army of Occupation, besides establishing "a peacefully inclined and responsible government," was to demobilize and disarm the Japanese army and navy. During the first year after the war tremendous stores of arms were destroyed and almost six million Japanese soldiers were stripped of their arms. On January 4, 1946, General MacArthur ordered the government to dissolve permanently twenty-seven military and political movements identified with military expansion and to remove from public office all officers of these organizations. After the publication of a detailed documented report concerning the mistreatment of American and Allied military and civilian prisoners, a number of Japanese were tried and the guilty ones convicted. Of special interest was the trial of General Yamashita, known as the "Tiger of Malaya," who was the Japanese commander in the Philippines during the last months of the war. Not that he was personally accused of brutalities. It was contended that the atrocities were on such a wide scale that they could hardly have escaped his notice. The trial set a precedent in that no man of General Yamashita's rank has in modern history been held responsible for brutalities practiced by his men.

Nor was the purge in Japan limited to militarists. A "house-cleaning" was designed by the Allies to end commercial monopolies and to eliminate from industry and finance all the industrial executives who helped prepare for war. A special target were the ten wealthiest families, who controlled so large a portion of Japanese industry and banking and had a stranglehold on Japan's economy. It was decided to convert their holdings into nonnegotiable government bonds and to forbid any of their members to hold executive positions with any of the organizations they formerly controlled. A further purge, designed to eliminate from schools and universities all "undesirable" teachers, was begun but proved ineffective. After screening 300,000 teachers the committees expelled less than one hundred.

In the field of economics the revival of textile manufactures is the prerequisite to economic recovery. To achieve this, manufactur-

ers of cotton, rayon, and silk products are not only repairing or rebuilding their plants to produce the cheap cloth for which Japan was noted, but they are also making an aggressive effort to win back some of the textile markets they had controlled in the prewar days. These efforts to speed economic recovery are being supported by the American State Department. This same Department is also urging a speeding-up of the preparatory work that is necessary for an early Japanese peace. Two years after the Japanese surrender, consideration of a treaty for Japan is still in a preliminary stage.

Appendix

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INDEX



Bibliography

THE number of books on European history since 1914 is so large that a mere listing of them would fill a volume. Various periodicals publish lists of the books they receive, among them the *American Historical Review* and the *Journal of Modern History*. An exceptionally full list can be found in *Foreign Affairs*. A part of this list has been published under the title, *Foreign Affairs Bibliography*, edited by William L. Langer and H. F. Armstrong (1933). For books on the earlier years of the period the student can consult *A Guide to Historical Literature*, edited by W. H. Allison, Sidney B. Fay, A. H. Shearer, and H. R. Shipman (1931). A more recent bibliography is L. J. Ragatz' *A Bibliography for the Study of European History* (1942), with supplements. Another important volume is the *Foreign Affairs Bibliography* (1945), with critical commentaries by Robert G. Woolbert, which offers a selected list of books on international relations for the period from 1932 to 1942.

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of *Modern History*, vol. 6 (1931), pp. 160-171. This study is supplemented by the same author's later articles in the same periodical, vol. 13 (1911), pp. 225-236, and vol. 16 (1911), pp. 169-201. O. H. Wedel has published a critical discussion of Austro-Hungarian documents (1908-1911) in *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 3 (1931), pp. 84-107. Another noteworthy review article is R. J. Sontag's "British Policy in 1913-1914," *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 10 (1938), pp. 512-553. Philip E. Mosely's "Russian Policy in 1911-1912," *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 12 (1910), pp. 69-86, is an excellent critical discussion of printed documents and secondary works on Russian foreign policy.

Short histories. Among the many short histories of the First World War C. R. M. Cruttwell's *A History of the Great War, 1914-1918* (1935) is one of the best; written in non-technical language and based on the best authorities. More concerned with the strategic and tactical side is Captain Liddell Hart's *A History of the World War, 1914-1918* (1931). Another good military history is G. L. McEntee's *Military History of the World War* (1937). An excellent short account for the general reader is C. J. H. Hayes' *A Brief History of the Great War* (1926). T. G. Frothingham's *A Guide to the Military History of the World War* (1920) is a useful synopsis. Sir G. G. Aston wrote a good brief survey for the Home University Library under the title, *The Great War of 1914-1918* (1930). A. F. Pollard's *A Short History of the Great War* (1928) is a good account by a British historian. Two other useful books are W. L. McPherson's *The Strategy of the Great War* (1919) and *A Short History of the Great War* (1920). J. Buchan's *A History of the Great War* (4 vols., 1922) and F. H. Simonds' *A History of the World War* (5 vols., 1917-1920) are good longer accounts. There is an excellent discussion by A. L. P. Johnson of the military histories that appeared up to 1931, in *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 3 (1931), pp. 266-286. A history of the war as seen by a camera is *The First World War; A Photographic History* (1933), edited by L. Stallings. For those who are interested in mistakes there is W. S. Woods' *Colossal Blunders of the War* (1930).

Special operations. Books on operations in special areas are so numerous that only a few can be listed. On the drive of 1914 S. Tyng's *The Campaign of the Marne, 1914* (1935) throws considerable light. General A. von Kluck's *The March on Paris, 1914* (1920) is an account by a German general. There are two good books on the campaign in East Prussia: N. N. Golovine's *The Russian Campaign of 1914* (1933) and Sir E. Ironside's *Tannenberg; The First Thirty Days in East Prussia* (1925). Winston Churchill's *The Unknown War* (1931) is a brilliant account of the fighting on the eastern front. L. Villari's *The War on the Italian Front* (1932) and G. L. McEntee's *Italy's Part in Winning the World War* (1934) are good discussions of Italy's war effort. R. W. Seton-Watson's *Roumania and the Great War* (1915) is a good account. E. Ashmead-Bartlett's *The Uncensored Dardanelles* (1928) is an authoritative discussion. On the question of the Straits in general there is the excellent article by R. J. Kerner, "Russia, the Straits, and Constantinople," *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 1 (1929), pp. 400-415. H. Kannengiesser's *The Campaign in Gallipoli* (1928) is an account by a general who fought on the side of the Central Powers. G. Gordon-Smith's *From Serbia to Jugo-Slavia* (1920) is an informative account of the Serbian military campaigns. Among the many books on the Arabian adventure the following are outstanding: R. Graves' *Lawrence and the Arabian Adventure* (1928), C. T. E. Edmonds' *Law-*

rence of Arabia (1935), and Captain Liddell Hart's *Colonel Lawrence: The Man Behind the Legend* (1935). Lowell Thomas' *With Lawrence in Arabia* (1924) is an interesting account. Not to be overlooked, of course, is T. E. Lawrence's *Revolt in the Desert* (1927). For the operations in Palestine the student should consult Major-General M. G. E. Bowman-Manifold's *Outline of the Egyptian and Palestine Campaigns, 1914 to 1918* (1922) and Colonel A. P. Wavell's *The Palestine Campaigns* (1928). There is much interesting information in the two books by W. T. Massey, *How Jerusalem Was Won* (1920) and *Allenby's Final Triumph* (1920).

Naval warfare. A good treatment of Anglo-German naval competition between 1900 and 1914 can be found in E. L. Woodward's *Great Britain and the German Navy* (1935). Sir H. Newbolt's *A Naval History of the War, 1914-1918* (1920) is an excellent survey of British operations. One of the most important books in the field of naval history is Sir Julian Corbett's *History of the Great War: Naval Operations*, 5 vols. (1920-1931), based on the British Admiralty Papers. J. R. Jellicoe's *The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916* (1919) is an account by the man who commanded the Grand Fleet. The commander of the German fleet at the battle of Jutland, Admiral R. Scheer, has also written an account which is entitled *Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War* (1920). Another interesting work by a German naval officer is Admiral A. von Tirpitz' *My Memoirs* (2 vols., 1919). J. E. T. Harper's *The Truth about Jutland* (1927) and *The Riddle of Jutland* (1934) by the same author in collaboration with L. Gibson are two of the best books on the famous battle.

The submarine. Two careful and fair-minded studies on submarine activities are R. H. Gibson and Maurice Prendergast's *The German Submarine War, 1914-1918* (1931) and David Masters' *The Submarine War* (1935). Louis Guichard's *The Naval Blockade* (1930) is a good scholarly account. W. G. Carr's *By Guess and by God* (1930) and L. Thomas' *Raiders of the Deep* (1928) tell the story of submarine activities in interesting fashion. J. R. Jellicoe's *The Submarine Peril* (1934) is a record of British policy during the early years of the war.

Propaganda and secret service. Ralph H. Lutz's "Studies of World War Propaganda," *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 5 (1935), pp. 496-516, offers an excellent critical discussion of the various books on war propaganda during World War I. Harold D. Lasswell's *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (1927) is a definitive book based on exhaustive study of the sources. Another important work is George Bruntz's *Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918* (1938). James M. Read's *Atrocity Propaganda, 1914-1919* (1941) is a careful study of the causes and consequences of atrocity propaganda. Arthur Ponsonby's *Falsehood in Wartime* (1928) discusses an assortment of lies "considered necessary to maintain the morale of soldiers and civilians." On espionage during World War I there are a number of interesting books including W. Nicolai's *The German Secret Service* (1924), H. R. Berndorff's *Espionage* (1930), and Sir B. Thomson's *The Allied Secret Service in Greece* (1931).

Biographies, memoirs, and reminiscences. Four outstanding biographies of military men are Captain B. H. Liddell Hart's *Foch, the Man of Orleans* (1932), Sir G. G. Aston's *Biography of the Late Marshal Foch* (1929), Karl Tschuppik's *Ludendorff: The Tragedy of a Military Mind*, translated by W. H. Johnston (1932), and Sir Archibald Wavell's illuminating biography of his former commander, *Allenby: A Study in Great-*

ness (1941). Other important biographies are E. J. Galet's *Albert, King of the Belgians, in the Great War* (1931), R. Recouly's *Joffre* (1931), and H. A. Gibbons' *Venizelos* (1923). Memoirs and reminiscences of men who played leading roles during the period are so numerous that only a few can be listed. Important British memoirs include Winston Churchill's *The World Crisis, 1911-1918* (4 vols., 1923-1927), D. Lloyd George's *War Memoirs* (6 vols., 1933-1937), Viscount Grey's *Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916* (2 vols., 1925), and Viscount Haldane's *Before the War* (1920), Sir G. Buchanan's *Mission to Russia* (2 vols., 1923) and H. H. Asquith's *Genesis of the War* (1924) contain much important information. Memoirs by prominent Frenchmen are R. Poincaré's *The Origins of the War* (1922) and *The Memoirs of Raymond Poincaré* (2 vols., 1926-1928); also G. M. Paléologue's *An Ambassador's Memoirs* (3 vols., 1924-1926), F. Foch's *Memoirs* (1931), and J. J. C. Joffre's *Personal Memoirs* (2 vols., 1932). Notable memoirs by prominent Germans include Wilhelm II's *The Kaiser's Memoirs, 1887-1918* (1922), Th. von Bethmann-Hollweg's *Reflections on the World War* (1920), Prince Lichnowsky's *Heading for the Abyss* (1928), B. von Bülow's *Memoirs* (4 vols., 1931-1932), E. Ludendorff's *Ludendorff's Own Story* (2 vols., 1920), and P. von Hindenburg's *Out of My Life* (2 vols., 1921). Important memoirs by Americans include Brand Whitlock's *Belgium: A Personal Narrative* (2 vols., 1919) and J. J. Pershing's *My Experiences in the World War* (2 vols., 1931).

Miscellaneous. Frank P. Chambers' *The War Behind the War, 1914-1918* (1939) shows what took place in civil life during the war years. Leon W. Fuller's "The War of 1914 as Interpreted by German Intellectuals," *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 14 (1942), pp. 145-160, is an interesting study of a neglected phase. The development of the tank and its use in the First World War is presented in detail in J. F. C. Fuller's *Tanks in the Great War, 1914-1918* (1920) and Sir Murray Sueter's *The Evolution of the Tank* (1937). Edwin Campbell's *Zeppelins: The Past and the Future* (1918) contains an interesting brief account of the part Zeppelins played in World War I. For a more detailed treatment see Ernst A. Lehmann and Howard Mingos' *The Zeppelins* (1927). Treusch von Buttler-Brandenfels' *Zeppelins over England* (1932) is an account by a German Zeppelin expert. On the use of gas the student will find an interesting discussion in C. H. Foulkes' *Gas! The Story of the Special Brigade* (1934). H. W. Miller's *The Paris Gun* (1930) tells the story of the gun which dropped shells into Paris from a distance of seventy miles.

Russian Revolution of 1917. M. M. Karpovich's *Imperial Russia, 1801-1917* (1932) is a good brief outline of a century of Tsarist rule. A more comprehensive survey can be found in Sir Bernard Pares' *History of Russia* (1926). Sir George Buchanan's *My Mission to Russia* (1923) contains some interesting observations on Russian conditions. Gleb Botkin's *The Real Romanovs* (1931) presents a picture of the Romanovs as seen by the court physician. William Gerhardt's *The Romanovs* (1940) tells the story of the Russian imperial family. *Letters of the Tsaritsa to the Tsar, 1914-1916* (1923) and *The Letters of the Tsar to the Tsaritsa, 1914-1917* (1929) afford a real insight into the character of both. An excellent scholarly account of conditions among the peasants is to be found in Geroid T. Robinson's *Rural Russia under the Old Regime* (1932). René Fülöp-Miller's *Rasputin: The Holy Devil* (1928) is a sensational biography of the Russian "holy man," but not always authentic. For further information on the influence of Rasputin the student may consult Prince F. F. Iusupov's *Rasputin* (1927) by

one of Rasputin's assassins and M. V. Rodzyanko's *The Reign of Rasputin* (1927) by the president of the Duma to whom Rasputin became an obsession. G. G. Tellberg and R. Wilton's *Last Days of the Romanovs* (1920) offer a good account of the murder of the tsar and his family. Sir John Hanbury-Williams' *The Emperor Nicholas II as I Knew Him* (1922) is a picture of the tsar as seen by an Englishman. M. T. Florinsky's *The End of the Russian Empire* (1931) is an excellent study of Russia during the early years of the war. Victor Chernov's *The Great Russian Revolution* (1936) tells the story largely in terms of the prominent persons involved. Alexander Kerensky's *The Catastrophe* (1927) is his own story of the Russian Revolution. Anton I. Denikin's *The White Army* (1930) and George Stewart's *The White Armies of Russia* (1933) record the counterrevolutionary efforts.

For critical discussion of books on the Russian Revolution up to 1930 the student may consult Michael Karpovich's bibliographical article, "The Russian Revolution of 1917," *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 2 (1930), pp. 258-280. An excellent brief survey is to be found in George Vernadsky's *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1931* (1932). James Mavor's *The Russian Revolution* (1928), Lancelot Lawton's *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1926* (1927), and Louis P. Kirby's *The Russian Revolution* (1940) are good short accounts. A good longer work is William H. Chamberlin's *History of the Russian Revolution* (2 vols., 1935). G. R. Treviranus' *Revolutions in Russia: Their Lessons for the Western World* (1944) is a historical interpretation of revolutionary politics. Sir Bernard Pares' *The Fall of the Russian Monarchy* (1939) is one of the better accounts of the causes and outbreak of the revolution. E. A. Walsh's *Fall of the Russian Empire* (1928) is successful in dealing with the Romanovs, but not with the revolution. Documentary materials are to be found in *Documents of Russian History, 1914-1917*, edited by F. A. Golder (1927); *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918*, edited by J. Bunyan and H. H. Fisher (1934); and *The Red Archives*, edited by C. E. Vulliamy (1929). For an account by one of the key figures see Leon Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution* (1934). Morris G. Hindus' *The Russian Peasant and the Revolution* (1920) is a vivid account of the effect of the revolution on rural life. For other books on Russia and the Russian Revolution consult the bibliography for Chapter 7.

United States enters the war. An excellent discussion of works on the gradual drift of the United States into the war is to be found in B. E. Schmitt's "American Neutrality, 1914-1917," in *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 8 (1936), pp. 200-211. Charles Seymour's *American Neutrality, 1914-1917* (1935) is a series of revealing essays. The most detailed discussion of American neutrality is C. C. Tansill's *America Goes to War* (1938). Other important discussions include C. F. Gauss' *Why We Went to War* (1919), Newton D. Baker's *Why We Went to War* (1936), and H. Gratton's *Why We Fought* (1929). T. A. Bailey's "German Documents Relating to the 'Lusitania,'" *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 8 (1936), pp. 320-337, throws much light on the *Lusitania* controversy. Walter Millis' *Road to War: America, 1914-1917* (1935) is an interesting study which presents novel viewpoints. The most adequate general account of the United States war effort is Frederic L. Paxson's *American Democracy and the World War* (2 vols., 1939). Other informative volumes are S. T. Moore's *America and the World War* (1937), H. J. Reilly's *America's Part* (1928), and F. Palmer's *Our Gallant Madness* (1937). Among the interesting recollections one must include J. W. Gerard's *My Four Years in*

Germany (1917) by the United States Ambassador to Germany; R. Lansing's *War Memoirs* (1935) by the United States Secretary of State; and J. von Bernstorff's *My Three Years in America* (1920) by the German ambassador to the United States. Of special interest are the memoirs of the commander-in-chief of the A. E. F., General J. J. Pershing's *My Experiences in the World War* (2 vols., 1931).

United States in the war. On the military participation of the United States, General James G. Harbord has written two good books: *America in the World War* (1933) and *The American Army in France* (1936). A brief popular account of American operations can be found in A. W. Page's *Our 110 Days Fighting* (1920). Other informative accounts are S. Thomas' *History of the A. E. F.* (1920), H. Liggett's *A. E. F.* (1928), D. Van Every's *The A. E. F. in Battle* (1928), and F. Palmer's *Our Greatest Battle*. For naval operations there is an excellent book by W. S. Sims, the commander of the United States naval forces that operated in European waters, entitled *The American Navy in the War* (1920). Another good account by the same author in collaboration with B. J. Hendrick is *The Victory at Sea* (1920). For an account of aerial operations the student may consult M. M. Patrick's *The United States in the Air* (1928). The problem of recruiting the A. E. F. and shipping it across the ocean is ably discussed in T. G. Frothingham's *The American Reinforcement in the World War* (1927), A. Gleaves' *A History of the Transport Service* (1921), and E. N. Hurley's *The Bridge to France* (1927).

End of the war. Harry M. Rudin's *Armistice, 1918* (1941) offers a dispassionate day-by-day account of events leading to the armistice. Sir Frederick Maurice's *The Armistices of 1918* (1943) is a well documented study. Another good book by the same author is *The Last Four Months* (1919) which describes the last military campaign. The documents regarding the armistice are to be found in *Preliminary History of the Armistice*, edited by J. B. Scott (1921). Karl F. Nowak's *The Collapse of Central Europe* (1924) is a sound informative volume. Stephen M. Bouton's *And the Kaiser Abdicates* (1920) is an account by an American who was in Germany at the time. M. Baumont's *The Fall of the Kaiser* (1931) is the best treatment of the subject. For information on the costs of the war the student can consult H. Folks' *The Human Costs of the War* (1920), E. L. Bogart's *Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great World War* (1919), and J. M. Clark's *The Costs of the World War to the American People* (1931).

CHAPTER 4. *The Paris Peace Conference*

Making the peace. There are three interesting brief accounts, all written by journalists: H. Wilson Harris' *The Peace in the Making* (1919), Sisley Huddleston's *Peace-Making at Paris* (1919), and E. J. Dillon's *The Inside Story of the Peace Conference* (1920). C. T. Thompson's *The Peace Conference Day by Day* (1920) contains some interesting sidelights. Frank H. Simonds' *How Europe Made Peace without America* (1920) is a good popular account. D. H. Miller's *The Drafting of the Covenant* (2 vols., 1928) is a good account by a leading American jurist on the Commission. Edward M. House and Charles Seymour's *What Really Happened at Paris* (1921) is a series of lectures by leading members of the American delegation. Harold Nicolson's *Peace-making, 1919* (1933) contains vivid excerpts from the diary of a liberal Englishman. *History of the Peace Conference* (6 vols., 1920-1924), edited by H. Temperley, offers a detailed account by experts attached to the British and American delegations. James

T. Shotwell's *At the Paris Peace Conference* (1937) is a day-to-day record of what a distinguished historian saw. Critical discussions of all the important books that appeared on the Peace Conference from 1919 to 1941 can be found in Robert E. Binkley's "Ten Years of Peace Conference History," *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 1 (1929), pp. 607-629; Paul Birdsall's "The Second Decade of Peace Conference History," *ibid.*, vol. 11 (1939), pp. 362-378; and Bernadotte E. Schmitt's "The Peace Conference of 1919," *ibid.*, vol. 16 (1944), pp. 49-59. The text of the treaties is to be found in *The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923* (2 vols., 1924) issued by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Specific countries. Alma M. Luckau's *The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference* (1941) is a detailed treatment of the subject. Victor Schiff's *The Germans at Versailles* (1919) presents the observations of a socialist journalist. A detailed and impartial study of the treaty as it affected the relations between Germany and Poland is to be found in Ian Morrow's *The Peace Settlement in the German-Polish Borderlands* (1936). G. E. R. Gedyc's *The Revolver Republic: France's Bid for the Rhine* (1930) tells the story of the efforts to separate the Rhineland from Germany. René Albrecht-Carrié's *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference* (1938) is a clear, scholarly account of the negotiations regarding Italy. Francesco Nitti's *Peaceless Europe* (1922) denounces the treaty. For Hungary there is Francis Deák's *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference* (1912), a painstaking collection of materials, but somewhat onesided. Count Albert Apponyi, head of the Hungarian delegation, discusses the making of the Treaty of Trianon in a chapter of his *Memoirs* (1936). *The Treaty of St. Germain*, edited by Nina Almond and Ralph H. Lutz (1931), is a valuable study which sets forth by means of documents the evolution of the territorial and political clauses of the treaty.

Discussions of the treaties. Paul Birdsall's *Versailles Twenty Years After* (1941) is an excellent piece of historical writing. A. P. Scott's *An Introduction to the Peace Treaties* (1920) is a good analysis of the treaty of Versailles. Another good analysis is H. Stegeman's *The Mirage of Versailles* (1928). G. Adam's *The Tiger: Georges Clemenceau* (1930) and Geoffrey Bruun's *Clemenceau* (1913) are two good brief biographies. A. Tardieu's *The Truth about the Treaty* (1921) is an account by Clemenceau's right-hand man. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy's *The Fourteen Points and the Treaty of Versailles* (1939) is an interesting brief discussion. Clemenceau's attitude toward the treaties is to be found in his *Grandeur and Misery of Victory* (1930). W. H. Dawson's *Germany under the Treaty* (1933) is an eloquent demand for a revision of the treaty by a British historian. R. B. McCallum's *Public Opinion and the Last Peace* (1945) is a scholarly and interesting study which refutes some popular misconceptions about the Versailles treaty. William O. Molony's *Nationality and the Peace Treaties* (1931) is a penetrating discussion by an official of the League. George B. Noble's *Policies and Opinions at Paris, 1919* (1935) makes a striking comparison between the diplomacy at Paris and earlier diplomacy. Bernard M. Baruch's *The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty* (1920) is a good discussion by the economic adviser to the American Peace Commission.

Woodrow Wilson and the peace. Thomas A. Bailey's *Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace* (1944) is an interesting study of the struggle over the treaties. Ray S. Baker's *What Wilson Did at Paris* (1919) is a defense of Wilson. Karl F. Nowak's *Versailles* (1928) is based on information from members of the German delegation and, there-

fore, unsympathetic to Wilson. Robert Lansing's *The Peace Negotiations* (1921) and *The Big Four and Others at the Peace Conference* (1921) are angry attacks on Wilson's methods and policies. A detailed defense of Wilson's efforts can be found in R. S. Baker's *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (3 vols., 1923). Another sympathetic work is W. E. Dodd's *Woodrow Wilson and His Work* (1932). Stephen Bonsal's *Unfinished Business* (1911) is a simple and straightforward study of Wilson's idealism and the postwar ferment. Important for the study of United States diplomacy in the peace efforts are *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (4 vols., 1928), edited by Charles Seymour.

The League of Nations. R. Jones and S. S. Sherman's *The League of Nations: From Idea to Reality* (1927) traces the growth of the idea of a League. A more detailed account is to be found in T. Marburg's *Development of the League of Nations Idea* (2 vols., 1932). W. E. Rappard's *United Europe* (1930) is a good short account by a distinguished student of international relations. A good penetrating discussion of the Covenant is at hand in F. Wilson's *The Origins of the League Covenant* (1928). C. Howard Ellis' *The Origin, Structure and Working of the League of Nations* (1928) is an excellent introduction. In a more popular vein there is P. J. N. Baker's *The League of Nations at Work* (1926). J. S. Bassett's *The League of Nations* (1928) is a careful and fair-minded account. Woodrow Wilson's *Case for the League of Nations* (1923) contains a collection of President Wilson's speeches in behalf of the League idea. M. O. Hudson's *The Permanent Court of International Justice* (1934), E. Lindsey's *The International Court* (1931), and J. W. Wheeler-Bennett's *Information on the World Court, 1918-1928* (1929) are three good books on the World Court.

CHAPTER 5. *The Weimar Republic*

Founding of the Republic. *Fall of the German Empire, 1914-1918* (2 vols., 1932), edited by Ralph H. Lutz, is a valuable collection of documents. A. Rosenberg's *The Birth of the German Republic, 1871-1918* (1931) is a good objective narrative of events. H. G. Daniels' *The Rise of the German Republic* (1927) is a slow-moving survey. Ralph H. Lutz's *The German Revolution, 1918-1919* (1922) is an excellent account of the first year of the republic. G. Young's *The New Germany* (1920) and H. Stroebel's *The German Revolution and After* (1923) are two good surveys of conditions in Germany at the close of the war. *The Making of New Germany: The Memoirs of Philipp Scheidemann* (2 vols., 1929) are reminiscences by one of the founders of the republic. *The Memoirs of Prince Max of Baden* (2 vols., 1928) are interesting revelations by the last German chancellor. G. P. Gooch's *Germany* (1925) is an excellent short survey of Germany after World War I. R. Brunet's *The New German Constitution* (1922) and H. Oppenheimer's *The Constitution of the German Republic* (1923) are invaluable for an understanding of the constitution. J. F. Coar's *The Old and New Germany* (1921) offers an interesting comparison between the Germany before and after 1917.

Books on the Republic. One of the best accounts of the first years of the Weimar Republic is to be found in Elmer Luehr's *The New German Republic* (1929). J. W. Angell's *The Recovery of Germany* (rev. ed., 1932) is an excellent survey of German economic conditions. A. Rosenberg's *History of the German Republic* (1936) is fair. H. Quigley and R. Clark's *Republican Germany* (1928) is a well-written survey of the first years of the republic. Paul Kosok's *Modern Germany: A Study in Conflicting*

Loyalties (1933) contains some penetrating discussions on various phases of German life. E. Jacckh's *The New Germany* (1927) is a survey by a German professor. Rupert Emerson's *State and Sovereignty in Modern Germany, 1871-1928* (1928) is an excellent discussion of political theory.

Reparations and inflation. Karl Bergmann's *History of Reparations* (1927) is a good detailed account by a German expert. Sir A. McFadyean's *Reparation Reviewed* (1930) is a clear treatment up to the acceptance of the Young Plan. J. W. Wheeler-Bennett's *Wreck of Reparations* (1933) tells the story of the failure to extract reparations from Germany. J. M. Keynes' *The Economic Consequences of Peace* (1919) is a determined attack on the reparation agreement. C. Bresciani-Turroni's *The Economics of Inflation* (1927) and Frank D. Graham's *Exchange, Prices and Production in Hyperinflation: Germany, 1920-1923* (1930) are two informative books. Hjalmar Schacht's *Stabilization of the Mark* (1927) is an account by the man who played a large part in stabilizing it.

Biographical works. Rudolf Olden's *Stresemann*, translated by R. T. Clark (1930), is a sound, informative biography. The most intimate biography of the German statesman is *Stresemann* (1931) by A. Vallentin, his devoted secretary. There is also an intimate record of Stresemann and his diplomacy in E. Stern-Rubarth's *Three Men Tried* (1939). There are two well-chosen collections of documents on Stresemann's life, *Stresemann's Papers* (3 vols., 1936) edited by Henry Bernhard, and *Gustav Stresemann: His Diaries, Letters, and Papers* (2 vols., 1935-1937). The best biography of Hindenburg in English is J. W. Wheeler-Bennett's *Hindenburg, the Wooden Titan* (1936). M. L. Goldsmith and F. Voigt's *Hindenburg, the Man and the Legend* (1930) is a popular account. Emil Ludwig's *Hindenburg and the Saga of the German Republic* (1935) is an attempt to explode the Hindenburg myth. T. R. Ybarra's *Hindenburg, the Man with Three Lives* (1932) stresses the changes in his career.

CHAPTER 6. *Battered and Bleeding France*

General. Paul Vaucher's *Post-War France* (1934) is an admirable brief survey. For the years immediately after the war William MacDonald's *Reconstruction in France* (1922) contains a good account. D. W. Bogan's *The Development of Modern France, 1870-1939* (1940) and Richard W. Hale's *Democratic France; The Third Republic from Sedan to Vichy* (1941) are good surveys of a wider period of French history. Gordon Wright's *Raymond Poincaré and the French Presidency* (1942) is a work of painstaking and thorough research. H. G. Daniels' *The Framework of France* (1937) and Walter R. Sharp's *The Government of the French Republic* (1938) are good introductions. A good brief account of the political confusion is to be found in R. H. Soltau's *French Parties and Politics* (1930). André Siegfried's *France: A Study in Nationality* (1930) offers a brief analysis of French character, parties, and politics. There are several interesting books on the political confusion in France by Alexander Werth whose sympathies are with the left: *France in Ferment* (1934) and *Destiny of France* (1937). C. J. H. Hayes' *France: A Nation of Patriots* (1930) is a penetrating study of patriotism in French education. D. J. Saposs' *The Labor Movement in Post-War France* (1931) is a thoroughgoing analysis. Sisley Huddleston has written two interesting popular books: *France and the French* (1925) and *France* (1927).

Economic conditions. Economic conditions in France during the first decade after World War I are expertly described by William F. Ogburn and William Jaffé in

The Economic Development of Post-War France (1929). Shepard B. Clough's *France: A History of National Economics, 1789-1939* (1939) is an excellent survey. There are two good books on French economic history by George Peel: *The Financial Crisis of France* (1925) and *The Economic Policy of France* (1937). R. M. Haig's *The Public Finances of Post-War France* (1929) is a clear discussion of a complex subject. Two other informative books on finances are E. Dulles' *The French Franc, 1914-1928* (1929) and J. H. Rogers' *The Process of Inflation in France, 1914-1927* (1929). An enlightening discussion on the population problem in France is to be found in J. J. Spengler's *France Faces Depopulation* (1938).

Empire and foreign affairs. H. I. Priestley's *France Overseas* (1938) is an excellent survey of French colonialism. C. Southworth's *The French Colonial Adventure* (1931) is a well-done authoritative treatment. A detailed scholarly discussion is to be found in S. Roberts' *History of French Colonial Policy* (2 vols., 1929). W. A. Roberts' *The French in the West Indies* (1931) is a timely, interesting, and carefully-done book. Melvin M. Knight's *Morocco as a French Economic Venture* (1937) is a penetrating study of one of the French colonies. V. D'Ormesson's *France* (1939) is an excellent survey of French foreign policy in the period between the two World Wars. Arnold Wolfer's *Britain and France Between Two Wars: Conflicting Strategies of Peace Since Versailles* (1940) is a well written, authoritative analysis.

CHAPTER 7. *Soviet Russia*

General. For books on the Russian Revolution of 1917 see the bibliography for Chapters 1, 2, and 3. There is a plethora of books on the Soviet experiment. One of the best introductions is *U.S.S.R.: A Concise Handbook* (1947), edited by Ernest J. Simmons; it contains a series of well-written articles by nineteen writers. William Mandel has written a good factual description in his *A Guide to the Soviet Union* (1946). *Understanding the Russians*, edited by Bernhard J. Stern and Samuel Smith (1947), is a collection of fifty-two articles which previously appeared in various periodicals; uneven in character. Among the better introductions to Soviet Russia which appeared before World War II one must include Michael T. Florinsky's *Toward an Understanding of the U.S.S.R.* (1939), Ethan T. Colton's *The XYZ of Communism* (1931), Albert R. Williams' *The Soviets* (1937), Arthur Feiler's *The Russian Experiment* (1930), Waldemar Gurian's *Bolshevism: Theory and Practice* (1932), and René Fülöp-Miller's *The Mind and the Face of Bolshevism* (1928). N. de Basily's *Russia under Soviet Rule* (1938) and Victor Serge's *Russia: Twenty Years After* (1937) are acute appraisals of twenty years of Bolshevik rule. Samuel N. Harper's *The Government of the Soviet Union* (1938) deals with the structure and functioning of the Soviet agencies. Hans Kohn's *Nationalism in the Soviet Union* (1933) is a well written, scholarly book. Victor Serge's *From Lenin to Stalin*, translated from the French by Ralph Manheim (1937), is unsympathetic. Nicholas Berdyayev's *The Origin of Russian Communism* (1938) traces the roots of Leninism. F. W. Halle's *Women in Soviet Russia* (1933) discusses the position of women in the communist state. W. P. and Zelda Coates' *From Tsardom to the Stalin Constitution* (1938) is a sympathetic account. David J. Dallin's *The Real Soviet Russia* (1945) is a dispassionate indictment of the Russian regime by a Russian socialist who is an anti-Bolshevik.

Russia as seen by visitors. W. Duranty's *I Write as I Please* (1935) and *Duranty Reports Russia* (1934) paint a vivid picture of life in Russia. Morris G. Hindus' *Broken Earth* (1926) depicts village life during the early years of the Soviet regime. William H. Chamberlin's *Soviet Russia: A Living Record and a History* (1931) is a competent and interesting account by an American journalist. Eugene Lyons' *Assignment in Utopia* (1937) records the author's disappointment over what he found in Russia. J. E. Davies' *Mission to Moscow* (1941) is a record of the experiences of the United States ambassador to the Soviet Union. Walter Citrine's *I Search for the Truth in Russia* (1937) contains the diary kept by the general secretary of the British Trades Union Congress during his travels in Russia. Sidney and Beatrice Webb's *The Truth about Soviet Russia* (1942) depicts life in Russia as a superior civilization. N. S. Timasheff's *Religion in Soviet Russia, 1917-1942* (1942) describes the resistance of the believers to the efforts to stamp out religion.

Biographical works. There is no really good biography of Lenin. Informative biographies are F. J. P. Veale's *The Man from the Volga* (1932), Isaac D. Levine's *The Man Lenin* (1924), and M. A. Landau-Aldanov's *Lenin* (1922). *Lenin: Toward the Seizure of Power* (2 vols., 1932) is a collection of Lenin's articles and papers edited by A. Trachtenberg. N. K. Krupskaya's *Memories of Lenin* (1930) is a volume by Lenin's widow. Eugene Lyon's *Stalin: Czar of All the Russias* (1940) is a brief but well-rounded story of Stalin's life written in a critical vein. Stephen Graham's *Stalin* (1939) is slow moving and unsympathetic. Leon Trotsky's *Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence* (1946) is an appraisal by an avowed enemy. Isaac D. Levine's *Stalin* (1931) tells the story of Stalin's rise to power. Boris Souvarine's *Stalin: A Critical Study of Bolshevism* (1939) is a long scholarly and well-documented study. Stalin's *Leninism* (1941) is an authorized translation of Stalin's papers and addresses. *Stalin's Kampf: Joseph Stalin's Credo, Written by Himself*, edited by M. R. Werner (1940), contains excerpts from his speeches, interviews, articles, and books. For Trotsky there is an early life by R. Levy (1920). Trotsky himself left an interesting autobiography entitled *My Life* (1930).

Economic history. Lancelot Lawton's *An Economic History of Soviet Russia* (2 vols., 1932) is a very important study. Two good surveys are L. E. Hubbard's *Soviet Labor and Industry* (1942) and A. Yugow's *Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace* (1942). William H. Chamberlin's *Soviet Planned Economic Order* (1931) is a competent book by a trained observer. The same author's *Russia's Iron Age* (1935) is less sympathetic. Calvin B. Hoover's *The Economic Life of Soviet Russia* (1931) is a good survey by an able American historian. Maurice Dobb's *Russian Economic Development since the Revolution* (1928) is a keen analysis. G. F. Gringko's *The Five Year Plan of the Soviet Union* (1930) is a discussion by a Soviet official. M. Farbman's *Piatiletka: Russia's Five Year Plan* (1931) is a good discussion. W. P. and Zelda Coates' *The Second Five Year Plan of Development of the U.S.S.R.* (1934) is a sympathetic account. J. Beauchamp's *Agriculture in Soviet Russia* (1931) discusses the state farms. M. G. Hindus' *The Russian Peasant and the Revolution* (1920) and *Humanity Uprooted* (rev. ed., 1930) are two interesting accounts of rural changes. A more up-to-date survey of Soviet agriculture can be found in L. E. Hubbard's *The Economics of Soviet Agriculture* (1939). Manya Gordon's *Workers Before and After Lenin* (1941) is an

interesting comparison of conditions under the tsars with those under the Bolsheviks.

Secret police and labor camps. The story of the dreaded Russian secret police is told in G. K. Popov's *The Tcheka: The Red Inquisition* (1925) and S. Melgunov's *The Red Terror in Russia* (1925). Studies of the secret police at a later period are to be found in G. Agabekov's *Ogpu* (1931). The story of the labor camps is told in David J. Dallin and Boris I. Nicholaevsky's *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia* (1947), a book buttressed by careful scholarship. T. Tchernavin's *Escape from the Soviets* (1934) is a record of personal experiences at the hands of the police. W. G. Krivitsky's *In Stalin's Secret Service* (1939) recounts the experiences of the former chief of the Soviet Intelligence.

Education and culture. Beatrice King's *Changing Man: The Education System in the U.S.S.R.* (1936) tells the story of the educational changes under Soviet rule. Scott Nearing's *Education in Soviet Russia* (1926) is a sympathetic discussion of the early years by an American socialist. A. P. Pinkevich's *The New Education in the Soviet Republic* (1929) is an account by a Russian educator. S. N. Harper's *Making Bolsheviks* (1931) is an interesting study by an expert on Russian history. Gleb Struve's *Soviet Russian Literature* (1935) is an excellent discussion of the new literature to 1935. G. Reavey and M. Slonim's *Soviet Literature: An Anthology* (1934) has an introductory chapter on "The New Spirit in Russian Literature." Paul Miliukov's *Outlines of Russian Culture* (3 vols., 1912) contains some excellent brief summaries of culture under the Soviets. R. J. Cooke's *Religion in Russia under the Soviets* (1924) and W. C. Emhardt's *Religion in Soviet Russia* (1929) are two accounts by American clergymen. J. F. Hecker's *Religion under the Soviets* (1927) is a defense of the Soviet policy toward religion. M. Spinka's *The Church and the Russian Revolution* (1927) discusses the effects of the revolution on the Orthodox Church.

Foreign policy. Louis Fischer's *The Soviets in World Affairs* (2 vols., 1930) is a full account by an American who at the time had leftist sympathies. A good brief account can be found in R. P. Arnot's *Soviet Russia and Her Neighbors* (1927). Two other well founded studies are Alfred L. P. Dennis' *The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia* (1924) and S. N. Harper's *The Soviet Union and World Problems* (1935). William P. and Zelda Coates' *World Affairs and the U.S.S.R.* (1939) is an interesting defense of Russian foreign policy. John T. Murphy's *Russia on the March: A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy* (1941) is a good brief account by a socialist. F. Borkenau's *The Communist International* (1938) is a good account of the evolution and activities of the Comintern. K. W. Davis' *The Soviets at Geneva: The U.S.S.R. and the League of Nations, 1919-1933* (1934) is an interesting account of Russia's attitude toward the League.

CHAPTER 8. *British Economic and Imperial Problems*

General. For the effects of World War I on Britain the student may consult Frank Dilnot's *England after the War* (1920), A. L. Bowley's *Some Economic Consequences of the Great War* (1930), Francis W. Hirst's *The Consequences of the War to Great Britain* (1934), and C. F. G. Masterman's *England after War* (1922). On the coal mines there are three informative volumes: I. Lubin and H. Everett's *The British Coal Dilemma* (1927), J. P. Dickie's *The Coal Problem, 1910-1936* (1936), and G. D. H.

Cole's *Labour in the Coal Mining Industry, 1914-1921* (1923). The latter has also written an interesting volume entitled *A Short History of the British Working Class Movement* (1927). A. Hutt's *The Post-War History of the British Working Class* (1938) is another important book. There is a good account of British protectionism in F. Benham's *Great Britain under Protection* (1941). Ramsay Muir's *How Britain Is Governed* (3rd ed., 1933) is an excellent introduction to the study of Britain.

British Empire. Paul Knaplund's *The British Empire 1815-1939* (1942) is an excellent scholarly and dispassionate survey. Albert Viton's *Great Britain: An Empire in Transition* (1940) is a keen analysis of British imperialism. Stephen Leacock's *The British Empire* (1940) is a combination of entertainment and history. W. K. Hancock's *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs* (2 vols., 1937 and 1942) is a good survey of a complicated period, 1918-1939. Ramsay Muir's *The British Commonwealth: How It Grew and How It Works* (1941) is a lucid treatise by a noted British historian. Ernest Barker's *The Ideas and Ideals of the British Empire* (1941) is a good discussion. Other good books are William Y. Elliott's *The New British Empire* (1932) and Ralph W. Fox's *The Colonial Policy of British Imperialism* (1933). R. H. Murray and H. Law's *Ireland* (1924) is a good brief outline. A good account of a short period of Irish history can be found in D. R. Gwynn's *The Irish Free State, 1922-1927* (1928). B. O. Briain's *The Irish Constitution* (1929), W. Moss' *Political Parties in the Irish Free State* (1933), and J. G. MacNeill's *Studies in the Constitution of the Irish Free State* (1925) are informative discussions of parties and political organization. D. Gwynn's *De Valera* (1933) is a good biography of the Irish leader. L. Paul Dubois and T. P. Gill's *The Irish Struggle and Its Results* (1934) puts special emphasis on the period after 1914. Among the books on Palestine there are but few dispassionate accounts. N. Bentwich's *England in Palestine* (1932) and *Fulfillment in the Promised Land, 1917-1937* (1938), T. R. Feiwel's *No Ease in Zion* (1939), E. Main's *Palestine at the Crossroads* (1937), and F. F. Andrews' *The Holy Land under Mandate* (2 vols., 1931) are outstanding for their moderate viewpoints. A. Granovsky's *A Land Policy in Palestine* (1940) is interesting. J. M. N. Jeffries' *Palestine: The Reality* (1939) is not sympathetic with Zionism. L. Farago's *Palestine at the Cross-Roads* (1937) is an account of a trip in 1936. Other works are listed in the bibliography for Chapter 21.

Biographical. Philip Guedalla's *A Gallery* (1924) offers brief incisive studies of British political leaders. Short biographies of George V and Edward VIII can be found in E. Acland and E. H. Bartlett's *Long Live the King!* (1936). For a longer biography of George V the student may consult J. Gore's *King George V* (1941). C. E. Mallet's *Mr. Lloyd George: A Study* (1930) is critical, while E. A. Thompson's *Mr. Lloyd George* (1922) is sympathetic. Iconoclast's *James Ramsay MacDonald* (1931) and H. H. Tiltman's *Ramsay MacDonald: Labor's Man of Destiny* (1929) are good biographies. H. W. Steed's *The Real Stanley Baldwin* (1930) is a sympathetic study. Robert Senecourt's *Winston Churchill* (1940) is a picture of the British leader as seen through "right wing" eyes.

CHAPTER 9. *Fascist Italy*

Democracy and the dictatorships. J. F. Coar's *Democracy and the War* (1922) discusses the influence of World War I on the development of democracy. Alan F. Hattersley's *Short History of Democracy* (1930) is a good brief survey. F. W. Coker's *Recent*

Political Thought (1934) and A. Zimmern's *Modern Political Doctrines* (1939) contain illuminating discussions. A. D. Lindsay's *The Modern Democratic State* (1913) is an analysis of the essence and functions of the modern democratic state. J. A. Leighton's *Social Philosophies in Conflict: Fascism and Nazism, Communism, Liberal Democracy* (1937) is a careful, provocative volume. Michael Oakeshott's *The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe* (1939) is a good analysis. F. A. Voight's *Unto Caesar* (new ed., 1939) is a searching analysis of the ideology of the three European dictatorships. Francesco Nitti's *Bolshevism, Fascism, and Democracy* (1927) is a discussion by an exiled Italian statesman. Albert Carr's *Juggernaut: The Path of Dictatorship* (1939) is a good exposition.

Rise of Fascism. For a general survey of modern Italian history the student can consult Margot Hentze's *Pre-Fascist Italy* (1939). Cecil J. S. Sprigge's *The Development of Modern Italy* (1944) is a survey by a correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* who spent twenty years in Italy. Count Carlo Sforza's *Contemporary Italy: Its Intellectual and Moral Origins* (1944) is a book of essays dealing with the political, cultural, and historical aspects of Italian history. George D. Herron's *The Revival of Italy* (1922) is a survey of economic conditions after World War I. One of the best accounts of the rise of Fascism to power is Angelo Rossi's *The Rise of Fascism: Italy from 1918 to 1922* (1938). Paul Einzig's *The Economic Foundations of Fascism* (1933) is an illuminating study. Gaudens Megaro's *Mussolini in the Making* (1938) is a revealing reconstruction of the early years of Mussolini's career; reveals the opportunist in Mussolini. Giorgio Pini's *The Official Life of Benito Mussolini* (1939) does not adequately trace the development of Mussolini's mind and thought. V. E. De Fiori's *Mussolini: The Man of Destiny* (1928) is marred by a pro-Mussolini bias. Among Mussolini's own writings that had a wide circulation are his *Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions* (1935), *Four Speeches on the Corporate State* (1935), and *My Autobiography* (1928). There is a good brief life of Mussolini in J. A. R. Marriott's *Makers of Modern Italy* (1937). Gilbert Seldes' *Sawdust Caesar* (1935) is a popular biography.

Fascism in action. One of the best short introductions to Fascism is Bolton King's *Fascism in Italy* (1931). William Ebenstein's *Fascist Italy* (1939) is a well written, scholarly account based on the best authorities. One of the most thorough investigations of Fascism as a political, economic, and social system is to be found in Herman Finer's *Mussolini's Italy* (1935). Stephen Rauschenbush's *The March of Fascism* (1939) is a critical analysis of Fascism "with a sobriety of style and an absence of vituperation." Max Ascoli and Arthur Feiler's *Fascism for Whom?* (1938) is an analysis of both German and Italian Fascism. G. A. Borgese's *Goliath: The March of Fascism* (1937) is written in a brilliant style, but its treatment of the various phases of Fascism is not always adequate. Gaetano Salvemini's *Under the Axe of Fascism* (1936) is a devastating analysis of Italian Fascism. Michael T. Florinsky's *Fascism and National Socialism* (1936) is a comparison of the social and economic policies of the two "isms" in action. Herbert W. Schneider's *Making the Fascist State* (1928) and *The Fascist Government of Italy* (1936) are good scholarly studies. *Making Fascists* (1929) by the same author in collaboration with Shepard B. Clough tells the story of the propaganda techniques of Fascism.

Economic history. For the economic history of Italy under Fascism the student may consult William G. Welk's *Fascist Economic Policy* (1938), Giuseppe Gaddi's *The Workers in Fascist Italy* (1939), and Henry S. Miller's *Price Control in Fascist Italy* (1938). Carl T. Schmidt's *The Plough and the Sword* (1938) is an excellent account of rural Italy under Fascism. The efforts of the Fascists to increase the population are discussed in a chapter of D. V. Glass' *The Struggle for Population* (1936). William S. Halperin's *Italy and the Vatican at War* (1939) is a scholarly study of the relations between the Vatican and the Italian state from 1870 to the death of Pius X. T. E. Moore's *Peter's City* (1930) and B. Williamson's *The Treaty of the Lateran* (1929) tell how the Lateran agreements were concluded. W. Parsons' *The Pope and Italy* (1929) is a brief discussion by a Catholic. Luigi Villari's *The Expansion of Italy* (1930) is sympathetic with the Italian idea of empire. An excellent brief discussion of the Ethiopian question is to be found in E. P. McCallum's *Rivalries in Ethiopia* (1935). For a longer account see E. Work's *Ethiopia: A Pawn in European Diplomacy* (1935). Carl T. Schmidt's *The Corporate State in Action* (1939) and Herbert L. Matthews' *The Fruits of Fascism* (1913) are interesting attempts to evaluate the achievements and weaknesses of Fascism.

CHAPTER 10. *The Succession States of the Habsburg Empire*

General. Oscar Jaszi's *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (1929) is a good account of the collapse of the Dual Monarchy. S. Burian von Rajecz's *Austria in Disolution* (1925) and E. von Glaise-Horstenau's *The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire* (1930) are two accounts by officials of the old empire. K. Weikmann von Hohen-salzburg's *The Tragedy of Charles of Habsburg* (1921) tells the story of the ill-starred monarch. M. G. Graham's *The New Governments of Central Europe* (1926) has good chapters on the organization of new governments in Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. G. E. R. Gedyc's *Heirs to the Hapsburgs* (1932) presents a picture drawn by a British correspondent. L. Pasvolsky's *Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States* (1929) is an enlightening scholarly study. Arnold J. Zurcher's *The Experiment with Democracy in Central Europe* (1933) is a sound and interesting survey. The background of the collapse of the Dual Monarchy is interestingly treated in K. Tschuppik's *Francis Joseph I: The Downfall of an Empire* (1930) and A. Margutti's *The Emperor Francis Joseph and His Times* (1921).

Austria. David F. Strong's *Austria (October, 1918–March, 1919): Transition from Empire to Republic* (1939) contributes much to a fuller understanding of the problem. Otto Bauer's *The Austrian Revolution* (1925) is a worthwhile account. For a short account of Austria during the years immediately after World War I the student may consult M. H. Macartney's *Five Years of European Chaos* (1923). O. Bauer's *The Austrian Revolution* (1925) is a good book by a Social Democrat. An excellent account of the social changes can be found in C. A. Macartney's *The Social Revolution in Austria* (1926). There is a good survey of Austrian history to 1935 in C. Hamilton's *Modern Austria* (1935). Mary MacDonald's *The Republic of Austria: A Study in the Failure of Democratic Government* (1917) is a good brief account. M. Bullock's *Austria, 1918–1938: A Study in Failure* (new ed., 1941) is a good survey of Austria between the

two wars. For Dollfuss there is John D. Gregory's *Dollfuss and His Times* (1935). The last days and the *Anschluss* are treated in Franz Borkenau's *Austria and After* (1938) and Ernst Klein's *Road to Disaster*, translated by D. Weaver (1940). Kurt von Schuschnigg's *Austrian Requiem* (1947) is the confession of an honest, naive chancellor who appeased Hitler.

Hungary. C. A. Macartney's *Hungary* (1934) and *Hungary and Her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences* (1937) are two good accounts of the modern period. F. Eckhart's *Short History of the Hungarian People* (1931) offers a brief background of Hungarian history. For the Béla Kun period there is Albert Kaas and F. Lazarovics' *Bolshevism in Hungary* (1931), a series of documents. Oscar Jaszi's *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Hungary* (1924) is excellent. Dominic G. Kosáry's *Hungary* (1941) lacks fluency of expression, but is, nevertheless, a book of solid worth. On the Treaty of Trianon and the demand for revision there are *Justice for Hungary* by A. Apponyi and others (1928), E. Ashmead-Bartlett's *The Tragedy of Central Europe* (1923), R. Donald's *The Tragedy of Trianon* (1928), and R. W. Seton-Watson's *Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers* (1931). On the question of minorities the student may consult R. Gower's *The Hungarian Minorities in the Succession States* (1937). Hungarian agriculture is discussed in *Agricultural Systems of Middle Europe: A Symposium*, edited by O. S. Morgan (1933).

Czechoslovakia. *Czechoslovakia: Twenty Years of Independence*, edited by Robert J. Kerner (1940), is a comprehensive and thoroughly objective study of the various phases of internal and external life. S. Harrison Thomson's *Czechoslovakia in European History* (1941) is a good general discussion. *Slovakia, Then and Now*, edited by R. W. Seton-Watson (1931), is a careful and interesting survey. Thomas Capek's *The Origins of the Czechoslovak State* (1926) is a good account by a Bohemian historian. Robert Birley's *Czechoslovakia* (1939) is a sound and readable short account in the series, Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs. E. P. Young's *Czechoslovakia: Keystone of Peace and Democracy* (1938) is dispassionate. Kamil Krofta's *Short History of Czechoslovakia* (1935) is a good survey by a Czech historian. L. E. Textor's *Land Reform in Czechoslovakia* (1923) is a sound analysis. Paul Selver's *Masaryk* (1940) is an authorized biography of the father of the Czechoslovak Republic. Edward B. Hitchcock's *Beneš: The Man and the Statesman* (1940) is a good biography.

Poland. Raymond L. Buell's *Poland: Key to Europe* (1939) is one of the best books available in English. A good general survey is Oscar Halecki's *History of Poland* (1943), written in scholarly language. R. Dyboski's *Outlines of Polish History* (1931) is a sound and interesting popular survey. *Poland*, edited by Bernadotte E. Schmitt (1945), is a collective work of twenty-three scholars; an objective and comprehensive guide. *Poland's Progress, 1919-1939*, edited by Michael Murray (1941), is another handy guide on Poland. R. Machray's *Poland, 1914-1931* (1933) is a sober narrative of facts. The same author has also written *The Poland of Pilsudski* (1936). Probably the best life of Pilsudski in English is W. F. Reddaway's *Marshal Pilsudski* (1939). There is also a well written biography of Pilsudski by his wife Alexandra (1941) as a tribute to her husband. Roman Gorecki's *Poland and Her Economic Development* (1935) is an enlightening study. For a more detailed account of Polish history the student may consult *The Cam-*

bridge History of Poland, edited by W. F. Reddaway, J. H. Penson, O. Halecki, and R. Dyboski (1940). The question of the minority groups is discussed in A. L. Goodhart's *Poland, the Minority Races* (1922). Two thoroughgoing scholarly studies on the Jewish question are O. I. Janowsky's *The Jews and Minority Rights, 1898-1919* (1933) and the same author's *People at Bay: The Jewish Problem in East-Central Europe* (1938).

CHAPTER 11. *Turkey Faces toward the West*

General. Lord Eversley's *The Turkish Empire: Its Growth and Decay* (1923) is probably the best known brief account to 1922 of the Turks in English. T. W. Arnold's *The Caliphate* (1924) is the best account of the subject in English. William Miller's *The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors* (3rd ed., 1927) has been a standard survey for many years. This is true also of W. S. Davis' *Short History of the Near East (330 A.D. to 1922)* (1937). Ahmet E. Bey's *Turkey in the World War* (1930) is an account by a Turkish writer. Harry N. Howard's *Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913-1923* (1931) is a careful scholarly study. Halidé Edib's *Turkey Faces West: A Turkish View of Recent Changes and Their Origin* (1930) is an account by an ardent Turkish feminist and reform leader. Hans Kohn's *Western Civilization in the Near East* (1936) describes the Europeanization of the Near East and its place in modern civilization. Donald E. Webster's *The Turkey of Atatürk* (1939) is a scholarly and comprehensive study of the transformation of Turkey. Another excellent volume is H. E. Allen's *The Turkish Transformation* (1935). Probably the best brief account of the changes that took place in Turkey is Barbara Ward's *Turkey* (1942).

Ruth F. Woodsmall's *Moslem Women Enter a New World* (1936) is interesting. The most prominent Turkish woman of the period throws much light on the changes that took place in *The Memoirs of Halidé Edib* (1926). *Unveiled: The Autobiography of a Turkish Girl*, by Selma Ekrem (1930), is the story of a girl who grew up in the midst of the changes. A more recent account of the changes can be found in Ernest Jackh's *The Rising Crescent* (1944) which deflates many legends about the Turks. On the man who inaugurated the changes there are a number of interesting books. One of the best though somewhat critical is H. C. Armstrong's *Gray Wolf, Mustafa Kemal* (1933). Other interesting biographies are H. E. Wortham's *Mustapha Kemal of Turkey* (1931) and H. Froemberg's *Kemal Atatürk* (1937). J. T. Shotwell and Francis Deak's *Turkey at the Straits* (1940) is a short history of the struggle for possession of the straits connecting the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

CHAPTER 12. *Nazi Germany*

Rise of nazism. Robert T. Clark's *The Fall of the German Republic* (1935) sharply criticizes the errors of the Weimar statesmen. Calvin B. Hoover's *Germany Enters the Third Reich* (1933) offers an objective analysis of the forces and events leading to the Nazi Revolution. Louis L. Snyder's *Hitlerism: The Iron Fist in Germany* (1932) is one of the best of the earlier accounts of the development of nazism. The same author has also written a good scholarly analysis of German nationalism under the title, *From Bismarck to Hitler: The Background of Modern German Nationalism* (1935). Ernst Cassirer's *The Myth of the State* (1947) reveals the deep roots of nazism. Rohan D. Butler's *The Roots of National Socialism* (1942) is one of the most thorough books in English on the ideas of German origin that contributed to National Socialist beliefs.

William M. McGovern's *From Luther to Hitler: The History of Fascist Nazi Political Philosophy* (1941) traces the totalitarian tradition into the dimmest recesses of the past. One of the fullest accounts of the rise and victory of nazism is Konrad Heiden's *History of National Socialism* (1934); at times hostile, but often fair and objective. Less openly hostile than Konrad Heiden is H. Powys Greenwood's *The German Revolution* (1934). Peter Viereck's *Metapolitics: From the Romantics to Hitler* (1941) is a valuable book. On the question of race there are two excellent general discussions: Louis L. Snyder's *Race: A History of Modern Ethnic Theories* (1939) and Jacques Barzun's *Race: A Study in Modern Superstition* (1938).

Hitler. Konrad Heiden's *Der Fuehrer: Hitler's Rise to Power* (1944) is the most authoritative account that has appeared in English. Emil Lengyel's *Hitler* (1932) and Ludwig Wagner's *Hitler: Man of Strife* (1942) also tell effectively and convincingly the story of the intrigue that raised Hitler to the dictatorship. Theodore Abel's *Why Hitler Came into Power* (1938) is a judicious and readable account. Frank Owen's *The Three Dictators: Mussolini, Stalin, Hitler* (1936) contains a good brief biography of Hitler. Rudolf Olden's *Hitler* (1936) is a biography by a German journalist. Hitler's own story is, of course, recorded in large part in *Mein Kampf*, of which there are a number of translations. A vivid record of the struggle for power is also to be found in *Dr. Goebbels' Diary* (1938). Adolf Hitler's *My New Order*, edited by Raoul de Sales (1941), is a revealing collection of Hitler's speeches. There is a more complete collection in *The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April, 1922–August, 1939*, edited by N. H. Baynes (2 vols., 1943). Herman Rauschning's *Hitler Speaks* (1939) is a record of conversations the author heard in Hitler's circle by a former high Nazi official. *The Voice of Destruction* (1940) reproduces conversations with Hitler. Oswald Dutch's *The Errant Diplomat* (1940) is a competent biography of a Nazi diplomatist who aided Hitler in his rise to power. Otto Strasser's *Hitler and I* (1940) contains reminiscences by a man who was Hitler's intimate friend but became his enemy. Fritz Thyssen's *I Paid Hitler* (1941) is the amazing story of the relations of a powerful German industrialist with Hitler and the Nazis. K. G. W. Lüdecke's *I Knew Hitler* (1937) offers recollections by a former friend of Hitler.

The Nazis in power. Franz L. Neumann's *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism* (1942) is one of the most important books on the Third Reich in English. Albert Carr's *Juggernaut: The Path of Dictatorship* (1939) offers an interesting survey. Frederick Schumann's *Hitler and the Nazi Dictatorship* (1936) presents a record of Nazi achievements and a critical analysis. William Ebenstein's *The Nazi State* (1943) is a work of painstaking research; shows real insight into the facts. Albert C. Grzesinski's *Inside Germany* (1939) is an interesting account by a former German trade union leader. Henri Lichtenberger's *The Third Reich: Germany under National Socialism* (1937) is still one of the best books on the subject. H. Rauschning's *The Revolution of Nihilism* (1939) is an exposé of Nazi methods by a former Nazi leader. Stephen Roberts' *The House that Hitler Built* (1938) is a penetrating analysis of the man, the system, and the movement. Robert A. Brady's *The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism* (1937) is a detailed, well documented account. On the Nazi government there are two careful studies: Fritz M. Marx's *Government in the Third Reich* (1936) and Fritz Ermarth's *The New Germany: National Socialist Government in*

Theory and Practice (1936). Wallace R. Deuel's *People under Hitler* (1942) is a richly informative volume by a United States correspondent.

Nazi economics. C. W. Guillebaud's *The Social Policy of Nazi Germany* (1941) is a valuable discussion. The same author had also written *The Economic Recovery of Germany, 1933-1938* (1939), which discusses Nazi economics. Antonin Basch's *The New Economic Warfare* (1941) discusses the methods employed by the Nazis to expand their trade. D. Miller's *You Can't Do Business with Hitler* (1941) is an interesting revelation of Nazi business methods. Vaso Trivanovitch's *Economic Development of Germany under National Socialism* (1937) is a dispassionate survey which neglects agriculture. Otto Nathan and Milton Fried's *The Nazi Economic System: Germany's Mobilization for War* (1941) is an excellent analysis. E. Banse's *Germany Prepares for War* (new ed., 1941) is a solid treatise. Ralph E. Bischoff's *Nazi Conquest through German Culture* (1943) is a valuable addition to the literature on German nationalism. Clifford Kirkpatrick's *Nazi Germany: Its Women and Family Life* (1938) is an able and interesting survey. James T. Shotwell's *What Germany Forgot* (1940) is a group of illuminating essays on the relationship of Germany with the rest of the world between 1919 and 1939.

Jews in Germany. G. Warburg's *Six Years of Hitler: The Jews under the Nazi Regime* (1939) is a grim record of man's inhumanity to man. *Nazi Germany's War against the Jews* (1947) is a collection of documents on anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany collected by Seymour Krieger. There is also a discussion of the German Jews in Oscar I. Janowsky's *People at Bay: The Jewish Problem in East-Central Europe* (1938). The same author in collaboration with M. M. Fagen published a collection of documents under the title, *International Aspects of German Racial Policies* (1937). M. Lowenthal's *The Jews of Germany* (1936) is a good account.

Education and culture. Edward Y. Hartshorne's *The German Universities and National Socialism* (1937) is a record of the changes that took place in higher education. Gregor A. Ziemer's *Education for Death: The Making of the Nazi* (1941) is a unique account of an educator's experiences in Germany. Erika Mann's *School for Barbarians* (1938) is an interesting brief discussion of Nazi educational methods. Isaac L. Kandel's *The Making of Nazis* (1935) is an informative account of Nazi educational and propaganda technique. George F. Kneller's *The Educational Philosophy of National Socialism* (1941) is a careful analysis. Oscar J. Hammen's "German Historians and the Advent of the National Socialist State," *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 13 (1941), pp. 161-188, is an interesting study of a neglected subject. Mario Bendiscioli's *Nazism versus Christianity* (1938) is a careful survey of the position of Roman Catholics and Protestants under nazism. Nathaniel Micklem's *National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church* (1939) is a fair-minded account of the conflict between the Nazis and the Roman Catholic Church. A. S. Duncan-Jones' *The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany* (1938) is a chronological account by a British clergyman. C. S. MacFarland's *The New Church and the New Germany* (1934) is scholarly and fair minded.

CHAPTER 13. *The Balkans*

General. Bernard Newman's *Balkan Background* (1945) is an important book, packed with solid information and well balanced. H. F. Armstrong's *The New Balkans* (1926) is a sane and careful study by the editor of *Foreign Affairs*. Frederic W. L. Kovacs'

The Untamed Balkans (1941) contains summaries of the history of each Balkan state; stresses exploitation of the peasants by the dynasties. L. S. Stavrianos' *Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times* (1944) deals with the problem of Balkan union from the late eighteenth century to the present. R. Machray's *Little Entente* (1929) traces its beginnings and development to 1928. J. O. Crane's *The Little Entente* (1931) is an informative survey from the Czech viewpoint. Oscar I. Janowsky's *Nationalities and National Minorities* (1941) is a scholarly analysis of the problems of the nationalities of eastern Europe. Joseph S. Rouček's *Central-Eastern Europe* (1946) and *The Politics of the Balkans* (1939) are two surveys by a recognized authority.

Rumania. Joseph S. Rouček's *Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems* (1932) is one of the best accounts in English. Another good source of information is N. L. Forter and D. B. Rostovsky's *Roumanian Handbook* (1931). R. W. Seton-Watson's *History of the Roumanians* (1931) is a sympathetic study by a distinguished historian. N. A. Joiga's *History of Rumania* (1925) is a good survey. V. Madgearu's *Roumania's New Economic Policy* (1930) is based on official statements. On the peasant problem there are two careful studies: Ifor L. Evans' *The Agrarian Revolution in Roumania* (1924) and D. Mitrany's *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania* (1930). Hector Bolitho's *Roumania under King Carol* (1939) is a spirited account. Derek Patmore's *Balkan Correspondent* (1941) contains revealing sketches of Rumanian high advisers. Baroness Helena von der Hoven's *King Carol of Romania* (1940) is an "official biography." George Gay's *King Carol of Rumania* (1940) gives a clear account of the domestic and foreign policies of King Carol's government. On the Bessarabian question the student can consult A. Popovici's *The Political Status of Bessarabia* (1925), which supports the claims of Rumania, and C. G. Rakovsky's *Roumania and Bessarabia* (1925), which expounds the Russian claims. J. M. Cabot's *The Racial Conflict in Transylvania* (1926) is a clear statement of the problem.

Yugoslavia. Henry Baerlein's *The Birth of Yugo-Slavia* (2 vols., 1922) is a valuable account of the welding of the Serbians, Montenegrins, and other Southern Slavs into the new kingdom. Robert D. Hogg's *Yugoslavia* (1941) is a good survey of Yugoslav history from World War I to 1941. *Yugoslavia*, edited by John Buchan (1923), is a good account of the early years. For the government and administration of Yugoslavia the student can consult Charles Beard and G. Radin's *The Balkan Pivot: Yugoslavia* (1929). Eric J. Patterson's *Yugoslavia* (1936) and R. G. D. Laffan's *Yugoslavia since 1918* (1929) are good surveys. Grace Ellison's *Yugoslavia: A New Country and Its People* (1935) is a popular description. Louis Adamic's *My Native Land* (1934) records the impressions of a United States citizen upon his return to the land of his birth. Nora Alexander's *Wanderings in Yugoslavia* (1936) and Lovett F. Edwards' *Profane Pilgrimage* (1938) are two interesting travelogues.

Greece. William Miller's *History of the Greek People, 1821-1921* (1922) is an excellent account by a student of the Near East. E. G. Mears' *Greece Today: The Aftermath of the Refugee Impact* (1929) is a survey which gives considerable attention to economic factors. C. B. Eddy's *Greece and the Greek Refugees* (1931) is a sound and well done study. A. J. Toynbee's *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study*

in the *Contact of Civilizations* (new ed., 1923) is a stimulating book. J. Mavrogordato's *Modern Greece* (1931) is an informative survey. C. A. Macartney's *Refugees* (1931) tells the story of the exchange of population between Greece and Bulgaria. There is a more detailed account in S. P. Ladas' *The Exchange of Minorities* (1932). H. A. Gibbons' *Venizelos* (2nd ed., 1923) is a good biography of the Greek leader. P. Hibben's *Constantine I and the Greek People* (1920) is sympathetic to the king. Demetrius Caclamanos' *Greece: A Panorama* (1944) is an account by the editor of the *Athenian Daily*, who possesses a wide knowledge of Greek statesmen and affairs.

Bulgaria. Philip E. Mosely's "The Post-War Historiography of Modern Bulgaria," *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 9 (1937), pp. 348-366, is an excellent critical discussion of works that have appeared on Bulgaria. G. C. Logio's *Bulgaria: Past and Present* (1936) is a judicious survey. C. E. Black's *The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria* (1944) is a valuable scholarly study. L. Pasvol'sky's *Bulgaria's Economic Position* (1930) is an able analysis. H. Leslie's *Where East Is West: Life in Bulgaria* (1933) endeavors to analyze the Bulgarians. L. Buxton's *The Black Sheep of the Balkans* (1920) is a pointed criticism of the treatment of Bulgaria and Turkey after World War I. On the movement for Macedonian independence the student can consult S. Christowe's *Heroes and Assassins* (1935) or C. Anastasoff's *The Tragic Peninsula* (1938).

Albania. J. Swire's *Albania: The Rise of a Kingdom* (1929) is probably the best account in English. Two good earlier accounts are: C. A. Chekrezi's *Albania, Past and Present* (1919) and *Albania and the Albanians* (1920) by B. Barcilles and others.

CHAPTER 14. *Spain and Portugal*

General. J. B. Trend's *The Civilization of Spain* (1914) is a clear and unified story of a peculiar but fascinating civilization. R. Altamira's *A History of Spanish Civilization* (1930) is a first-rate survey. W. C. Atkinson's *Spain: A Brief History* (1931) is a clear and well planned survey. H. D. Sedgwick's *Spain: A Short History of Its Politics, Literature and Art* (1925) is a good brief survey. Salvador de Madariaga's *Spain* (1943) condenses a lifetime of meditation on Spain's character and destiny by a Spanish republican.

Modern Spain. J. A. Brandt's *Toward the New Spain* (1932) traces the development of republicanism in Spain from 1873 to 1931. G. Young's *The New Spain* (1933) is an interesting portrayal. The early postwar years are also analyzed in F. B. Deakin's *Spain Today* (1924). R. Sencourt's *The Spanish Crown, 1808-1931* (1932) is a survey with rightist sympathies. E. Stewart's *Twenty-nine Years* (1931) is an interesting biography of Alfonso XIII. W. B. Wells' *The Last King* (1934) is a severe indictment. V. Blasco Ibáñez' *Alfonso XIII Unmasked: The Military Terror in Spain* (1924) is a bitter attack. Princess Pilar and D. Chapman-Huston's *Every Inch a King* (1931) is a sympathetic account. F. E. Manuel's *The Politics of Modern Spain* (1938) is a well documented interpretation of the period of the republic: sympathy leftist. Gil Robles' *Spain in Chains* (1937) is a sharp attack on the leftist republic. J. McCabe's *Spain in Revolt, 1814-1931* (1931), is a survey that is unsympathetic to the Church. There is a first-rate discussion of the Church in E. A. Peers' *The Church in Spain, 1737-1937* (1938), by a noted British historian. On the constitution of 1931 the student may consult R. M.

Smith's *The Day of the Liberals in Spain* (1939) or *Manual of Spanish Constitutions, 1808-1931*, compiled by A. R. Verduin (1941).

Dictatorship and civil war. Emmet J. Hughes' *Report from Spain* (1947) is a stern picture of Spain and its dictator by an American Roman Catholic. Sir Samuel Hoare's *Complacent Dictator* (1947) is an unsympathetic account of the Franco regime. Gerald Brenan's *The Spanish Labyrinth* (1943) and T. J. Hamilton's *Appeasement's Child. The Franco Regime in Spain* (1943) offer two careful analyses of the causes that precipitated the civil war. F. Borkenau's *The Spanish Cockpit* (1937) is an interesting study of the social elements in Spain. G. M. Godden's *Conflict in Spain, 1920-1937* (1937) and E. A. Peers' *The Spanish Tragedy, 1930-1936* (1937) are two carefully documented accounts. R. Sender's *Counter-Attack in Spain* (1937), is by one of Loyalist persuasion. E. White's *War in Spain* (1937) and A. L. Strong's *Spain in Arms* (1937) are two readable volumes. For Italian participation the student may consult *The Spanish White Book: The Italian Invasion of Spain. Official Documents and Papers Seized from Italian Units in Action at Guadalajara* (1937).

Portugal. V. de Braganza-Cunha's *Revolutionary Portugal, 1910-1936* (1937) is a well done and readable volume. M. Derrick's *The Portugal of Salazar* (1938) is an analysis of government policies under the dictatorship. F. Cotta's *Economic Planning in Corporative Portugal* (1937) is sympathetic to Salazar's regime. S. West's *The New Corporative State of Portugal* (1937) is the official introduction to Salazar's government. The dictator himself has laid down the principles of his government in *Doctrine and Action* (1939).

CHAPTER 15. *The Small States of Europe*

Belgium. *Belgium*, edited by John Epstein (1941), is an up-to-date brief account in the *British Survey Handbook Series*. For a longer account the student may consult Claude E. A. Andrews' *Belgium* (1932). *Belgium*, edited by Jan-Albert Goris (1945), is an excellent introduction to all aspects of Belgian life and achievement. T. H. Reed's *Government and Politics in Belgium* (1924) is a good analysis. H. L. Shepherd's *The Monetary Experience of Belgium, 1914-1936* (1936) is an illuminating study. King Albert and his house are the subjects of two sympathetic studies by Emil Cammaerts: *Albert of Belgium* (1935) and *The Keystone of Europe: A History of the Belgian Dynasty* (1939). Shepard B. Clough's *The Flemish Movement* (1930) is a first-rate analysis of the subject.

Netherlands. A. J. Barnouw's *The Making of Modern Holland* (1944) is an excellent survey. Bernhard H. M. Vlekke's *Evolution of the Dutch Nation* (1945) and Hendrik Riemens' *The Netherlands* (1944) are good accounts. *The Netherlands*, edited by B. Landheer (1944), is a series of essays on various phases of Dutch history. *Contribution of Holland to the Sciences*, edited by A. J. Barnouw and B. Landheer (1943), is a much-needed addition to the historical literature on the Netherlands. Philip Paneth's *Queen Wilhelmina* (1943) is an appreciation. L. J. Power's *The Royal Ladies of the Netherlands* (1939) offers an interesting story. Albert Hyma's *The Dutch in the Far East* (1912) is an admirable brief treatment of the subject. E. S. de Klerck's *History of the Netherlands East Indies* (2 vols., 1938) is the work of a competent historian. B. H. M. Vlekke's *Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago* (1943) is the most

up-to-date history of the East Indian archipelago in English. Two other important books are A. Vandenbosch's *The Dutch East Indies* (4th ed., 1943) and J. S. Furnivall's *Netherlands India* (1939). Albert Hyma's "Recent Literature on the Netherlands," *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 16 (1944), pp. 299-305, offers a critical discussion of a number of works on various phases of Dutch history.

Norway. *Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland in the World War* (1930), by E. F. Heckscher and others, tells the story of Scandinavia in World War I. Paul G. Vigness' *The Neutrality of Norway in the World War* (1932) is a sound and informative discussion of the effect of World War I on Norway. For the historical background of Norwegian history the student may consult Knut Gjerset's *History of the Norwegian People* (1927), G. M. Gathorne-Hardy's *Norway* (1925), S. C. Hammer's *Norway* (1928), or Jacob Vidnes' *Norway* (1935). *Norway Today*, edited by Karl Fischer (1933), gives the reader glimpses of the many facets of Norwegian life. O. B. Grimley's *The New Norway* (1939) is an instructive volume. Harold Larson's *Björnstjerne Björnson: A Study in Norwegian Nationalism* (1941) is a careful scholarly study of one of the most picturesque figures of modern Norway. Oscar J. Falnes' *Norway and the Nobel Peace Prize* (1938) is a painstaking and scholarly history.

Denmark and Sweden. J. H. S. Birch's *Denmark in History* (1938) is a useful survey. Josephine Goldmark's *Democracy in Denmark* (1936) is a good brief analysis of the Danish government. Andrew A. Stromberg's *History of Sweden* (1931) is a well proportioned analysis of the political, social, and cultural development of the Swedish people. C. Hallendorf and A. Schück's *History of Sweden* (1929) and R. Svanström and C. F. Palmstierna's *Short History of Sweden* (1931) are two good surveys. Other brief surveys can be found in Carl Grimberg's *Sweden* (1935) and Dudley Heathcote's *Sweden* (1927). Marquis Childs' *Sweden: The Middle Way* (1936) is a widely circulated popular account of the Swedish cooperatives. M. Blomstedt and F. Böök's *Sweden of Today: A Survey of Its Intellectual and Material Culture* (1930) is an informative study. M. Cole and C. Smith's *Democratic Sweden* (1938) is a careful analysis of the structure of Sweden's government. Agnes Rothery's *Sweden: The Land and the People* (1934) is a good work of description. An earlier work of the same nature is Robert M. Medill's *Sweden and Its People* (1924).

Finland. Kay Gilmour's *Finland* (1931), Frank Fox's *Finland Today* (1926), and Agnes Rothery's *Finland: The New Nation* (1936) are good descriptive works. Eugene Van Cleef's *Finland: The Republic Farthest North* (1929) is a good account of the earlier years of the new nation. J. H. Jackson's *Finland* (1938) is one of the best surveys in English. John H. Wuorinen's *Nationalism in Modern Finland* (1931) is a careful scholarly study of the rise of nationalism in Finland. There are a number of good biographies of Sibelius, including Elliott Arnold's *Finlandia: The Story of Sibelius* (1941), Karl Ekman's *Jean Sibelius: His Life and Personality* (1936), and Rosa H. Newmarch's *Jean Sibelius* (1939).

Switzerland. R. C. Brooks' *Government and Politics of Switzerland* (1927) is a good introduction. The same author's *Civic Training in Switzerland* (1930) is an interesting account of many phases of Swiss political life. D. de Rougemont and C. Muret's *The Heart of Europe* (1941) is a readable discussion of Swiss life and character. W. E. Rappard's *The Government of Switzerland* (1936) is an excellent analysis by a distin-

guished Swiss historian. There is a translation of the Swiss constitution in C. E. Martin and W. H. George's *Representative Modern Constitutions* (1923).

CHAPTER 16. *Revolt of the East against Western Imperialism*

General. George M. Dutcher's *Political Awakening of the East* (1925) shows how the Western political ideas stimulated the awakening. Upton Close's (Josef W. Hall) *Revolt of Asia* (1927) is one of the earliest popular accounts to discuss the revolt. Nathaniel Peffer's *The White Man's Dilemma* (1927) is a first-rate analysis of the conflict between the Orient and Occident. J. A. Spender's *The Changing East* (1926) puts the emphasis principally on Egypt and India. M. M. Hyndman's *Awakening of Asia* (1939) is also an informative account. Philip Jaffe's *New Frontiers in Asia: A Challenge to the West* (1943) is a good analysis of the interrelationship of the Western powers with Asia. Moritz Bonn's *The Crumbling of an Empire: The Disintegration of World Economy* (1938) is an informative volume. Hans Kohn's *Orient and Occident* (1934) points out some interesting differences. The same author's *History of Nationalism in the East* (1929) is an excellent study which analyzes the Near East and India. *Government and Nationalism in Southeast Asia*, by Rupert Emerson and others (1942), is a rich source of information. G. Antonius' *The Arab Awakening* (1939) tells the story of the awakening of political consciousness among the Arabs. A well documented and reliable book on Egypt is M. T. Symons' *Britain and Egypt: The Rise of Egyptian Nationalism* (1925). A treatment of the growth of Egyptian nationalism which deserves careful attention is George Young's *Egypt* (1927), written by a man who had long and varied experiences in Egypt. Three fine studies on various phases of Far Eastern history, issued by the Institute of Pacific Affairs, are: Ian F. G. Milner's *New Zealand's Interests and Policies in the Far East* (1940), Jack Shepherd's *Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East* (1940), and R. Levy and others' *French and Italian Interests in the Far East* (1940). B. Emeny's *The Strategy of Raw Materials* (1936), Clark Grover's *The Balance Sheets of Imperialism* (1934) and F. V. Field's *Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area* (1931) are rich sources of information on the economic phases of imperialism. P. J. Treat's *The Far East* (1928), H. M. Vinacke's *A History of the Far East in Modern Times* (1933) and G. Nye Steiger's *A History of the Far East* (1929) are excellent general surveys. E. Denney's *Asia's Teeming Millions* (1931) is an interesting discussion of the population problem. *Northeastern Asia*, collected and edited by Robert J. Kerner (2 vols., 1939), is a selected bibliography of works in Oriental and European languages.

India. Peter Muir's *This Is India* (1943) and F. R. Moraes and Robert Stimson's *Introduction to India* (1943) are designed as introductions, but are not always clear and unbiased. For the period immediately after World War I there is an excellent account in C. H. Van Tyne's *India in Ferment* (1923). Sir F. E. Younghusband's *Dawn in India* (1931) is a good account of the rise of Indian nationalism. Bruce T. McCully's "The Origins of Indian Nationalism According to Native Writers," *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 7 (1935), is a first-rate discussion of the origins of Indian nationalism as indicated in the works of native writers. E. Thompson and G. T. Garratt's *Rise and Fulfillment of British Rule in India* (1934) is a sound fair-minded survey. E. A. Horne's *The Political System of British India* (1922) is a good introduction for the period

immediately after World War I. A. Duncan's *India in Crisis* (1931) is a good survey of Indian affairs during the two decades before 1931. J. Beauchamp's *British Imperialism in India* (1934) and Kate L. Mitchell's *India without Fable* (1942) score British imperialism. R. Palme Dutt's *The Problem of India* (1943) is a veritable arsenal of argument for India's freedom. M. Read's *The Indian Peasant Uprooted: A Study of the Human Machine* (1931) paints a black picture based on official documents. L. M. Schiff's *The Present Condition of India* (1939) is good reporting. W. R. Smith's *Nationalism and Reform in India, 1900-1937* (1938) is a first-rate survey. H. G. Rawlinson's *India: A Short Cultural History* (1938) is well organized and authoritative. *Mahatma Gandhi: His Own Story*, edited by his friend, C. F. Andrews (1930), with a continuation in 1931 are autobiographical. M. K. Gandhi's *The Story of My Experiments with Truth* (2 vols., 1927-1929) is a longer autobiography.

China. Thomas E. LaFargue's *China and the World War* (1937) is an account of the main events in China during the period of World War I, based on a careful use of the sources. Paul Monroe's *China: A Nation in Evolution* (1928) is a good survey by an American. Another good survey is Paul Hutchinson's *What and Why in China* (1927). One of the best surveys in English is Kenneth S. Latourette's *The Development of China* (4th rev. ed., 1929). The same author has written a monumental work entitled *The Chinese: Their History and Culture* (2 vols., rev. ed., 1931). A third important work by the same author is his *History of Christian Missions in China* (1929). *China*, edited by Harley F. MacNair (1917), is a comprehensive survey by a notable group of scholars. Owen and Eleanor Lattimore's *The Making of Modern China* (1944) is a skillful primer written by a couple who have a wide knowledge of their subject. H. B. Restarick's *Sun Yat-sen: Liberator of China* (1931) and L. Sharman's *Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning* (1934) are two good biographies. There is also a compilation of Sun Yat-sen's writings under the title, *Sun Yat-sen: His Political and Social Ideals*, edited by L. S. Hsu (1933). Arthur N. Holcombe's *The Spirit of the Chinese Revolution* (1930) is an interesting account. H. F. MacNair's *China in Revolution* (1931) is a first-rate presentation. The same author's *China's New Nationalism* (1925) is also a good study. G. W. Kecton's *The Development of Extraterritoriality in China* (2 vols., 1928) is a sound scholarly study. H. A. Van Dorn's *Twenty Years of the Chinese Republic* (1932) is a mine of information. W. W. Willoughby's *Foreign Rights and Interests in China* (2 vols., 1927) is a solid study by a keen student of Chinese affairs. Robert Berkov's *Strong Man of China: The Story of Chiang Kai-shek* (1938) and Sven A. Hedin's *Chiang Kai-shek: Marshal of China* (1940) are two informative biographies. Hollington K. Tong's *Chiang Kai-shek: Soldier and Statesman* (2 vols., 1937) is an authorized biography. *China's Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory* by Chiang Kai-shek, with notes and commentary by Philip Jaffe (1947), and *China's Destiny* by Chiang Kai-shek, with an introduction by Lin Yutang (1947), are two competing editions of a book giving access to the Generalissimo's mind. Paul M. Linebarger's *The China of Chiang Kai-shek* (1941) and William F. Bainbridge's *Rising China* (1943) are two recent surveys that throw light on a complex situation.

Japan. A. J. Brown's *Japan in the World of Today* (1928) and Arthur M. Young's *Imperial Japan, 1926-1938* (1938) are two good surveys which together cover the period between the two wars. Norman E. Herbert's *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State*

(1940) is an excellent introductory volume for the study of Japanese history. There are a number of good discussions of the Japanese government, among them Charles B. Fahs' *Government in Japan* (1940), Naokichi Kitazawa's *The Government of Japan* (1929), Robert K. Reischauer's *Japan: Government and Politics* (1939), and Harold S. Quigley's *Japanese Government and Politics* (1932). Kenneth S. Latourette's *The Development of Japan* (1938) is a readable volume. Other good discussions of Japan between two wars include Hugh Borton's *Japan since 1931* (1940), M. D. Kennedy's *The Changing Fabric of Japan* (1930), Morgan Young's *Imperial Japan, 1926-1938* (1938), Wilfrid Fleisher's *Volcanic Isle* (1941), and William H. Chamberlin's *Modern Japan* (1942). William H. Chamberlin has also written one of the best accounts of the Japanese invasion of China, under the title *Japan in China* (1940). An excellent earlier volume by the same author is entitled *Japan over Asia* (1937). A. E. Hindmarsh's *The Basis of Japanese Foreign Policy* (1936) is an informative volume. O. D. Rasmussen's *The Reconquest of Asia* (1934) discusses Japan's designs to dominate Asia. O. Lattimore's *Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict* (rev. ed., 1935) is a standard treatise. H. F. MacNair's *The Real Conflict between China and Japan* (1938) is a first-rate book. D. C. Holton's *Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism* (1941) is a revealing study by an outstanding scholar on Shinto. O. Tanin and E. Yohan's *Militarism and Fascism in Japan* (1934) is a well-founded account. W. R. Crocker's *The Japanese Population Problem* (1931) is a technical discussion of the subject.

Economic history. John E. Orchard's *Japan's Economic Position: The Progress of Industrialization* (1930) is a careful appraisal of Japan's position in terms of industrial development. G. C. Allen's *Japanese Industry: Its Recent Development and Present Condition* (1940) is an interesting analysis of the technical efficiency of Japanese industry during the period between the two wars. D. R. Nugent and R. Bell's *The Pacific Area and Its Problems* (1936) includes a discussion of Japan. C. Lowe's *Japan's Economic Offensive in China* (1939) is an interesting discussion of Japanese imperialism. Harold M. Vinacke's "Japanese Imperialism," *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 5 (1935), pp. 366-380, is an excellent critical discussion of the books which appeared up to 1934. G. Stein's *Made in Japan* (1935) is a short discussion of Japanese economic expansion. *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo, 1930-1940*, edited by Elizabeth B. Schumpeter (1940), discusses the problem of population, raw materials, and industry. Oland D. Russel's *The House of Mitsui* (1939) is an enlightening account of one of the powerful houses that controlled so large a part of Japanese economic life. For further titles see bibliography for chapters 19, 20, and 21.

CHAPTER 17. *The Background of World War II*

Decline of security. Robert Dell's *The Rise and Fall of the League of Nations* (1943) records the impressions of one who had ample opportunity to observe the workings of the League. There is an excellent discussion of the League in Lord Robert Cecil's autobiography, *A Great Experiment* (1941). Edward H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939* (1940) develops the thesis that the League was an instrument for the preservation of the *status quo*. J. W. Wheeler-Bennett's *The Disarmament Deadlock* (1934) and *The Pipe Dream of Peace* (1935) are two good accounts of the failure of disarmament efforts. *War in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Willard Waller (1940),

is an excellent series of essays by United States historians on the background of the war. E. Stanley's *Raw Materials in War and Peace* (1937) discusses the effects of unequal distribution. *The World Economic Crisis*, by Sir Arthur Salzer and others (1932), is a discussion of the great depression. Margaret S. Gordon's *Barriers to World Trade* (1941) discusses the question of tariffs. H. Liepmann's *Tariff Levels and the Economic Unity of Europe* (1938) is a careful study. On the Treaty of Versailles there is Paul Birdsall's excellent *Versailles Twenty Years After* (1941).

International relations. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy's *Short History of International Affairs* (1938) is a good survey. Count Carlo Sforza's *Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Treaty of Versailles* (1928) is a picture as seen by an Italian statesman. A. C. Coolidge's *Ten Years of War and Peace* (1927) and F. Alexander's *From Paris to Locarno* (1928) survey the years immediately after Versailles. W. E. Rappard's *The Quest for Peace* (1940) is an important contribution by a student of international affairs. Frederick L. Schumann's *Europe on the Eve: The Crises of Diplomacy, 1933-1939* (1939) is a spirited analysis. Bernadotte E. Schmitt's *From Versailles to Munich* (1938) is a brief, lucid treatment. Two other revealing accounts are C. Golding's *From Versailles to Danzig* (1941) and M. Foote's *Armistice, 1919-1939* (1940). Sumner Welles' *The Time for Decision* (1944) presents the first-hand knowledge and experience of an American diplomat. Arnold Wolfers' *Britain and France Between Two Wars; Conflicting Strategies of Peace since Versailles* (1940) is a work of careful scholarly research and high literary excellence.

Britain. R. W. Seton-Watson's *Britain and the Dictators* (1938) is a good analysis. Paul Einzig's *Appeasement Before, During and After the War* (1942) is one of the best accounts in English. In this connection the student must not overlook Neville Chamberlain's *In Search of Peace* (1939), a collection of speeches. Winston Churchill's *While England Slept* (1938) and *Step by Step, 1936-1939* (1938) vigorously attack the policy of appeasement. The foreign relations of Britain are competently and comprehensively surveyed in Edward H. Carr's *Great Britain: A Study of Foreign Policy from the Versailles Treaty to the Outbreak of War* (1939) and W. M. Medlicott's *British Foreign Policy since Versailles* (1940). C. Scarfoglio's *England and the Continent* (1939) is critical of British foreign policy. An excellent account of British foreign policy is to be found in G. P. Gooch's *Studies in Diplomacy and Statecraft* (1942). John F. Kennedy's *Why England Slept* (1940) shows how and why Britain slept while Germany whetted her sword.

Nazi Germany. Peter de Mendelssohn's *Design for Aggression: The Inside Story of Hitler's War Plans* (1946) reveals the inside story of Hitler's war plans on the basis of newly discovered documents. Karl Loewenstein's *Hitler's Germany: The Nazi Background to War* (rev. ed., 1944) shows how the Nazi government was a war government from its inception. Gerhard Thomée's *Der Wiederaufstieg des Deutschen Heeres, 1918-1938* (1939) tells the story of the rebuilding of the German army in preparation for war. *Ambassador Dodd's Diary, 1933-1938* (1941), edited by William E. Dodd and Martha Dodd, contains not a few tart and juicy comments on prominent Nazis. Otto D. Fraser's *Germany Between Two Wars: A Study of Propaganda and War-Guilt* (1945) shows how Germany sabotaged the Peace of Versailles and prepared for the next war. Margaret M. Ball's *Post-War German-Austrian Relations, 1918-1936* (1937) is a careful account of the

historical development of the *Anschluss* movement. For a more detailed account of the *Anschluss* the student may consult Oswald Dutch's *Thus Died Austria* (1938), G. E. R. Gedy's *Betrayal in Central Europe* (1939), or Martin Fuchs' *Showdown in Vienna: The Death of Austria* (1938). Gerhard Schacher's *Germany Pushes South-East* (1938) tells one phase of the *Drang nach Osten* story.

General accounts of the causes. C. Grove Haines and Ross J. S. Hoffman's *The Origins and Background of the Second World War* (1943) is a work of mature historical scholarship. Dwight E. Lee's *Ten Years: The World on Its Way to War, 1930-1940* (1942) is a first-rate survey of the decade before the war. Walter Millis' *Why Europe Fights* (1940) is a broad interpretation by an American writer of the factors which made for war. *The Deeper Causes of the War and Its Issues*, edited by Sydney E. Hooper (1940), is a discussion of the causes by a group of British writers. Another work by a group of Englishmen is *The Background and Issues of the War*, by G. Murray and others (1940). Frederick T. Birchall's *The Storm breaks: A Panorama of Europe and the Forces that Have Wrecked its Peace* (1940) is a picture of Europe on the eve of World War II, by a correspondent. J. Mackintosh's *The Paths That Led to War* (1940) is an analysis by a British author. Kurt London's *Backgrounds of Conflict* (1945) is designed to give the student a grasp of the basic ideas dominant in world politics at the time the war broke out.

Munich. Vera M. Dean's *Europe in Retreat* (1939) provides an interesting background of the Munich crisis. There are also good accounts in Hamilton F. Armstrong's *When There Is No Peace* (1939) and R. W. Seton-Watson's *Munich and the Dictators* (1939). Alexander Werth's *France and Munich: Before and After Surrender* (1939) recounts the rise and decline of appeasement in France. R. W. Seton-Watson's *From Munich to Danzig* (1939), which is a revision of his *Munich and the Dictators*, tells how Czechoslovakia was finally dismembered. Maurice Hindus' *We Shall Live Again* (1939) is an eye-witness story of the German occupation. Another vivid account is V. Beneš and R. Ginsburg's *Ten Million Prisoners* (1940). Felix J. Vondráček's *The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia, 1918-1935* (1937) is a scholarly account of the diplomatic background. Kamil Krofta's *Germany and Czechoslovakia* (2 vols., 1937) is a competent scholarly study of the relations between the two countries.

After Munich. G. Hutton's *Survey After Munich* (1939) is a clear, well-organized discussion. Frederick L. Schumann's *Europe on the Eve: The Crises of Diplomacy, 1933-1939* (1939) is a detailed record of the events preceding the outbreak of war. Most of the nations involved in the war have published pertinent documents. The principal publications are: *British War Blue Book* (1939), *The French Yellow Book* (1940), *The German White Book* (1940), *The Polish Official Documents Concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations, 1933-1939* (1940), and *The Finnish Blue Book* (1940). Raymond Swing's *How War Came* (1939) is a news analyst's interpretation of the events that led to the outbreak of hostilities. Neville Henderson's *Failure of a Mission: Berlin, 1937-1939* (1940) contains the observations of the last British ambassador before the war.

CHAPTERS 18, 19, 20. *World War II*

General. *The Background of Our War*, by the Bureau of Public Relations of the United States War Department (1942), written by Colonel Herman Beukema and others, is an excellent brief survey of the early period of the war. J. H. Varwell's *The War up to Date* (1942) is a brief account by a British author. For a brief survey of the entire war the student may consult *The Pocket History of the Second World War* (1945), edited by Henry Steele Commager. Roger W. Shugg and Major H. A. De Weerd's *World War II: A Concise History* (1946) is a sound survey devoted largely to military affairs. A more detailed survey may be found in Francis T. Miller's *History of World War II* (1945). Edgar McInnis' *The War* (5 vols., 1940-1947) coordinates a bewildering amount of material in a sound, readable account. Adrian van Sinderen's *The Story of the Six Years of Global War* (1946) is a chronicle of the war by months through the surrender of Japan. Walter P. Hall's *Iron Out of Calvary: An Interpretative History of the Second World War* (1946) offers an emphatic interpretation of events. Waverly L. Root's *The Secret History of the War* (3 vols., 1945-1946) purports to reveal little-known actions, diplomatic transactions, and personalities; informative but not always sound. For a photographic record of action in all theaters the student may consult *Pictorial History of the Second World War* (2 vols., 1944). A more complete record of the war in pictures may be found in Walter Hutchinson's *Pictorial History of the War* (26 vols., 1939-1945). Rudolf Modley's *History of the War in Maps, in Pictographs, in Words* (rev. ed., 1944) is a useful volume. More inclusive is James F. Horrabin's *Atlas History of the Second Great War* (9 vols., 1941-1945).

Military background. For the military background of the war there is *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to Hitler* (1943), an authoritative group of essays edited by Edward M. Earle. Thomas H. Wintringham's *The Story of Weapon and Tactics: From Troy to Stalingrad* (1943) is a vivid though not always accurate survey. Two books by Harvey A. De Weerd portray the outstanding military leaders, *Great Soldiers of the Two World Wars* (1941) and *Great Soldiers of World War II* (1944). Brief sketches of United States generals may be found in *These Are the Generals* (1943), by a group of writers with a foreword by Walter Millis. Other informative volumes are Don Cook's *Fighting Americans of Today* (1944), Johannes Steel's *Men Behind the War* (1942), and Donald H. Stokes' *Men Behind Victory* (1944). A discussion of the German military leaders may be found in W. E. Hart's *Hitler's Generals* (1944). British leaders are portrayed in the *Leaders of Britain* series, which includes Edward K. Chatterton's *Leaders of the Royal Navy* (1940), Henry Karslake's *Leaders of the Army* (1940), and A. O. Pollard's *Leaders of the Royal Air Force* (1940). Max Werner (pseudonym for Aleksandr Shifrin) published three interesting books: *The Military Strength of the Powers* (1940), *The Battle for the World* (1941), and *The Great Offensive* (1942). Alfred H. Burne's *Strategy in World War II* (1947) is a brief analysis of land operations.

Early campaigns. F. O. Miksche's *Attack: A Study of Blitzkrieg Tactics* (1942) is an outstanding exposition by a military officer of the methods of warfare practised by the Germans. A somewhat briefer survey, though equally well informed, is to be found in W. E. Hart's *Landmarks of Modern Strategy* (1942). Other informative volumes are Major Paul C. Raborg's *Mechanized Might: The Story of Mechanized Warfare* (1944),

Paul W. Thompson's *Modern Battle* (1941), and H. Foertsch's *The Art of Modern Warfare* (1940). *The Axis Grand Strategy: Blueprints for the Total War*, compiled and edited by Ladislav Farago (1942), analyzes German military literature dealing with the aims, methods, and conduct of total war. How a Polish general foresaw the German attack on Poland and warned his countrymen is related in General Wladyslaw Sikorski's *Modern Warfare* (1944). Josef Hanč's *Tornado Across Europe; The Path of Nazi Destruction from Poland to Greece* (1942) is based on a thorough knowledge of the subject matter. Ann Su Cardwell's *Poland and Russia: The Last Quarter Century* (1944) traces Soviet-Polish relations from 1917 to 1943. Cedric Salter's *Flight from Poland* (1940) relates the experiences of a British correspondent. Simon Segal's *The New Order in Poland* (1942) is a picture of Poland under Nazi rule. On the Polish resistance movement there is Jan Karski's *Story of a Secret State* (1943). *The Black Book of Polish Jewry*, edited by Jacob Apenszlak (1944), shows how the Nazis tried to exterminate the Polish Jews. In Irena Oska's *Silent Is the Vistula* (1946) a Polish patriot describes her experiences during the tragic and futile Warsaw uprising of 1944.

John Langdon-Davies' *Invasion in the Snow* (1941) discusses the strategy and tactics of the Finnish war. There is a graphic eyewitness account of the Russian attack in H. B. Elliston's *Finland Fights* (1940). Hudson Strode's *Finland Forever* (1941) is based on the author's experiences during a visit to Finland. *The Finnish Blue Book*, issued by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (1940), traces the development of Finnish-Soviet relations and includes the official documents and the peace treaty of 1940. There is an interesting biography of *Field-Marshal Mannerheim*, who designed the Mannerheim Line, by Tancred Borenius (1940). Halvdan Koht's *Norway: Neutral and Invaded* (1941) paints a picture of Norway's futile efforts to preserve her neutrality, by the former foreign minister of Norway. Carl J. Hambro's *I Saw It Happen in Norway* (1940) is a vivid eyewitness account. *Norway and the War: September, 1939–December, 1940* (1941), edited by Monica Curtis, is a collection of documents on the invasion of Norway. J. S. Worm-Müller's *Norway Revolts Against the Nazis* (1942) offers an account of the first nine months of German occupation. A similar book on Denmark is Paul Paulmer's *Denmark in Nazi Chains* (1942). The invasion of Holland is aptly described in Elco N. van Kleffen's *Juggernaut over Holland* (1941). L. de Jong and W. F. Stoppleman's *The Lion Rampant: The Story of Holland's Resistance to the Nazis* (1943) is a revealing book. On the Belgian campaign there is *The Official Account of What Happened, 1939–1940* (1942), by the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is also a brief account by a group of writers entitled *The Belgian Army* (1940), published by the Belgian-American Educational Foundation. On the Belgian resistance to the Nazis there are two graphic books: Lars Moéns' *Under the Iron Heel* (1941) and Jan-Albert Garis' *Belgium in Bondage* (1944). A. D. Divine's *Dunkirk* (1945) tells the story of the withdrawal. Douglas Williams' *Retreat from Dunkirk* (1941) contains ten short narrative sketches by British soldiers who participated in the withdrawal.

The Fall of France. There are many books which try to explain the causes of the French collapse. Among the more notable are André Maurois' *Why France Fell*, translated from the French by Denver Lindley (1941), Alexander Werth's *The Twilight of France, 1933–1940* (1942), and Elie J. Bois' *Truth on the Tragedy of France* (1941). Albert L. Guérard's *The France of Tomorrow* (1942) offers an historian's diagnosis of

the causes of the French collapse. Daniel Vifroy's *War in the West: The Battle of France, May-June, 1940* (1942) is an enlightening brief description of the French débâcle. Pierre Mailland's *France* (1942) is perhaps the best and most compact appraisal of the factors making for the capitulation of June, 1940. *The Grave-Diggers of France* (Gamelin, Daladier, Reynaud, Pétain) by Pertinax (1943) is an indictment of the French leaders. Robert de Saint Jean's *France Speaking* (1941) is a French journalist's record of the French republic's fall. Heinz Pol's *The Suicide of Democracy* (1940) is a journalist's account of what happened and why. Alexander Werth's *The Last Days of Paris* (1940) is an interesting record. Hamilton F. Armstrong's *Chronology of Failure* (1940) is a factual account of the collapse. Stanton B. Leeds' *These Rule France* (1940) contains impressions of a number of French leaders. René de Chambrun's *I Saw France Fall* (1940) is a more or less legendary account by the son-in-law of Pierre Laval. Charles A. Micaud's *The French Right and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939; A Study of Public Opinion* (1943) is a useful and valuable contribution to the literature on the French crisis of 1940. For the Vichy regime Paul Tissier's *The Government of Vichy* (1942) is an excellent introduction. Janet Flanner's *Pétain: The Old Man of France* (1945) offers a brief incisive sketch, clearly and simply written. Henry Torres' *Pierre Laval* (1941) is a highly critical biography of the arch-appeaser of Germany. One phase of the resistance movement is discussed in George R. Millar's *Maquis* (1945). Noteworthy also is Fred L. Hadsel's "Some Sources on the Resistance Movement in France During the Nazi Occupation," *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 18 (1946), pp. 333-340. Raoul Aglion's *The Fighting French* (1943) gives an account of the Free French movement from its birth in June, 1940, to the invasion of North Africa in November, 1942. Philip Barrès' *Charles de Gaulle* (1941) presents a somewhat superficial sketch of the general and his associates. Irving M. Gibson's "The Maginot Line," *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 7 (1945), is an interesting short study of the line which the French believed insured their safety against invasion.

Italy's entrance. Reynolds and Eleanor Packard's *Balcony Empire* (1942) and Richard G. Massock's *Italy from Within* (1943) are the work of veteran correspondents who remained in Italy until Mussolini declared war on the United States. *Twilight of the Gladiators* (1944), by Frank Heller (pseudonym of Gunnar Serner), recapitulates events in Italy from 1939 to 1943. *The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943*, by Count Ciano, edited by Hugh Gibson (1946), contain invaluable information about Italy and Mussolini.

The Battle of Britain. *The Battle of Britain: An Air Ministry Record of the Great Days from August 8th to October 31st, 1940*, by H. A. Saunders (1941), is the official account of the British Air Ministry. On the Royal Air Force there are two informative books: *The Royal Air Force at War*, edited by William Buchan (4th rev. ed., 1940), and *The Sky's the Limit; A Study of British Air Power*, by James M. Spaight (1940). Hector Bolitho's *Combat Report; The Story of a Fighter Pilot* (1943) is an interesting record. Allan Nevins' *This Is England Today* (1941) is an American's readable account of the reorganization in economic, political, and cultural life caused by wartime conditions. René Kraus' *The Men Around Churchill* (1941) is an interesting discussion of British leaders. The same author has also written a sympathetic biography of the British prime minister entitled *Winston Churchill* (1940). Philip Guedalla's *Mr. Churchill* (1942) is a biography by a brilliant British writer. *The Lives of*

Winston Churchill (1945), by Charles Davenport and Charles J. V. Murphy, is a brief anecdotal biography devoted largely to the war years. Two books by Mr. Churchill himself on this period are *Blood, Sweat and Tears* (1941) and *The Unrelenting Struggle* (1942). *The British Commonwealth at War* (1943), edited by W. Y. Elliott and H. Duncan Hall, is a symposium on the empire's role in the war. W. E. Murphy's *The British War Economy, 1939-1943* (1943) is an informative study.

War at sea. On the war at sea there is a monumental fourteen-volume history in preparation, edited by Samuel E. Morison. Volume 2, entitled *Operations in North African Waters, October 1942-June 1943*, was published early in 1947. Volume 1, which bears the title, *The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939-1943*, is scheduled for publication late in 1947. The Atlantic war is also treated in Volume 2 of *Battle Report*, prepared from official naval sources by Commander Walter Karig and others (1946). Captain W. D. Puleston's *The Influence of Sea Power in World War II* (1947) assesses sea power in the light of new weapons. Another revealing account is Bernard Brodie's *Seapower in the Machine Age* (1943). A. M. Low's *The Submarine at War* (1942) and Herbert S. Zim's *Submarines* (1942) are two general discussions of submarine warfare. Warren Armstrong's *Battle of the Oceans* (1941) is an account of the British merchant marine in World War II. Ivor Halstead's *Heroes of the Atlantic* (1942) offers a description of the activities of British seamen during the early part of the war.

Air war in Europe. *Target Germany* (1943) is the official story of the Eighth Bomber Command's first year over Europe. Allan A. Michie's *The Air Offensive Against Germany* (1943) is a plea to substitute night bombing for the daytime "precision" bombing. *Air Force Diary*, edited by James H. Straubel (1947), is a terse, first-hand account of the vital part played by the United States Air Force. The air fighting during the early part of the war is surveyed in David Garnett's *War in the Air, September, 1939-May, 1941* (1941). Keith Ayling's *Bombers* (1941) and Charles G. Grey's *Bombers* (1942) describe the chief characteristics of the principal types of American and British bombers. Eric Friedheim's *Fighters Up* (1945) tells the story of American fighter pilots in the battle of Europe. Asher Lee's *The German Air Force* (1946) is a critical history of the *Luftwaffe*. Hauptmann Hermann's *The Luftwaffe: Its Rise and Fall* (1943) is an account of the growth and development of the German aircraft industry. Ferdinand O. Miksche's *Paratroops* (1943) discusses the part of air-borne troops in modern warfare. James M. Spaight's *Blockade by Air* (1942) is an account of the campaign against Axis shipping.

Greece and the Balkans. Stephen Lavra's *The Greek Miracle* (1943) is a study of the political and diplomatic background of the invasion of Greece. Stanley Casson's *Greece Against the Axis* (1943) gives a general outline of the campaign in Greece. Betty Wason's *Miracle in Hellas: The Greeks Fight On* (1943) describes conditions in Greece under Axis occupation. *Italy's Aggression Against Greece* (1940) and *The Greek White Book* (1942) contain the official documents published by the Greek government. David Martin's *Ally Betrayed: The Uncensored Story of Tito and Mihailovich* (1946) is an attempt to explain the situation in Yugoslavia. Michael Padev's *Marshal Tito* (1944) is a good biography by a Bulgarian journalist. Ruth Mitchell's *The Serbs Choose War* (1943) relates the author's experiences in Albania and Yugoslavia. Howard M. Coffin's *Malta Story* (1943) is a record of the experiences of an American pilot who joined the RAF. Major General Sir Francis De Guingand's *Operation Victory* (1947) is a defense

of General Montgomery's tactics. There is also a good biography of Montgomery by Alan Moorehead (1946).

Invasion of Russia. Among the various books on the Russian army Walter Kerr's *The Russian Army: Its Men, Its Leaders and Its Battles* (1944) is outstanding for its objectivity and readability. Other informative books on the Russian army are: I. Minz' *The Red Army* (1943), D. Fedotoff White's *The Growth of the Red Army* (1944), Sergi N. Kournakoff's *Russia's Fighting Forces* (1942), Michel Berchin and E. Ben-Horin's *The Red Army* (1942), Alexander Poliakov's *Russians Don't Surrender* (1942), and Nikolaus Basseches' *The Unknown Army* (1943). John Scott's *Duel for Europe* (1942) tells how Hitler and Stalin came to blows. David J. Dallin's *Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy* (1943) is a careful and thorough account. Alexander Werth has written two interesting books on the fighting in Russia: *Moscow War Diary* (1942) and *The Year of Stalingrad* (1947). William H. Chamberlin's *The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation* (1944), W. E. D. Allen's *The Ukraine: A History* (1940), and Michael Hrushevsky's *A History of the Ukraine*, edited by O. J. Frederiksen (1941), are good accounts of the Ukraine. On the relations between the Soviet Union and Japan, Maurice Hindus has written a book under the title *Russia and Japan* (1942). Two stirring pictures of the Russian war are to be found in Boris Voyetekhov's *The Last Days of Sevastopol* (1943) and Boris Skomorovsky and E. G. Morris' *The Siege of Leningrad* (1944).

Inside Germany. William L. Shirer's *Berlin Diary, 1934-1941* (1942) is an informal but penetrating record of the way the war affected the German people. Harry W. Flannery's *Assignment to Berlin* (1942) carries on from where the "Berlin Diary" leaves off. Howard K. Smith's *The Last Train from Berlin* (1942) makes clear what it was like to live in Germany. Max Seydewitz's *Civil Life in Wartime Germany* (1945) describes the experiences of the German people and attempts to defend them against the charge of willingly supporting the Nazi rule. Joseph C. Harsh's *Germany at War* (1942) and Wallace Deuel's *People under Hitler* (1942) contain interesting revelations of life in wartime Germany. One of the best books on the Third Reich at war is *This Is the Enemy*, by F. C. Oechsner and other correspondents (1942). *The Von Hassell Diaries, 1938-1944*, by Ulrich von Hassell (1947), is a valuable and informing record kept by a member of the underground. Other good accounts of the German underground in the war years are Allen W. Dulles' *Germany's Underground* (1947); F. von Schlabrendorff's *They Almost Killed Hitler*, edited by Gero V. S. Gaevernitz (1947); and Ruth Andreas-Friedrich's *Berlin Underground* (1947). *Pens Under the Swastika*, by William W. Schuetz (1946), is an analysis of recent German writing.

United States and the war. An excellent series of essays on various phases of United States foreign policy are to be found in *The United States and Its Place in World Affairs, 1918-1943* (1943), edited by Allan Nevins and Louis M. Hacker. Denys Smith's *America and the Axis War* (1942) is a smoothly running account of United States foreign policy during the two decades before the war. One of the best records of United States policy before Pearl Harbor is Forrest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley's *How War Came* (1942). A brief official summary may be found in *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941* (1943), issued by the United States Department of State. Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner's *American White Paper* (1940) offers a summary of the United States policies before 1940. George Morgenstern's *Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret*

War (1947) presents a bitter and highly biased view; charges that Roosevelt plotted to get the United States into the war. Walter Millis' *This Is Pearl! The United States and Japan—1941* (1947) contains much new material on the period before Pearl Harbor. S. K. Hornbeck's *The United States and the Far East: Certain Fundamentals of Policy* (1942) is an authoritative discussion. W. C. Johnstone's *The United States and Japan's New Order* (1941) is an exposition of Japanese aims. An excellent summary may be found in *The United States at War* (1947) prepared under the auspices of the Committee of Records of War Administration. Francis L. Bacon's *The War and America* (1942) is a good brief summary. Francis T. Miller's *Eisenhower, Man and Soldier* (1944) contains much human interest material but no real evaluation of the soldier. The same author has also written a brief popular biography under the title *General Douglas MacArthur, Fighter for Freedom* (1942). *Yank—The GI Story of the War* by the staff of *Yank*, the army weekly (1947), is a grim record in photography and prose. John R. Deane's *The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Cooperation with Russia* (1947) is a semiofficial account of our not always successful efforts to cooperate with the Soviet Union. De Witt Mackenzie's *Men Without Arms* (1946) tells the story of the United States Medical Department in World War II. On lend-lease there is *Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory* by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. (1944), a volume packed with information.

Japan. Hugh Byas' *The Japanese Enemy: His Power and His Vulnerability* (1942) is an excellent brief survey. Carl Crow's *Japan's Dream of World Empire* (1942) outlines the Japanese plan of conquest on the basis of the Tanaka Memorial. John Goette's *Japan Fights for Asia* (1943) gives the inside story of Japan's attempt to dominate the Far East. Kate L. Mitchell's *Japan's Industrial Strength* (1942) gives an outline of Japan's industrial development during the preceding decade. *Japan: Its Resources and Industries*, by Clayton D. Carus and Charles L. McNichols (1944), is an excellent compilation of factual information. How Japan coiled to strike is related 'in Otto D. Tolischus' *Tokyo Record* (1943). The same author's *Through Japanese Eyes* (1945) lets the Japanese speak for themselves regarding their aims, plans, and ideas. Willard Price's *Japan Rides the Tiger* (1942) presents a close-up view of the Japanese and their country. John F. Embree's *The Japanese Nation*, (1945) is primarily a study of the Japanese social organization. Hillis Lory's *Japan's Military Masters* (1943) discusses the organization, psychology, and training of the Japanese army. Edwin A. Falk's *From Perry to Pearl Harbor* (1943) outlines the story of the rise of the Japanese navy. Mark J. Gayn's *The Fight for the Pacific* (1941) is a competent survey. Joseph C. Grew's *Ten Years in Japan* (1944) is the interesting diary of the United States Ambassador to Japan. Hubertus J. van Mook's *The Netherlands Indies and Japan: Battle on Paper, 1940-1941* (1944) is a concrete account of Japanese machinations, by the Netherlands Minister for the Colonies.

China. Lawrence K. Rosinger's *China's Wartime Politics, 1937-1944* (1944) is a brief but clear and well-balanced narrative. Edgar Snow's *The Battle of Asia* (1941) is a terse, authentic report of the Japanese terror in China. David N. Rowe's *China Among the Powers* (1945) presents an interesting summary of China's position. Harold S. Quigley's *The Far Eastern War, 1937-1941* (1942) is a comprehensive account of the struggle up to the time the United States became involved. Carl Crow's *China Takes*

Her Place (1944) is an informally written survey of Chinese politics from 1911 to 1944. Mme. Mei-ling Chiang's *China Shall Rise Again* (1941) is a discussion of China's plight by the wife of Chiang Kai-shek.

Pacific area. *Government and Nationalism in South-East Asia*, by Rupert Emerson and others (1942), is an excellent brief survey of the problems arising from the war in the Far East. Roger Levy's *French Interests and Policies in the Far East* (1942) is a good survey of the French Far Eastern relations. Lenox A. Mills' *British Rule in Eastern Asia* (1942) is a valuable study of British colonial administration in Malaya and Hong Kong. Bruno Lasker's *Peoples of South East Asia* (1943) contains much interesting information. John L. Christian's *Modern Burma* (1942) surveys the political and economic development of modern Burma. Sir Richard Winstedt's *Britain and Malaya* (1945) is a good brief discussion. Robert T. Oliver's *Korea: Forgotten Nation* (1944), Andrew J. Grajdanzev's *Modern Korea* (1944), and M. Frederick Nelson's *Korea and the Old Order in Eastern Asia* (1945) are good accounts.

The United States in the Pacific. Frank O. Hough's *The Island War: The United States Marine Corps in the Pacific* (1947) tells the story of the fighting from one grim island to another. *Semper Fidelis: The U. S. Marines in the Pacific, 1942-1945*, by U.S.M.C. combat correspondents, edited by Captain Patrick O'Sheel and Staff Sergeant Gene Cook (1947), is a vivid account by men who were eyewitnesses of the fighting. Keith Ayling's *Semper Fidelis: The U. S. Marines in Action* (1943) presents a description of Marine exploits in Guadalcanal, Wake, and Midway. *Betio Beachhead: The U. S. Marines' Own Story of the Battle for Tarawa*, by Marine combat correspondents with a summary by Lieutenant-General A. A. Vandegrift (1945), tells the story of the first seaborne assault on a defended atoll. Laura Thompson's *Guam and Its People* (1947) is interesting descriptive writing. D. N. Leff's *Uncle Sam's Pacific Islets* (1940) is a brief survey. Richard Tregaskis' *Guadalcanal Diary* (1943) is an unforgettable record of the Pacific war.

Philippines. Joseph R. Hayden's *The Philippines: A Study in National Development* (1942) is a solid, detailed, and factual presentation of the political situation in 1941. *I Saw the Fall of the Philippines* by Carlos P. Romulo (1942) is an excellent piece of reporting on the fighting. William L. White's *They Were Expendable* (1942) is a chronicle of Bataan. Juanita Redmond's *I Served on Bataan* (1943) is a simple story of the nurses' heroic part in the Manila war. *The Dyess Story*, by William E. Dyess (1944), is an eyewitness account of the death march from Bataan and a narrative of experiences in Japanese prison camps. John Hersey's *Men on Bataan* (1943) is one of the first full accounts of the fighting on Bataan. *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, by Allison Ind (1944), is one of the most complete records of the Philippine campaign. *General Wainwright's Story*, by Jonathan M. Wainwright (1946), is, as the subtitle states, "the account of four years of humiliating defeat, surrender, and captivity."

Sea and air war in the Pacific. Three books by Gilbert Cant cover American naval action in the Pacific: *The War at Sea* (1942), *America's Navy in World War II* (1943), and *The Great Pacific Victory: From the Solomons to Tokyo* (1946). Fletcher Pratt's *The Navy's War* (1944) is a factual account of the major engagements of the United States Navy to 1944. Another interesting book is Oliver Jensen's *Carrier War* (1945). C. Vann Woodward's *The Battle for Leyte Gulf* (1947) is an authentic account of the

greatest naval battle of the war. *Admiral Halsey's Story*, by William F. Halsey and J. Bryan, 3rd (1917), covers the period from Guadalcanal to Tokyo. Richard G. Hubler's *Flying Leathernecks* (1944) surveys the Pacific war during the years 1941 to 1944 from the viewpoint of the Marine Air Corps. *The Brereton Diaries*, by Lewis H. Brereton (1946), is the personal record of General Brereton in the air war of the Pacific, the Middle East, and Europe. *Mission Beyond Darkness*, by Joseph Bryan and Philip Reed (1945), is a thrilling account of an attack on a Japanese fleet by an air group from the U.S.S. *Lexington*. *The Flying Guns: Cockpit Record of a Naval Pilot from Pearl Harbor to Midway*, by Clarence E. Dickinson and Boyden Sparkes (1942), relates the experiences of an American naval pilot during the first six months of the Pacific war.

The end of the war in Europe. Richard Tregaskis' *Invasion Diary* (1944) is an unadorned account by a soldier who participated in the invasion of Italy. *Invasion*, by Charles C. Wertenbaker (1944), tells the story of D-Day and after in words and pictures. Colonel Robert S. Allen's *Lucky Forward* (1917) relates the story of General Patton's Third United States Army. *Dark December: The Full Account of the Battle of the Bulge*, by Robert E. Merriam (1947), gives a factual account of the famous battle. Leo Heaps' *Escape from Arnheim* (1945) records the personal experiences of a paratrooper. H. R. Trevor-Roper's *The Last Days of Hitler* (1917) develops the idea that Adolf shot himself while Eva gulped poison.

The end of the war in Japan. Ted W. Lawson's *Thirty Seconds Over Tokio* (1943) is the personal narrative of one of the pilots who bombed Tokyo on the Doolittle raid. *The Lost War*, by Masuo Kato (1946), is a Japanese reporter's story of the events leading to the defeat of Japan. John W. Campbell's *The Atomic Story* (1917) is a primer of the atom. Two other simply written introductory volumes are Selig Hecht's *Explaining the Atom* (1947) and O. R. Frisch's *Meet the Atoms* (1947). *One World or None: A Report to the Public on the Full Meaning of the Atomic Bomb*, edited by Dexter Masters and Katherine Way (1946), is the story of the atom bomb versus the human race.

Miscellaneous. Raphael Lemkin's *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (1944) is a scholarly study of the laws of occupation in occupied Europe. *The Hidden Weapon: A Story of Economic Warfare*, by David L. Gordon and Royden Dangerfield (1917), presents a panoramic view of economic warfare in World War II. David Rousset's *The Other Kingdom* (1947) is a revealing book on concentration camps. Kurt D. Singer's *Spies and Traitors of World War II* (1945) contains stories of spies of all types the world over. Richard W. Rowan's *Terror in Our Time* (1911) gives a detailed account of the sensational methods developed by secret agents in the underground combat of modern times. *Total Espionage* by Curt Riess (1941) tells how the enormous espionage organization of the Third Reich was started. Interesting books on the Fifth Column and espionage in the United States include *Sabotage: The Secret War Against America*, by Michael Sayres and Albert E. Kahn (1912), Alan Hynd's *Passport to Treason* (1943) and *Betrayal from the East* (1913), and Roy Carlson's (pseudonym of Arthur Derou-nian) *Under Cover* (1943). *Medicine and the War*, edited by William H. Taliaferro (1944), is an enlightening study.

CHAPTER 21. *The Postwar World*

On the peace problems. In C. J. Hambro's *How to Win the Peace* (1942) the president of the Norwegian parliament outlines his plan for peace. *The Problems of Lasting Peace*, by Herbert C. Hoover and Hugh Gibson (1942), reviews the peace treaties of the world from Rome to Versailles with some interesting conclusions. The same authors have published another brief study, *The Basis of Lasting Peace* (1945), which advances a number of proposals for the establishment of permanent peace. Emery Reves' *Anatomy of Peace* (1945) presents an argument for a world government with power to establish a system of universal law. *Problems of the Post-War World* (1945), edited by T. C. McCormick, is a symposium on postwar problems by members of the University of Wisconsin faculty. Robert M. MacIver's *Towards an Abiding Peace* (1943) sets up a specific framework for an international order. *An Intelligent American's Guide to the Peace*, edited by Sumner Welles (1945), offers brief discussions of the geography and economics of every independent nation and the factors determining its part in the postwar world. André Visson's *The Coming Struggle for Peace* (1944) analyzes many of the problems involved in making peace. Dexter Perkins' *America and Two Wars* (1944) asks Americans not to retreat into "isolationism." Hans Kelsen's *Peace Through Law* (1944) and Henry M. Wriston's *Strategy of Peace* (1945) endeavor to set up guideposts on the tortuous road to peace. James T. Shotwell's *The Great Decision* (1944) is an important book on the problem of control in international affairs.

Forging the peace. *The Four Cornerstones of Peace*, by Vera M. Dean (1946), discusses the Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, Mexico City, San Francisco, and Potsdam conferences. David J. Dallin's *The Big Three: The United States, Britain and Russia* (1945) is a well-organized summary of the interests and policies of the Big Three. *Dumbarton Oaks*, compiled by Robert E. Summers (1945), contains a comprehensive collection of articles discussing all phases of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. James F. Byrnes' *Speaking Frankly* (1947) is the first account by a major participant in the great and fateful conferences near the close of and after the war.

The United Nations. Manley O. Hudson's *International Tribunals, Past and Future* (1945) summarizes past experiences and applies them to immediate problems. Norman D. Bentwich's *From Geneva to San Francisco* (1946) tells how the new international organization was set up. A copy of the United Nations charter may be obtained by sending ten cents to the American Association for the United Nations, 45 East 65 Street, New York City. J. Eugene Harley's *Documentary Textbook on the United Nations* (1947) is a thorough, skilfully edited work, "bright with crystallizing passages of famous speeches, historic events, and shrewd observations." *Peace, Security, and the United Nations*, edited by Hans J. Morgenthau (1946), is a series of lectures on the United Nations. Louis Dolivet's *The United Nations: A Handbook on the New World Organization* (1946) is an objective study of the structure, power, aims, and limitations of the new organization. Other informing volumes are Ernest M. Patterson's *Making the United Nations Work* (1946), William G. Carr's *One World in the Making: The United Nations* (1946), and Andrew K. Boyd's *The United Nations Organization Handbook* (1946).

Postwar Europe. *Continent in Limbo*, by Edith Sulkin (1947), is a first-hand report on postwar Europe. William H. Chamberlin's *The European Cockpit* (1947) records the author's impressions of Europe in the summer and early fall of 1946. Karl Loewenstein's *Political Reconstruction* (1947) offers proposals for the political reconstruction of Europe. *Government and Politics Abroad*, edited by Joseph S. Roucek (1947), is a political survey of contemporary Europe by a group of writers. For events of 1945 and succeeding years the student may consult *The Associated Press News Annual*, edited by Russell Landstrom, vol. 1 (1946). For 1945 there is *It Happened in 1945*, edited by Clark Kinnaird (1946). There is a treasure trove of material in *Voices of History, 1945-46*, edited by Nathan Ausubel (1946), which includes state papers and important speeches by leading figures. *The Netherlands in a Changing World*, by Bart Landheer (1947), is a discussion of postwar conditions. Edgar Bonjour's *Swiss Neutrality: Its History and Meaning* (1947) is an interesting study.

Germany. *Report on Germany*, by William L. White (1947), considers the German mind since 1939. Lewis H. Brown's *Report on Germany* (1947) is a study of western Germany's postwar industrial potentials. *American Military Government in Germany*, by Harold Zink (1947), is a thoughtful and scholarly work. Hajo Holborn's *American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies* (1947) is a general discussion of military government, with chapters on Germany and Austria. *Germany Under Occupation*, by James K. Pollock and James H. Meisel (1947), is an interesting collection of documents. William L. Shirer's *End of a Berlin Diary* (1947) is a report on postwar conditions in Germany. *Germany: Bridge or Battleground*, by James P. Warburg (1947), surveys the state of affairs in Germany. Russell Hill's *Struggle for Germany* (1947) sees Germany as the world's problem child. *German Youth: Bond or Free*, by Howard Becker (1947), discusses the problem of German youth in its wide social and political ramifications. *The Nürnberg Case*, as presented by Robert H. Jackson (1947), chief of counsel for the United States, gives the high points of the unique war criminals trials. Victor H. Bernstein's *Final Judgment: The Story of Nuremberg* (1947) is a distillation of the evidence offered at the Nürnberg trials. *Nuremberg Diary*, by G. M. Gilbert (1947), is a prison psychologist's account of the last days of the condemned Nazi leaders.

Britain and France. *International Implications of Full Employment in Great Britain*, by Allan G. B. Fisher (1947), is an effort to discover what international economic system will best serve the interests of Great Britain. *The British General Election of 1945*, by R. B. McCallum and Alison Readman (1947), offers an analysis of its progress and procedure. *Post-War Britain*, edited by Sir James Marchant (1945), is a discussion of postwar problems by a group of writers. In George H. Soule's *America's Stake in Britain's Future* (1945) an economist discusses the social, political, and economic relationships between Britain and the United States. *Rival Partners: America and Britain in the Post-War World*, by Keith Hutchinson (1946), is a discussion of the economic and commercial policies of the two countries as they affect each other. Helen D. Miller's *France: Crossroads of a Continent* (1944) is a brief survey in the Foreign Policy Headline Series. *France Between the Republics*, by Dorothy M. Pickles (1946), is an interesting discussion of the political groups in France after its liberation from Nazi occupation.

Spain and Italy. *Appeasement's Child*, by Thomas J. Hamilton (1943), gives an account of what happened in Spain after the civil war. Cedric Salter's *Try-Out in Spain* (1943) is a personal narrative of the author's experiences. *Smouldering Freedom*, by Isabel de Palencia (1915), tells the story of the Spanish Republicans in exile. Sir Samuel Hoare's *Complacent Dictator* (1947) relates his experiences as wartime ambassador to Franco. *Report from Spain*, by Emmet J. Hughes (1917), presents a dark picture of Franco and his Spain. *Franco's Black Spain*, by Luis Quintanilla (1946), is a volume of sketches with a brief commentary on scenes and incidents of the civil war and its aftermath. *The New Italy*, by Muriel Grindrod (1947), discusses the transition from war to peace; sound and clearly written. Count Carlo Sforza's *Contemporary Italy* (1944) offers a discussion of the Italian problem.

Russia and eastern Europe. *Russia's Post-War Economy*, by Harry Schwartz (1947), is a brief survey. Edmund Stevens' *Russia Is No Riddle* (1945) throws light on Russia at war and afterward. Edgar Snow's *The Pattern of Soviet Power* (1946) is a journalist's attempt to explain and justify Soviet expansion. *Russia: Menace or Promise*, by Vera M. Dean (1947), discusses the question whether Soviet communism and American capitalism can coexist and peacefully share the world. Christopher Norborg's *Operation Moscow* (1947) lays down the necessary conditions for the achievement of an agreement with Russia. *Russia on the Way*, by Harrison Salisbury (1916), reports on conditions in Russia at the end of the war. Edgar Snow's *Stalin Must Have Peace* (1947) is a penetrating analysis of conditions in postwar Russia. In *The Bright Passage* (1947) Maurice Hindus gives a report on what is being planned and done in Czechoslovakia. *The Balkans: Frontier of Two Worlds*, by William E. King and Frank O'Brien (1947), surveys conditions in Yugoslavia, Albania, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. Oscar I. Janowsky's *Nationalities and National Minorities* (1946) analyzes the nationality problem in southeastern Europe. William H. McNeill's *The Greek Dilemma: War and Aftermath* (1947) charts the basic antagonisms behind the Greek civil war. *Red Star Over Poland: A Report from Behind the Iron Curtain*, by Edward S. Kerstein (1947), is a brief account by a reporter of Russian activities in Poland.

Revolt of Asia. Robert Payne's *The Revolt of Asia* (1947) analyzes the men and forces causing the upheaval in the East. Owen Lattimore's *Solution in Asia* (1945) offers some suggestions regarding a policy toward the Far Eastern countries. *No Peace for Asia*, by Harold R. Isaacs (1947), proposes a formula for pacifying Asia. Edmond Taylor's *Richer by Asia* (1947) presents an analysis of western imperialism and its effect upon the mind of Asia. *The Future of Freedom in the Orient*, by Ralph Coniston (1947), develops the idea that after the collapse of western imperialism the Asiatic natives will be ruled by oppressors from their midst. Nathaniel Pfeffer's *Basis for Peace in the Far East* (1942) discusses Asiatic conditions and makes definite recommendations for the founding of an enduring peace.

Palestine. Richard Crossman's *Palestine Mission: A Personal Record* (1947) and Bartley C. Crum's *Behind the Silken Curtain: A Personal Account of Anglo-American Diplomacy in Palestine and the Middle East* (1947) are frank discussions of the problem by two members of the Anglo-American Committee. *Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies*, published for the Esco Foundation for Palestine, Inc. (2 vols., 1947), is the work of a score of scholars and experts on the Palestine ques-

tion. Nevill Barbour's *Palestine: Star or Crescent?* (1947) records in brief compass the steps which have led to the tragic conditions in Palestine, with emphasis on Arab arguments. *Palestine: Land of Promise*, by Walter C. Lowdermilk (1944), describes the changes that have taken place in Jewish Palestine. Jakob Rosner's *Palestine Picture Book* (1947) is a plea for a Jewish Palestine. Ellen Thorbecke seeks to show in *Promised Land* (1947) that Jews have rights in Palestine based on achievement as well as on historical grounds.

India. Raleigh Parkin's *India Today: An Introduction to Indian Politics* (1946) presents in concise form the history of Indian politics in the twentieth century. *India: A Restatement*, by Sir Reginald Coupland (1946), offers a plan for the division of India into Hindu and Moslem spheres. Beverly Nichols' *Verdict on India* (1947) gives a fairly clear recital of events during the war years and after. *Caste in India: Its Nature, Function and Origins*, by J. H. Hutton (1947), is an excellent study written from the point of view of an anthropologist. Sumant K. Muranjan's *Economics of Post-War India* (1946) is an interesting brief survey. Louise Hagan's *Indian Route March* (1947) is a record of personal impressions of wartime India.

China. *China After Seven Years of War*, edited by Hollington K. Tong (1945), contains discussions of many phases of Chinese life during and after the war. David N. Rowe's *China Among the Powers* (1945) is an attempt to estimate China's potentialities as a great power in the postwar era. Harrison Forman's *Report from Red China* (1945) is a report on the communists' fight against the Japanese. Lin Yutang's *Vigil of a Nation* (1945) is a record of the author's experiences and impressions as a visitor to China. *Is China a Democracy?*, by Creighton Lacy (1943), answers the question in the affirmative. Israel Epstein's *The Unfinished Revolution in China* (1947) attempts to justify the policy of the Chinese communists. Robert Payne's *China Awake* (1947) is an eyewitness account of postwar conditions.

Japan. *Japan's Prospect*, edited by D. G. Haring (1946), is an extensive survey of modern and contemporary Japan by nine authors. Robert O. Ballou's *Shinto* (1945) is an examination of the state religion and its bearing on the future. *Star-Spangled Mikado*, by F. R. Kelley and C. Ryan (1947), is a colorful and informative report on the American occupation of Japan. Willard D. Price's *Key to Japan* (1946) is a series of interesting and revealing sketches of Japanese life. *Japan Past and Present*, by Edwin O. Reischauer (1947), offers a concise survey of Japanese history to April, 1946. A somewhat fuller account may be found in Kenneth Latourette's *History of Japan* (1947), which carries the story to February, 1946.

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